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ABSTRACT
In this thesis I respond to Miroisav Volfs proposal that in the eschaton painful 
memories will be forgotten in order not to detract from the joy of the New 
Creation. Through consideration of the constitution of personal identity and 
memory I will show that his proposal Is problematic if, in the New Creation, 
persons are to be continuous with themselves. In my chapter on forgiveness I 
show that that it is possible, through forgiveness, for people to come to 
remember even the most painful of experiences without experiencing pain 
anew, I will show that painful memories can be healed and transformed, and 
thus that eschatological forgetting is not necessary. I will argue in the final 
chapter that, just as in his resurrection body Christ bore scars of the crucifixion, 
so in the New Creation we too will bear scars from our earthly lives.
The main sources in the chapter on personal identity are John Macmurray, 
Alastair McFadyen and, to a lesser extent, Paul Ricoeur. The work of Gregory 
Jones is significant in chapters 2 and 3 (looking at memory and forgiveness 
respectively). In chapter 4 (New Creation) I have drawn on the work of Jürgen 
Moltmann as well as that of Bauckham and Hart.
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INTRODUCTION
Writing from his personal experience of the atrocities of war during the 
Balkan crisis in the early 1990s, together with his observation of the 
unimaginable horrors suffered by those around him, Miroslav Volf suggests 
that the experience of suffering of some people in this life is so horrendous 
and so all-embracing, that even in God’s New Creation, where according to 
the Christian eschatological imagination there will be no more suffering, the 
memory of having suffered will continue to cause suffering. Such continued 
suffering, he suggests, has the potential to diminish the joy and perfection of 
the New Creation. Volf, therefore, presents the thesis that victims will forget 
painful memories in God’s New World. Initially in considering this he refers to 
‘non-remembering’  ^ but as his discussion progresses he refers instead to 
‘eschatological forgetting’^ .
On a superficial level non-remembering and forgetting may appear to be 
synonymous. There are, however, subtle but important differences between 
the two that will be considered in chapter 2. Something that is forgotten is 
lost while that which is non-remembered has lost its power to inflict pain or 
damage. For Volf either the memory of horror is erased in the New Creation, 
or the joy of the New Creation is marred by the memory. “The alternative, ” 
he says, “is either heaven or the memory of horror.... For if heaven cannot 
rectify Auschwitz, then the memory of Auschwitz must undo the experience 
of heaven.’’^  This is unthinkable for it would mean that evil, or the memory of 
evil, was more powerful than the Christian God, the God is who sovereign 
over evil.
There is, of course, something attractive about Volf’s thesis. The thought of 
our most painful memories being permanently erased is surely appealing to 
most people, particularly to those who experience the most heinous suffering. 
Would not those who have undergone torture, or lived through the horrors of
 ^Volf, 1996: 132f
 ^Volf, 1996:140 
® Volf, 1996:136f (original emphasis)
war, or victims of terrorist attack, or indeed everyone who has known the pain 
of bereavement welcome the opportunity to forget — forever -  the memories 
that continue in this life to haunt them and cause untold, unrelenting suffering 
and grief?
I think not. Perhaps, at first glance, they would but such appeal may mask 
significant difficulties.
To begin with, our experience of good and bad, pleasure and pain are 
inextricably mixed up. To fully erase the memory of suffering would seem 
logically also to necessitate the erasure of some positive memories and of 
the people associated with these memories. Suppose, for example, that the 
painful memories of the parents whose child was murdered were erased. 
They would then be left with the new agonising question, “where is my 
child?”. Were they to forget their suffering but remember their child had been 
murdered they would surely begin to question themselves, asking what kind 
of heartless monster they must be to have experienced the murder of their 
child without suffering.
It seems, then, that the only way it is possible for the memory of suffering to 
be fully erased and not replaced with new suffering, “Where is my child?” or 
“How could I experience such loss without feeling pain? I must be a terrible 
person,” is for positive memories also to be erased. The parents would have 
to forget their joy the day their child was born, their excitement when she took 
her first step or said her first word. These along with every other memory 
from the child's short life, including the child’s relationships with others -  
peers, grandparents, teachers -  would also have to be erased.
Such erasure of memories is, I suggest, a serious threat to the integrity of our 
sense of personal identity. The erasure of memories (good or bad) and the 
disentanglement or abstraction of the ‘self from webs of relationships with 
others which such erasure would entail poses a significant question mark 
against the sense in which such a ‘healed’ self would actually be the same 
person at all. My thesis will be that rather than being erased in the New
Creation our most painful memories will be transformed. In arguing this I 
shall contend for a significant difference between what Volf initially discusses 
-  ‘non-remembering’ -  and the ‘forgetting’ that he later proposes.
In this dissertation I shall consider the following question, which Volfs 
contention provokes; Is the discontinuity indicated by the Christian claim that 
human suffering, loss and transience will be redeemed in God’s New 
Creation compatible with the equally strong claim that human beings will be 
recognisable to themselves, to others and to God in the New Creation 
because in some meaningful sense they will indeed be ‘the same person’?
The central question, then, has to do with the sense in which persons’ may 
be redeemed or healed of that which characterises them in this life while yet 
remaining identiflably the same person. Chapter 1, therefore, looks at what 
sort of thing ‘personal identity’ is and how it is constituted. The chapter 
begins with consideration of issues drawn from a variety of sources -  
literature, philosophy, theology -  about the nature of the self. It then moves 
on to consider time and the conception of the self, embodiment, the 
constitution of the self in relation to others, and memory and personal 
identity.
Chapter 2 looks in more depth at memory in particular. Memory is central to 
our experience and understanding of ourselves and our lives moment by 
moment and year by year. Without memory we would have no clear sense of 
our own identity for our memory of who we are and what we have been 
enables us in large measure to make sense of the present moment. Memory 
makes available to us people, places and experiences that have shaped our 
identity over time and -  as we remember them -  continue to do so. So vital 
is this link that some have even sought to define ‘selfhood’ in terms of our 
possession of a specific set of memories.
The chapter begins with a discussion of what memory is and the difference 
between the memory of facts or skills learned and the memory of people, 
places and events experienced, the memory, in other words, which is
constitutive of personal identity. It goes on to consider memory as an activity 
of imagination, making present to the mind people and places from the past. 
Many factors, such as perception, forgetting and the introduction of new 
information, can distort memory making it less than one hundred per cent 
reliable. Some memories continue to cause damage to the self. In these 
situations the distortion can have a positive affect as the meaning of memory 
and thus of the past event is reinterpreted. The chapter also considers the 
fact that, while we do not remember every single mundane event 
experienced on a day-to-day basis, to forget formative memories would 
change us in some way. It goes on to consider that, with memory being 
constitutive of personal identity, to lose the memory is potentially to lose the 
sense of self. The chapter looks at how our stories -  the stories we recall 
and relate -  can shape our identities. It also considers that we must 
remember if we are going to forgive or be forgiven. Forgiveness and 
reconciliation enable us to ‘remember well’ because they change the 
meaning of the past event but cannot take place if the action to be forgiven is 
forgotten. Likewise, painful experiences that are forgotten or denied will not 
heal but fester. Finally, the chapter considers what it means to ‘remember 
weir. ‘Remembering well’ is only possible when we are willing to forget and 
is made possible through forgiveness, which transforms the meaning of the 
past enabling us to gain new perspective on people and events.
In chapter 3 the focus shifts to the theme of forgiveness which picks up on 
remembering well’ from chapter 2. Forgiveness, I shall argue, does not 
change the past but changes the meaning of the past as we experience it 
from the perspective of the present. Thereby, it also changes the meaning of 
our present. It is not our memories that are changed by forgiveness, but their 
meaning and the power they have to cause continued pain and suffering. 
Forgiving and being forgiven can change our understanding of ourselves and 
others.
Before looking at what constitutes forgiveness, the chapter considers some 
of the things that forgiveness is commonly confused with but is not -  
condonation, pardon, mercy, modifying one’s moral judgement and excuse.
It looks briefly at whether or not resentment has to be present before 
forgiveness is necessary and at whether repentance is sufficient reason to 
forgive. It then considers that, for some, forgiveness is too costly and 
acknowledges that there are others for whom it is apparently not costly 
enough. The chapter considers forgiveness as a way of life which takes a 
lifetime to learn. It looks at the fact that we do not ‘forgive and forget’ but, 
rather, forgive and ‘remember well’, and that even after forgiveness given 
and received an action’s consequences can remain for victim or perpetrator 
or both -  suffering may still continue. Despite this, however, forgiving and 
remembering well gives victim and perpetrator the freedom to move on. The 
chapter asks if there are limits to forgiveness, if there is such a thing as the 
unforgivable, and considers the gulf between God’s forgiveness, which is 
unconditional, and interpersonal forgiveness, suggesting that God’s 
forgiveness is a model for us.
Volf accepts the inevitability that the mere memory of having suffered will 
continue to cause suffering in lives lived in this world. His concern is with the 
suggestion that it might continue to do so in the New Creation. The next and 
final stage of our argument will therefore consist in a treatment of this theme 
in its wider location within the structure and logic of Christian hope for God’s 
promised future.
For Moltmann, as we will consider in chapter 4, the starting point in our 
consideration of the eschaton has to be what we already know from 
experience and its transformation. “The future of God...(begins) in the 
transforming thought of the present.”"^ And, according to Travis, 
“Eschatological hope...is essentially a matter of extrapolation from present 
experience of God and trustful acceptance of what the God thus experienced 
is believed to have revealed through Christ and his apostles.”® In my 
consideration of the New Creation in chapter 4, therefore, I will look both at 
present experience, referring back in particular to the importance of
Moltmann, 1973a: 55 
® Travis, 1980:138
relationality and memory from previous chapters, and at what we can know 
from Christian Scripture.
Eschatological language, whether biblical or otherwise, is of necessity 
figurative. This is shown by Bauckham and Hart who state, “Since 
eschatological thought is an imaginative picturing of the unimaginable, we 
may have to use alternative images to represent different aspects of the 
eschatological hope, but we can understand these images as different angles 
on the one eschatological reality.”® To illustrate the point they draw attention 
to a passage in Revelation 19 (11-21) which uses two alternate images in 
this way. “There is no need,” they tell us, “to prefer one image to the other, 
precisely because both are /mages...both give imaginative expression to the 
hope that God must finally remove evil from his world before it can be new 
creation. The alternation and combination of the images serves to remind us 
that both are images.”^
From this we can see that any statements we make about the eschaton are 
limited because the eschaton goes beyond our experience in the here-and- 
now, beyond what we can imagine and beyond the limitations of language.
“If what is to be transcends our ability to conceive it, what words should be 
used to describe it?” asks Williams.® As Bauckham and Hart indicate, 
however, if we do not use the limited experience, imagination and language 
available to us, we have no other way of speaking of God and his promised 
future. “When we speak of the new creation we do so using language 
appealing to pictures and states of affairs, drawn from this old order, the 
world as we know and are used to talking about it...we don't actually have 
any other language to use!.... Strictly speaking, language belonging to the 
here-and-now is not fitted to speak of anything more that the here-and-now. 
But of God and his promised future, speak we must unless we would be 
content with agnostic silence.”®
® Bauckham and Hart, 1999:138 
Bauckham and Hart, 1999: 140 (original emphasis) 
® Williams, 1997: 306 
® Bauckham and Hart, 1999: 81f
Given all the above, the argument of this dissertation ought not to be 
understood as seeking to establish in concrete terms what will be the case in 
God's New Creation. We cannot know this in any certain way. But nor can 
Christians afford to be agnostic or remain silent about the New Creation, and 
the imaginative logic of eschatological language permits and requires us to 
ask questions about what (given the shape of our experience of the here and 
now, and given the sort of images and depictions found in Scripture) we 
might reasonably suppose may be the case. The argument of the 
dissertation will effectively be that, given what we experience and understand 
of what it is to be a person in this life, and given some of the things which 
Scripture encourages us to suppose or imagine of the shape of the eschaton, 
it is more rather than less likely that Volfs contention about eschatological 
forgetting is wrong, and more rather than less likely that memories of this- 
worldly suffering will remain part of our particular personal identity in some 
form in the New Creation.
The chapter looks first at hope. It starts with consideration of the nature of 
‘secular’ everyday hope and hopelessness before turning to consider the 
distinctives of Christian hope. It then looks specifically at the theme of New 
Creation, attending in particular to the tension between elements of continuity 
and discontinuity which characterise the way this hope is constructed. A 
discussion about physical and emotional scars illustrates the coexistence of 
continuity and discontinuity. A scar illustrates continuity because, as a 
healed wound, it is a permanent reminder of a painful incident from the past. 
It also illustrates discontinuity because it is a wound that is healed, and 
because it is healed it no longer causes the intense suffering it once did, thus 
no longer constitutes a threat to the wellbeing of the one who bears it.
Finally the chapter's focus returns to hope as such, considering the impact 
that hope in the New Creation has -  or should have -  on life now, in terms of 
both its impact on suffering and the action which it motivates.
Having explored and discussed these issues, it is my conclusion that far from 
our most painful memories being erased in the New Creation as Volf
suggests they will indeed be healed and redeemed. I have suggested that 
this is necessary if we are to be ourselves -  the selves to whom the promises 
of God are made in this life through his Word - in the New Creation. I have 
also indicated that the presence of such memories is in no way threatening to 
the joy and perfection of the New Creation because they will be ‘remembered 
weir. Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 4 and touched on again in the 
conclusion, the healing for which the Christian hopes in the New Creation 
can begin in the this life.
Chapter 1 
BECOMING BEING:
AN EXPLORATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
Who are You? Asked the Caterpillar. This was not an 
encouraging opening for a conversation. Alice replied, 
rather shyly, l-l hardly know, just at present -  at least I 
know who I was when 1 got up this morning but I think I 
must have changed several times since then.’ ‘What do 
you mean by that?’ said the Caterpillar sternly, ‘Explain 
yourself!’ I can’t explain myself, I’m afraid, Sir,’ said 
Alice, because I’m not myself you see.’
I don’t see,’ said the Caterpillar.
(Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures In Wonderland)
1.1 Introduction
As indicated in the introduction, this thesis is a response to Volf’s contention 
that in the New Creation our most painful memories, those which he feels 
threaten to continue to cause suffering even in the New Creation where there 
is no suffering, will be erased. I shall argue, however, that if significant 
formative memories were to be erased this would undermine our sense of 
personal identity, our sense of self. To undermine the sense of self raises 
problems for the claim that in the New Creation we shall be -  and shall know 
ourselves and be known by others to be -  the same persons. In this chapter 
I will consider how, within mainline twentieth century theology and 
philosophy, personal identity has been thought to be constituted, looking in 
particular at the roles ascribed to relationship with others and to time. 
Memory will also be looked at briefly though this will be considered more fully 
in chapter 2. These should not be seen as alternative models of constituting 
the self but as complementary and overlapping. In considering the relational 
aspect we shall be thinking about the synchronic constitution of personal 
identity (identity at a specific time), while the temporal factor looks at how 
identity is constituted diachronically (identity over time). Memory looks back 
at the self over time from the viewpoint of a specific point in time. Time gives 
meaning to both relationship and memory.
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The nature of the self, which is highly enigmatic, has been an issue of 
concern to theologians, philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists, medical 
scientists and historians, as well as poets and novelists. The self has been 
variously thought of as something and nothing; as always present and 
constructed now and again; as the very core of one's being and a complex 
add-on\
The casual observer of the subject might be excused for assuming that the 
question “What is the self?” is a simple one to answer since the experience of 
being a self is common to all humankind. The shelves of books, however, 
which address the issue, and the diversity of opinion that exists, bear witness 
to the fact that it is far from being the simple matter it may at first appear to 
be. Indeed, Paul Ricoeur refers to the, “(E)minently problematic character of 
personal identity”.^  This ‘problematic character' is reflected in the ways 
people struggle to answer the question ‘what’ or ‘who am I?' Moltmann also 
expresses the opinion that understanding and knowing the self are a problem 
when he says, “So in practice man is the greatest puzzle that man has. He 
needs to know himself.”®
Stevenson and Haberman state In their book Ten Theories of Human Nature, 
“To hope to finish this book with some final or complete truth about human 
nature would be foolish.”"^ The same could be said about this chapter. It is 
not an attempt to be the final word on the metaphysics of the self or an 
exhaustive phenomenology of the self, but rather seeks to explore our sense 
of the self, concentrating on those aspects of contemporary consideration of 
the subject which seem to be most relevant to my case against Volf. Identity 
as a metaphysical concept is not something we can adequately define or 
describe but our experience of being self -  our sense of our own identity - is. 
It is not the nature of the self as such with which I am concerned here but 
rather with our sense of self. I will begin with some thoughts on the
^Brockelman, 1985: 7 
^Ricoeur, 1992:141 
 ^Moltmann, 1971b: 2 
^ Stevenson & Haberman, 1998: 225
1Q
experience of being self drawn from various sources to illustrate something of 
the wide-ranging interest in the subject.
Soren Kierkegaard is among the many who have pondered the issue of what 
personal identity is. He asks, “But what then is this self of mine?...if I were 
required to define this, my first answer would be, ‘It is the most abstract of all 
things and yet at the same time the most concrete.’.”® Thinking of the same 
question, John Newton writes, “I am not what I ought to be; I am not what I 
would like to be; I am not what I hope to be. But I am not what I once was; 
and by the grace of God, I am what I am.”®
Thinking beyond just her own self to human life in general, Alexandra Taylor, 
a character from a novel, asks on the death of her fiancé Eric Morro, “What is 
a life? Is it merely water running through our fingers, impossible to cling to? 
Does it leave a trace like salt from seawater? Or does it simply vanish, 
invisible, transformed into vapour without our notice? Does it evade our 
description? Yes, yes, yes and yes.”^
The following poem, written by Dietrich Bonhoeffer in prison, betrays his 
sense of confusion as he struggled to make sense of his ‘self, of who he 
was.
WHO AM I?
“Who am I? They often tell me 
I would step from my cell’s confinement 
Calmly, cheerfully, firmly 
Like a squire from his country house.
Who am I? They often tell me 
I used to speak to warders 
Freely and friendly and clearly 
As though it were mine to command.
Who am I? They also tell me 
I bore the day’s misfortune 
Equably, smilingly, proudly,
Like one accustomed to win.
^Clted In Macquarrie, 1982; 9
®Cited in Keyes, 1986:249 
 ^Brewer, 1996:11
11
Am I then really all that which other men tell of?
Or am I only what I myself know of myself,
Restless and longing and sick, like a bird in a cage.
Struggling for breath, as though hands were compressing my throat. 
Yearning for colours, for flowers, for the voices of birds.
Thirsting for words of kindness, for 
neighbourliness, tossing in expectation of great events,
Powerlessly trembling for friends at infinite distance,
Weary and empty at praying, at thinking, at making,
Faint and ready to say farewell to it all?
Am I one person today and tomorrow another?
Am I both at once? A hypocrite before others,
And before myself a contemptibly woe-begone weakling?
Or is something within me still a beaten army.
Fleeing in disorder from victory already achieved?
Who am I? They mock me, these lonely questions of mine,
Whoever I am, thou knowest, O God, I am thine!”®
Part of Bonhoeffer’s confusion seems to be the difference between the ‘self 
he experiences and the ‘self observed by others. It appears from the 
consternation expressed in the poem that Bonhoeffer had not set out to 
present to others such a different self from the one he knew. Susan 
Howatch's character, Charles Ashworth, on the other hand, deliberately 
keeps his true self hidden behind a mask of falseness but, like Bonhoeffer, 
comes to a stage where he finds this overwhelming and confusing. “I looked 
in the glass and saw the spy behind the clergyman, the image beyond the 
image, and beyond the spy was yet another man, the image beyond the 
image beyond the image. Reality blurred; fantasy and truth became 
inextricably intertwined. I told myself I had imagined the distant stranger but 
as I felt my personality begin to divide I covered my face with my hands.”® 
Ashworth’s fellow-character in the same novel, Lyle Christie, who later 
becomes his wife, also expresses dissatisfaction at hiding behind a mask and 
a deep yearning to be her true self. “Oh if you only know...how much I long 
to put aside my glittering image and be the woman I really am.” ®^ Expressing 
a similar dissatisfaction with the false image of herself, Rebecca Davitch -  
another character from fiction -asks herself, “How on earth did I get like this?
® http://www.pbs.org/opb/bonhoeffer/legacy/whoami.html 
® Howatch, 1988: 70 
Howatch, 1988: 336 (original emphasis)
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How? How did I ever become this person who's not really me?”^^  What 
these reflections have in common is the struggle many people experience at 
some time or other simply of being themselves in the face of changing 
circumstances.
Locke states, “To find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider 
what person stands for; which I think, is a thinking, intelligent being, that has 
reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself...it being Impossible for 
anyone to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive.”^^  For David 
Hume, on the other hand, ‘self cannot be observed, but only a series of 
perceptions. Whenever he tries to pin down self he only ever finds a 
perception or emotion, therefore he concludes that the self cannot be 
observed apart from such perceptions. He writes, “For my part, when I enter 
most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular 
perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or 
pleasure. I can never myse/f catch at any time without a perception, and can 
never observe anything but the perception.” ®^ According to his way of 
thinking, “Since we are never aware of any enduring self, we are never 
justified in claiming we are the same person we were a year or a minute 
ago.” "^^  By contrast, Hume's contemporary Thomas Reid had no difficulty 
locating the self, as long as he viewed it temporally. Reid states, “My 
personal identity, therefore, implies the continued existence of that individual 
thing which I call myself. Whatever self may be, it is something which thinks, 
and deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and suffers. I am not thought, I am 
not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks and acts and suffers. 
My thoughts, and actions, and feelings change every moment; they have no 
continued, but a successive existence; but that self, or I, to which they 
belong, is permanent and has the same relation to all the succeeding 
thoughts, actions and feelings which I call mine.” ®^
Tyler, 2002; 20 
Locke, 1975: 211 (li.xxvli:9) 
Hume, 2000: 165(1.4.6.3) 
"^^Solomon, 2000 (www)
^^Cited in Brockelman, 1985:14
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According to Buddhist thought, the very existence of the self is an illusion and 
it is only when we come to an acceptance of this that we attain truth. The 
Buddha, who encouraged his followers to be aware of the various aspects of 
themselves and to strive towards the total extinction of the individual self 
(Nirvana) states, “Where self Is, truth is not. Where truth is, self is not.” ®^ 
This is a striking contrast to the Christ who says, “I AM...the t r u t h . I t  is 
paradoxical to use terms such as 7’ when saying there is no such thing -  
what sense is there is a statement such as “/ do not exist” or “My self does 
not exist”? James Giles responds to this line of reasoning by stating that to 
say ‘I think’ does not presume the existence of an T any more than to say ‘it 
thunders’ presumes the existence of an ‘it’. According to the Buddha, Giles 
tells us, terms such as ‘self and ‘I’ do not refer to anything but are merely 
grammatical devices^®. Were this the case we need not be concerned about 
the erasure of painful memories undermining the self. It is not, however, the 
Christian belief. The Christian belief, as we shall consider, is that the self will 
be wholly self -  healed and redeemed - in the New Creation for God’s 
promises are “for you and your children” ®^.
John Macquarrie who makes a similar observation to Hume, saying that 
when he attempts to plough the depths of self he finds perception rather than 
the subject of perception^®, suggests that humanity is a natural endowment of 
Homo Sapiens in much the same way as being feline is for cats, and yet 
unlike cats, it is at the same time something which has to be discovered and 
striven after throughout life. In saying that humanity is a natural endowment 
he is saying that being a human being is a natural endowment, that it is, quite 
simply, being born as a human being. In saying that it has to be discovered 
and striven after, on the other hand, he refers to what we have been calling 
personal identity. He refers, that is, to that which makes you uniquely you 
and me uniquely me and distinguishes each of us from every other being. 
Influenced by existentialist thought, he suggests, that ‘human becoming’
http://Koolhost.com/bucldhaonself.htm 
John 14:6
Giles, 1993:186,188 
Acts 2:29
Macquarrie, 1982: 40
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would be a more appropriate term than human being’ because of this 
continued learning and growth. “Becoming suggests process, transition. 
Incompleteness, movement from non-existence to existence (or the 
reverse).”^^  He later states, “One is engaged in the life long task of 
becoming a person, of sculpting the raw material of life into a truly human 
shape.”^^
The thought that our personhood is a given and has, at the same time, to be 
striven after and worked at is also found in Bauckham who writes, “All we are 
and have is given us. Along with all we are and have, we are given some 
freedom to choose what we make of ourselves. This is the very limited 
sense in which we may be said to create ourselves.... It is true that what we 
are is not something static; we are the selves we become. And it is true that 
we have limited freedom to become what we choose. But this is no more 
than making something of what we are given.” ®^
Etymologically, the term ‘person’ is closely related to the term ‘role’ for the 
term ‘person’ comes from the Latin ‘persona' which means social, legal or 
theatrical role; the part one plays in society or on stage. But we cannot 
reduce a person to the roles she or he plays. “Being a person,” says 
McFarland, “is understood to be something more fundamental than any role 
we play. Although a person may have many roles (chemist, mother, wife, 
daughter, administrator), she is only one person; and while roles can change, 
personhood tends to be part of who we are.” "^^  To define personal identity 
too narrowly, in terms of a specific role, could be threatening to the person’s 
sense of self if there is a major change in circumstances such as loss of a job 
or death of a friend or partner^®.
Macquarrie, 1982: 2 
Macquarrie, 1982:43 
^  Bauckham. 2002: 39 
McFarland, 2001: 209 
McFarland, 2001: 209
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Having considered briefly the kinds of questions related to the experience of 
being or having a ‘self we now turn our attention to the constitution of the 
‘self, considering in particular relationality and temporality.
1.2 The Constitution of Self in Relation to Others
Such is the centrality of other people in constituting and maintaining our 
identity that Ford can say, “To ask ‘who am I?’ leads straight to the other 
people who are part of me. Is there any layer of self where there are no 
others?” ®^ Sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann make the 
similar observation that our identity is shaped and maintained by social 
relations^^, and Ricoeur writes, “The selfhood of oneself implies otherness to 
such an intimate degree that one cannot be thought of without the other. 
This can be seen in the way we introduce people to one another -  ‘my 
colleague’, ‘Linda’s husband’, ‘George’s daughter’, ‘my father’s brother’ -  
nearly always in relation to another.
1.2.1 Macmurrav and McFadven: Being In Relation
John Macmurray {Persons In Relation) and Alastair McFadyen (The Call To 
Personhood) have similar theses concerning the constitution of the self. Both 
argue that the self is constituted only in relation to others. “Individuality, 
personhood and selfhood,” states McFadyen, “do not...refer to some internal 
or independent source of identity, but to the way one is and has been in 
r e la t i on .T h e y  are, of course, only two among many who discuss this but, 
coming from different disciplines - philosophy and theology respectively - and 
the works having been published some 30 years apart, it will be a useful 
exercise to consider them together here.
Persons In Relation is the companion volume to The Self As Agent in which 
Macmurray rejects the traditional Cartesian ‘I think therefore I am’ definition
^¥ord, 1997: 3 
Berger & Luckmann, 1979:194 
Ricoeur, 1992: 3 
^^McFadyen, 1990:18
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of self and substitutes action as the basis for self. To view self as a thinking 
being, he argues, is isolating. Furthermore, such a statement carries the 
implication that if I am incapable of thought I do not exist. This raises ethical 
questions about the status as persons of babies who have not yet developed 
the capacity for independent thought, the severely mentally retarded who 
may never develop it and those who, through illness, injury or serious 
emotional trauma have lost this capacity. It is not through thinking about 
existence that self knows self exists, argues Macmurray, but through doing, 
through actively taking part in existence^®. This leads him to posit that our 
existence depends on the existence of the other. This, the main thesis of 
Persons In Relation, is laid out clearly by Macmurray in the introduction 
where he tells us that the book’s main purpose is, “(T)o show how the 
personal relation of persons is constitutive of personal existence; that there 
can be no man until there are at least two men in communication.”^^
Macmurray argues that thinking causes one to become detached and 
subjective because it necessitates withdrawing from action and from all other 
practical personal relations with others. It isolates one from the other 
because the thinker is always T, never ‘you’. This said, however, he also 
makes the point that even our thoughts do not exist in a vacuum but require 
some frame of reference external to the self to ascertain their veracity or 
falsity^^. The self as agent, on the other hand, cannot be isolated but must 
be in relation to the other. The active self as opposed to the isolated thinking 
self exists as a person and, just as the ‘self is personal, so too the ‘other’ is 
personal. The ‘I', that is, exists only as part of ‘you and me’. Of course it 
hardly need be said that each person is both subject (‘I’) and object (‘you’ or 
‘other’)^  ^ - I am the ‘other’ to the other’s T. This interdependence between 
self and other, between the ‘I’ and the ‘you’ is reminiscent of the philosophical 
anthropology of Martin Buber.
^^Macmurray, 1961:17 
Macmurray, 1961:12 
^^Macmurray, 1961:20ff 
^^Macmurray, 1961:25
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“Man”, says Buber, “becomes an I through a You.” "^^  Buber distinguishes 
between the T of 1-lt’ and the T of 1-You', or ‘l-Thou’, making the point that 
there is no T apart from one or the other^® but also that the 1’ of 1-lt’ and the 
T of ‘l-You’ are very different Ts. The T of 1-lt’ experiences the other as an 
object while the I’ of l-You’, or 1-Thou’, relates to the other as a person. 
Buber puts it this way, “The world of experience belongs to the basic word I- 
It. The basic word l-You establishes the world of relation.” ®^ The I of l-You is 
relational while the I of 1-lt is experientiaP.
For Feuerbach too, “Where there is no Thou’ there is no 1’” ®^. This, 
Macquarrie cautions, needs to be stated and emphasised in today’s highly 
individualistic culture^®. The implication here is that the further a person 
retreats from connection with the other the more they lose sight of their true 
self. Brian Keenan, who was kidnapped and imprisoned in Lebanon in the 
1980s, initially was held in solitary confinement and later was in with another 
prisoner. Reflecting on the way they related to one another and of their 
importance to one another, he says, “No man is singular in the way he lives 
his life. He only lives it fully in relation to others.... We cannot know 
ourselves or declare ourselves human unless we share in the humanity of 
a n o t h e r . “If it is indeed the case that there is no I’ without a Thou’,” writes 
Macquarrie, “if everyone needs the confirmation of dialogue with the other, 
the distance and the relation of community, the vivifying atmosphere of the 
‘between’, then to deny and seek to diminish the humanity of the other is to 
deny and diminish one’s own h u m a n i t y . I  will return to this and discuss it 
more fully elsewhere in this chapter.
By way of explanation Buber tells us that the I of 1-lt is Ego V and is set apart 
from all other egos whereas the I of l-You is ‘person I’ and is in relation with
"^^ Buber, 1970: 80 
Buber, 1970: 53f 
Buber, 1970: 62 
Buber, 1970: 111 
^  Cited In Macquarrie, 1982: 88 
^  Macquarrie, 1982: 88 
Keenan, 1992: 277,287 
Macquarrie, 1982: 89f
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other persons"^ .^ The difference between the two is that while the ‘person I' 
acknowledges the self, the ‘ego V is totally absorbed and preoccupied with 
the self and with all things ‘mine’"^ .^ The egoist has self and the seeking of 
the self’s own ends at the centre. The egoist or 1-lt way of experiencing 
others comes from the world of autonomous reason and rationality. It 
demands control, analysis, and hypothesis of the other, and sovereignty over 
the other. Macquarrie states that to reduce ‘l-Thou’ to 1-lt’ is the essence of 
slavery -  one person has become the possession, object and instrument of 
the other. If there is no ‘I’ without ‘Thou’ then this kind of objectivisation of 
the other must similarly affect the slave owner"^ "^ . Of course this does not 
only apply to slavery, the same applies to other forms of exploitation where 
the other is treated as an object and less than an equal. Moltmann writes, 
“People who understand freedom as domination really only know themselves 
as determining subjects, and everything else as their property, their object.... 
They do not know other people as persons.’"^  ^ To relate to others as objects, 
freedom is in the form of rule - but there can be no freedom for the ruled, only 
for the ruler. If human subjects relate to each other as subjects then freedom 
is in the form of community -  all are free"^ ®.
The devastating effect on a person of continually being objectified and 
experienced as ‘It’ instead of being related to as ‘You’ can be seen in the 
autobiographical works of David Pelzar whose mother, while David was a 
young child, stopped using his name when speaking to him or about him and 
called him, ‘the boy’. She later dropped this too, calling him ‘It’. 
Remembering that time, Pelzar writes, “You are a nobodyl An lt\ You are 
non-existent...she had stripped me of my very existence.... I would have 
been relieved if she had returned with a knife and ended it all.’”^  ^ Again, in a 
later book Pelzar writes, “I know deep inside that I do not now, nor will I ever.
'^^Buber, 1970:11 I f  
'^^Buber, 1970: 114 
^  Macquarrie, 1982: 89 
^  Moltmann, 1999:155 
Moltmann, 1999: 159 
Pelzar, 1995: 40 (original emphasis)
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deserve any love, attention, or even recognition as a human being. I am a 
child called, ‘It’. I am all alone inside.”"*®
The personal, or ‘l-You’ way of relating, on the other hand, displays mutuality 
and equality, possible because the T gives up what Newbigin would call any 
“sovereign claim of autonomous reason”"*® over the other. No one is one 
hundred per cent ‘person’ or one hundred percent ‘ego’ but oriented toward 
one or other®®.
While it is widely acknowledged that ‘1-lt’ makes the other an object and that 
if the self objectifies the other then it too becomes an object for the self is 
neither disclosed nor realised®^ Macmurray does think it legitimate and, at 
times necessary, to relate to the other not as ‘you’ but as ‘it’. The relation of 
self with other, he tells us, can be personal or impersonal. Examples of 
impersonal relations would be an employer interviewing a job applicant or a 
judge trying an accused person. In treating the other impersonally we treat 
the other not as a person but as an object^^. In the case of an employer 
interviewing the job candidate this would mean an almost mechanical 
analysis of the candidate’s skills compared with the requirements of the job. 
In the case of the judge trying an accused person, the judge is assessing the 
available information about the accused’s reported actions in the light of 
legislation in an attempt to establish guilt or innocence. Even within personal 
relations, Macmurray suggests there is an element of the impersonal, which 
enhances rather than undermines the personal. “The Impersonal attitude is 
justifiable when it is itself subordinated to the personal attitude when it is 
adopted for the sake of the personal, and is itself included as a negative 
which is necessary to the positive.”®®
^  Pelzar, 2000:4 
"*®Newbigin, 1994: 61 
Buber, 1970:114f 
Gay, 1998: 296ff 
®®Macmurray, 1961: 33 
®®Macmurray, 1961: 35
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That our humanity is relational is not a new idea. It is as old as humankind 
itself. As the creation narrative shows, we were created for community, not 
for isolation. Because we were thus created to live in community and not in 
isolation, a self who tries to live in isolation diminishes his or her own 
selfhood. “The goal is to become a person-in-community, for no person 
exists in isolation, though a self may try to do so, and in so doing diminish its 
own person hood... the natural direction of the human being is outward.... 
The egoist, on the other hand, is concerned with his own centre...curved in 
on himself.... So instead of achieving his aim of self-aggrandisement, he 
slips back into a subhuman existence.”®"* The loner not only deprives others 
of company and community but also causes damage to herself or himself. 
To dehumanise the self is to dehumanise the other but it is a two way 
process and to dehumanise the other also dehumanises the self. As 
Macquarrie notes, to reduce l-You to 1-lt leads to slavery and exploitation - 
one person has become the possession, object and instrument of the other®®.
Trevor Hart makes a similar point when he states, “Whenever and to 
whatever extent we slip into purely impersonal and objectifying modes of 
approach to the human other we run the risk of dehumanising the other (and 
thereby ourselves also in the process). Again in relating to persons 
(participating in human communication) we need both objective and personal 
modes to be held together as two aspects of the same interpretative 
activity.”®®
Bonhoeffer also gives some consideration to the damage done to the 
individual who isolates himself or herself from the community and fellowship 
of others. His concern is with the spiritual damage. “Sin,” he tells us, 
“demands to have a man by himself. It withdraws him from community. The 
more isolated a person is, the more destructive will be the power of sin over 
him, and the more deeply he becomes involved in it, the more disastrous is
®"*Macquarrie, 1982: 43, 46 
®®Macquarrie, 1982: 6 
Hart, 2000: 321f
21
his isolation. It shuns the light. In the darkness of the unexpressed it 
poisons the whole being of a person.”®^
Buber’s main concern is with the effect on the self of relating to the other as 
‘it’ instead of ‘you’. His concern here is the emotional effect on the person of 
isolating self from others. “By setting himself apart from others, the ego 
moves away from being.”®® It can also have a devastating and dehumanising 
effect on the other to be used as an ‘it’, to be merely experienced and not 
related to. The devastating and dehumanising effect of being related to as 
“It” rather than “You” is seen in the story of Gunther. Gunther was a 
handicapped child born in Germany in 1914. He was starved of 
communication and love as well as food by the grandmother with whom he 
and his father lived. To ensure he kept quiet his grandmother dosed him with 
medicine. “Not that he cried very much -  or loudly -  if and when he did. 
Since his crying had always been ignored in the past, he had given up crying 
as an infant means of telling his needs.”®® On the rare occasions his 
grandmother spoke to him it was to tell him, “You’re a nothing. You’re 
nothing but a nothing.... You’re such a nothing you don’t even know what a 
nothing is.”®®
When he was seven years old Gunther was taken to ‘Bethel’, a village- 
community providing care for children and adults with learning difficulties. 
Learning that the child did not speak, Bethel’s administrator asked Gunther’s - 
grandmother if she spoke to him. “’’What’s there to say to the likes of him?” 
snapped the grandmother ”®^ Gunther responded positively to the care he 
received at Bethel, he responded to being related to as ‘l-You’ after seven 
years of being experienced as 1-lt’. Within a few days he was able to say his 
name and over time he learned to walk, talk, sing and read, to love and be 
loved.
®^Bonhoeffer, 1976: 87 
®®Buber, 1970: 114 
Hong, 1976: 14 
Hong, 1976:15 
Hong, 1976; 20
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We have seen, in this section, the difference between, and the different effect 
on both self and other of, relating to the other as person and experiencing the 
other as object. In order to relate to the other as person we need to know 
what it is to be related to as persons and, as we will consider in the following 
section, the foundations of relating are laid in our earliest days.
1.2.ii Laving Foundations - Relating From Infancy
Macmurray traces the early development of personal relationships between 
persons back to early infancy. He makes the point that as far back as 
Aristotle, babies have traditionally been seen as potentially rather than 
actually rational, acquiring personality through forming habits, which in turn 
create character. We will return to this idea of habits creating character when 
considering Paul Ricoeur’s thinking on narrative identity. Character might be 
defined in this traditional view as a systemisation and organization, by the 
potentially rational infant, of ‘animal impulses’. Macmurray, however, 
challenges this view citing Ian Suttie for whom infants are more like human 
adults than animals. Although closer to his own view Macmurray feels Suttie 
goes too far in the opposite direction® .^
Macmurray sees babies neither with fully developed personalities like adults 
nor as merely having the potential to develop personality at a later stage but 
actually beginning to develop personality from their earliest days. He 
devotes a large section of his book to considering how this takes place, 
focussing on the relation between the dependent infant and the nurturing 
adult mother figure. Macmurray makes the point that although usually the 
biological mother, this caring, nurturing role can be fulfilled by any caring 
adult of either gender®®. Having clarified how he is using the word, 
Macmurray goes on to use the term ‘mother’ to refer to the caring, nurturing 
adult in an infant’s life.
^^Macmurray, 1961: 44f 
®®Macmurray, 1961: 50
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Macmurray’s theory of an infant’s development through relations with the 
other is very similar to object relations psychology or object relations theory 
in which the other is related to as object. Thomas Klee defines object 
relations as, “A psychodynamic approach to human behaviour, development, 
relationships.... Within modern object relations theory, objects can be people 
(mother, father, others) or things...with which we form attachments. These 
objects and the child’s developing relationship with them are incorporated 
into the self.”®"*
Price describes object relations theory, thus, “Object relations theory is based 
on the observation of the psychological development of the child from the 
earliest stages of infancy. In object relations the attachment of the child to 
the mother forms the primary matrix from which the self, in the context of an 
ever-widening circle of relations, is formed.... Object relations...describes the 
person as a composite history of interpersonal relations.”®® Price later 
indicates that generally adults are unaware that their very earliest cognitive 
processes are a result of their very earliest object relations, “However, this 
does not mitigate the fact that most adults could not perform their abstractive 
reasoning processes had not their mothers, or some parent or parent figure, 
bonded to them by talking, cooing, holding, and generally being available for 
them in order that they might become psychologically attached.”®®
It has been suggested that ‘human relations theory’ may be a more 
appropriate term but Klee disagrees because we form attachments not only 
to other human beings but also to things and animals. For example, many 
children form relationships with stuffed animals and other toys, and adults 
may form relationships, albeit self-destructive relationships, with alcohol. 
Both adults and children form relationships with animals® .^
Klee, 2000-2002 (www) 
Price, 2002:132 
Price, 2002: 271 
Klee. 2000-2002 (www)
24
The young infant, Macmurray tells us, very quickly learns to communicate 
and to expect his®® mother to respond to his communication. This 
expectation is based on memory as the mother establishes a pattern of 
withdrawal and return®®. The memory of the mother’s faithful and repeated 
return enables the child to hope that she will do so again. This hope, when, 
fulfilled, in turn becomes a memory on which renewed hope may be 
founded^®.
We can illustrate this with reference to a situation where loss of memory 
results in loss of hope. Ruby suffers from dementia. Once a week her 
husband Tom goes out with his friend, assuring Ruby before he goes that he 
will return in three hours. Three hours later when he returns Tom invariably 
finds Ruby in a highly agitated state because she thinks he has left her. She 
has no memory of the previous week, much less of the many years when 
Tom has been faithful to his promises to her, thus she has no reason to hope 
that he will return^\
Long before they learn to talk, human infants have learned complex methods 
of communication and can generally make their needs, wants and feelings 
known. Although some animals use basic communication techniques, human 
beings are unique in having life shaped by communication from their earliest 
days. Communication remains fundamental and determinative in personal 
experience throughout life^ .^ This, Macmurray argues, is because 
throughout life and not only in infancy persons are persons only in relation to 
others. In infancy the foundations are laid for relating to others whether 
directly or indirectly, personally or impersonally throughout the whole of the 
rest of life. Dysfunctional adults with poor social skills are often found to
®®For the sake of simplicity I wiil use masculine third person pronouns for baby and feminine 
third person pronouns for mother in this section of the paper.
®®Macmurray, 1961: 87ff
®^ We see in this an example of the overlapping of reiational and temporai aspects of 
personal identity together with memory as Indicated at the beginning of this chapter.
As told to me by their grandson (names have been changed)
^^Macmurray, 1961: 67
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have been infants who were not related to adequately by a caring, nurturing 
adult figure.
We perhaps come to realise how skilled young infants are at communication 
when the skills are absent, or at least appear to be absent through not being 
employed. Young babies whose cries elicit a negative response or no 
response can learn not to cry even to express hunger or discomfort. They sit 
or lie still and quiet, staring wide-eyed at their supposed-carers. Thus very 
young children who have suffered from abuse or neglect are often described 
as being in a state of ‘frozen watchfulness’ or ‘frozen awareness’ ®^. For 
example the wide-eyed stares and silence of the Romanian orphans shown 
on television in the early 1990s shocked and unsettled the viewing public. 
“The orphans were so neglected that they failed to show any emotions at all. 
They didn’t cry or show anger or even respond to people coming in and out 
of the room.” "^* It was shocking to be confronted in our own living rooms by 
images of children who had been depersonalised through only ever having 
been experienced as what Buber would call, ‘1-lt’, never related to as ‘l-You’.
The skills a young child acquires as he develops do not equip him for 
independent survival but for personal community for, as we have discussed, 
persons, no matter how self-sufficient they may appear to be, do not exist In 
a vacuum but always in relation to other persons. The early stage of an 
infant’s mobility, for example, is not a precursor to independence as is the 
case with other animals. Increased mobility does not increase the young 
child’s ability to care for himself but in fact increases the potential danger 
thus creating a need for even more care, supervision and protection.
In considering where the earliest foundations of personal identity are laid, 
McFadyen goes further back than Macmurray. Macmurray traces it back to 
earliest infancy. McFadyen goes right back to the circumstances of 
conception. Knowledge of the circumstances surrounding his or her 
conception - for example if from rape or an incestuous relationship or from a
http://www.newman.ac.uk/studweb/abuse/physical.htm)
http://www.csuchlco.edu/engl/faculty/engl1Tom/The%200rphanages.htmI
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casual ‘one night stand’ - can have a psychological impact on a child and 
subsequently on an adult. He then considers the fetal relationship with the 
mother. In this, the mother’s health, diet, emotional well-being, economic 
and social status during pregnancy are all factors^®. That a mother’s attitude 
towards her developing unborn child can have serious consequences for the 
child postnatally and on into adulthood is recognised by counsellors. 
Although we have no conscious memory of what happens to and around us 
while in the womb, it is believed by some that unconscious memories exist 
and can influence our lives, not only in the early days but throughout our 
lives. Counsellors will, at times, take counselees ‘back to the womb’ in their 
memories within the counselling session in order to explore deep-seated 
problems. Michael Gabriel is a counsellor and hypnotherapist who employs 
this practice. He believes that the mother’s feelings and emotions, both 
positive and negative, have a deep impression on the unborn infant and that 
these impressions have potential consequences for the infant’s future life. 
Gabriel writes, “The body does not forget what eludes the mind. Who we are 
today is due, to a significant degree, to our experiences in the womb, and to 
the way each of us has responded to those experiences.” ®^ Just as adverse 
physical conditions such as drug or alcohol abuse can cause irreparable 
physical harm to the growing fetus so too it is believed that adverse 
emotional conditions can cause irreparable emotional harm. This is, 
however, a controversial area in counselling.
1.2.111 Building On The Foundations -  Continuing To Relate in
Adulthood
Interpersonal relations are a vital part of our existence not only in childhood 
but also in adulthood. "In ourselves we are nothing; and when we turn our 
eyes inward in search of ourselves we find a vacuum.... It is only in relation to 
others that we exist as persons.... We live and move and have our being not
’^ ®McFadyen, 1990: 87 
Adzema (www)
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in ourselves but in one another."’  ^ That relationality is a central part of our 
human make up perhaps accounts for why, as a penal method, solitary 
confinement is so difficult for prisoners and why it is so often used as a form 
of torture. Since the beginning of time humankind was made to be in relation 
with one another, not in isolation. “To be in the image of God is to subsist in 
relations of mutual constitutiveness with other human beings.... Personal 
beings are social beings, so that of both God and man it must be said that 
they have their being in their personal relatedness.” ®^ We can, then, never 
reach a stage in life when we have no need of other people. Those who try 
to live as if they had reached such a stage suffer and deprive others as a 
result
Of course, the relations which we consider most important to ourselves, and 
those most influential in shaping the self, are those with whom we have direct 
personal contact, but dependence on the actions of others who are unknown 
to us - indirect relations - is also essential to our being and our well-being. 
The chaos that would ensue if emergency and essential services were 
withdrawn, and indeed does ensue from time to time during periods of 
industrial dispute, whether of firefighters, postal workers, petrol tanker 
drivers, or whoever else, illustrates this. There would be no fire service, 
crime would go unchecked, we would have no health services, no social 
services, roads would not be repaired - if indeed they were ever built - 
rubbish would not be collected. There would be no telecommunication or 
postal services, no Internet or E-mail. We could not go to the supermarket to 
buy food but would each have to milk our own cow and slaughter our own 
pig, which we would cook along with our homegrown vegetables over 
firewood that we had collected ourselves. John Macquarrie touches on this. 
He writes, “Perhaps there was a time in the dawn of human history when 
each individual did everything for himself -  secured his own food, made his 
own clothes, built his own shelter and so on. But it soon was discovered that
^^Macmurray, 1960; 211 
^®Gunton, 1993: 3, 229
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it is much better for each to acquire skill...and then exchange his products 
with others.” ®^
Personal identity is formed, in part, through social processes therefore the 
identity of any person is related to the identities of others. Related that is, but 
not restricted. Otherwise a person’s identity would have no meaning beyond 
a particular social situation. There would be no continuity. Similarly, 
although our personal identity is defined by how we relate to and respond to 
others, giving of ourselves and receiving from others, it is not reducible to our 
relationships®®. No-one’s personal identity is reducible to the sum of the 
relationships she or he has with others. As Gestalt psychologists have 
sought to show, the whole is always different from and greater than the sum 
of the parts®*. Just as a face is more than simply a collection of features so 
the personal identity of a person is more than a collection of her or his 
relations. Remove all the parts, however, whether the ‘parts’ constituting 
personal identity or the ‘parts’ constituting a face, or whatever else, and 
nothing is left. (Nothing left, that is, only if we see identity as wholly 
constituted in relation to others.) As we will consider, however, it is not 
possible to entirely dissociate from all relations. There are those who remain 
with us, influencing us for better or worse, for the rest of our lives even from 
the other side of the world or from the grave. We are not identical with any 
of our relations but are what McFadyen would call a ‘sedimentation’ of 
significant relations throughout life®^ . “Personal Identity is a sedimentation of 
a significant history of relations which will have had both a societal and an 
interpersonal aspect.”®®
Price states that object relations theory shows, “How the person is shaped by 
a social context: by relation to an ‘other’”...(and) ’’how interpersonal relations
Macquarrie, 1982: 87 
®® McFadyen, 1990: 27 
®*Gleitman, 1991: 76 
®^McFadyen, 1990: 40 
®®McFadyen, 1990: 256
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are the fundamental building blocks of an individual’s personhood; each 
person is shaped by his or her peculiar history of personal relations.”®"*
Drawing attention to the centrality of relations to a person’s being, Price 
notes that through our encounters with others we have the power to shape 
their persons but, like McFadyen, is clear that this does not mean relation to 
others is harmful to the self. He writes, “A relation is not peripheral or 
incidental to human ontology but is constitutive of the human essence.... One 
person can actually affect the being of another at the deepest level.... It is 
important to keep in mind that in healthy interpersonal encounter there 
should be no loss or confusion of identity. The identity of each human being 
becomes increasingly distinct in relation to the other.”®® This is surely what it 
means for our identity to be a sedimentation of significant relationships. Hart 
makes a similar point, stating that our identity being a sedimentation of 
relationships, “does not detract from but rather reinforces our own identity 
(ipse-identity in Ricoeur’s phrase) as the particular person we are and no 
other can ever be or become.”®®
Harriet Harris, in a critical response to McFadyen’s thesis, asks what we 
were prior to sedimentation from relationships? If, I would suggest in 
response to Harris’ question, relationality begins in earliest infancy as 
Macmurray describes then sedimentation too begins in our earliest days. 
There is, therefore, no ‘prior to sedimentation’.
Harris, who is less than comfortable with McFadyen’s way of thinking, 
concedes, “We could describe one’s character or personality and one’s 
sense of oneself (even one’s sense of oneself as a person) as sediment from 
a history of interactions and relations up until now. My sense of myself is 
affected by affirming and discouraging reactions I have received from 
others.... My sense of myself as a person (my belief that I am a person, and 
my corresponding view of personhood) is more stable, learned from infancy.
^  Price, 2002: 231 
Price, 2002: 237ff 
Hart, 2000: 311
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and through the filter of my culture, and affected by the philosophy, theology 
and psychology I have read. Personal identity is affected by none of these 
things but is found in that history of interaction or line of continuity.”®^
The last two sections have considered relating in infancy and adulthood 
respectively. We have seen that communication in infancy does not prepare 
us for independence but for relationships throughout life and that we never 
outgrow the need to be in relation. We considered that personal identity is 
related but not restricted to the identities of others. With our identities thus 
related to the identities of others, and formed in relation with others, the 
others' betrayal of us, or the death of significant others could be a serious 
threat to the self. It is to this that we now turn our attention.
1.2.iv Vulnerability Caused By Being In Relationship
Each relationship influences our personal identity and contributes toward 
making us what we are and what we will become. This is true of both 
positive, constructive, harmonious relationships and negative, destructive, 
conflictive ones. For Ford the impact on the self of a deep wound inflicted by 
another - particularly a significant other - indicates just how vital others are to 
us. “When someone deeply hurts us it is one of the worst forms of 
overwhelming. It can dominate a whole life.... The extent of the misery is a 
measure of how vital other people are to us. Because others are so deeply 
part of us, when core relationships go wrong our whole being is 
threatened. .. The wounds that critically disfigure the heart,” he continues, 
“are given and received between lovers, husbands and wives, parents and 
children, friends, long-term colleagues and partners -  any relationship where 
deep trust and loyalty create potentially tragic vulnerability.”®® Thus the 
psalmist expresses his pain at being hurt and betrayed by a friend when he 
writes, “If an enemy were insulting me, I could endure it; if a foe were raising 
himself against me, I could hide from him. But it is you, a man like myself, 
my companion, my close friend, with whom I once enjoyed sweet fellowship
®^ Harris, 1998:218f 
®® Ford, 1997:13ff
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as we walked with the throng at the house of God.”®® If the person inflicting 
the wound is not very important to us the impact is less. For example, an 
insult or slight from a stranger will have considerably less impact on us than 
one from someone whom we love and respect, hence the verse from Michael 
Card’s song about Judas Iscariot’s betrayal of Christ,
Why?
“Why did it have to be a friend 
Who chose to betray the Lord?
Why did he use a kiss to show them?
That's not what a kiss is for.
Only a friend can betray a friend 
A stranger has nothing to gain.
And only a friend comes close enough 
To ever cause so much pa/n.”®®.
McFadyen, as we will see, insists that a person’s individuality and 
uniqueness - the autonomy of his or her identity - is not harmed but 
enhanced by being in community. He also indicates the threat to the person 
from the loss of significant relationships. He writes, “Where we are caught up 
in the dynamics of genuine community our integrity and autonomy are not 
threatened in relation, but rather enriched, enlarged, intensified, empowered. 
The reverse is also perceived to be the case, that loss of relation does not 
constitute but imperils genuine autonomy.”®^ We can also see this through 
the effect the death of someone close can have on an individual.
Rowan Williams illustrates the overwhelming effect the loss of significant 
relationship by death can have on the self by looking at Mary Magdalene’s 
apparent loss of herself in the death of the one who loved her and affirmed 
her. “It is not simply the Lord’s body that has been carried away -  it is the 
Lord who has loved and affirmed Mary, and so, in a sense, it is Mary herself 
who has been ‘carried away’.” And following the resurrection, “Mary is offered 
her name, her identity, the name which specifies her as a person with a 
particular story.... Mary goes blindly back to the tomb and finds herself....
®® Psalm 55:12-14 
Michael Card, Why? (emphasis added) 
McFadyen, 2000:106f
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Mary is not dead because Jesus is not dead.... Mary lives because Jesus 
lives.”®^ He cites the following poem which paints a graphic picture of the 
devastation suffered by Mary in the death of her Lord and master.
Marv Magdalene (by Saunders Lewis)
“About women, no one can know. There are some,
Like this one, whose pain is a locked sepulchre;
Their pain is buried in them, there is no fleeing 
From it and no casting it off...
...Deep calls unto deep, a grave for a grave,
A carcass drawing towards a carcass in that unhappy morning;
Three days was this one in a grave, in a world that died 
In the afternoon. It is finished.
The cry that drew blood from her like the barb of a sword.
It is finished. Finished. Mary fell from the hill 
To the emptiness of the last Easter....
A world without a living Christ, the horrifying Sabbath of creation.
The abyss of the hundred thousand centuries and their end,
Mary lay down in the grave of the trembling universe.
...All the flowers of memory withered except the rain of the blood
...God was extinguished,
in the dying together, in the burying together.”®®
We may seek to end a negative, destructive, conflictive relationship but 
Macmurray tells us that no matter how much conflict exists within a 
relationship, the relationship cannot be annulled, only refused. This is 
because to annul an action would be to reverse the past, which clearly is 
impossible. This is something to which we will return in chapter 3. 
Macmurray gives the example of a parent disowning a child who has 
behaved in such a way as to bring disgrace on the family. The parent may 
even insist that the child does not exist but such insistence is only necessary 
because of the actuality of the child’s existence. Even killing the child is not 
the answer as this serves only to remove the child’s potential future and not 
the past. The relation of parent-child remains a fact^ "* as does the influence 
the relationship has had on the parent’s self.
®^ Williams, 1982; 44ff 
®® Cited in Williams, 1982; 45 
^"*Macmurray, 1961: 92ff.
33
Conflict, or apparent conflict, within a relationship need not be destructive 
despite appearances. Both Macmurray and McFadyen give examples of 
situations where what appears to be conflictive is actually constructive. In his 
consideration of the infant in relation to the mother, Macmurray notes how, as 
the young child develops he must gradually learn to do for himself what the 
mother does for him. The how and when of this learning process is the 
mother’s decision. She has to refuse to do for her child what the child has 
come to expect of her. This, he suggests, could be perceived by the child as 
a breakdown in the relationship, and the perceived isolation from the other 
threatens the child’s very being. “The child can only be rescued from 
despair.... By a revelation of (the mother’s) continued love and care which 
convinces him that his fears are groundless.”^^  Macmurray does not consider 
what happens when the relationship is fractured, when the mother’s love and 
care are not continued, when the child’s fears are not groundless. What 
often happens in these sad situations - unless another takes the place of the 
mother and provides the love and care necessary for the child’s healthy 
development - is that the child grows into a dysfunctional adult unable to 
relate appropriately to others and unable to offer adequate care to his or her 
own infants, thus perpetuating the cycle.
Just as Macmurray discusses what the infant perceives as the mother’s 
withdrawal when she ceases to respond in the way the child expects in order 
to teach the child to do certain tasks for him or herself, so too McFadyen 
discusses what he calls Yecodification’ ®^. Recodification takes place in order 
to maintain the relationship and may, like the mother’s actions in 
Macmurray’s example, look like withdrawal. He gives the example of the 
drug addict’s parents who, out of love and concern for their son or daughter, 
put the child out of their home in order to face him or her with the reality and 
extent of the problem. This is a painful exercise for both parents and child 
but it is not withdrawal. It is positive action on the parents’ part for the benefit 
of the other who, in this case happens to be their own child, even although at 
the time it may feel to the child like negative, conflictive action and be painful
Macmurray, 1961: 90 
^®Macmurray, 1961:169
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for the parent. The parent lets go of the child but not of the relationship. 
Writing of the parable of the Prodigal Son, Volf makes the point that although 
the prodigal’s father let him go he never let go of the relationship for, “The 
relationship did not rest on moral performance and therefore could not be 
destroyed by immoral acts.”®^
In this section we have seen that the greater a person’s significance in our 
life, the greater will be the hurt of their betrayal or loss. The loss of a 
relationship, however, does not equal the loss of the relationship that has 
been. The Prodigal’s father, for example, let go the person who was his son 
without letting go of the relationship.
The last three sections all draw on the thought of John Macmurray and 
Alistair McFadyen in the area of persons constituted in relation with others. 
The following section considers alternative views.
1.2.V Criticism of McFadven & Macmurrav
In contrast to what McFadyen and Macmurray say about being what we are 
because of relations with others, Elliot says we relate to others as we do 
because of what we are, and we are what we are, he says, because of 
conscious and unconscious memories of our narrative^®. In other words, he 
is indicating that it is not a matter of being persons because we are in relation 
with others but relating because we are persons; and it is that relating which 
enriches and fulfils our identities. Taking a similar position to Elliot, Harriet 
Harris challenges McFadyen’s thesis that personhood is relational as 
“logically confused and ethically precarious.”®® She questions the claim that 
personhood is relational arguing rather that persons relate, that it is persons 
who precede relations not relations that precede persons. Harris argues that 
while personhood is not relational perhaps we can say that our sense of 
being a person is, and perhaps also our self-esteem. She identifies that a,
®Wolf, 1996: 169 
®® Elliot, 1995; 192 
®® Harris, 1998: 214
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“Frequently occurring problem in McFadyen’s work and elsewhere is that 
discussions about personality or about the sense of one’s self are treated as 
discussions about personhood (what it is to be a person) and about personal 
identity (what it is to be the same person over time)”.*®®
Harris concludes that, “To be a person is to have certain capacities whether 
or not these capacities are realised.”*®* This is based on the Aristotelian 
thought that persons are beings with the capacity to acquire skills (such as 
understanding and decision-making) but just because a capacity is not 
realised does not mean the being is any less a person. In this case to be a 
person would be to have the capacity for relation whether or not the capacity 
was realised. Harris here seems to be thinking of the relationships in which 
we deliberately participate but there are also those relationships that exist 
without choice or effort on our part, such as parents, siblings, grandparents 
or neighbours, as indicated in the following quotation from Hart. “Our 
existence and our identity is given and shaped in the complex network of 
relationships which we inhere in life, some of which are obviously closer than 
others...and some of which are ‘given’ to us at birth by virtue of biological 
accident, or by virtue of our immediate social location, and others we choose 
to enter into, thereby modifying who we are.”*®^
Like Macquarrie, Harris makes a helpful distinction between what it is to be a 
person and personal identity. Personhood, she suggests, is what it is to bo a 
person and personal identity is what it is to be the same person over time*®®. 
She discusses the numerical and qualitative identity of persons, and clarifies 
that when we speak of change in a person whose personality has changed in 
some way -  we might say, she suggests, following Christian conversion, that 
a, person ‘is not thq same’ -  we are saying that the numerically identical 
per^qn is no longer qualitatively identical with her or himself*®"*. We will
Harris, 1# 8 : 216f 
® Harris, 1 # 8 : 234 
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consider numerical and qualitative identity in more detail later in this chapter 
in the section on temporality.
Harris draws attention to and criticises what she perceives to be 
discrepancies in McFadyen’s reasoning. For example, he says that our 
identity is the same in different times and places, and that it is defined in 
relation to others. Harris argues that it cannot be both*®® but her argument 
surely denies that our identity remains constant in the face of growth and 
change. As we will consider in the section on temporality, personal identity 
remains constant - we are who we were yesterday -even in the face of 
change and discontinuity. She also challenges McFadyen’s assertion that 
personal identity can be both a line of continuity and the way one exists for 
others, on the basis that the continuity of the self would be regardless of 
others and if personal identity is a way of being for others then we cannot 
assume continuity. “My personal identity...cannot be, as McFadyen would 
have it, both a ‘dynamic line of continuity’ and the way one exists in relation 
to others (p. 317), for if it is a line of continuity it is that regardless of relations 
to others, and if it is a way of being for others there is no logical reason why it 
should be continuous.”*®® I would suggest, however, that it is a denial of 
personal integrity to say that we cannot have continuity of the self while being 
for others. As will be discussed in the section on temporality, keeping one’s 
word -  being faithful to one’s promises - is one of the ways considered by 
Ricoeur in which identity is ensured a permanence in time. In Jesus Christ 
we see the ultimate example of ‘being for others’ but we also see a continuity 
of identity from his preincarnate self*®*" to his post-resurrection self*®®.
Harris cautions that to define personhood relationally, as opposed, say, to 
simply recognising that personhood is constituted in part by relationships, 
can result in having degrees of personhood, measured by the quality of 
relationships, and she insists, “We need to affirm the personhood of those
Harris, 1998: 218
Harris, 1998: 219
John 8:58
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who have been relationally impoverished.”*®® Harris’s distinction between 
personhood and our sense of being a person is both helpful and important 
here. To define personhood solely on the basis of relationship might infer 
that the person whose personal relationships are strong and positive is more 
fully ‘person’ than the one with a history of damaged and damaging personal 
relationships; or that the person with many personal relationships is more 
fully ‘person’ than the person with few. Harris also notes that some 
relationships are harmful and undermine individuals, and suggests that 
damaged or broken relationships do not call personhood into question, thus 
implying that personhood as such cannot be thought to be wholly contingent 
of relationships. Rather, she argues, the fact that broken and damaged 
relationships can damage a person is evidence of that person’s 
personhood**®. For all these reasons -  that defining a person relationally can 
result in having degrees of personhood, that some relationships can be 
harmful to the person, and that broken damaged relationships can damage 
the person - Harris states, “We need an ethic which distinguishes the identity 
of individual persons from the sum of their relationships.”*** As we have 
already noted, McFadyen also notes that personal identity is not reducible to 
our relationships**^.
Harris turns her attention briefly to Macmurray. She says, “The thrust of 
Macmurray is not that a being becomes a person through relations, but that 
humans are persons because relationality is central to human life.”**® She is 
happier with this interpretation of Macmurray than with McFadyen’s thesis. In 
Macmurray, she notes, human beings are personal because they are born 
with the need to communicate with others. “It is not that relations precede 
persons so much as that personal existence is created as relational.... That 
human infants are born needing to communicate with others locates them 
already in the realm of the personal.”**"* In McFadyen, by contrast, persons 
emerge from relations. She is concerned because this seems to imply that
Harris. 1998: 229 
Harris, 1998: 229ff 
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McFadyen, 1990: 27 
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humans can fail to become persons, but qualifies her concern because 
McFadyen also says persons are, “created with the metaphysical status of 
personally related to God.”**® Harris makes the important, if rather obvious, 
observation that a person must be a person before interpersonal relations are 
possible**®. In other words, interpersonal relations are possible only because 
persons exist. "We are urged to view persons as relational,” says Harris, “yet 
do not relations need to be understood as personal if they are to be the sort 
of relations from which persons arise?”**^  For Zizioulas, relationality 
distinguishes what it is to be a person from what it is to be an individual. 
“Being a person,” he writes, “is fundamentally different from being an 
individual or a ‘personality’ for a person cannot be imagined in himself but 
only within his relationships.”**® We will return to Zizioulas below.
McFarland expresses this same view, that it is preferable to see personhood 
as the basis of relationships and not the result of them. He states, “I concur 
with Harris’ view that it is important to distinguish the claim that relationships 
define the way in which we are persons from the idea that relationships 
constitute our personhood as such.**®” McFarland cites McFadyen saying, 
“There is essence and personal identity only in communication”*^ ® and 
argues that, “It seems preferable to view personhood as the basis for our 
relationships rather than their product. It is because we are persons that we 
exist in relation, not the other way round.”*^ * I suggest that personhood is the 
basis of relationships, as McFarland indicates, but that without relationship 
personhood is stunted and unfulfilled and the sense of self seriously 
diminished. At the end of the day the areas of disagreement between Harris, 
or McFarland, and McFadyen are not very important -  they all agree that 
personhood is in some way bound up in relationships and without 
relationships the self would be impoverished.
Cited in Harris, 1998; 226 
Harris, 1998: 226 
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Important as interpersonal relations are in the constitution of personal 
identity, these relationships are secondary in significance to our relationship 
to God. “In theological sense the ‘person’ comes into being through God’s
summons.
In this section we have considered the view that human beings relate 
because they are persons. This contrasts with the view In earlier sections 
that we are persons because we are in relation with others. We considered 
Harris’ concern that to define personhood relationally can result in degrees of 
personhood. We also looked at the important distinction she makes between 
our personhood and our sense of being a person. Having considered self in 
relation to others (whether in relation because we are persons or persons 
because we are in relation) we turn now to look at self in relation to God as 
the ultimate other.
1.2.VÎ In Relation to God
In considering the centrality of personal relations - or personal community - to 
our being, John Macquarrie insists that the self is nothing if considered in 
isolation. It only has value and meaning in relation to others, with God being 
the ultimate Other. “My ego is only an abstract fragment, and to fulfil myself I 
have to get out of myself...the fragmentariness of the individual must be 
overcome by joining himself with others. Finally, perhaps, he must transcend 
towards God and find his true centre there.... Only through losing the narrow 
egocentric self can a fuller humanity be attained.”*^ ®
This idea, mentioned by Macquarrie, of God being the ultimate Other to 
whom we relate is central to McFadyen and can also be found in Macmurray. 
Whereas Macmurray, writing as a philosopher, introduces God as the 
ultimate universal Other only towards the end of Persons In Relation, 
McFadyen, writing as a theologian, does so right at the beginning and makes 
frequent reference to it throughout A Call To Personhood. “Human being is
Moltmann, 1999: 80 
Macquarrie, 1982: 46
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therefore to be described as...a being addressed as Thou to God’s I. .. It is 
the divine intention that human beings shall be free in relation to Godself as 
God’s dialogue partners.”^^"^  In other words, God communicates as dialogue 
partner to humankind while showing respect for humankind’s (God-given) 
freedom and independence. God gives us the freedom to respond however 
we want. The one freedom we do not have is not to respond, as everything 
we do or say is a response even if we do or say nothing. God gives us the 
freedom not to become, and the freedom - and indeed the ability - to become 
what McFadyen describes as his ‘dialogue partners’. God calls us, we 
respond to his call by either accepting it and becoming his ‘dialogue 
partners’, or rejecting it and going our own way.
Whereas Macmurray simply presents God as the ultimate universal other, 
McFadyen goes further, suggesting that relations with others are only right 
when God, in the person of Christ, is at the centre. In support of this he cites 
Bonhoeffer who says, “Christ stands between us, and we can only get into 
touch with our neighbours through him.”^^  ^ Both Bonhoeffer and McFadyen 
suggest here that social relations are modified through redemption because 
redemption transforms the relation to God. Such statements might be taken 
to suggest that by definition Christians are always in right relationship with 
others because their relationships have been redeemed, but such a claim 
ignores the countless schisms and factions which punctuate the history of all 
denominations as well as the very existence of denominations. It also denies 
that those who are not Christians are capable of relating to others, saying 
that only Christians can be capable. While it is true that relationships with 
others are changed as our relationship with God is changed and transformed, 
care must clearly be taken not to appear to be making false claims that only 
Christians are capable of healthy relationships or that Christian relationships 
are always healthy. The transformation of interpersonal relationships takes 
place because redemption gives us a new framework of meaning within 
which to operate^^^. “It is only through the incorporation of persons into
^ "^^McFadyen, 1990:119f. 
^^^Cited in McFadyen, 1990: 58 
^^^McFadyen, 1990: 114
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God’s interaction with us that persons and relations become properly 
constituted, although this reconstitution remains incomplete. It is only 
therefore by viewing persons and relations against the horizon of 
redemption...that we can come to a proper understanding of them.”^^  ^
Perhaps the answer to why this should be is found in Hauerwas’ comment 
that we are no self until we are the self God called us to be^ ^®. We cannot 
begin to understand others unless and until we have begun to understand 
ourselves, and surely if the self is unfulfilled and incomplete then self- 
understanding will be very sparse.
T.F. Torrance also considers that we can only fulfil our potential as persons, 
whether in relation to others or in other areas of life, through God. “I submit 
that it is only through a divine Trinity who admits us to communion with 
himself in his own transcendence that we can be consistently and 
persistently personal, with that kind of freedom, openness and transcendent 
reference which we need both to develop our own personal and social culture 
and our scientific exploration of the universe.... What we need is the recovery 
of spiritual being, being that is open to personal reality and not impersonal in 
its own se If-ce ntred ness.
The world remains fallen but the orientation of individuals is transformed if 
they respond appropriately to God, receiving his forgiveness and justification. 
McFadyen is careful to point out that responding to Christ gives a person a 
transformed orientation rather than a complete new beginning. The apostle 
Paul, on the other hand, seems to suggest that there is a complete new 
beginning when he writes, “Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, he is a new 
creation; the old has gone, the new has come.“^^ ° Identity, however, is not 
abandoned when it is renewed^^^ and previous relations which formed that 
identity are not negated. The newness refers to qualitative newness, not 
numerical newness. As we will consider in chapter 3, it is not the past but
^^^McFadyen, 1990:116 
Hauerwas, 1984: 36 
Cited In Gay, 1998: 285 
Corinthians 5:17 
^^^McFadyen, 1990: 51
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our perception of the past that changes^^. It is possible to suppose, then, 
that in redemption God does not destroy identity but recreates it. The 
continuity between fallen and redeemed reality lies in God’s continuity and 
faithfulness^
While McFadyen sees persons as persons-in-relation to others and with God, 
Craig Gay seems to suggest, like Macquarrie where he speaks of ‘human 
becoming’^ t h a t  personhood is a goal towards which we strive, that it Is 
something we become rather than something we are. Gay states, “We 
become persons only in relation to other p e r s o n s . H e  goes on to say that 
we only become persons as we move towards communion with others and 
ultimately with God. In support of this he appeals to Kierkegaard’s contention 
that the degree of self-consciousness it is possible for us to reach is 
determined by the others to whom we relate and that full selfhood is only 
possible in relation to God^ ^®. Gay seems here to conflate our being with our 
sense of being. He writes, “Christianly understood, then, personal existence 
is the creative act of the personal God who graciously calls us into 
relationship with himself.
McFarland, on the other hand, says that to say personhood is constituted in 
relation to others and to God excludes those unable to relate to God^ ^®. This, 
at first glance, seems to assume that being in relation to someone (or 
something) equals being in a conscious relationship with them, but whether 
or not persons are consciously in relationship with God, they are related to 
him as creatures to creator. That we can be unconsciously in relation to 
others and to things is indicated by Colin Gunton where he says, “I am 
related to you as a distinct person, to cabbages and stars and oceans as 
distinct beings, albeit as those whose substantiality takes a myriad of
Brockeiman, 1985: 67
McFadyen, 1990: 71 f
see introduction to this chapter
Gay. 1998: 279
Gay, 1998: 279f
Gay, 1998: 280
McFarland, 2001: 205
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different f o rms .McFar land ,  however, goes on to make the important point 
that our personhood is dependent, not on our response to God but on his 
treatment of us. “We are persons because Jesus reveals us as such, not 
because we possess a certain number of ontological characteristics.... Our 
being human is simply a function of our being created human beings like 
Jesus, quite apart from how we may respond to God’s address in Jesus.... 
We are persons because God, acting in Christ treats us as persons. W e  
also find this thought in Moltmann where he says, “Human beings are 
intended to live in this relation to God. That gives their existence its inaliable, 
transcendent depth dimension. In their relationship to the transcendent God, 
human beings become persons whose dignity must not be infringed.
Having established that Jesus is the image of God (“He is the image of the 
invisible God.” (Colossians 1:15)) and that we are made in God’s image 
(“Then God said, ‘Let us make man in our image, in our likeness’.... So God 
created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and 
female he created them.” (Genesis 1;26f)), McFarland suggests that to show 
what a person is the Gospel directs us to the risen Jesus. This in turn, he 
suggests, points us to the crucified Jesus and, in so doing, we are enabled to 
perceive the other. “If we want to know what a person is, the Gospel 
narratives point us to the risen Jesus; but in the very process of pointing to 
Jesus they direct us to look behind him, to the crucified man on Golgotha 
and, thereby, to the various other reputable and disreputable human 
characters whom he is not...so that to look at Jesus becomes the means for 
perceiving the other as other.... This suggests that the imago Dei is properly 
conceived not as a model to which individual beings may or may not 
conform, but as a lens through which individuals are able to be perceived as 
persons. That human beings are created ‘in’ this image means that they are 
the kind of being whose personhood is disclosed in Jesus.
Gunton, 1993: 204
McFarland, 2001: 213, 217 (emphasis added)
Moltmann, 1999:122 
McFarland, 2001: 212f
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John Zizioulas also points us to Christ as the means of discovering what 
humankind is when he says, “The mystery of man reveals itself fully only in 
the light of Christ.” '^^ ®
1.2.vii Relationalitv Within The Trinity
In his attempt to understand and explain why as persons we need to be in 
relation with other persons, Volf turns his attention to the perichoretic 
relationships within the Trinity. There he finds a model for our inter­
relatedness with and interdependence on one another. He writes, “The 
others are part of my true identity. I cannot live authentically without 
welcoming the others -  the other gender, other persons, or other cultures -  
into the very structure of my being. For I am created to reflect the personality 
of the triune God.... The one divine person is not that person only, but 
includes the other divine persons in itself; it is what it is only through the 
indwelling of the others.... Every divine person is the other persons, but is the 
other persons in his or her particular way.... The same is true of human 
persons created in the image of God. Their identity as persons is 
conditioned by the characteristics of other person in their social relations.
He makes a similar point elsewhere about the mutual indwelling and 
interdependence of the Trinity. “The identity of each Trinitarian person 
cannot be defined apart from the others.... The Son is the Son because the 
Father and the Spirit indwell him; without this interiority of the Father and the 
Spirit; there would be no Son.” '^^ ® He notes that whether we endorse a 
traditional hierarchical view of the Trinity or the more recent non-hierarchical 
view, we can agree that the life of God is a life of, “Self-giving and other- 
receiving love.” "^*®
John Zizioulas and Colin Gunton both consider the question of relationality 
within the Trinity and the absolute necessity of the Trinitarian relations to the 
being of God. Zizioulas writes, “Outside the Trinity there is no God.... The
Zizioulas, 1975: 433 
Volf in Gundry-Volf & Volf, 1997: 59 
^^ ®Volf, 1996: 128 
"^*®Volf, 1996:127
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being of God is identified with the p e r s o n . T h a t  is to say that the being of 
God is identified in the person who God is, not in the substance of what God 
is^ "^ ®. He emphasises the importance of loving relationship such as is found 
in the Trinity, to the person by insisting that in the absence of love 
personhood is diminished. “Outside the communion of love the person loses 
its uniqueness and becomes...a ‘thing’ without absolute ‘identity’ and ‘name’, 
without a ‘face’.” "^^®
In Gunton we read, “According to the teaching of perichoresis, the three 
divine persons are all bound up with one another, so that one is not one 
without the other two.... The persons do not simply enter into relations with 
one another, but are constituted by one another in relations. Father, Son and 
Spirit are eternally what they are by virtue of what they are from and to one 
another. Being and relation can be distinguished in thought, but in no way 
separated ontologically."^®®
Gunton polarises the concepts of perichoresis (which, he says shows, “the 
ontological interdependence and reciprocity of the three persons of the 
Trinity”) and particularity (“Which in Trinitarian theology is a way of pointing to 
the distinctiveness of the persons”) ^ Z i z i o u l a s  applies these same 
concepts of perichoresis and particularity to human persons in relation. He 
writes, “For someone or something to be, two things are simultaneously 
needed: being itself {hypostasis) and being in relation (i.e. being a person). It 
is only in relationship that identity appears as having an ontological 
significance, and if any relationship did not imply such an ontologically 
meaningful identity, then it would be no relationship.... The significance of the 
person rests in the fact that he represents two things simultaneously which 
are at first sight in contradiction: particularity and communion.
Zizioulas, 1985: 41 
Zizioulas, 1985: 42 
Zizioulas. 1985: 49 
Gunton. 1993: 153, 214 
Gunton. 1993: 152f 
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We find further consideration of these twin themes of perichoresis and 
particularity in Hart who writes, "Generality and particularity, then, far from 
being opposed to one another, are mixed together and require one another, 
being mutually self-constitutive and self-defining.... The general, or ‘shared’ 
is necessary as a familiar backdrop in order for us to identify particular 
versions of or departures from it; while particularity requires a certain sort of 
generality in order to be significant and meaningful to others.” ®^®
Also considering Trinitarian relationships. Gay expresses concern that 
because it is unfashionable to think theologically people today tend to lose 
sight of the importance of our relationality. "While modern post-christlan 
thought retains a vague awareness of the importance of individuality and 
personality, its refusal to ground these notions in God’s self-revelation means 
that it can have no real consciousness of the relational essence that forms 
the absolute ground of each of us, an absolute ground that transcends 
psychological and/or cultural advantage.” ®^'^  This could explain why modern 
western secular society is so highly individualistic and lauds absolute 
independence of the individual over mutual interdependence. Zygmunt 
Bauman similarly expresses concern that postmodernity with its emphasis on 
individual autonomy renders relationships, ‘‘Fragmentary and discontinuous, 
fostering disengagement and commitment avoidance.””*®® Fragmentariness, 
disengagement and commitment avoidance may well be typical features of 
postmodern relationships as Bauman suggests, but theologically speaking, 
"To be a human is to be created in and for relationship with God and with 
other human beings.... Communion is being in relation, in which there is due 
recognition of both particularity and relationality.” ®^® Heathy relationships, 
then, are not characterised by disengagement and commitment avoidance 
but by engagement, commitment and perichoretic mutuality.
In the last two sections we have considered persons In relation to God and 
God in relation with Godself. In section 1.2,vi we considered God as the
Hart, 1999a: 38f
Gay, 1998: 286
Cited in Volf, 1996:21
Gunton, 1993: 83
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ultimate other to whom we relate and the transformation brought about in our 
interpersonal relationships by a transformation in our relationship with God.
1.2.VÜ shows that we find our model for our inter-relatedness and 
interdependence in the perichoretic relationships in the Trinity. We saw that 
each person of the Trinity is as he is because the others are as they are. 
Both perichoresis and particularity are necessary. In the next section we will 
consider mutual indwelling and otherness in relationship as It refers to 
relationship between persons.
1.2.vni Mutual Indwelling And Otherness In Relationship
Volf discusses the self in healthy relation to others. "The self," he tells us, “is 
dialogically constructed...I am who I am in relation to the other.... Hence the 
will to be oneself, if it is to be healthy, must entail the will to let the other 
inhabit the self; the other must be part of who I am as I will to be myself. 
This inhabitation of the one by the other is also found in Ford who suggests 
that the people closest to our hearts give a clue to our identity^ ®®. He tells us 
that there are those in whose presence we always live, even when they are 
not physically present with us. Our connection to them is crucial to our sense 
of self. “We find ourselves,” he says, “partly by remembering those who are 
most deeply woven into us and by continuing to relate to them.... They may 
be on the other side of the world or they may be dead, but they are 
constantly before us and within us.” ®^® This same thought is expressed the 
following poem by Frederick Beichner.
Remember
When you remember me.
It means that you have carried something of who I am with you.
That I have left some mark of who 1 am on who you are.
It means that you can summon me back in your mind even
Though countless years and miles may stand between us.
It means that when we meet again, you will know me.
157
158 Volf, 1996:90 Ford, 1999:18 
Ford, 1997: 3ff
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It means that even after I die, you can still see my face 
And hear my voice and speak to me in your heart J®®
Our perception of others and our relationships with them is compounded by 
the fact that we are not relating only to the otherness of the other whom we 
perceive but also to what Ford calls the community of his or her heart. “We 
constantly come up against the sheer otherness and difference of each other. 
And we do not just have to do with an individual, but with the community of 
his or her heart, and all the secrets of those relationships."^®^ Of course, not 
only do we have to do with the community of the other person's heart, the 
other person also has to contend with our personal community, for, as Ford 
says, some people are so much a part of our identity that something of their 
identity is woven into our thinking and feeling^® .^ While, as I have said, this 
compounds the already complex nature of our interaction with the other, our 
encounter with the other’s heart-community can also help us as we get to 
know the other and as the other gets to know us for, “The people closest to 
us give a clue to our identity -  a mental picture of them stirs memory of the 
past as well as future hopes and fears. ’’ ®^® The part someone plays in the 
life of another can continue (consciously or unconsciously) to exert an 
influence, either positive or negative, for many years, perhaps for the rest of 
the other’s life, and through that person on the lives of others.
We might say, then, that the emotionally healthy person can cope with both 
solitude and community, shunning neither and perhaps even needing both. 
Bonhoeffer expresses this dual need paradoxically when he ways, “Let him 
who cannot be alone beware of community...let him who is not in community 
beware of being alone.... Only in fellowship do we learn to be rightly alone 
and only in aloneness do we learn to live rightly in the fellowship.’’ ®^'*
Central to Volfs Exclusion And Embrace are, as the title suggests, the 
themes of excluding and embracing the other. Although he recognizes that
www.jasonmccutcheon.com/PoemsQuotes.com?RID=67
Ford, 1997: 88
Ford. 1997: 2
Ford, 1997: 18
Bonhoeffer, 1976: 57
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the embrace metaphor is not appropriate in all cultures -  in some it indicates 
too high a degree of intimacy while in others it is too commonplace -  he 
defines it as, “The will to give ourselves to others and welcome them, to 
readjust our identities to make space for them.”*®® This theme of giving and 
receiving resonates with elements of McFadyen’s account where he says, 
“(A) personal relation is one characterised by the call and response, the gift 
and return of dialogue”.*®® It is not, however, embrace at any cost. The will 
to embrace, Volf tells us, is dependent on expressions of truth and actions of 
justice. Without truth and justice embrace cannot happen*® .^ “Without the 
will to embrace the other there will be no truth between people and without 
truth between people there will be no peace.... Inversely, the will to embrace 
cannot be sustained and will not result in an actual embrace if truth does not 
reign.... Telling what one believes to be true is a way of being loyal to a 
relationship; telling what one believes not to be true is a way of defecting 
from a relationship.... We speak truth because community matters to us and 
we sustain community that matters to us by speaking truth.”*®®
Volf describes in detail what he means by embrace and it will be helpful to 
summarise it here. In embrace we open our arms, wait, close them and then 
open them again. Anything less is not embrace*®®. He points out that the 
metaphor would easily be applied to a handshake where we open our hands, 
wait for the other then, close and re-open our hands. To open the arms, the 
first stage of embrace, gives the message, “I do not want to be myself 
always; be part of the other...suggest the pain of the other’s absence and the 
joy of the other’s anticipated presence.”*^ ® It is also a sign that I have 
created space in myself for the other. The next stage, waiting, respects the 
integrity of the other who may not want embrace. He gives the example here 
of women for whom past embrace has turned into rape. An embrace cannot 
be fulfilled unless the other reciprocates. We cannot force this or it would not
^^Volf, 1996: 29
McFadyen, 1990:18f 
Volf, 1996:29
Volf, 1996: 258ff (original emphasis) 
^^Volf, 1996: 14 
Volf, 1996:41
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be embrace. Embrace does not coerce or exploit the other, it offers and 
invites; it does not grasp the other but reaches out to the other.
The goal of embrace is to close the arms, giving a situation where each is the 
host and each the guest. Even in this action, however, it is important that 
each maintains his or her own boundaries. We need to respect the 
particularity of ourselves and of others*^*. To act otherwise embrace 
becomes what Volf calls a, “self-destructive act of abnegation”*
Finally the arms are opened again. If this does not happen the embrace is 
cancelled because the other is being coerced and exploited. “In an embrace 
the identity and alterity of the self is both preserved and transformed and the 
alterity of the other is both affirmed as alterity and partly received into the 
ever changing identity of the self.... The other must be let go that her alterity 
-  her genuine dynamic identity - may be preserved; and the self must take 
itself back into itself so that its own identity, enriched by the traces that the 
presence of the other has left may be preserved.”*^ ® “Sin's more immediate 
goal is...to violently reconfigure the pattern of its interdependence, to ‘put 
asunder what God has joined and join what God has put asunder.”*^ "* This 
Volf calls exclusion, his other core theme.
Exclusion cuts us off from others, assuming a position of ‘sovereign 
independence' in which the other emerges as at best, the enemy and at 
worst a nonentity. It is important to recognise that exclusion differs from 
having legitimate boundaries. “For without boundaries there would be no 
discrete identities and without discrete identities there could be no relation to 
the other.”*^ ® I will return to the theme of boundaries toward the end of this 
chapter and will look here at what Volf says about exclusion.
Hart, 1999a: 37 
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Volf looks at the life and ministry of Jesus and his followers with social 
outcasts. From this he concludes that, “The real sinner is not the outcast but 
the one who casts the other out.”*^ ® He goes on to define sin as, “The 
exclusion of the other from one's heart and one’s world" -  in other words, to 
refuse to embrace the otherness in others* A problem arises when the 
other is not what I wish the other to be (this can take many forms -  for 
example, the other may be too aggressive for my liking, or may be more 
talented than I am) and I try to force the other to be less like other and more 
like me, so that In relation I can be what I want to be*^ ®. Those who 
continually experience the exclusion by others of their unique otherness may 
eventually exclude, "their own self from the will to be oneself."*^® 
Furthermore, to exclude the other is to exclude God*®® for, as Jesus says in 
Matthew's Gospel, “Whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers of 
mine, you did for me...whatever you did not do for one of the least of these, 
you did not do for me."*®* The way we treat others reflects the way we treat 
God in whose image humankind is made. Buber makes a similar point when 
he observes that we cannot have an l-You relationship with God and l-lt with 
everyone else. If we use people only for our own ends we will treat God the 
same way*® .^ A similar point is made by Moltmann who notes that to do 
violence or turn away from one made in God's image is to do violence or turn 
away from God*®®. “God," he says, “has a relationship to every embryo, 
every severely handicapped person and every person suffering from one of 
the diseases of old age, and he is honoured and glorified in them when their 
dignity is respected."*®'*
In a discussion of what it means for us to relate to that which is other than 
ourselves, Moltmann cautions against excluding others by rejecting their 
otherness for to do so limits not only the other but also the self. To know only
Volf in Gundry-Volf & Volf, 1997: 49 
Volf in Gundry-Volf & Volf, 1997: 49 
Volf, 1996: 91
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that which is like self is to know only self. To know only ‘like’ is to know 
nothing we did not already know. “The fascination of knowing is missing. 
The interest in knowing is paralysed.”*®® He tells us that we have to come 
close to others and form relationships with them if we are to know them and 
have them come close to us and form relationships with us. To treat the 
other as a reflection of the self and not as other, he says, undermines both 
knowledge and community*®®. Macquarrie, however, indicates that this kind 
of reaching beyond the bounds of self and into the realm of the other 
described here by Moltmann can be so frightening and threatening to some 
persons that they fail to manage it*®^ .
Moltmann makes the suggestion that “other is only known by other” and that 
“the acceptance of others creates community in diversity.”*®® The 
epistemological statement, ‘like is only known by like’, he tells us, indicates 
that unlike (other) is finally unknowable -  cognition equals recognition. Early 
Greek philosophy extended ‘like is only known by like’ to include ‘similar’. 
So, in perceiving the different, we perceive within the ‘different’ that which is 
‘same’ or ‘similar’, that is, that which corresponds in some measure to self*®®. 
Moltmann states, “We respect and recognise other people and those who are 
strange to us when we stop trying to make them like ourselves but attempt to 
open ourselves for their particular character.”*®®
In this section we have seen that other people are so much a part of who we 
are that their identity is interwoven with ours. Thus, the other who is part of 
me continues to exert influence on me and is present in my interactions with 
others even when absent. Even when the other dies the fact of our 
relationship and its influence does not cease. We looked at 
embracing/including the other and said that even in embrace the particularity 
of the self and of the other is not denied. We also looked at
Moltmann, 1999:136 
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excluding/rejecting. To accept or reject the other, we said, is to accept or 
reject God.
In our relations with others, our perception of sameness and difference often 
begins with our perception of the physical -  skin colour and ethnic group, 
maleness and femaleness, youth and age. “Human beings are particularised 
and identified by their bodies because they are the chief means by which to 
distinguish one person from another.”*®*
1.2.ÏX Embodiment and Name
Embodiment gives identity a concrete recognisability - and concrete evidence 
of continuity. Although the body is arguably, as McFadyen describes it, the, 
“First and best tool in the identification of persons,” identity, as we are 
considering, is a great deal more than the body*® .^ Other sources of 
recognition -  secondary sources - are habits in speech and behaviour, and 
artefacts such as birth or marriage certificates*®®.
Paul Fiddes also acknowledges that, although Inseparable from it, the person 
is more than the body and the body's experiences. “We can think of the 
person as being more than the body, and even more than a collection of 
mental and physical events, and yet still being inseparable from the 
body...the T is a distinct self with thoughts, feelings and actions which is not 
reducible to the body.”*®'* The same activities are mentioned by Thomas 
Reid who, in describing the self, as we have seen says, “I am not thought. I 
am not action. I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and 
suffers.” *®®
In addition to the body being the primary tool in identification it can also give 
information about how we relate to others, for example ‘laughter lines' gives
Gunton, 1993: 45 
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an indication of good humour. In certain situations we can use our bodies to 
convey social meanings such as sexual interest, or being in need of 
assistance, or boredom*®®. While there is a great deal more to the ‘self than 
the body, it is almost Impossible for us to imagine a non-bodily existence of 
ourselves. To say, for example, ‘I am over six feet tali' is a shorthand way of 
saying ‘my body is over 6 feet tall’*®^ . Daniel Price makes the same point 
that we do not say ‘my body has a toothache’ but rather, I have 
toothache’*®®. Likewise reference to a person other than ourselves often 
includes reference in some way to the person's body -  ‘the tall man', ‘the 
blond girl’ -  or we point to them, or use a name, which conjures up a physical 
image for the listener*®®. Identity, then, is inseparable from, but more than 
embodied continuity.
In considering the question of personal continuity, Paul Fiddes (2000), Derek 
Parfit (1989) and John Hick (1979) all show an interest in the Startrek style 
‘body transporter’ device which apparently dissolves the body into its 
component atoms and reassembles them elsewhere having transmitted the 
necessary information, if not the component atoms, by radio wave to the new 
location. ‘Travellers’ lose consciousness and wake up in their new body in 
the new location. This raises the question -  is the replicated person the 
same person as the original?^®® According to Hick, if the replica has exact 
body similarity and the same memories, and be the only one of that person in 
existence then it is the same person^®*. Fiddes qualifies what Hick says by 
adding that identical body must include identical brain state, and memory 
must include the consciousness of being the same person with the same 
beliefs, habits and so on^ ®^ .
Parfit considers that in teletransportation the person is destroyed and is 
recreated elsewhere, complete with all her or his memories, preferences, and
*®®McFadyen, 1990: 88 
Shoemaker, 1963:18 
Price, 2002: 276 
Shoemaker, 1963:15f 
Fiddes, 2000: 76 
Hick. 1979: 280ff 
^  Fiddes, 2000: 77
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such like. The ‘replica’, as he calls it, is qualitatively but not numerically 
identical with the original self®®. If then, a replica of the self lives on through 
replication although the self is destroyed, Parfit questions why he would be 
reluctant to enter the scanner. “My reluctance to enter the scanner and travel 
by teletransportation,’’ he suggests, “would thus show that I have an 
unhealthy preoccupation with my own ego from which I need to be released. 
It also shows that I think there is some kind of deep fact’ about ‘me’ that the 
device will fail to reproduce.” ®^^* For Fiddes, “Parfit’s reflections are highly 
valuable for our concern about future hope.... It...highiight(s) the inadequacy 
of a mere ‘replica’ idea, and urges us towards a view of re-creation that is 
more than reproduction.” ®^®
This hints at the line of thought that says for post mortem identity to have 
continuity with mortal identity, the resurrection body has to be made up of the 
same atoms as the old body, brought back together and re-energised^®®. 
Augustine seems to have anticipated the logical arguments against this, 
which says the body destroyed by fire or devoured by animals or cannibals 
cannot be reconstructed because it no longer exists and counters it by 
appeal to the omnipotence and providence of God. “For the earthly matter of 
which mortals’ flesh is created is never lost to God: but into whatever dust or 
ashes it be dissolved; into whatever vapours or mists it flee away, or 
whatever substance of other bodies it be converted, or even into the very 
elements, into whatsoever animal’s or men’s food it be reduced, so as to be 
changed into their flesh, it returns in a moment of time to that human soul 
which in the first place made it animate.” ®^^ Fiddes notes that for “The power 
of divine omnipotence to reconstitute the same matter cannot be defeated 
even by a person’s being eaten by fishes or cannibals.” ®^®
^  Parfit, 1984:199f 
^  Cited in Fiddes, 2000: 83 
^  Fiddes. 2000; 83f 
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Parfit asks, “Why we would want to have a centred unitary subject at the 
heart of personal identity.” ®^® Fiddes follows this by asking why he would 
want his resurrected ‘me’ to be exactly the same as what he calls ‘me’, and 
states, “Unless there is continuity of identity doubt is cast on the value of our 
present existence with its trials and decisions...and the faithfulness of God is 
not clear if divine promises are to be fulfilled to a different person from the 
one to whom they were made.” *^® In answer to Parfit’s question, Fiddes 
writes, “We hope for a preserving of personal uniqueness not because our 
egos are so important that they must remain; rather it would be a denial of 
the love of others who have made us what we are, if the result of their love 
were to be absorbed into a cosmic whole.” *^*
Something of the importance to the self of preserving personal uniqueness in 
the face of change is seen in the experience of one-time Superman actor, 
Christopher Reeve who broke his neck in a horse riding accident, leaving him 
quadriplegic. He states in his autobiography that he was in despair and 
feeling that death was the only solution to his situation. Reeve believes his 
life was saved because his will to live was restored by these simple words 
spoken by his wife, “You’re still you. And I love you.” *^  ^ This shows both the 
importance of a sense of continuity even in the face of radical bodily changes 
(also reflected in the book’s title, Still Me) and how continuity of the self is in 
part constituted and sustained by certain relationships.
“It is not the sameness of my body,” says Ricoeur, “that constitutes its 
selfhood but its belonging to someone capable of designating himself or 
herself as the one whose body this is.” *^®
Significant as the whole body is for concrete recognisability and evidence of 
continuity, Ford points out, the face is perhaps the primary locus for relating
^  Cited in Fiddes, 2000: 84 
Fiddes, 2000: 84 
Fiddes, 2000:108 
Reeve, 1999: 28 
Ricoeur, 1992: 129
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because all five senses are located on the face^*'*, and Macquarrie reminds 
us of the rather obvious but important point that we are aware of the faces of 
others before we ever see our own, and even then we never see our own 
faces directly^*®. The face is our means and mode of orientation towards the 
other. The self is revealed to the other and the other to the self face to face. 
“The way in which the other presents himself...we here name face.” *^® That 
the self of the other is somehow disclosed in his face is suggested by 
Levinas through his use of the word ‘epiphany’. He writes, “The other 
remains infinitely transcendent, infinitely foreign; his face in which his 
epiphany is produced and which appeals to me breaks with the world that 
can be common to us.” *^^
In many places in the Old and New Testaments God is known in the ‘face of 
God’. God’s face in Scripture represents Godself^*®. Clearly when the 
Scriptures speak of God’s face being turned toward or away from people, or 
people seeking God’s face, it is Godself that is being turned toward or away 
from people and Godself whom people are seeking. So too in our personal 
encounters with others the face is the physical aspect that is turned toward 
the other. This point is emphasised by Levinas’ insistance that In the face we 
find, “a coinciding of the expressed with him who expresses...the coinciding 
of the revealer and the revealed.” *^®
Levinas seems to suggest that it is the face more than anything else that 
encapsulates and presents to others the true being of a person. “To seek 
truth I have already established a relationship with a face which can 
guarantee itself, whose epiphany itself is somehow a word of honour.... The
Ford, 1997:19 
Macquarrie, 1982: 85 
Levinas, 1969:50 
Levinas, 1969:194
^^ ®For example, “The Lord make his face shine upon you and be gracious to you.” (Numbers 
6:25), “On that day I will become angry with them and forsake them; I will hide my face from 
them.... And I will certainly hide my face on that day because of all their wickedness in 
turning to other gods.” (Deuteronomy 31:17f), "Look to the Lord and seek his strength, seek 
his face always.” (1 Chronicles 16:11), “My heart says of you, ‘seek his face!' Your face Lord 
I will seek. Do not hide your face from me." (Psalm 27:8f), “The face of the Lord is against 
those who do evil.” (1 Peter 3:12).
Levinas, 1969: 66f
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face in which the other -  the absolutely other -  presents himself does not 
negate the same, does not do violence to it as do opinion of authority or the 
thaumaturgie supernatural.”^^ ®
It is surely because a person’s face is what physically identifies her and 
distinguishes her from the next person more than anything else that the 
recent concern expressed over the possibility of face transplants is justified. 
Peter Butler, consultant plastic surgeon, has researched the possibility of 
using face transplants from people who have just died for patients whose 
faces have been seriously disfigured as a result of injury or disease, in much 
the same way as healthy organs from people who die are used to replace 
diseased organs. In a survey of people’s attitudes, including doctors, nurses 
and lay people, Butler found that while most people would be willing to 
accept a face transplant if they required it, few would be willing to give 
consent to their faces being used^^*.
Often when painting a self-portrait, the artist will represent himself or herself 
by painting his or her face. Appendix 1 shows a series of self-portraits by 
William Utermohlen, a professional artist who was diagnosed with 
Alzheimer’s disease at the age of 61 years. From prior to his diagnosis he 
painted self-portraits at regular intervals. Each was a self-motivated attempt 
at self-portrait and not a copy of earlier paintings. The first was painted at 
age 60 and is a good representation, bearing a strong facial resemblance to 
the artist. By the time the second was painted at the age of 62, Utemohlen 
appears to have had difficulty representing features. The third, at age 63, 
shows a skewed sense of proportion (see, for example, his ear). This is the 
first portrait in which there is no context or background filled in. In the fourth, 
painted when the artist was 64, the features are blurred together and 
disjointed. By the time the fifth portrait was done, when he was 65, 
Utermohlen had resorted to using a pencil and his drawing was more
Levinas, 1969: 202f
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hl/health/2516281 .stm
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abstract and primitive. His other work at this time apparently was also 
abstract^ ^^ .
It is unlikely that Utermohlen would have been able to express verbally his 
sense of his disappearing self but he showed his feelings graphically through 
his art as his representations of himself moved from being a good physical 
likeness, through blurring and disproportion and finally to unrecognisable 
abstract. His artistic impressions of himself are a good illustration of the 
increasingly blurred and confused sense of self he is likely to have been 
experiencing over the years as his illness progressed. As we will consider in 
chapter 2, when, due to illness or injury, a person’s sense of self is blurred or 
confused, as represented in Utermohlen’s art, the identity of the person is not 
lost, even although it is lost to him or herself. It is sustained through the 
memory of those who care about him or her.
“The identity of a person’s whole life history,” says Moltmann, "is indicated by 
his or her name. Through my name I identify with the person I was in the 
past, and anticipate myself as the person I will be in the future.”^^ ® Faced 
with the question, ‘who are you?’ the first answer most people would give is 
their name. Name identifies us. or as Bauckham puts it, “A name symbolises 
i d e n t i t y . W h e n  those who know who we are hear our name or see it 
written, they know it refers to us, but if we started using a different name 
people would not know. If, for example, I stopped using the name I have 
used all my life and started using my maternal grandmother’s name -  a name 
which bears no resemblance to mine^^® -  people would not know who I was 
unless of course they could see or hear me. It is not uncommon for 
offenders to give police a false name in the hope of escaping prosecution. 
When detected, however, instead of escaping prosecution they find 
themselves convicted of an additional offence -  ‘attempting to pervert the 
course of justice’. Sometimes people deliberately give themselves a new
Crutch, Isaacs & Rossor, 2001: 2130f 
Moltmann, 1999: 87 
Bauckham, 2002: 40
My name Is M Jane McArthur, my grandmother’s was Norah Morrison, neé MacLennan.
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identity by formally and legally changing their names. While in the Balkans in 
the years following the Balkan crisis, I met people who had changed their 
names in an attempt to alter their preferred national identity to fit the country 
in which they lived. For example, Dragan lived in Croatia but had a Serb 
name. He changed his name to Ivan, a popular Croat name.
Primo Levi felt that if only he and his fellow-prlsoners could hold onto their 
names while in concentration camp they would be holding onto their 
identities. He writes, “Nothing belongs to us anymore.... They have even 
taken away our name: and if we want to keep it we will have to find ourselves 
the strength to do so, to manage somehow so that behind the name 
something of us, of us as we were, still remains.
The idea that name symbolises identity is not new. When we read in the 
book of Genesis Jacob asking, “Please tell me your name,” (Genesis 32:29) 
he was asking God to reveal his identity. God responds to Jacob's request 
by blessing him. In blessing Jacob, God reveals his identity, thus answering 
Jacob’s question.
With name symbolising identity, biblical statements about God giving us a 
new name (for example, Isaiah 62:2, Revelation 2:17) might be thought to be 
problematic, suggesting that in the New Creation our ‘newness’ will be 
numerical rather than qualitative. This, though, misses the point of what it 
means to be given a new name in Scripture. Rather than losing what we are, 
to be given a new name is to be given something more. When Abram and 
Sarai became Abraham and Sarah they did not cease to be themselves, nor 
did Simon when he became Peter or Saul when he became Paul. Women 
who marry usually change their surnames to their husband’s name. I 
suggest that this change of name signifies a taking on of something new 
rather than lost identity. The person’s single status is lost, but not her identity 
unless her identity has been defined too closely in terms of the role played as 
a single person, in which case the change in circumstances could be
Levi. 1987:33
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threatening to her identity. So too when God bestows a new name it does 
not symbolise a loss of identity, but a taking on of something new, thus 
adding a new dimension to existing identity.
While not denying that name symbolises identity, Neil Anderson stresses that 
name is not identity. Name, he says, is name. It is not our identity any more 
than nationality, profession, denominational preference or height and weight, 
though our identity can be shaped by any or all of these factors. We are not 
our name and we are not the sum of our preferences, interests and activities. 
We make the choices we do because of who we are and not the other way 
round. Anderson emphasises this point by asking, “Is who you are 
determined by what you do, or is what you do determined by who you 
are?«227 Hauerwas makes a similar point when he says that T is not 
determined by what we do or do not do but that T must somehow stand 
behind what we do^ ^®.
This section has considered that although we are clearly more than body, 
embodiment gives concrete recognisability and concrete evidence of 
continuity. We have seen that the primary bodily locus of relating is the face. 
Ford notes that we cannot separate face and self but neither can we identify 
face with self. Just as we are more than body so, says Ford, we are more 
than face^^®. For Levinas, as we saw, the face is both the expression of the 
self and the self who is expressed. We considered too that in Scripture 
reference to the face of God is reference to Godself.
We also considered that, while we are more than a name, our name identifies 
us. Using biblical characters and married women as examples we saw how 
a change of name does not detract from the self but can alter our Identity in a 
positive way by adding something to it. Having considered the relational 
aspect of the self we will now consider the temporal aspect.
Anderson, 2000: 23f 
^  Hauerwas, 1984:41 
Ford, 1999:19
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1.3 Time and the conception of the self
1.3.Î Understanding Time: Understanding Self
John Macquarrie states, “Perhaps the first thing to be said about a self is that 
it needs time. It is through and through temporal...it is essential to a self to 
exist over a stretch of time.... A material thing too exists in time.... But the 
peculiarity of a human self is that it lives in awareness of time.” ®^® It is, then 
to time that I turn in this next section.
Augustine says of time that he knows what it is until someone asks him. “For 
what is time?” he asks. “Who could find any quick or easy answer to that? 
Who could even grasp it in his thought clearly enough to put the matter into 
words? Yet is there anything to which we refer in conversation with more 
familiarity, any matter of more common experience, than time? And we know 
perfectly well what we mean when we speak of it, and understand just as well 
when we hear someone else refer to it. What, then, is time? If no one asks 
me, I know; if I want to explain it to someone who asks me, I do not know.” ®^* 
Whether or not we embrace Augustinian theology we cannot but agree with 
him in this. Time, the passage of time, memory of time past, anticipation of 
future time are experiences we all share whether consciously or not and yet 
trying to explain what time is leaves most of us frustrated at the inadequacy 
of language.
Time not only makes sense of self as we remember what has been and 
anticipate what will be, it also enables us to make sense of the words 
someone utters or the notes played by a musician. Because we remember 
what has just been said and anticipate that more is to come we can make 
sense of the 'but' or the ‘and’ or the ‘however’ in the middle of a sentence. 
Without memory and anticipation when listening to a piece of music, a single 
note or chord would be no more than that but memory of what has been and 
anticipation of what will be give that note meaning and context. Thinking of 
time past, present and future, and the crucial role of memory and 
anticipation, musician George Rochberg writes, “We live between memory
Macquarrie, 1982: 42f
Augustine, 1997:14, 17
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and anticipation.... We live in time and through time. We are both of it and 
immersed in it. The present therefore is more than the moment of physical 
existence in which we feel pain or joy.... The present is destined to join the 
vast accumulation of all other lived moments of life...everything consciously 
or unconsciously becomes a part of memory.
In suggesting that any conception of self is determined by an understanding 
of time, Paul Brockeiman essentially makes the same point as Macquarrie. 
He suggests further that a phenomenological understanding of how we 
experience time helps us to understand the self because life is shaped and 
ordered by time. Brockeiman insists that a phenomenological analysis of 
time would help our understanding of the nature of ‘self because time, he 
says, is a fundamental and all-inclusive concept. “Our lives as a whole, as 
well as our activities, are bounded and shaped by time in a remarkably 
continuous and pervasive manner.” He adds that the world in which we live 
and our experience of ourselves is formed and ordered by time^ ®®. Time, 
Brockeiman continues, changes everything^®'*. Of course it is not time but 
processes taking place over time that cause changes. A child does not grow 
and develop simply because time passes but because over the course of 
passing time he or she is nourished and nurtured, kept safe and stimulated, 
played with and taught. In saying that life is shaped and ordered by time and 
that time changes everything, Brockeiman is saying we each have a history 
which gives shape and continuity to our identity and which makes the self 
comprehensible. He goes on to say that it is not only past and present time 
but also our hopes for the future that make us what we are. “To know ‘me’ it 
is not enough to know my past and present. You must also know my hopes 
and dreams, who T want to become.” ®^® In other words, he says, to know 
me the other needs to know what I have been, what I am and what I hope to 
be^ ®®. He later states, “There is no existing or personal identity which does 
not have its own history and anticipated future as part of itself. Remembering
^  Cited in Harrison, 2001 (www) 
^  Brockeiman, 1985:10 
^®'*BrockeIman, 1985: lOf. 
Brockeiman, 1985: 63 
Brockeiman, 1985: 64
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my history and anticipating a future I am seeking to appropriate are 
essentially elements of me.... I am who I am because of who I have been in 
the past and who I shall be in the future...’!’ am a story in the process of 
happening.” ®^^ It is not surprising then, that David Hume, who had a 
fragmented view of time, seeing no link between one moment and the next, 
found the ‘self to be elusive.
In this brief section we have seen that because the self exists over time, an 
understanding of time can assist in understanding the self. Memory of past 
time, experience of present time and anticipation of future time are all 
important as we seek to make sense of the self over time.
1.3.ii Narrative Identity
The temporal dimension that we are considering is central to the thinking of 
Paul Ricoeur with regard to personal identity^ ®®. He makes the observation 
that without the temporal dimension we cannot speak of personal identity,^ ®® 
and from this observation seeks to develop a theory of narrative as it applies 
to the self. This, he calls ‘narrative identity’. Human lives, he tells us, are 
understood through stories that interpret events. “(D)o we not consider 
human lives to be more readable when they have been interpreted in terms 
of the stories that people tell about them?” '^*® We can understand the self, 
whether our own or another’s, by telling the selfs story through the filter of 
interpretation. Or, to put it another way, “Narrative identity means reading 
and rewriting one’s life story in the context of a web of narratives. Identity 
then is based on the narrative, or more precisely, on a variety of narratives 
that are part of a vast laboratory for thought experiments.” '^**
Even this is not straightfon/vard, however, for the temporal dimension which 
facilitates understanding of the self by giving it a history can also distort
Brockeiman, 1985: 74 
^®®Ricoeur, 1992: 113ff 
^®®Rlcoeur, 1992:114 
'^*®Rjcoeur, 1992: 114n.
^'**Streils, 1999 (www)
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understanding and introduce doubt. With the passage of time we become 
less certain both about what Ricoeur calls numerical identity and what he 
calls the qualitative identity of something. For example, it becomes less 
certain whether the pen I am using today is the same pen (numerical identity) 
or a pen the same as (qualitative identity) the pen I used last week. Is it one 
and the same pen or is it two separate pens that look the same? If the pen 
has been continuously in my hand all week I can be confident that it is the 
same pen, but if I left it down and returned to it later it may be the same one 
or it may simply be one that looks that same. Similarly, we can know that two 
men are wearing two similar suits if they enter the room together but if one 
leaves the room before the other enters it is less certain whether they are 
wearing one and the same suit (numerical identity) or suits which look the 
same (qualitative identity).
Drawing attention to the two major different uses of the concept of identity, 
Ricoeur distinguishes between identity as selfhood (numerical identity) to 
which he applies the Latin term ipse, and identity as sameness (qualitative 
identity) to which he refers by the Latin word idem. As in the illustrations of 
numerical and qualitative identity using pens and suits ipse and idem are 
different. Selfhood is not identical to sameness '^*^. While selfhood and 
sameness are not identical, they do overlap but, “This overlapping does not 
abolish the difference...my character is me, myself, ipse] but this ipse 
announces itself in idem.... Here the two poles of identity accord with one 
another...one cannot think of the idem of the person without considering the 
ipse.” "^^  ^ Referring to selfhood, ipse answers the question ‘who?’; ‘Who is 
self?’ ‘Who am I?’ ‘Who are you?’ Idem, on the other hand relating to 
sameness, answers the questions ‘what?’ and ‘why?’ ‘What remains the 
same as before?’ ‘Why is my hair not the same colour as it once was?’ '^^ '^ .
It is the element of doubt, introduced with the passage of time, which makes 
it more difficult for victims or witnesses of crime to confidently identify the
"^^ ^Ricoeur, 1992:116 
Ricoeur, 1992:121 
'^^ ‘^ Ford. 1999: 67
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perpetrator. This is less likely to be a problem if identification takes place 
soon after the event. The lack of certainty is partly due to the problem of 
memory and partly because personal appearance can alter over time. 
Ricoeur tells us that, “Doubt is not far away when we compare present 
perception with a recent m e m o r y . H o w  much closer that doubt becomes 
when comparing present perception with a distant memory. Not only does 
the passage of time distance us from our Immediate perception thus 
introducing an element of doubt regarding identity, it also causes difference 
and change. Despite this change we know that persons are the same 
persons over time because of what Ricoeur terms the ‘uninterrupted 
continuity’ between the first and last stages of an individual’s development^"^®. 
He takes as an example an oak tree being ‘the same’ as the acorn from 
which it grew even although the passage of time has brought about an 
enormous difference between the two.
Parfit uses a similar illustration of a caterpillar which transmutes into a 
chrysalis then later becomes a butterfly. He notes that continuity of identity 
over time depends on the “spatio-temporal physical continuity of the 
o b j e c t . I n  other words, there has to be continuity despite change. The life 
cycle of a caterpillar-chrysalis-butterfly is the continuous existence of a single 
organism even although it may be physically unrecognisable at one stage of 
its development from the previous stage^ "^ ®.
Like the acorn and oak tree or the caterpillar, chrysalis and butterfly we 
change over time, although perhaps our changes are less dramatic. The 
majority of our body’s cells are renewed several times in the course of our 
lives, our thoughts, feelings and knowledge all change and yet we are in 
essence the same persons^ "^ ®. This is because of the spatio-temporal 
physical continuity discussed by Parfit. Despite many changes and 
differences -  whether physical, visible differences or not -  each person’s
"^^ ^Ricoeur, 1992:117 
"^‘^Ricoeur, 1992: 117 
Parfit, 1984; 202 
Parfit. 1984: 203
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personal identity is, as we are considering, the same over time. Media stars 
such as Madonna and Michael Jackson may seek to reinvent themselves 
and give themselves a new image but their personal identity -  their ipse -  
remains the same with the new public image -  the new idem -  incorporated 
into their personal narrative. To say that a person's identity is the same over 
time, therefore, is not to say that it is static. Identities, or selves are not 
static. They grow and develop and later they degenerate and decay, but 
despite this fluidity and change there is continuity.
Thus we can look at photographs of ourselves from childhood and from 
adulthood and recognise both as ourselves. As with the acorn which 
becomes an oak tree, many changes are wrought in our appearance over 
time. Perhaps we now have grey hair where it was once dark brown or none 
where there was once a mop of curls, we may gain or lose weight or become 
stooped. Changes in the ‘self over time are not limited to our physical 
appearance - our knowledge may have increased through the development 
of new interests, or decreased as the result of a brain-wasting disease or 
injury; changed interests and social networks may have given rise to 
changed priorities and values. So much about what makes us 'us' changes 
yet we still recognise ourselves, and indeed others, as the same persons, 
and are recognised by others. The fact that our genetic code which is 
individually unique, remains the same throughout life, no matter what 
changes occur, ensures a 'permanence in time'^®°. It proves scientifically 
what we instinctively know about ourselves and those around us. The 
identity of the self is not dependent on the body remaining qualitatively the 
same but on, “Its belonging to someone capable of designating himself or 
herself as the one whose body it is.” ®^^ (Or, as we shall consider in the 
following chapter, on someone doing so on our behalf if we are unable, due 
to impaired memory to do it for ourselves.)
In seeking an answer to the following, “Is there a form of permanence in time 
which can be connected to the question, ‘who?’...that is a reply to the
^^°Rlcoeur, 1992: 117 
Ricoeur. 1992:129
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question, ‘Who am 1?’?” ®^^ , Ricoeur identifies two models of permanence in 
time in addition to bodily continuity which, because they do not require 
technical scientific research, are more readily accessible to us than our 
genetic code. Both relate to what we might think of as our personal integrity. 
They are character and self-constancy, or keeping one's word. He writes, 
“The fact of character is what makes us most inclined to think of Identity in 
terms of sameness. Character is the self under the appearance of 
sameness.” ®^® Ricoeur further defines character as, “The set of distinctive 
marks which permit a reidentification of a human individual as being the 
same” ®^"^ . He suggests that permanence of character, which he says is 
immutable, gives expression to a considerable overlap between idem (what 
we are or sameness) and ipse (who we are or selfhood), whereas keeping 
one’s word indicates a gap between the permanence of self and same^ ®® - 
between who we are and what we are. This seems to indicate a 
considerable tension between an overlap of ipse and idem on the one hand 
and a gap between them on the other. Ricoeur, however, suggests that 
narrative mediates between the two in the constitution of personal identity, 
thus lessening the tension. He writes, “The polarity I am going to examine 
suggests an intervention of narrative identity in the conceptual constitution of 
personal identity in the manner of a specific mediator where idem and ipse 
tend to coincide, and the pole of self-maintenance where selfhood frees itself 
from sameness.” ®^® In a case study based on Ricoeur’s narrative identity, 
Jeanette Corey-Guernes states, “The conflict between idem and /pse-identity 
is resolved, for the most part, with Ricoeur’s work of their mutual feature, 
permanence in time as fundamentally characteristic of the ipse and only 
secondarily characteristic of the idem"^^^ We will return to character in the 
following section.
^^^Rlcoeur, 1992:118 
^^^Ricoeur, 1992:128 
^^ "^ Ricoeur, 1992: 119 
^^^Ricoeur, 1992: 118 
^^^Rlcoeur, 1992:118f.
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Narrative is essential to our sense of personal identity not only because it is a 
means of communication through which we get to know the other (the 
another’s self) and allow the other to know our self but also because it 
enables us to know our own self. The linking together of individual events 
and experiences into a story gives meaning and continuity to the self. “Who I 
am is tied up with that narrative meaning which lies within my actions and 
binds them together into a single meaningful plot or personal story.... I am a 
series of events that are strung together coreferentially into a meaningful 
narrative whole.... T am an emerging story in the process of happening.... 
The very notion of self involves memory, decision and anticipation.... 
Remembering my history and anticipation of a future I am seeking to 
appropriate are essentially elements of ‘me’.... I am who I am because of 
who I have been in the past and who I shall be in the future.... T am a story 
in the process of happening.’’^ ®®
Anderson and Foley make the point that if family expectations are too 
overpowering, children are unable to write their own stories and this inability 
can continue throughout life^ ®®. This should cause us to ask how, in the 
absence of their own narrative, they can make sense of their own personal 
identity. We would not question, however, the existence of their self, only 
their sense of self. Also thinking about the role of narrative in our sense of 
the self, Stephen Crites writes, “A man’s sense of his own identity seems 
largely determined by the kind of story he understands himself to have been 
enacting through the events of his career, the story of his life.” ®^®
If it is the case that being able to tell our story enables us to make sense of 
and know ourselves as Crites, Brockelman and Ricoeur, among others, are 
claiming, then it is a logical assumption that if there are gaps in our 
knowledge of our own narrative then there will be gaps in our knowledge and 
understanding of ourselves. For this reason Life Story Book work is an 
important area of work done with young children who are separated from
Brockelman, 1985: 72ff 
Anderson & Foley, 1998: 62 
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their birth parents in their formative years and are being placed with 
alternative permanent families. “Children who are separated from their birth- 
parents often have little sense of their own past and identity. One way of 
helping them recover the past and clarify the present is by doing story work 
with them, recording their lives in words, images, photographs and 
documents.” ®^^ The Life Story Book, usually in the form of a scrap book or 
loose-leaf folder, would include basic facts of the child’s early history, 
photographs or drawings (by the child) of significant places and people, and 
perhaps, where appropriate, documents such as a copy of the child’s birth 
certificate. The life story book would include information on the child’s birth 
parents and family, schools or pre-schools attended, any significant 
information on the child’s health or disabilities, the country and town where 
the child was born and places he has lived, and any special memories the 
child himself might have of his early life^ ®^ . The book would not be filled but 
blank pages left at the end for the child to continue adding to her or his own 
storybook after moving to the new family. Where appropriate the birth 
mother is also encouraged to write a letter for her child, which he would be 
given when he reached an age of understanding. In such a letter, the mother 
would share with the child simple facts about herself, the child’s father, 
siblings, grandparents and perhaps explain briefly why she felt she had been 
unable to care for him. Obviously the appropriateness and content of these 
letters varies enormously but they can be very useful in enabling a child who 
has been separated from his family of origin at an early age to fill in the 
blanks in his narrative identity and to give him an enriched sense of his own 
personal identity. “As a person’s identity becomes defined so the kind of 
story he tells about himself takes on a richness and depth which draws on his 
cumulative experience of life.” ®^®
As we shall consider in what follows below, our own personal narrative is 
indivisibly interwoven with the personal narratives of others. Just as our 
existence and our story impinge on the life story of others, so their existence
BAAF, 2002: 18
www.baaf.org.uk/pages/publish/mylife.htm 
Giilett, 1987: 86
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and story impinge on ours. David Augsburger writes, “One’s individual story 
is framed in a larger communal story which gives definition to our identities 
as persons.... Stories give us vision.... One’s personal story is inadequate 
told as an individual tale of a solitary life. It is in need of another’s story, of 
others’ stories to complete it.’’^ ®"^  In narrative we see the interaction between 
the temporal and relational aspects of selfhood.
We can see the interaction between our own personal story and the stories of 
others illustrated when we consider ourselves at an earlier stage (for 
example in childhood) through the memory of our interactions with others, 
and from the fact that we generally relate our narrative in relation to others 
because they are a part of it^ ®®. The Prodigal Son, for example, rediscovered 
his true self only when he remembered the other from his past (his father). 
His memory of interactions with his father, and of his father with family 
servants reminded him of who and what he had been in relation to others, 
enabling him to imagine who and what he might yet be.
Due to this interaction of our narratives with the narratives of others, we are, 
to some degree, both accountable to one another and responsible for one 
another. “Narrative selfhood,” writes MacIntyre, “is correlative; I am not only 
accountable, I am one who can always ask others for an account.... I am part 
of their story, as they are part of mine. The narrative of any one life is part of 
an interlocking set of narratives. Moreover this asking for and giving of 
accounts itself plays an important part in constituting narratives.” ®^®
Ricoeur is not alone in acknowledging the major role played by narrative in 
our understanding of the self. Hauerwas notes that our ability to have a 
character depends on our recognising the narrative nature of our lives. “The 
fundamental category for ensuring agency, therefore, is not freedom but 
narrative.” ®^^ He is not saying, however, that narrative dictates how the 
character is shaped, but is simply drawing attention to the importance of
Augsburger, 1996:118ff (original emphasis) 
^  Elliot, 1995: 9
MacIntyre, 1985: 218 
Hauerwas, 1984:43
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recognising the narrative nature of our lives^ ®®. For Hauerwas, that we are 
both physical and spiritual means we have a history and are able to own our 
past, linking past events into a narrative that makes full sense of the self. It 
looks backward and forward giving both purpose and direction^®®. Our place 
in a narrative, he tells us, depends both on people who went before us and 
people now^^°, for stories generally have more than one character and while 
we may be the main character In our own narrative we also have ‘walk-on 
parts’ in the narratives of others. Each person’s story, as we have just seen, 
is incomplete without the stories of others. Hauerwas suggests that it takes 
courage to face our narratives truthfully and asks about those whose 
negative past prevents them from being able to respond to or to tell truthful 
narratives. He questions whether this means they are prevented from being 
an agent and unable to be true to their own character. Hauenmras sees the 
solution to this problem in becoming part of God’s story and states that no- 
one is so crippled by the past that they are unable to respond to God’s story 
and become part of it. He goes on to say that it is only by making God’s 
story our own that we make our life our own and are enabled to accept what 
has happened to us, and thus to accept ourselves and what goes to make us 
ourselves. We are enabled to accept ourselves as we are, he suggests, 
because we accept God’s acceptance of us. This, in turn, gives us 
confidence to trust self and others^^\
In the last section we have looked at the narratival aspect of personal 
identity. We saw that we are able to understand lives -  our own and other 
people’s -  through the stories told about them and as a result saw the 
importance of providing information for children separated from their birth 
families at a young age.
In a discussion of Ricoeur’s narrative identity we considered the difference 
between the numerical and qualitative identity of an object. We saw the 
difference between idem (identity as sameness) and ipse (identity as
Hauerwas, 1984; 45 
^  Hauerwas, 1984; 36 
Hauerwas, 1984: 45f 
Hauerwas, 1984: 44, 48
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selfhood). We saw too the uninterrupted continuity of the self despite many 
changes. This uninterrupted continuity of self is ensured, Ricoeur tells us, by 
two modes of permanence in time -  character and keeping one’s word.
1.3.iîî Permanence in Time
Ricoeur describes character as being an ‘absolute involuntary’ in the area of 
decision-making, contrasting it with motives which he describes as a ‘relative 
involuntary’. ‘Absolute involuntaries’ are these qualities which we do not 
choose and we cannot change. They are, as the term suggests, both 
absolute and involuntary. The other two absolute involuntaries Ricoeur 
identifies are the unconscious and being alive^^ .^ The nature of these other 
absolute involuntaries identified by Ricoeur suggests to us that a person’s 
character is the very essence of the person. Character and self cannot be 
separated any more than being self and being alive or self and the 
unconscious can be separated. Character, says Ricoeur, is that which 
permits identification and re-identification of an individual as the same 
individual over time and is unchanging. He calls it the “lasting disposition by 
which a person is r e c o g n i s e d . T h a t  our character is our very essence is 
also indicated by Hauerwas, for whom character is not just something that 
shows on the surface and develops out of the choices a person makes, it is 
what we are. He states simply and unambiguously, “We are our 
character.
It could be argued that character is less steadfast than Ricoeur and 
Hauerwas seem to suggest. People are often said to be acting ‘out of 
character’ when acting or speaking in unexpected ways. The very fact, 
however, that such a statement can be made is a clear indicator that an 
individual’s character is generally consistent and, in normal circumstances, 
can be relied on to prescribe standards of behaviour and speech. That a 
person acting or speaking in a surprising manner can be said to be acting
^^^Rlcoeur, 1992:119 
Ricoeur, 1992: 121 
^ "^^Hauerwas, 1984: 39
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‘out of character’, therefore, reinforces rather than weakens Ricoeur’s 
argument about character. ‘Out of character’ behaviour elicits different 
responses in observers. We might look for reasons for the behaviour - is the 
person ill or upset? Has she won the lottery? Has he received bad news? 
We may dismiss behaviour we consider to be out of character’ or, on the 
other hand, we may attach greater significance to it. For example, an angry 
outburst from someone who is generally placid and even-tempered is likely to 
be taken more seriously than the same outburst from someone who is known 
to be volatile.
Ricoeur does not make the claim, however, that character is static. Rather 
he explains that it develops as we form new habits and adhere to new 
values. He draws attention to the close linguistic link in Greek between 
character (ethos) and habit (hthos)^^®. That we acquire new habits shows 
that character has a history^^® and because character has a history, so too 
does personal identity. As we have already considered, being permanent 
does not mean being permanently static.
Ricoeur’s other indicator of permanence over time is, as I have said, keeping 
one’s word. It is about being faithful to oneself as well as to others. Ford 
also comments on the fact that loyalty to one’s own word ensures continuity 
amidst change saying, “Promising is one of the main ways in which a shape 
of life is maintained through good and bad overwhelmings.”^^  ^ Ricoeur 
suggests that for this reason we keep our word even over trivial matters and 
even when we change our opinion for keeping one’s word, he says, 
challenges time and change^^®. Keeping one’s word, says Ricoeur, is an 
expression of the constancy of the self. It symbolises both faithfulness to a 
word given and also constancy of relationship^^®. There is a sense in which 
we are always whatever we have been to someone at some stage and may 
be called upon to answer for that however we have changed and however
'^^^Ricoeur, 1992:120 
^^^Rlcoeur, 1992:122 
^^^Ford, 1997:43 
^^^Ricoeur, 1992: 124 
Ricoeur, 1992: 123
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our opinions and values have changed in the interim. As Alasdair Macintyre 
states, “I am forever whatever I have been at any time for others -  and I may 
at any time be called upon to answer for it -  no matter how changed I may be 
now.... The self inhabits a character whose unity is given as the unity of a 
character.” ®^® Hannah Arendt makes a similar point, emphasising the 
importance of keeping promises, and of having promises to keep to the 
integrity of our identity. “Without being bound to the fulfilment of promises, 
we would never be able to keep our identities...depend on plurality on the 
presence of others, for...no-one can feel bound to a promise made only to 
himself.” ®^^ Elsewhere Arendt says, “The remedy for unpredictability is the 
faculty to make and keep promises...binding oneself through promises 
serves to set up in the ocean of future uncertainty islands of security without 
which even continuity...would ever be possible in the relationship between 
men.... Without being bound to the fulfilment of promises we would never be 
able to achieve the amount of identity and continuity which together produce 
the ‘person’ about whom a story can be told.” ®^^
Moltmann also speaks of the relationship between being true to our promises 
and true to ourselves where he writes, “Through the promises I give, I make 
myself in all my ambiguity unambiguous for others and for myself. In 
promising we commit ourselves and become dependable.... In faithfulness to 
our promise we acquire identity in time, because in being reminded of our 
promise we are reminded of ourselves.... Those who forget their promises 
forget themselves; and those who remain true to their promises remain true 
to themselves...if we break our promises.... We lose our identity and no 
longer know ourselves.” ®^® And again, “Through the promise I make, I make 
myself -  equivocal though I am -  unequivocal for others and for myself. In 
promising we commit ourselves.... People who remain true to their promises 
remain true to themselves too.... If we break them, other people distrust us -  
and rightly so, for then we lose or deny our identity, and in the end no longer
^  MacIntyre. 1985 217 
Arendt, 1958: 237 
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Moltmann, 1999: 87
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know ourselves.” ®^"^  If character is, as Ricoeur says, “The ‘what’ of the 
‘who’.” ®^®, keeping one’s word might be said to be the ‘who’ of the ‘what’ - 
faithfulness to oneself and one’s word (the who) taking priority over the 
content of that word (the what).
Defining character, Ricoeur states, “Character, I would say, designates the 
set of lasting dispositions by which a person is recognized.” ®^® Some people 
undergo such enormous changes in the course of their lives that it can be 
difficult to see a connection between what they were and what they have 
become, difficult to recognise the set of lasting dispositions which, for 
Ricoeur, designate character. This can often be seen in Christian 
conversion. For example Saul, the Christian-slayer became Paul, the 
passionate Christian preacher, missionary and theologian who wrote these 
words, undoubtedly from personal experience as well as from observing 
others, “Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation; the old has 
gone, the new has come!” ®^^. Paul became completely unrecognisable in 
terms of his values and behaviour although the single-minded passion with 
which he pursued his goal is recognisable in both the old Saul in his 
persecution of the church, and the new Paul with his missionary zeal. Before 
her conversion to Christianity Irene^ ®® engaged in a wide range of illegal, 
immoral and unsociable behaviours. When asked five or six years later if she 
missed her old lifestyle, she stated that she did not because she is ‘no longer 
the same person’.
For someone to say, I have changed’ presupposes existence of an ‘I’ who 
has changed. If the ‘I’ was not the same person throughout, if there was not 
a sense of continuity, the I’ could not have a concept of discontinuity and 
could not say, ‘T have changed’. Idem (what we are or sameness) may 
change; ipse (who we are or selfhood) remains constant or, to put it another
^  Moltmann, 1999; 157 
^®®Ricoeur, 1992:122 
^®®Rlcoeur, 1992:121 
®^^ 2 Corinthians 5:17
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way, our qualitative identity may undergo changes but not our numerical 
identity. We always are numerically identical with what we were in the past. 
The garden which is a blaze of colour in June may be dull and drab in 
November but no-one would suggest it was a different garden. It has 
changed drastically but is undoubtedly the same garden. Bauckham writes, 
“One may want to change oneself and can, to an important extent change 
oneself. But one cannot exchange oneself for another. Not even Christian 
conversion is such a change, though it may feel like it.” ®^®
In this section we saw that, for Ricoeur, character permits the identification 
and reidentification of a person over time. We considered that character, 
which he describes as the very essence of a person. Is permanent but not 
static. The other model of permanence in time discussed by Ricoeur is 
keeping one’s word. We considered that there is a sense in which we are 
always whatever we have been to someone at some stage and may be 
called upon to answer to it however our opinions may have changed. In 
these situations faithfulness to oneself and one’s word takes priority over the 
content of the word.
1.3.iv Distorted View of Self
As we have seen the ‘self grows and develops throughout life and is shaped 
by many factors such as our own past experiences and future expectations, 
the relationships we have with others and with God as the ultimate other, the 
knowledge we have and values we endorse, where, how and with whom we 
spend our time, and so on. It stands to reason that if the self is formed and 
reformed through these different influences then negative and destructive 
experiences, relationships and values will have an adverse affect, resulting in 
a negative, distorted sense of self. “The quality of intimacy between carer 
and child in the earliest years” writes Pattison, “is significant in shaping the 
child’s sense of self.... If the carer’s gaze is loving and empathie the infant’s
Bauckham, 2002: 40
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self-esteem is confirmed and enhanced.... If the mother's face is absent, or is 
unresponsive and fails to reflect the baby’s feelings...then the child’s sense 
of self will not be enhanced and may be damaged. This may prevent it from 
gaining a proper sense of self.” ®^® (In the case of a blind infant the responses 
between carer and child would be tactile or aural^®\)
Of course, the potential for a person’s sense of the self to be damaged exists 
throughout life and not only in infancy. The way we are treated by others can 
be destructive. This is perhaps most graphically and most horrifically seen in 
the treatment of Jews and other minority groups by the Nazis in the 
Holocaust. McFadyen writes, “The deliberate destruction of the human spirit 
prior to the destruction of their bodies and completed in the industrial use of 
some Jewish remains was a practical expression of the ideological denial of 
Jews’ humanity which, in the end, Nazis required Jews themselves to 
experience.” ®^^
Writing as one who experienced this destruction at first hand, Primo Levi 
describes his arrival in concentration camp then writes, “Our language lacks 
words to express this offence, the demolition of a man.” ®^® He invites us to, 
“Imagine now a man who is deprived of everyone he loves and at the same 
time of...everything he possesses: he will be a hollow man, reduced to 
suffering and needs, forgetful of dignity and restraint, for he who loses all 
often easily loses himself.” ®^"^  In the following poem, Shemà, Levi appeals to 
those of us who have not been stripped of possessions, comforts and dignity 
to consider the plight, and indeed the status, of those who have. The last 
verse is a plea not to forget the horrors of the holocaust. It is an urgent plea 
with serious consequences threatened for failing to remember. It echoes 
loudly the words of the Shemà, from which the poem takes its title, words 
familiar to all Jews, from the words of God’s command to his people not to
Pattison, 2000: 98 
Pattison, 2000: 99 
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forget his deliverance of them from Egypt, as found in Deuteronomy chapter
6.
Shemà
You who live secure 
In your warm houses,
Who return at evening to find 
Hot food and friendly faces
Consider whether this is a man.
Who labours in the mud 
Who knows no peace 
Who fights for a crust of bread 
Who dies at a yes or a no.
Consider whether this is a woman,
Without hair or name
With no more strength to remember
Eyes empty and womb cold
As a frog in winter
Consider that this has been:
I commend these words to you.
Engrave them on your hearts
When you are in your house, when you walk on your way.
When you go to bed, when you rise.
Repeat them to your children.
Or may your house crumble.
Disease render you powerless.
Your offspring avert their faces from you.^ ®®
Another way in which the self can be distorted and damaged is by the 
absence of appropriate boundaries between persons. Alistair McFadyen 
expresses concern that some persons, in particular women, lose their 
identities in their relationships. “Women are those whose sense of self is 
submerged in relationships to others to the extent that one may speak of a 
loss, dissipation or diffusion of self and identity: a virtual collapse of self into 
relationships.” ®^® This happens when those involved fail to maintain 
appropriate boundaries between one another. “For without boundaries there 
would be no discrete identities, and without discrete identities there could be 
no relation to the other.” ®^^ In his discussion of this Volf writes that in our 
relationships with others we need a balance between our separateness and
^  Levi, 1988: 9 
^  McFadyen, 2000:136f 
^®^Volf, 1996: 67
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connectedness or, as he says, between separating and binding^ ®®. He 
writes, “The formation and negation of identity always entails the drawing of 
boundaries, the setting of the self as distinct from the other.... We are who 
we are not because we are separate from others who are next to us, but 
because we are both separate and connected, both distinct and related; the 
boundaries that mark our identities are both barriers and bridges.... Identity is 
a result of the distinction from the other and the internalisation of the 
relationship to the other."^ ®®
Volf borrows the terms ‘separating’ and binding’ from Cornelius Plantinga’s 
description of creation. “So God begins to do some creative separating: he 
separates light from darkness, day from night, land from water, the sea 
creatures from the land cruiser.... At the same time God binds things 
together: he binds humans to the rest of creation as stewards and caretakers 
of it, to himself as bearers of his image, to each other as perfect 
complements.”®®® This separating and binding, Volf notes, results in complex 
patterns of interdependent relations. To have separation without binding 
results in self-enclosed and isolated beings®®^  while binding without 
separating would result in the kind of problematic, destructive situation we 
have been considering. Both are required. “We become truly ourselves 
when we are truly for others,” but this does not mean, as Paul Fiddes 
indicates, and we have already seen in Volf, “That we do not resist as well as 
respond to others.”®®^
Another factor which commonly distorts self-image is shame. Shame 
wounds the self and threatens the identity. It is extremely destructive. ‘As a 
state of being, shame takes over one’s whole identity. To have shame as an 
identity is to believe that...one is defective as a human being. Once shame
^®®Volf, 1996: 65 
^®®Volf, 1996: 90ff 
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is transformed into an identity, it becomes toxic and dehumanising.”®®® 
Shame can be deeply demoralising and dehumanising®®"  ^and not only for a 
brief interlude but throughout a person’s life. With this in mind Pattison seeks 
a remedy. “Spoiled, soiled identity must be restored and people must be 
given face by and within the human community If they are to live full and 
responsible lives.... In the restoration of face, one might hope that 
Christianity has a part to play.”®®® He goes on to suggest that Christians 
should expose the shameful self to God and in so doing, like Augustine find 
God no longer hidden. This, he argues, allows an end to isolation from God 
and others®®®. In view of our discussion on relationality, it is interesting to 
note Pattison’s observation that shame does not occur in isolation. “No one 
is shamed in social isolation...even if they are on their own when they 
experience the shame.”®®^ The root of shame is found in relationships.
In considering those whose negative pasts prevent them from being able to 
form their own character, who are pulled in so many different directions that 
they have difficulty remaining loyal to one ‘self, Hauerwas also suggests that 
becoming part of God’s story is a solution. As we have seen, he states that 
no one is so crippled by the past that they are unable to respond to God’s 
story and become part of it®®®. Of course, he does not limit being part of 
God’s story to those at risk of being crippled by their destructive past (or 
present), but indicates that no one is truly self until she or he is the self God 
called her or him to be®®®.
John Bradshaw, cited in Pattison, 2000: 93 
^  Pattison, 2000: 204 
^  Pattison, 2000:183f 
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T.F. Torrance makes the similar observation that we cannot be truly human 
unless we know God as that is what we are created for. “Unlike the other 
creatures of the world, man lives truly as man only in conscious and thankful 
relation to the grace of God, and in the consciousness of his own 
creaturehood...for it is only when a man knows himself to be a creature 
utterly dependent on the grace of God that he is able in his knowledge of 
God so to live in a thankful fashion corresponding to the motion of grace he 
reflects in the mirror of his intellectual life in the glory of God.... Of supreme 
importance here is the interwoven ness of the knowledge of self.”®^®
In this section we have considered some of the factors that can distort and 
damage our sense of self, such as the way people treat one another -  we 
thought particularly here of the treatment of concentration camp inmates -  
the absence of appropriate boundaries, and shame. We looked at how a 
distorted sense of self can be healed by becoming part of God's story.
Knowledge of self, as we have seen, is not possible without knowledge of the 
selfs narrative. Where there are gaps in our own narrative there are gaps in 
our knowledge and understanding of the self. To know and understand the 
self, then, we need to remember what has been in the past.
1.3.V The Place of Memory in Personal Identity
Memory of what has been in the past and anticipation of what will be in the 
future are, it seems, both crucial elements in the constitution of our sense of 
the self. Without memory our past is lost to us; our sense of who we are, of 
who we have become, of how the T has come to be just who the T has 
become is diminished. Without hope, on the other hand, we lose our vision 
of what will be and who we will yet become and if we lose our vision, we lose 
our sense of purpose for, “Where there is no vision the people perish.”®*^  Life 
today loses meaning if there is no concept of tomorrow and often people who 
attempt suicide later acknowledge that they did so because they felt their life
Torrance, 1965:101
^Proverbs 18:29
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was meaningless. Where we have been (memory) and where we are going 
(hope) together inform our picture of who we are. In the words of John 
Macquarrie, “Through memory we bring with us our past; through anticipation 
and the projects of the will, we reach out into our future. This is the basis of 
that feeling of identity which belongs to a self.”®^^
So important does Nietzsche see our past experience in making us what we 
are that he writes, “Only...through the power of using the past for living and 
making history out of what has happened, does a person first become a 
person.” And so important does he see our past in shaping our present and 
our future that he continues, “The glance into the past pushes them into the 
future...they look backwards only to understand the present by considering 
the previous process and to learn to desire the future more keenly.”®^®
Holloway also acknowledges the importance of remembering what has been 
as we move towards the future. He says that we should not make the 
journey into the future without what he calls a rear view mirror’ but nor 
should our gaze be fixed in the ‘rear view mirror’ of the past. “In order to 
move forward safely,” he says, “we have to keep an eye on what is 
behind.”®^"^  Both memory and hope are discussed in detail in separate 
chapters. In this section I will look briefly at memory as it relates to the 
constitution of the self.
Who and what we are - our personal identity - is to a large extent determined 
by where and when and with whom we grew up and what we have done in 
the past®^  ^ Our experiences and our relationships over time all contribute to 
the selves that we are today. In leaving home the Prodigal Son pulled 
himself out of the relationships that made him what he was, cutting himself 
off from where and with whom he grew up and from what he had done in the 
past. Volf observes that it was only when he remembered the other from his 
past (his family, and in particular his father) that he was able to rediscover his
Macquarrie, 1982: 43
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true self and, from this, observes, “There is no coming to oneself without the 
memory of belonging. The self has been constructed in relation to others, 
and can come to itself only through relation to others.”®^® It was the memory 
of his significant others that reminded the prodigal who he himself was. It is 
interesting to note that even after all that had passed he still thought in terms 
of 'My f a t h e r ' ® ^ I n  the film, The Wedding, Shelby Coles, great 
granddaughter both of a slave-owner and of a slave, tries to sort through her 
confused thoughts and feelings, and concludes, “In order to understand who 
you are you have to first understand where you came from.”®^® In this way, 
the Prodigal Son came to an understanding that life for him need not be as it 
was when he remembered those who were part of his past; he understood 
who he was by understanding where he came from.
In order to have a sense of continuity of the self over time, in order for our 
personal narrative to unfold over time, in order for us to understand who and 
what we are, in order for us not to find ourselves elusive as did Hume, our 
past has to be available to us today. This happens through memory. 
“Memory acts in the present to represent the past.... It is memory and its 
tokens that provide the substantive grounds for claims to corporateness and 
continuity.”®^® Without the corporateness and continuity which memory gives 
us, without memory making our past available to us, our selves would be only 
what we experienced them to be at any given moment. Self would, perhaps, 
be reduced to no more than the perception it was for Hume. That memory 
has a crucial role in identity is alluded to by many writers. Charles Elliot, for 
example states, “Memory defines, or helps to define, the self, and thereby 
constitutes the identity of the believer before God.”®^® And Mark Santer, “It is 
through our memories, through our recollection of the past, and through what 
others have told us about the past that we identify ourselves as we are.”®^^
^^®Volf, 1996: 157f 
Volf, 1996:158 
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Considering the role of memory in our sense of identity and the connection 
between the self today and the self of memory, Sydney Shoemaker makes 
the observation that since an T statement can only be made by an T who 
exists at the time of making it then a statement such as, ‘I went for a walk 
yesterday’ is both a present and a past statement. By this he means that it 
concerns a presently existing T (for the statement could not be made if the T 
had ceased to exist) and a past event done by someone who existed at the 
time referred to in the statement (yesterday). How do I know that I went for a 
walk yesterday? I know because I remember. “My memory,” says 
Shoemaker, “can inform me of the existence of a self at t1 and of its 
properties and activities at that time, of the existence of a self at t2 and of its 
properties and activities at that time, and so on, but it seems that any 
statement that identifies a present self with a past self...necessarily goes 
beyond what can be known solely on the basis of memory.”®^  ^ He clarifies 
that in addition to such a statement being based on memory it is also based 
on what T know about the present ‘self®^ ®. Shoemaker makes a similar 
statement elsewhere, “Persons have, in memory, a special access to facts 
about their own past histories and identities and of other persons and other 
things.... When a person remembers a past event there is a correspondence 
between his present cognitive state and some past cognitive and sensory 
state of his that existed at the time of the remembered event and consisted in 
his experiencing or otherwise being aware of its occurrence.”®^"^
I have been considering memory here not so much as constitutive of identity, 
but as that which links us to our past thus enabling us, and those around us, 
to form and indeed retain a picture of the self. Memory gives continuity to 
personal identity. It enables us to make sense of who we are and, as Parfit 
says, “Memory makes us aware of our own continued existence over 
time.”®2®
“^ shoemaker, 1963:126,130 
Shoemaker, 1963:136 
Shoemaker, 1970: 269, 271 
Parfit. 1984: 205
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For some thinkers, of whom John Locke is best known, the memory is the 
self, and that which is not remembered is not a part of the self. “If I cannot 
remember past thoughts and actions, then they are not part of m y s e l f . F o r  
Locke, if someone cannot remember something she or he previously said or 
did then she or he is not the same person as the one who spoke or acted. A 
similar line of thought can be found in Thomas Reid who gives the oft-cited 
example of a general who could remember an act of bravery as a young 
soldier but could not remember stealing apples as a child, an event he could 
remember when he was a brave young soldier. Even although it defies the 
logic which says if A=B and B=C, then A=C, Reid argues that the general 
was the same person as the young soldier but not the same person as the 
child even although the young soldier, because he could remember the 
childhood theft, was the same person as the child. Mackenzie suggests that 
the solution to this problem lies in the ‘overlapping recollection’ -  C 
remembers being B, B remembers being A therefore C was A even if C does 
not remember being A®^ .^ This concept of ‘to remember is to be’ is strongly 
reminiscent of Descartes’ ‘to think is to be’ and has, as we have seen very 
serious ethical and pastoral implications for those whose rational capacity is 
limited for whatever reason.
Mackie also considers Reid’s gallant officer story and suggests that in order 
to avoid the problem that arises in it we need another criterion or constituent 
of personal identity rather than Locke’s consciousness alone. He notes that 
memory is fragmentary®^®. He also notes, however, that Locke would not 
have been blind to the fragmentary and unreliable nature of memory when he 
made the statement and concludes, “But since with these difficulties fully in 
sight he repeated the assertion that personal identity extends as far as 
consciousness, he must have meant this literally: having identified a person 
at a particular time we are able to take as belonging to that person all and 
only those past actions and experiences which he could now be brought to 
recollect, and presumably all and only those future person-occurrences for
®^®Kenneth Winkler in Ralston, 1999 (www) 
Mackenzie, 1983: 169 
^  Mackie. 1976: 179ff
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which he feels a concern somewhat like the special, intimate concern that 
one feels for one’s present self.”®^®
There is a school of thought within psychology which similarly believes we 
need a chain of memories linking past-present-future to be the same 
person®®®. They claim that consciousness has to be present in order to be, 
not just the same person, but a person at all, thus they would argue that a 
fetus is not a person. Likewise, when cognitive ability and consciousness are 
lost as a result of damage or disease they would claim that the victim ceases 
to be a person®®*. They would go as far as to say that because we have no 
conscious memory of it we were never fetuses or infants. “No person was 
ever a fetus and no fetus ever becomes a person.”®®^ To say that we were 
never fetuses or infants contradicts both what McFadyen says about the 
potential long-term influence of in-utero experiences and what Macmurray 
says about the foundations of personal identity being laid in infancy. It also 
makes a mockery of the somewhat controversial back-to-the-womb 
counselling mentioned earlier in this chapter.
In this section we saw that memory and anticipation are both essential in 
making sense of the self. Who and what we are is shaped by where, when 
and with whom we grew up. Without memory of the ‘where’, ‘when’ and 
‘who’ of our pasts it is very difficult, if not impossible, to make sense of the 
self. In a previous section we considered the importance of narrative. In this 
section we saw that memory is needed in order for narrative to unfold over 
time.
Our memory, of course, comprises recollections of both negative, destructive 
and positive, affirmative relationships, of painful and pleasant experiences as 
we will consider in depth in the next chapter.
Mackie, 1976:182 
®®®Olson, 1997: 74ff. 
®®*Olson, 1997: 24ff. 
®®^ Olson, 1997: 74
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1.4 Summary and Conclusion
The enigmatic nature of the self has given rise to much pondering on the 
subject. The introduction to this chapter includes a collection of questions 
and statements from a variety of theological, philosophical and fictional 
sources about the nature of the self in order to illustrate this enigma. It also 
serves to illustrate the wide-ranging interest in the subject; to show, as 
Zizioulas says that, “Diffused today throughout all forms of social life is the 
intense search for personal identity.”®®® The chapter, as indicated in the 
introduction, seeks not to be an exhaustive phenomenology of the self but to 
explore our sense of self.
In the first main section, which deals with relational aspects of the self, we 
considered that persons are persons only in relation to others and 
consequently to experience others as objects instead of relating to them as 
persons dehumanises both self and others. Mistreatment of others, having 
only ‘l-lt’ relationships with others instead of *l-You’ relationships - is 
damaging to both self and other. To dehumanise others is to dehumanise 
the self and to dehumanise the self dehumanises others. The foundations of 
relating to others are laid in infancy although being in relation continues 
throughout life. As a result of inter-relating with one another, our identities 
are related to, but not restricted to, the identities of others. This is a theme to 
which we return at several points in the chapter.
We considered that the influence of others can continue to shape our 
identities (positively or negatively) long after a relationship has ended or after 
the other has died. Clearly not all others have the same degree of influence 
as not all relationships are of equal significance in our lives. The greater a 
person's significance in our life the deeper will be the hurt caused by the loss 
of the relationship or by the other's betrayal.
Zizioulas, 1985: 47
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As we also saw, some suggest that we are not persons because we relate to 
others but that we relate to others because we are persons. This, however, 
seems to miss that we all are in relation whether or not we are aware of it, to 
miss that we are born in relation. It misses too the difference between 
relationships which are deliberately chosen and those which are a given. 
Harris expresses concern that if personhood is defined relationally, it could 
come to be seen as being contingent on the quality of our relationships with 
others. This, in turn, could result in degrees of personhood, determined by 
the quality of relationships.
God, of course, is the ultimate Other to whom we relate (whether or not this 
relating is conscious and deliberate) and because redemption transforms our 
relationship with God, our social relations are also transformed.
Each person of the Trinity Is, and is as he is, because the others are, and are 
as they are. We find a model for our interrelatedness and interdependence 
in the perichoretic relationships of the Trinity. As in the Trinity, so in 
relationships between human persons both mutuality and particularity are 
required. We considered Volfs themes of exclusion and embrace, and noted 
that even in embrace the particularity of self and other is not denied. We are 
who we are because we are connected to others and because we are 
separate from them.
Embodiment gives identity concrete recognisability and concrete evidence of 
continuity although we are more than our body. The body’s primary locus of 
relating is the face. For Levinas, the face is both the expression of the self 
and the self who is expressed. Similarly Godself is frequently represented in 
Scripture as ‘the face of God’. The face as an expression of the self is 
illustrated in the self portraiture of Altzheimer sufferer, William Utermohlen. 
His artistic impressions of himself became increasingly obscure as his illness 
progressed and his sense of self became increasingly obscure.
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We also considered that while we are more than our name, name identifies 
us. Name is often used to symbolize a person’s identity although, as we also 
saw, a change in name need not undermine identity.
The other main section of the chapter looks at temporal aspects of the 
constitution of personal identity. The self, we said, exists over time, therefore 
an understanding of time helps us make sense of the self.
We looked at Ricoeur’s narrative identity and saw that narrative allows us to 
know other and self because we understand lives through the stories told 
about them. Our stories do not stand alone but need the stories of others to 
give them completeness. In his consideration of narrative identity, Ricoeur 
distinguishes between numerical and qualitative identity; between identity as 
sameness (idem) and identity as selfhood (ipse). Although a person’s 
identity develops over time she or he is in essence the same person -  this is 
ensured by character and keeping one’s word which Ricoeur says are both 
models of permanence in time.
We looked briefly at some of the factors that can distort our sense of self -  
for example, ill-treatment by others, absence of appropriate boundaries, 
shame -  and said that a distorted sense of self can be healed by becoming 
part of God’s story. This theme will be developed in the chapter on 
forgiveness.
We said that memory of the past and anticipation of the future (both of which 
are dealt with in detail in later chapters) are essential to our sense of self. 
Memory is required for our narrative to unfold over time. To say, however, as 
Locke does, that our memory is our identity denies identity to those without 
memory of the past. What others, and God as ultimate other, remember of 
us is also important to our personal identity. This will be discussed in the 
following chapter.
91
The centrality of relationship with others in the constitution of personal 
identity places on each of us a responsibility for the well-being, not only of 
our selves, but also of others. To habitually cut the self off from others 
deprives the self of the enrichment of relationship, causing the self to become 
something less than God intends. Similarly it deprives others of being 
enriched through being in relation to us.
As Indicated in the introduction, time, relation and memory are not Intended 
to be alternative formulae for the constitution of personal identity. The 
temporal and relational aspects are, I suggest, mutually dependent on one 
another. Relationships change with time and develop over time, we lose 
contact with some ‘others’ (although we do not lose the contact that has 
been, it remains ever a part of us) and establish new contacts with different 
‘others’. The passage of time would be meaningless to personal identity 
were it not for the existence of others and our relationships with them. 
Memory gives continuity to personal identity by making our past available to 
us. “Our sense of where we have come from and who we have been bears 
powerfully (if often subliminally) upon our sense of who and where we are, 
and shapes our priorities, our desires, our patterns of behaviour in the here 
and now; sometimes for better and sometimes worse.”^^ "^
We have seen, then, that related ness to others (with God as the ultimate 
other) and our experience of having our existence across time are both 
constitutive of our self and our sense of self. The next chapter will focus on 
one aspect of our existence as relational beings situated in time, namely 
memory. Volfs contention that certain painful memories will be lost or 
forgotten at the eschaton implies that our temporal, relational self will be 
eroded in some way. This presents problems if, as I will consider in chapter 
4, we believe that personal identity is retained in the eschaton for, as we 
have seen in this chapter, without the temporal and relational aspects of the 
self, little remains that could be called self.
^  Bauckham & Hart, 2000: 58
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Chapter 2 
Being Through Remembering
“Abruptly the poker of memory stirs the ashes of 
recollection and uncovers a forgotten ember, still 
smouldering down there, still hot, still glowing, still red 
as red.”^
“God gave us memory that we might have roses in 
December.”^
2.1 Introduction
In the introduction I referred to Volfs thesis that some people's experience of 
suffering in this life is so enormous that the mere memory of having suffered 
will continue to cause suffering in the New Creation. There is as I said, 
something attractive about Volfs thesis -  part of us wants to believe it, wants 
it to be true.
Given the place our memories have in the constitution and integrity of 
personal identity, and in our sense of our own identity, however, I disagree 
with Volfs thesis and argue that rather than being erased our memories will 
be transformed. Rather than forgetting our negative, destructive experiences 
we will ‘non-remember’ them, or better, we will remember them well. A 
forgotten trauma or failure may continue to affect a person adversely, limiting 
her or his present and future functioning. If it is not remembered it cannot be 
confronted so continues to cause damage. The person may be aware of a 
sense of dis-ease or dysfunctional relationships, of insecurities or an inability 
to fulfil potential but be unaware of the cause. On the other hand, a non­
remembered incident is one which is not forgotten but can be left alone 
because it has been dealt with, there is no further reason to call it to mind. 
Non-remembering is volitional and distinct from memory which has been lost 
and forgotten. It is there but is not called to mind. There are also those 
memories which are ‘remembered well’. These are the memories of pain and
 ^ Manchester, W, http://www.brainvquote.eom/auotes/auotes/w/q115683.html 
 ^Barrie. JM, http://www.thinkexist.com/asp/search.asp?paae=2&kevwordin=memorv&author
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trauma that have been redeemed and healed, the conscious awareness of 
which cause no upset or pain to the one who remembers. Non-remembering 
and remembering well will be considered below.
Before entering into further discussion with Volfs thesis it will be helpful to 
look at what memory is, to look at what it is that Volf believes will be 
miraculously erased at the eschaton and I believe will be miraculously 
transformed.
2.2 What Memory Is
According to Martin and Deutscher there are three basic different types of 
memory all of which draw on the past, either past learning or past 
experience. The three types they identify are memory of events and 
experiences, memory of information or facts, and memory of how to do 
something. We remember a fact of history because we learned it and an 
event because we experienced it. We do not remember historical events we 
did not experience; we only remember that they occurred.^ For example, I 
may remember that the Council of Chalcedon took place in October 451 or 
that the Scots were defeated by the English at Culloden in 1746 but 1 do not 
remember the Council of Chalcedon nor the battle of Culloden. We have to 
observe or experience something if we can be said to remember it.
Both the memory of how to do something, such as how to make a telephone 
call or how to ride a bike, and the memory of information (factual memory) 
concern remembering what has been learned. We remember how to ride a 
bike because we learned the skill. We remember that hundreds of Scots lay 
dead and dying on Culloden field following the last battle to be fought on 
British soil because we learned the historical fact.
The memories which will either continue to cause suffering in God’s New 
Creation or will be transformed, however, are not memories that have been
 ^Martin & Deutscher, 1966:161 ff
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learned. They are, rather, the memories of events we have observed or 
experienced at first hand. They are the memories of things we have done, of 
things that have been done to us, of places we have been and people we 
have encountered. It might be said that they are ‘our own memories'. It is for 
the most part memories from personal experience which are constitutive of 
personal identity, not the memory of skills or knowledge; although the 
memory of the experience of acquiring certain skills and knowledge, like any 
other experience, can be formative. This, of course, is the case particularly 
when the process of acquiring certain skills and knowledge has been painful 
or traumatic. We should recognise too that the possession of particular skills 
and knowledge may also contribute to our sense of who we are. It is the 
memories from personal experience, which are constitutive of personal 
identity, not the memory of skills or facts learned.
In an attempt to explain just how we retain what we do in our memories - 
whether facts, skills or experiences - Howe looks at the way an organised 
person stores items in such a manner that they can be found easily. He 
gives the examples of a warehouse manager, or a library cataloguing 
system, which ensures vast numbers of books can be stored and found. He 
looks too at computer files which, he says, are stored in a similar organised 
and logical manner."  ^ It is not difficult to see how his parallels could be 
extended to illustrate what may happen in situations where specific memories 
evade us. We are all familiar with the frustrating experience of being unable 
to locate a library book because it was left on the wrong shelf by a previous 
reader or the perhaps more frustrating experience of being unable to retrieve 
a file which we know is stored in our computer’s memory because we do not 
know where in the memory it is stored. Howe suggests that this kind of loss 
of long-term memory is more likely to be a lack of retrieval ability than 
disappearance®. It is somewhat like losing a golf ball during a game of golf - 
the ball still exists but is hidden - we cannot find it. Or it is like the elusive 
computer file -  easy to locate if we look in the correct folder but otherwise 
seems to us to have disappeared.
 ^Howe, 1970; 10 
® Howe, 1970; 48
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Norman Malcolm’s taxonomy of the different kinds of memory differs slightly 
from that of Martin & Deutscher. Malcolm distinguishes between factual 
memory (memory of things learned), perceptual memory (memory of things 
perceived) and personal event memory (memory of events we have 
experienced). He suggests that it is logically possible for people to have 
factual memory but no perceptual memory. By this he means it is logically 
possible to remember people and places while unable to visualise them 
whereas, on the other hand, it is not logically possible the other way round; 
not logically possible, that is, to have perceptual memory but no factual 
memory. Otherwise, he claims, we would forget what we were about to do or 
even forget half way through doing something what we were doing. (This is a 
common experience of people suffering from dementia.) Reading, writing 
and speaking would all be senseless activities for we would have forgotten 
the beginning of a sentence before reaching the end of it. Similarly when 
listening to a piece of music we would hear only notes, not a tune for we 
would have forgotten what went before. Factual memory, then, is for 
Malcolm independent of perceptual memory but perceptual memory 
presupposes remembered facts. For example, my remembering the fact that 
there is a coffee table in a room I have visited would not be negated by my 
inability to visualise it. By contrast the vivid mental image I have of the table 
(my perception memory) presupposes the fact that the table exists, or at one 
time existed. There is, of course, always the possibility that such a table has 
never existed, that my mental image of it is not perception memory at all but 
is imaginary. This is a theme to which I will return a little later.
Malcolm argues strongly that personal and factual memories are essential to 
humankind but not so perception memory. “A being without factual memory 
would have no mental powers to speak of, and he would not really be a man 
even if he had the human form.”® And again, “Could creatures who never 
remembered anything they perceived or experienced have anything like 
human powers? Surely not. For... they could not have many of the concepts 
that human beings have, and could not do many of the things that human
® Malcolm, 1963: 212
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beings do.”  ^ Such statements have massive ethical implications, similar to 
those raised by Joseph Fletcher’s indicators of person hood, or, as he calls it, 
‘humanhood’. Fletcher’s indicators are self-awareness, self-control, a sense 
of future, a sense of past, the capacity to relate to others, concern for others, 
communication and curiosity®. These indicators of personhood are largely 
missing in persons in advanced stages of Alzheimer's disease and other 
such illnesses and some or all are absent in people suffering from amnesia.
A human being who fails to fit Fletcher’s criteria of being a person, or fails to 
remember in the manner which is outlined by Malcolm, whether as the result 
of a birth defect, disease or injury, is at risk of being seen as a ‘human non­
person’ which Rae points out can fuel the argument that euthanasia, abortion 
or infanticide do not actually involve the killing of a ‘person’®. Rae draws our 
attention to the fact that many of the criteria by which Fletcher defines 
personhood are missing in all of us while we sleep^®. He makes an important 
distinction between the mind being unable to recall facts and experiences 
and the mind being missing altogether by observing the difference between 
losing the function of a leg and having the leg amputated. The non­
functioning leg, he tells us, “may be defective but it is still real.”^^  Similarly 
the fact that a person’s mind is, for some reason, apparently unable to 
function and remember does not equate with it being absent, even if there 
are those, such as Fletcher, for whom it would be anathema and who would 
question its value.
2.3 Memory and Imagination
Mary Warnock asks why we value memory so highly^^. The answer relates 
to our sense of continuity over time, to what Ricoeur would call our narrative 
identity^®. It enables us to see our lives as a pattern and to make sense of
 ^Malcolm, 1963: 221 
® Rae. 1993: 236 
®Rae, 1993: 236f 
Rae, 1993: 240 
Rae, 1993: 242 
Warnock, 1987: vll 
Ricoeur, 1992:113f
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them. This sense of identity is derived from our recollection of events, in 
recalling ‘our own memories', not in the remembering of skills^ "^ . Such 
conscious memory -  that is, the recalling of events from the past - is a mental 
activity. It is valued highly because it is a uniquely human activity^®. 
Aristotle, however, does not see it as a uniquely human activity but extends it 
to all animals with a sense of time^®.
Primo Levi discovered the value of memory when, in concentration camp, he 
underwent the dehumanising experience of being stripped of everything else 
which might evoke memory and sense of identity, including his name and his 
hair. We touched on this in the previous chapter in the section on 
embodiment and name. Levi writes, “But consider what value, what meaning 
is enclosed in...the hundred possessions which even the poorest beggar 
owns: a handkerchief, an old letter, the photo of a cherished person. These 
things are part of us, almost like limbs of our body; nor is it conceivable that 
we can be deprived of them in our world, for we immediately find others to 
substitute the old ones, other objects which are ours in their personification 
and evocation of our memories.”^^  In this way, Levi used memory to make 
sense of his life in the midst of a situation devoid of sense. Perhaps it is 
because the high value of memory and its function in our sense of our 
personal identity were recognised that camps such as Auschwitz were 
designed as places to destroy both existence and memory of existence.^®
If survival in concentration camp was to be possible, inmates had to 
remember life before and life outside the camp -  Auschwitz was not the 
whole memory. “That remembering itself was an act of resistance,” writes 
Banner, “is emphasised by the bureaucratic and brutal techniques which the 
camp system employed to discourage that remembrance.” ®^ Those who 
were unable to remember failed to survive because they became too
'‘‘^ Warnock, 1987:10 
Warnock, 1987: 9 
Sorabji, 1972: 48 
Levi, 1987:33 
''® Banner, 2000: 27 
Banner. 2000: 88
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vulnerable in a system which abolished identity^®. While some remembering 
was an invaluable antidote to the camp system's attack on identity and 
integrity, too much remembering had a negative effect. ‘There was a 
balance to be attempted between remembering and forgetting which was 
difficult to achieve but vital for s u r v i v a l . I t  is not only memory that is vital 
for survival of those suffering under dehumanising and depersonalising 
regimes, but also hope. As we will consider in chapter 4, Viktor FrankI 
describes the devastating effect on concentration camp inmates who gave up 
hope of freedom, concluding that, “The sudden loss of hope and courage can 
have a deadly e f f e c t . H o p e  will be considered in chapter 4.
It appears from what Malcolm says that it is logically possible to remember 
things, people, and places as mere facts without picturing them in the mind. 
But image and other sensory cues clearly play a very significant part in 
memory. It is almost impossible, if not entirely impossible, to recall a facial 
expression or a piece of music or the taste of something without recalling a 
sensory image. Aristotle commented on this saying, “When we remember 
there is something in us like a picture or impression.” ®^ For this reason 
memory, which is an activity of the imagination, and the imaginary can, at 
times, become confused. Warnock makes the point that both memory and 
imagination involve thinking of things, people or places in their absence '^*. 
She says that if we are unable to identify the relation between an image in 
our mind (memory) and the past event which the image represents then we 
are unable to distinguish between memory and imagination,^® but that just 
because memory and imagination can get confused it does not mean that 
they are the same thing any more than a tadpole and a newt are the same 
thing just because someone confuses them^®. If, as I have said, memory is 
an activity of the imagination then perhaps it would be more accurate to say
Banner, 2000: 88 
Banner, 2000: 95 
FrankI, 1962: 75f 
Cited in Warnock, 1987: 13 
Warnock, 1987: 12 
Warnock, 1987: 16 
Warnock, 1987: 35
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that it is memory and the imaginary that get confused instead of, as Warnock 
says, memory and the imagination.
In an attempt to distinguish between memory and imagination (or, more 
accurately, between memory and imaginary), Hume says that images of 
memory are sharper than those of imagination^^. In reality, however, this is 
not always true to experience. Memory is often blurred and vague while 
imagined images can be very vivid and sharp. For example, we can have a 
clear image of a scene from a dream while the image we have of a past 
experience is vague and sketchy. Also attempting to distinguish between 
memory and the imaginary Shoemaker writes, “Memory images are 
characterised or accompanied by an analysable feeling of pastness.” ®^ But is 
it not the case that some memory images ‘feel’ very current, very ‘now’, while 
some imaginary images have a feeling of pastness? Loftus and Garry 
discuss how imaginary images can come to have a feeling of pastness. They 
consider the effect of suggestion on memory, citing psychology research 
where eyewitnesses of a crime were given false information by a bystander, 
such as the colour of the vehicle, which they ‘remembered’ and reproduced 
when recounting the incident. They also cite studies of people 
“remembering” childhood events which did not take place because of 
suggestion by others or being shown doctored photographs. They conclude, 
“False memories sprout when a person believes that a made-up event is 
plausible. They become seedlings when he believes that the event 
happened. Finally, they take root when he embellishes the belief with the 
kinds of sensory details that make it feel like a real memory.” ®^
It may be that at least to some extent such distinctions between memory and 
imagination are false for there is significant overlap between the two. David 
Keck suggests that the distinction is not substantial. “Memory, in some 
senses of the word may seem to be grounded in the imaginative...faculties of 
the mind.... Given the interwoven characters of memory and imagination it
Warnock, 1987:19 
Shoemaker. 1967: 267 
^  Loftus & Garry, 2001: 22
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may be that the distinction between memory and imagination is a distinction 
of connotation more than anything else."®® How could we remember in the 
absence of imagination and how could we imagine in the absence of 
memory? Returning to our coffee table -  how could I imagine one if I had no 
previous memory of coffee tables from which to create it and how could I 
remember a specific one if the imagination did not produce an image of it?
Steiner tells us the arts produce nothing new but rather something different 
using pre-existing materials. “The artist re-counts, he inventories the 
extant.... Perhaps artistic fantasy only recombines, makes a mosaic of, 
juxtaposes via montage and collage what is already there.... Has any painter 
invented a new colour?... Even the most anarchic (the word means ‘un­
begun’) of twentieth-century surrealist or non-objective artefacts re-combine, 
disorder deliberately in space or in time shapes, materials, acoustic elements 
selected from what is available to our sensory perception. No art form, it can 
be argued, comes out of nothing. Always, it comes a/ïer.”®^ So too when 
the imagination produces what appears to be an original image it could be 
said to be reproducing something out of the raw materials of previously 
perceived and remembered images or building on previous knowledge. The 
seed of the old is contained in the new and the seed of the new is contained 
in the old. “Remembering is not just a process of passively receiving 
impressions but of creatively constructing a representation.’’®^ This close 
relationship between memory and imagination is also recognised by Aristotle 
who writes, “It is apparent, then, to which part of the soul memory belongs, 
namely the same part as that to which imagination belongs. And it is the 
objects of the imagination that are remembered in their own right.’’®®
Several philosophers (Locke, Russell, Harold, Furlong, Hume) argue in 
different ways that we have to believe an event took place if we can be said 
to remember it, that it is disbelief that distinguishes memory from imagination. 
Others (for example Benjamin and Saunders) challenge the view that we
Keck. 1996: 70f
Steiner, 2001: 267 {original emphasis) 
Cohen, 1989: 31
Sorabji, 1972:49
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have to believe if we can be said to remember, claiming that memory is 
possible without belief. For example, we have all experienced situations 
when we have been unsure whether we are remembering something or 
imagining it - we neither believe nor disbelieve that it took place. Perhaps, 
then, it is the absence of disbelief rather than the presence of belief that 
something took place that is necessary®^. Neither side addresses the 
problem of misbelief however. We can believe something took place when in 
reality it did not, so vivid was our imaginary image of the ‘event’. Our belief is 
false. What we believe to be an image from our memory is in fact imaginary, 
thus it is not enough to say with Locke, Russell, Harold, Furlong, and Hume 
that it is belief that separates the real from the imaginary.
Martin & Deutscher also consider the possibility of not believing something 
but remembering it. They give the example of an artist who believes he has 
painted an original scene but his parents recognise it as a scene from the 
artist’s childhood. He does not believe that he remembers it yet reproduces it 
in detail®®. This perhaps illustrates Steiner’s belief that art recreates rather 
than creates. Another similar example might be Helen Keller’s childhood 
experience of writing a story only to discover later its close similarity to an 
already existing published story which, it was concluded, had been read to 
her some time earlier but of which she had no conscious memory. She 
genuinely believed it to be a creation of her own imagination. Writing of that 
experience she says, “I never suspected that was the child of another 
mind.”®®
Martin & Deutscher do not, however, consider the scenario of believing 
something to have taken place but not remembering it. For example, all 
drivers have had the experience at times when driving a familiar route of 
finding themselves at a certain point of their journey but with no memory of 
passing through an earlier place. They believe they did pass through the 
non-remembered place otherwise they could not have arrived at where they
Martin & Deutscher, 1963:167 
Martin & Deutscher, 1963:168 
Keller, 1903: 63ff
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are now but they do not remember a certain part of the road. Also, we all 
believe that we were born yet none of us actually remembers the event.
In the rest of this chapter, I will look at various aspects of memory in order to 
show why I believe that Volf is mistaken when he says that painful memories 
will be forgotten at the eschaton. The aspects of memory which I will 
consider are memory and the self, reliability of memory, interpreting the past, 
forgetting, memory and identity, the place of story-telling, forgiveness and 
reconciliation, healing the past, and remembering well.
2.4 Memory. Its Loss And The Self
“We have, each of us, a life-story, an inner narrative -  whose continuity, 
whose sense, is our lives. It might be said that each of us constructs and 
lives ‘ narrative’ and that this narrative is us, our identities.... For each of us 
is a biography, a story. ”®^ For this reason people who, through illness or 
injury, have no memory often invent stories in order to invent identity®®. 
Studies of patients with Korsakov’s syndrome, for example, indicate that with 
the loss of memory goes the loss of a sense of identity, and patients are 
often observed to flit between personae in an attempt to find one that fits and 
to enable them to be in touch with the past.®®
Memory of what has been in the past and anticipation of what will be in the 
future are both crucial elements in the constitution of the self and in our 
sense of self, as discussed in the previous chapter. Without memory our 
past is lost to us; our sense of who we are, of who we have become, of how 
the T has come to be just who the T has become, is diminished. Without 
hope, on the other hand, we lose our vision of what will be and who we may 
yet become and if we lose our vision, we lose our sense of purpose for, 
“Where there is no vision the people p e r i s h . H o p e  looks for progress from 
where we are now. Where we have been (memory) and where we are going
Sacks, 1986:105 (original emphasis) 
Sacks, 1986:106 
Elliot, 1995: 27 
Proverbs 28:29
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(hope) together inform our picture of who we are. John Macquarrie puts it 
this way, “Each human being... says T, he calls ‘mine’ a particular strip of 
history, which extends through memory into the past and through anticipation 
into the future, and to which he is giving shape and direction by what he is 
doing in this present moment. So each human being is... engaged in his or 
her task of fashioning a unique human life-story.""*^
Our personal identity, who and what we are, and how we experience it, is to 
a large extent determined by where and when and with whom we grew up 
and what we have done in the past. Our experiences and our relationships 
over time all contribute to the selves that we are today. This reminds us of 
the thought from Warnock, considered above, that we value memory so 
highly because our sense of identity over time is derived from our recollection 
of events. Loftus and Garry also indicate that our memories are some of ‘the 
most precious things we possess’ because, “they define who we are as 
individuals and create a shared past that bonds us with others.’’"*^
In order to have a sense of continuity of the self over time, in order for our 
personal narrative to unfold over time, in order for us to understand who and 
what we are, in order for us not to find ourselves elusive, our past has 
somehow to be available to us today. This happens through memory. 
“Memory acts in the present to represent the past.... It is memory and its 
tokens that provide the substantive grounds for claims to corporateness and 
continuity.’’"*® Without the corporateness and continuity which memory gives 
us, without memory making our past available to us, our selves would be only 
what we experienced them to be at any given moment. Self would, perhaps, 
be reduced to no more than the perception it was for David Hume. Hume, 
who had a fragmented view of time, seeing no link between one moment and 
the next, found the ‘self to be elusive. In searching for himself all he could 
find were his perceptions. Ricoeur makes the observation that Hume’s 
perceptions were made by someone and cites Roderick Chisholm who
Macquarrie, 1982; 85 
Loftus & Garry, 2001:22 
Antze & Lambeck, 1996: xxlv f
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comments with some irony, “Someone is stumbling, observing a perception. 
With the question Who? - who is seeking, stumbling and not finding, and who 
perceives? - the self returns just when the same slips away.”"*"* His radical 
empiricist principle of the prioritising of the present moment gives Hume a 
fragmented view of time and this, in turn, contributes to his distorted view of 
self.
Jimmie G. was a patient of neurologist, Oliver Sacks whom Sacks met in 
1975"*®. Suffering from Korsakov’s syndrome, Jimmie spoke in the past tense 
when speaking of his childhood but the present tense when speaking of his 
young adulthood in 1945, not as if he was remembering it but as if he was 
currently living it even although it was some thirty years earlier. He was 
somewhat surprised when his brother visited that he should look so old, 
having no concept that he himself had also aged thirty years. Of the present 
he could remember nothing from one minute to the next. Sacks says of him, 
“He is, as it were, isolated in a single moment of being, with a moat or lacuna 
of forgetting all round him.... He is a man without a past (or future), stuck in a 
constantly changing meaningless moment.”"*® Sacks refers to him as a 
'Humean being’. Later, however, he argues against Hume’s assertion that 
we are nothing but sensations and perceptions, saying that we own our 
perceptions"*^.
Jimmie G., however, apparently showed no sign of Korsakov’s syndrome 
when participating in Holy Communion. He communicated, partook and 
remembered"*®. Pattison states that liturgy has a central role in shaping 
Christians’ identities and that people form an idea of themselves in relation to 
the worshipping community through the words spoken, sung and read in a 
service of worship^®. This was surely something of Jimmie G.’s experience 
as witnessed by Sacks. Similarly Bell and Troxel comment that often people 
with dementia respond to religious symbols and vestments because, for
Cited in Ricoeur, 1992: 128 
Sacks, 1986: 22-41 
Sacks. 1966:28 
Sacks, 1986:119 
Sacks, 1986: 36 
Pattison, 2000: 236
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many, religious practice and faith define who they are as persons and this is 
not lost in dementia®®.
From her experience as a chaplain in a residential home for elderly people 
with dementia, Margaret Goodall writes of the need for repetition and 
structure in worship services for people with dementia®^ She writes of the 
importance of physical symbols such as a cross, candle and open Bible for, 
she says, “they are important as ways into the imagination and memory.”®^ 
In fact she notes, citing Anthony Thiselton, “Not to use symbols...in 
liturgy...is to fight with one hand tied behind one’s back.’’®® She observes, 
“While the candle is being lit the silence seems full of meaning as memories 
of special occasions, church, birthdays, Christmas or candlelit suppers are 
kindled.”®"*
It is Goodall’s experience that the words of the Lord’s Prayer are often 
repeated by those who have apparently lost speech although she has found 
that closing eyes during prayer tends to be unhelpful as it excludes the 
physical cues to memory®®. She has also found that it is helpful to stick to 
familiar hymns rather than introduce new unfamiliar ones. "Hymns are a very 
important part of the service. The music can trigger words from time long 
past and even in those who are unable to sing a response can be seen -  a 
foot moving to the music, a nod of the head or someone clapping.”®® Alison 
Frogatt makes the same point, that even those without other speech often 
join in the Lord’s Prayer and familiar hymns® .^
Staff at Williamwood Home, Glasgow, a residential home for elderly persons 
with dementia, also find this.®® They have, in consultation with the local
“  Bell & Troxel, 2001: 36f 
Goodall, 1999: 96 
Goodall, 1999: 96 
Cited in Goodall, 1999: 96 
^  Goodall, 1997: 25 
Goodall, 1999: 98
Goodall, 1997: 25 
Frogatt, 1994:13
I visited Williamwood House in summer 2002 when I had the opportunity to interview the 
unit manager and one of the care workers.
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clergy who conduct worship in the home on a rota basis, compiled a list of 
well-known hymns for use in their short services of worship. They too find 
that residents who otherwise appear to remember very little join in singing the 
familiar hymns or saying the Lord's Prayer. Pat Ellis, a care worker in the 
home said that other well-known songs which would have been familiar to the 
residents from their youth can have a similar effect but that they tend to tire of 
them quickly in a way they do not tire of songs or prayers which are a part of 
their religious worship. A possible explanation why people who are no longer 
able to recognise and respond to, or communicate with other people are 
apparently able to recognise and respond to religious songs and symbols, 
and communicate with God is that the essence of the self is spiritual rather 
than physical or mental. Reams suggests that, “The reality of self is not 
grounded in the physical body, nor even in the mind...self is essentially 
spiritual in nature.” He continues, “Who do we think we are? The image of 
self created by thought includes identifying ourselves as the physical body, 
emotions or thoughts. It can also include identifying with our career, 
nationality, or a host of other things...who are we?... We are soul, infinite and 
eternal, and the true ground of our being is the unlimited, infinite realm of 
spirit ”59 perhaps, is why in worship, the One who is the object of our 
worship remembers us even if we do not remember him, or indeed 
ourselves. So, as we worship, God relates to and communicates with us, 
which enables us to relate to and communicate with him.
Neil Watson, Unit manager Williamwood Home, commented that even seeing 
a minister in a clerical collar can stimulate memory for his residents. 
Similarly Margaret Goodall finds that it helps stimulate memory for the 
residents with whom she works if she wears formal clothes or a cassock 
while conducting worship®®.
On the whole it is Goodall’s experience and the experience of the staff at 
Williamwood Home that a service of worship, “Might bring a sense of comfort 
and reassurance to those who live in a world that has become increasingly
^  Reams, 1998 (www)
Goodall, 1997: 25
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alien to them.”®^ One of the residents in the home where Goodall is chaplain, 
however, found it difficult to worship in a strange setting (i.e. not in a church) 
because, for her, it emphasised her losses® .^
When Debbie Everett’s grandmother suffered from dementia Everett found 
herself struggling with questions such as, “What did this fading away mean in 
regard to her relationship with God and with her world? Certainly God had 
not forgotten her for ‘her name was written in the palm of God’s hand...’ 
(Isaiah 45:16). Yet I wondered wasn’t it still possible for her to continue to 
experience God, others and her world in her new reality, though differently 
expressed?’’®® Alison Frogatt seems to be in no doubt that persons suffering 
from dementia do continue to experience the God who remembers them. 
“For Christians a service of worship with hymns, familiar prayers and Bible 
readings can often reach that earlier worshipping self, the person who knew 
about God, believed in Jesus and felt the divine love.”®"* This connection, she 
observes, can help families - people struggling with questions such as 
Everett’s -  to feel that the one they love is not entirely lost to them®®.
Jimmie G. can be contrasted with Willie, another of Sacks’ patients, also 
suffering from Korsakov’s syndrome. Jimmie was lost and despairing the 
loss while Willie’s fantasy world of confabulation and his frantic search for 
meaning was a barrier to meaning. Thus, while Jimmie found himself while 
participating in the ritual of Holy Communion, this was impossible for Willie®®.
Antze and Lambeck describe memory as the ‘phenomenological ground of 
identity’, explaining that by looking back at what has been we implicitly know 
who we are and recognise the various circumstances that contribute towards 
making us us®^ . Even although memory is not always entirely reliable
Goodall, 1999: 98 
Goodall, 1999:101 
Everett, 2000: 20 
Frogatt, 1994: 13 
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memory enables us to have a sense of our identity over time®®. It is to the 
reliability of memory that we now turn our attention.
2.5 Reliability of Memory
Without going into detail Jones suggests some of the factors that he believes 
can ‘distort’ memory, making our memory of an event or conversation 
somewhat different from the original event or conversation. Of course, the 
original event or experience is also subject to each person’s individual 
interpretation as she or he experiences it. The distorting factors suggested 
by Jones include perception, emotions, biases, prejudices, previous 
experience, cultural issues, gender-related issues and suggestion by others. 
Jones writes, “We know how easy it is for our memory to play tricks on 
us...how easily our memories are distorted by such factors.”®® We might also 
add ‘later experience’ and the length of time involved to this list of distorting 
features, as noted by Charles Elliot^®. Garry and Polaschek also consider 
the effect of later experience. They point out that recalling memory is not like 
replaying a film where events and conversations are exactly the same each 
time and the sequence of events is the same. We revise the script although 
the theme remains constant. “Every performance is at once similar and 
different.” They continue, “We are continually extracting new information 
from old experiences and filling in gaps in ways that serve some current 
demand.”^^
Primo Levi also notes how memory becomes distorted over time through 
over-telling and through interference from extraneous features. “Human 
memory is a marvellous but fallacious instrument. .. The memories that lie 
within us are not carved In stone; not only do they tend to become erased as 
the years go by, but often they change, or even increase by incorporating 
extraneous features.... Even under normal circumstances a slow degradation 
is at work, an obfuscation of outlines, a, so-to-speak, psychological oblivion
Priest, 1998: 56 
Jones, 2001: 243 
Elliot, 1995: 21
Garry & Polaschek, 1999 (www)
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which few resist.... It is certain that practice...keeps memories fresh and 
active...but it is also true that a memory evoked too often, and expressed in 
the form of a story, tends to become fixed in a stereotype, in a form tested by 
experience, crystallised, perfected, adorned, which installs itself in the place 
of raw memory and grows as its experience.”^^
Fictional character David Mosford, a historian, considers how the memory 
keeps the past alive by repeating and retelling stories. “David loved the past. 
He was a historian by training but a sentimentalist at heart.... Memory is like 
a series of time loops, he thought, and the people we love are recorded, 
repeating forever, gestures and actions that the mind has randomly chosen 
as their emblemata. And people we don’t love too.’’^ ® He goes on, like Levi, 
to acknowledge the fallaciousness of memory. He considers how memory 
changes by incorporating extraneous features. He thinks back to the time 
fifteen years before when he first brought Helena, who later became his wife, 
to meet his father. “And in the tape loop of Davy’s memory old Mr Mosford 
lifted his hat decorously to Helena. But that wasn’t true. He didn’t wear a 
hat...but he...carried a metaphorical trilby for just such occasions. Memory 
had supplied the hat.’’^ "*
Although we have noted from Jones that memory can be distorted or 
changed over time it is unlikely that it is time alone that causes the change, 
just as we saw in the previous chapter that it is not time alone that brings 
about growth and development in a child. Challenging the view that time is a 
causal factor in forgetting, J.A. McGeoch says, “In scientific descriptions of 
nature time itself is not employed as a causative factor nor is passive decay 
with time ever found. In time iron, when unused, may rust, but oxidation, not 
time, is responsible. In time organisms grow old, but time enters only as a 
logical framework in which complex chemical processes go their ways.” ®^ He 
suggests, instead, that it is the interference caused by subsequent 
information and experiences that causes the forgetting. Charles Elliot also
Cited in Banner, 2000:116 
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notes that the length of time between event and recall can affect memory 
because new experiences or information can influence how we remember^®. 
This reinterpretation, caused by new experiences will be considered below.
According to Jones, memory is also affected by sin. “Sin is both a cause and 
effect of forgetting."^^ We forget because we sin, we sin because we forget. 
The adulterer forgets his or her spouse, the rich forget the poor. Sometimes 
in certain situations we find ways of deliberately forgetting - is this to absolve 
ourselves of guilt? Does the adulterer absolve him or herself by forgetting 
the spouse who is being betrayed? Do the rich absolve themselves by 
forgetting the poor and hungry? I would suggest that far from absolving the 
guilty party, such creative forgetting serves only to intensify the offence. It 
adds the insult of forgetting the victim to the injury of the sin against the 
victim.
We forget God, we forget others and we forget our own sin in order to make 
life more tolerable for ourselves, says Jones^®. This observation was also 
made by Augustine who says, “I had noticed my iniquity but I had dissembled 
it, and contained it, and forgotten it.” ®^ Because of our habit of conveniently 
forgetting the inconvenient there is, as we will consider below, frequent 
biblical exhortation to remember and the church has memory-evoking rites 
and rituals - baptism, Eucharist, communion of saints, and the medieval 
practice of lectio divina^^. The hymn-writer demonstrates her awareness of 
remembering and the tendency to forget when she says, “Tell me the story 
often for I forget so soon.”®^ Something of the impact of the church's 
memory-evoking rites has been considered above while considering the 
effect on people suffering from dementia of participating in religious ritual and 
worship.
Elliot, 1995: 21 
Jones, 2001:243 
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While this tendency and temptation to forget God, our own sin and the sin of 
other people can present a problem, Jones also draws our attention to the 
problem of the ever-present painful memory which can be so powerful as to 
hinder our present functioning and rob us of any future hope. He also asks, 
“How do we cope with these situations in which forgetfulness might help to 
enable the healing of our psyche and our relationships?”®^ It is memories 
such as these which are the subject of Volfs concern.
As well as looking at some of the factors that distort or change memory, 
Jones identifies several of the dynamics affecting specific memory®®. These 
dynamics, which often overlap, are
1. Difficulty in coming to terms with a single horrifying incident that sears 
itself on the memory such as rape or the murder of a child.
2. Horror of repeated abuse which continues to 'perjure our souls’ long after 
the abuse stops, especially when visible or invisible wounds or scars remain.
3. Horrors from the past that pervade a culture.
4. Horrors which the self perpetrated, for example Nazi soldiers who played 
a part in the Holocaust.
Of these often overlapping and intertwined dynamics Jones says, “We need 
to disentangle several different dynamics involved in the discovery of ‘so 
much traumatic memory’ - dynamics which all-too-often converge in our most 
difficult psychological, social and political dilemmas: of the Middle East, of 
Bosnia... of oppressive and broken family relations, just to name a few. But 
disentangling them will help us understand the different yet overlapping 
issues involved in coping with searing memories.®"*” The intensity of the 
challenge presented by any of these searing memories depends on how 
deeply entrenched they are in a person’s mind or in the community. This 
disentangling of overlapping searing memories is an important first step in 
learning to remember well.
Jones, 2001: 244 
Jones, 2001:245 
Jones, 2001:245
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Even without these distortions, memory is not entirely reliable. The most 
obvious reason for this is quite simply that we forget - whether such forgetting 
is temporary or permanent is unimportant when considering the issue of 
unreliability. The fact that I may be able to remember clearly tomorrow 
something of which I only have a hazy recollection today does not alter the 
fact that today’s memory is somewhat unreliable on account of its lack of 
clarity. It is, however, perhaps more accurate, albeit more cumbersome, to 
say we fail to remember certain events. If the image were forgotten it would 
be lost to us. With non-remembering the image remains available to us, it is 
not lost but is not present to the memory because we are not calling it to 
mind. This is reminiscent of the missing golf ball that really still exists despite 
our difficulty in locating it. (As already indicated and will be returned to, while 
non-remembering enables us to live with a painful past, our ultimate goal 
should not be volitional non-remembering but remembering well.)
Amnesiac Leonard Shelby, a fictional character from the film Memento, was 
well aware of the unreliability of memory. He stated, "Memory's unreliable ... 
Memory's not perfect. It's not even that good. Ask the police; eyewitness 
testimony is unreliable ... Memory can change the shape of a room or the 
colour of a car. It's an interpretation, not a record. Memories can be changed 
or distorted, and they're irrelevant if you have the facts."®®
Richard Holloway illustrates the unreliability of memory with the following 
anecdote. “Meyerhold, the great Russian theatre director used to tell a story 
from his days as a law student at Moscow University. One of the professors 
would arrange for a powerful thug to rush into the classroom in the middle of 
a lecture, there would be a fight, the police would be called and the 
troublemaker removed. Then the students would be asked to recount what 
had happened. Each would tell a different tale. Some would even insist 
there had been not one thug but two. ‘Hence,’ the professor would explain, 
‘the Russian saying, “He lies like an eyewitness”.’”®®
Memento, Newmarket Films, 2001 
Holloway, 1994: 57
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The other main factor influencing the reliability of memory which I would like 
to consider here, and to which I have already alluded, is interpretation. Mark 
Freeman argues that we do not simply look back at past events but that we 
pass them through the filter of interpretation. He looks at how we create our 
‘selves’, not only by remembering, but also by interpreting events and 
experiences. He goes on to suggest that as well as interpreting events and 
experiences we also reinterpret them, and he argues that to reinterpret these 
events and experiences rewrites the self. This defines the self in terms of 
how we experience it ourselves and is considered above in the chapter on 
Personal Identity. Freeman seeks to show how the self is rewritten by 
reinterpreting experiences by looking with his reader at some lives which 
have undergone a reinterpretation and subsequent rewriting, and at the 
processes involved. This he does by using the autobiographical writings of 
his subjects as well as the fictional writing of novelists. One of Freeman’s 
subjects is Augustine for whom the writing of Confessions, “Marks an 
important turn in the meaning of selfhood... Seeing the recounting of one’s 
life as an appropriate and necessary vehicle for the development of self- 
understanding.”®^ Another is Helen Keller, who as she looked from young 
adulthood back to her childhood, was unsure where fact ended and fantasy 
began®®. “When I try to clarify my earlier impressions I find that fact and 
fancy look alike across the years that link the past with the present.” writes 
Keller.®® Being deaf-blind, many of Helen’s sensations were second hand, as 
described by others and she, at times when looking back, was unable to 
distinguish between the two. She is clear, however, that her world is not 
second hand from the descriptions of others but is a product of her own 
imagination. It is this imagination that made it possible for her to describe 
outdoor scenes in such graphic detail. “The opening was filled with ferns 
which completely covered the beds of limestone and in places hid the 
streams. The rest of the mountain was thickly wooded. Here were great 
oaks and splendid evergreens with trunks like mossy pillars, from the
Freeman, 1993: 26 
^  Freeman, 1993: 50 
Keller, 1903: 3
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branches of which hung garlands of ivy and mistletoe, and persimmon trees, 
the odour of which pervaded every nook and corner of the wood."®®
Such a description from a blind person clearly depends to some extent on 
what others describe to her but in recreating the scene for her reader, she is 
not merely repeating what she has been told. She describes the scene as 
she sees it in her imagination. It is a scene built up from her knowledge of 
what the bark of an oak tree or moss feels like beneath her fingers or the 
shape of an ivy leaf or a fern in her hand. She would recognise the smell of 
the moss and the persimmon trees and the moist atmosphere caused by the 
presence of the stream. Thinking back to Martin and Deutscher’s 
classification of three kinds of memory, we could say that Helen’s 
remembrance of this scene drew on her facts memory. She knew, for 
example, what an ivy leaf felt like because one had previously been placed in 
her hand and as she traced its outline with her finger, the word ‘IVY ‘ would 
be spelt out on her hand. But it was much more than that. It also drew on 
her events memory. She had been there in the midst of the scene she 
describes. She knew how it smelt, how it felt and, when someone described 
to her the mountains, the stream, the limestone, she knew how it looked for 
she could ‘see’ it in her imagination. That is why she Is able to insist that the 
memory is her own, born in her imagination. Freeman suggests that Helen’s 
experience is more common than we may realise, that we all think as we do - 
and so remember what we do - because of social forces and influences®^
Freeman’s conclusions are that we cannot separate ourselves from our past. 
He notes that present experience relies not only on memory but also on our 
interpretation of what is remembered®^. He goes as far as to say that we do 
not actually remember bald facts from the past but what we interpret or 
imagine the facts to have been. Freeman cites Philip Roth, saying, 
“Memories of the past are not memories of facts but of your imaginings of the
Keller. 1903: 50f 
Freeman, 1993: 63ff 
Freeman, 1993: 52f
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facts.”®^ This is something about which Aristotle is uncertain. He asks if 
what we remember is the original object or our image of it®"^ . Hauerwas 
makes a similar observation to Freeman noting that at times we take what is 
and what has been and interpret it to shape our characters and inform our 
decisions®®.
I introduced this section by noting, from Jones, that many factors cause our 
memory of events and conversations to differ from the original event or 
conversation (which, as indicated, is also subject to interpretation as it is 
experienced). While this is certainly true and is something we must bear in 
mind we do not do ourselves and one another the best service if we 
overemphasise it for our memory of our past and of one another is, as we 
have considered, one of the most precious things we possess, even although 
-  or perhaps because - events as we remember them may differ from events 
as they actually were. “There is little doubt," writes Henri Nouwen, “that 
memory can distort, falsify and cause selective perception. But that is only 
one side of memory. Memory also clarifies, purifies, brings into focus and 
calls into the foreground hidden gifts.”®® Nouwen argues that our 
relationships with others are enhanced through memory for we are not 
distracted by the idiosyncrasies, and perhaps the irritating habits of the 
other® .^ For example, I might have a happy memory of a pleasant evening 
spent with friends, the memory being enriched by having filtered out details 
such as the friend who used my name as if it was a punctuation mark, or the 
one who incessantly tapped a pen against the chair arm all evening. Giving 
no place in the memory to such irksome trivialities enhances our 
relationships with others. It might be argued that from our memories we 
rewrite our perception of others in much the same way as Freeman describes 
rewriting the self.
^  Cited in Freeman, 1992:117 
Sorabji, 1972: 50 
Hauerwas, 1984: 36 
^  Nouwen, undated: 40 
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2.6 Interpreting The Past
For Freeman we rewrite the past as we attach new meanings to it and it is his 
observation that the past is never the same once it is rewritten®®. It must be 
emphasised, however, that it is not possible to rewrite the past as such. 
What has been has been and cannot be changed or undone. It is our 
interpretation of the past that is rewritten, not the past. Our interpretations 
can be, and frequently are, rewritten, thus changing our perception of what 
has been and consequently of who we are. For example, the child who has 
suffered neglect may grow up believing herself or himself®® to be unimportant 
or worthless. She may continue to hold this negative self-image for many 
years or even for the rest of her life, and it will adversely affect her ability to 
form healthy relationships for she will not believe that she has anything of 
value to give to another person. If she later comes to recognise her own 
value and worth she will not alter the fact that she was neglected as a child 
but will reinterpret it. It did not happen because of any failure or inadequacy 
on her part but because of failure or inadequacy on the part of her carer. It is 
important to recognise here that the person who reinterprets the past in this 
way is not denying the past or attempting to rewrite history but is learning to 
see the past in a new light, changing its meaning and how it affects her or his 
life in the present. The person who attempts to rewrite memory is very 
different from the person who attempts to rewrite history. To rewrite memory 
is to reinterpret the meaning of events as they influence our sense of self. It 
is not to attempt to deny that events took place. To attempt to rewrite history, 
on the other hand, is to attempt to change facts, such as David Irving's 
attempt to deny the fact of the holocaust. Irving is reported as saying that, 
"the infamous gas chambers...did not exist."^ ®®
It is not only our perception of the past that is open to interpretation but also 
our present perception and experience. If, for example, we are unaware that 
our friend or colleague is feeling unwell or is anxious about something we
Freeman, 1993:163, 207
For the sake of simplicity here I will use third person feminine pronouns. 
Stauber (www)
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may misinterpret his grim expression or surliness to mean that he is, for 
some reason, displeased with us.
The potentially damaging influence of some memories and the need to 
address them in order to change the meaning they have on the present is 
indicated in Bauckham and Hart who state, “Memories can crush and bind as 
well as empower and release us...the presence of the past...exercises a 
debilitating and enervating influence on our present unless and until we face 
and redeem it.” ®^^ Seamands says of this, “We cannot change the facts we 
remember but we can change their meanings and the power they have over 
our present way of living.” ®^^ This belief surely is at the very heart of the 
Christian Gospel and is the presupposition of counselling, both Christian and 
secular. Elliot tells us that memory dictates how we shape the world and that 
we would shape it differently if we lived in the hope of ‘divine 
transformation’.^ ®® If we believe that such a change in the meaning and 
power of the past in the present is possible during our lifetime then it is surely 
not illogical to believe that a more complete transformation will take place at 
the eschaton.
In looking at the place of memory in writing and rewriting the self. Freeman 
does not seem to take account of the fact that our identity is, in part, 
attributed to us by others based on their experience of us, their memories of 
their experience, and of course, their interpretation of those experiences and 
memories. Perhaps the fact that the memories of others also pass through 
the filter of interpretation - of their individual interpretation - together with the 
fact that we present different facets of the self to different ‘others’ depending 
on the status of our relationship with them - for example, my parent, pastor 
and professor will all see me differently - accounts for the variation of 
perception different ‘others’ have of the same ‘self. As we present a different 
facet of the self to different others in this way, so the different others respond 
to the self whom they encounter. This in turn, gives us a message about how
Bauckham & Hart, 2000: 59 
Seamands, 1986:188 
Elliot, 1995: 218
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our self is experienced by others, which contributes to our sense of who we 
are.^ ®"^  The interpretative filter through which we pass our memories is not 
static, which means given the right trigger we are able to recall something 
today of which we had no conscious memory yesterday, or tomorrow will 
remember something clearly which is vague and hazy today.
The film, Eve's Bayou tells the story of a small town black doctor from
Louisiana, Louis Batiste, and his family in the 1960s. The story is told from
the perspective of the middle child. Eve. Having considered and responded 
to a major incident which had irreversible tragic consequences, as 
remembered and related to her by her older sister, Eve discovers that her 
father’s interpretation of events was somewhat different. Reflecting on this, 
Eve draws the following conclusion, “The truth changes colour depending on 
the light and tomorrow can be clearer than today. Memory is a selection of 
images; some illusive, others printed indelibly on the brain. Each image is 
like a thread, each thread is woven together to make a tapestry of intricate 
texture, and the tapestry tells a story, and the story is our past^ ®®.” Eve
Batiste’s sister, Cicely, is traumatised by the major incident and later
confesses that she cannot remember what actually took place.
Cicely’s experience is not unusual. Painful and traumatic memories are often 
filtered out through denial or suppression. The painful or traumatic event, the 
memory of which is denied or suppressed, may have an adverse effect on 
other areas of the life of the individual, robbing her or him of the opportunity 
to be all she or he can be as a person. Before giving him his commission, 
Jesus confronted Peter with his painful past. The memory of his denial of his 
Lord, together with his Lord’s forgiveness which brought healing would 
continue to provide the incentive for Peter to remain faithful^ ®®. Being 
confronted with his pain and failure, being forced to face up to it, enabled 
Peter to remain faithful to his high calling and to fulfil his potential. Had he 
not been helped to face his past head on, it would have undermined his work.
See chapter on personal identity for a fuller discussion of how the self, or our sense of 
self, is formed and reformed in relation.
Eve in Eve’s Bayou Trimark Pictures Inc. 1997 
Kraft, 1993: 19
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limited his ability and adversely affected his relationship with his Lord for the 
rest of his life. Volf, it seems, would disagree with this for he makes the point 
that without forgetting a forgiven sinner is still a past s in ne r^M igh t  it not be 
the case, however, that with or without forgetting forgiven sinners are 
eternally past sinners? This should not be a cause for despair and 
hopelessness for the forgiven sinner is a past sinner, a former sinner and in 
the eyes of God the forgiven-ness and pastness of the sin is eternal. God's 
concern is no longer with the forgiven sin. He non-remembers our forgiven 
sin. His concern is with the forgiven sinner whom he eternally remembers, 
and remembers as forgiven.
Just as new experiences and new relationships do not negate previous ones; 
just as the ‘self I am today is not a replacement but a development of the 
‘self I was ten years ago, so recent memory does not replace old memory 
but acts as a filter through which old memories are passed. Just as Peter 
would continue to remember his painful failure in the light of his Lord’s 
forgiveness and restoration, so too we remember old memories in the light of 
the new. Peter’s forgiveness and restoration after past failure does not erase 
or negate the past but serves as the “Foundation for a new and extended 
identity.’’^ ®® Not only do we remember old memories in the light of the new, in 
many situations we also need the old memories to make sense of the new. 
The two interpret one another. For example, how much sense would Peter’s 
memory of being forgiven and restored have made to him had the memory of 
his past failure been simultaneously obliterated? Grace can only be 
experienced as such when the need of it is kept in mind. Without an 
awareness of the need we lose awareness of the grace. David Keck 
illustrates the way old and new interpret and give meaning to one another by 
reference to the Old and New Covenants. The Old is viewed in the light of 
the New^ ®®, and oftentimes the New can only be properly understood with 
reference to the Old. Again, in the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ we 
see the dependence of old and new on one another. Just as the crucifixion
Volf, 1996: 132
Peter Williams cited in Volf, 1996:136 
^°®Keck, 1996: 70
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would have been meaningless without the resurrection, so too the meaning 
of the resurrection would have been different without the sacrificial death on 
the cross that preceded it. The meaning would have been different if, for 
example, the death had occurred as a result of illness or accident or if it had 
been suicide.
2.7 Lest We Forget
We have just seen that it is not possible to fully comprehend the new (the 
present) apart from the old (the past) and how the old give meaning to the 
new. We cannot make sense of ourselves without memory of the past. 
David Keck notes that, “It is impossible for us to distinguish between 
ourselves and our memories.... We are our memories and without them we 
have but a physical resemblance to that person we suppose to be."^ ^® Luis 
Bunuel also states this, indicating that it is often only as people lose their 
memories that they come to appreciate them. “You have to begin to lose 
your memory, if only in bits and pieces, to realise that memory is what makes 
our lives. Life without memory is no life at all.... Our memory is our 
coherence, our reason, our feeling, even our action. Without it we are 
nothing.”^ ^^
How, then, will individual identities be retained if, as Volf suggests, memory 
and experiences which are so much a part of our identity are erased at the 
eschaton? Volf does not address in his book the question of how individual 
identity is retained if the memory of formative experiences is erased but 
poses the related, yet opposite, question of why identity would not be 
retained even if memories were cancelled out? He makes the point that 
many experiences, of which we have no conscious memory, form and reform 
our identities throughout life. He does not acknowledge that in many 
instances a very small trigger is all that would be needed to revive these 
seemingly forgotten memories. Far from existing memory being erased at
Keck, 1996: 43 
Cited in Sacks, 1986: 22
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the eschaton as Volf suggests, I suggest that the opposite is true, that lost 
memory will be restored.
Volf, however, does anticipate the objection that identity is threatened if 
memory is lost, and argues that what has happened to us in our lives is 
formative whether or not we consciously remember it. “Our history forms part 
of our identity notwithstanding. For clearly we remember now neither 
everything that has happened to us nor everything we once remembered as 
having happened to us, and yet we are, arguably, ourselves. Indeed we are 
who we are precisely because we do not remember everything, but 
remember this or that and remember it in this way or that way. Why, then, 
would we not be able to be ourselves if the memory of wrongdoing and evil 
we suffered receded into oblivion? True, our identity would be reconstituted 
with such non remembrance, but it is our identity that would be thus 
reconstituted, much like it is being reconstituted daily."^^^
There can be no denying the truth of Volfs claim that we do not remember 
everything that has happened to us or even everything we once 
remembered. Our senses are bombarded every moment of every day 
throughout our lives with sights, sounds, smells, with touch and taste, and 
these sensations are accompanied by feelings of peace, pain, pleasure, fear 
and any number of other emotional responses. Many fade and are lost 
almost as soon as they happen, and have no bearing on who we are. I, for 
example, have no need to remember the bird that flew past my window while 
I was writing this (and it is extremely unlikely that I would have if I had not 
written about it) nor the sound of drilling and hammering emanating from my 
neighbours’ house. But if the drill developed a fault which caused an 
electrical fire razing both houses to the ground, the drilling would take on a 
new significance and would be very much more likely to be remembered. In 
considering our non-remembering of daily detail Hume writes, “For how few 
of our past actions are there of which we have any memory? Who can tell 
me, for instance what his thoughts and actions were on the first of January
^^^Volf, 1996:136n.
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1715, the eleventh of March 1719, and the third of August 1733? Or will he 
affirm, because he has entirely forgot the incidents of these days, that the 
present self is not the same person with the self of that time; and by that 
means overturn all the most established notions of ‘personal identity'?"^
Both Hugh Kerr and Frances Yates consider this, arriving at the same 
conclusion. Kerr notes that, “We seem to remember the unusual rather than 
the normal, the oddity rather than the routine, the amusing rather than the 
solemn, the mythology rather than the chronicle.”^ S i m i l a r l y  Yates points 
out that we remember the unusual rather than the everyday. For example, 
we do not remember the daily sunrise and sunset but we will remember the 
solar eclipse because it is unusual. She concludes, “But if we see or hear 
something exceptionally base, dishonourable, unusual, great, unbelievable or 
ridiculous, that we are likely to remember for a long time.”^^® So, had the bird 
passing my window been a colourful parrot or kingfisher it would have been 
remembered without being noted above. Although the sighting of foxes in 
the city is a more common experience than it was a few years ago we are still 
more likely to remember where and when we saw a fox while driving than 
where and when we saw a dog or a cat.
There are, however, in all of our lives certain key experiences that are so 
formative that to forget them would surely make us different people than we 
are. Let us return, once more, to Peter. Without the memory of his 
forgiveness after the resurrection, Peter may have been powerless in the 
years to come. Similarly, without memory of his denial, the words of 
forgiveness would have been meaningless. Peter was, we might suggest, 
the person he was because he remembered his failure and his restoration. 
They gave depth to the relationship he had with his Risen Lord and 
strengthened his resolve to faithfulness and loyalty. Without the experiences 
and the memory of the experiences he would have been the same impetuous
Hume, 2000:170 (1.4.6.20) 
Kerr. 1975:130 
Yates, 1992: 25
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Peter he was before, forever impeded by a sense of his own failure and 
inadequacy.
Different people have different reasons for attempting to suppress memory. 
The most obvious reason is that the memory is particularly painful and 
recalling it causes continued suffering but memories that do riot fit with our 
current sense of self or with public memory or norms may also be 
suppressed or reinterpreted in order to make ourselves more comfortable 
with who we are now and in order to give ourselves a sense of 
congruence^Thomson writes, “Memory is a battlefield. We fight within 
ourselves to make a particular memory of our experiences and to repress 
alternative memories.”^
Nouwen also discusses this and, unlike Thomson, he goes on to consider 
why not remembering can actually be more damaging than remembering. 
“We want to forget the pains of the past.... But by not remembering them we 
allow the forgotten memories to become independent forces that can exert a 
crippling effect on our functioning as human beings.”^ H e  goes on to 
explain that refusing to acknowledge or remember painful memories prevents 
us from changing and growing. It is only when we let wounded memories be 
available that they can be healed. He states, “Forgetting the past is like 
turning our most intimate teacher against us.”^^® Making a similar point 
Allender says, “Hiding the past always involves denial; denial of the past is 
always a denial of God. To forget your personal history is tantamount to 
trying to forget yourself and the journey that God has called you to.”^^® In his 
attempt to explain why he believes people sometimes try to forget and hide 
the past, Allender seems to suggest that denial of the past is a form of 
theodicy. If we deny or trivialise painful memories, he explains, we do not 
have to ask the prickly question of why God does not intervene. He 
continues, “The unbelieving world is willing to see the damage of abuse,
Thomson, 1990: 78 
Thomson, 1990: 73 
Nouwen, undated: 21 
Nouwen, undated: 22 
Allender, 1995:13
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because it feels no need to defend the God who could have intervened to 
stop i t  The Christian community, however, feels disposed to deny any data 
that casts doubt on God’s presence or willingness to act for the sake of his 
children.”^ ^^
Although in Exclusion And Embrace Volf speaks of eschatological forgetting, 
he has acknowledged elsewhere that what he actually was thinking about 
was more a volitional 'not calling to mind’/^^ This is a biblical concept^^® and 
Is the same as non-remembering, the term he employed earlier in his 
discussion. Non-remembering, or not calling to mind suggests that the 
memory is still available to us should we choose to recall it, while forgetting 
indicates more that it is completely and permanently lost.
If negative and painful memories are non-remembered and not erased at the 
eschaton could there be a risk of them suddenly coming to mind and marring 
eternity? Geoffrey Grogan suggests that we will be so caught up in the 
wonder of who Christ is that we will hardly be aware of ourselves, much less 
painful and destructive memories from the past. “We see that the Christ who 
offers himself to us is God and Lord.... He will be the centre of the redeemed 
universe throughout all eternity and, by his grace and only by that grace, we 
shall take our places among the worshippers. Perhaps in heaven we may 
hardly be aware that we exist. What will dominate everything is the fact that 
he exists, and that he is all-holy, all-wise, all-loving.’’^^ "^  In conversation with 
Grogan about this comment, he drew comparison with the experience of 
listening to a favourite piece of music. The music alone commands our full 
attention. It is as /fall else ceases to exist. We do not think other thoughts or 
concentrate on other concerns when we are lost in the music. Likewise, he 
suggests, when in heaven we are caught up in the worship of God it will be 
as if  all other thoughts and concerns had ceased to exist. It is not that they 
will have been erased, but they will not have any more significance. Perhaps 
the hymn-writer had a similar thought in mind when he wrote the words, “Till
Allender, 1995:14
Personal letter, February 2000 (see appendix 2) 
See, for example, Isaiah 43: 25; 65:17  
Grogan, 1998: 283
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in heaven we take our place...lost in wonder, love and praise.”^^ ® We must 
be careful, however, not to press Grogan’s illustration too far or we would be 
at risk of losing all sight of the self. It is our lives, our selves that are the 
object of redemption. It is we who will, as the hymn-writer says, ‘take our 
place’ and we who will wonder, love and praise’. This is clearer in 
Bauckham and Hart’s similar statement. “In the worship whose only purpose 
is to please God and to enjoy God, we shall eternally lose ourselves in the 
beauty and love of God and eternally enjoy the surprise of finding ourselves 
in God.’’
2.8 Memory and Identity
As we have seen, the memory of certain significant events and experiences 
is crucial in retaining a person’s sense of continuity, their narrative identity, 
over time. The memory of what has been has a role in making sense of what 
is. The same is true of cultural, social and national identity. Alan Falconer 
states that, “The first step in liquidating a people is to erase its memory.’’ 
Which is why communities and people groups have traditions, cultures, 
stories, songs, religion and literature for recall.
Similarly Peter Stevenson makes the observation that the community who 
refuses to remember the past is in danger of losing its identity and history^ 
The same could surely be said of individuals; the person who refuses to 
remember her or his past is in danger of losing her or his sense of identity. 
The fact that someone loses his or her sense of identity does not mean that 
his or her identity is totally lost for it can be preserved in the memory of 
others as Jill Robinson discovered when she lost her memory and, with it, her 
sense of who she was^^®. From a theological perspective, in the event that
Charles Wesley, Love Divine, All Loves Excelling 
Bauckham & Hart, 1999:159 
Falconer, 1988:1 
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no-one remembers on another’s behalf the person’s identity is still not lost 
because God remembers us
God remembers us. He remembers our name/®^ and, as we considered in 
the previous chapter, “a name symbolises identity.’’ ®^^ In the Old Testament, 
“For the sake of my name” and “For the sake of your name ” are frequently 
recurring phrases^®® and refer to God’s identity or reputation. Most people 
when asked who they are will, in the first instance, give their name as 
considered in the previous chapter. It is one of the first words an infant 
recognises and is usually the last memory to fade in dementia sufferers^ ®"^, 
and as we also saw in chapter 1, Primo Levi felt in concentration camp, that if 
he could hold on to his name he was holding onto himself. “They have even 
taken away our name...behind the name something of us, of us as we were, 
still remains.’’ ®^®
During the Balkan conflict in the early 1990s Serbian forces sought to wipe 
out all evidence that the town of Vukovar in the eastern Croatian region of 
Slavonia, and its people, had ever existed. Not only did they slaughter the 
people and destroy homes but they also burned down the public records 
office. The logic behind this action is the thought that if there was no 
recorded memory of the people’s existence then they could not ever have 
existed. But the people of Croatia did not let this happen, they refused to 
forget and gave Vukovar a stronger identity than it ever had before. In reality 
the aggressive action of the Serb forces had the opposite of the desired 
effect. The town of Vukovar and its inhabitants have been firmly placed in 
the memory of their fellow country-folk both in literature and in song. 
‘ZapamtiteJ Vukovar’, exhorts one popular song, ‘Remember Vukovar’. In 
1997 The Croatian Mint, in co-operation with the Croatian National Bank, 
produced commemorative gold and silver coins bearing Vukovar’s image and 
some years earlier the Croatian postal service printed postage stamps
Isaiah 49;15f; Isaiah 44: 21
Hebrews 12:23; Revelation 3:5
Bauckham, 2002:40
Psalm 25:11; 31:3; Ezekiel 20:9, 14, 22
Bell & Troxel, 2001:36
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portraying Vukovar, stamps which would be sent around the world on mail, 
thus drawing Vukovar to the attention of many who had never previously 
heard of it. The town featured in a BBC documentary. Two Hours From 
London, fixing it in the memories of a great many people outwith Croatia who 
had previously never heard of Vukovar. Through documentary, song, story, 
stamps and coins millions of people in Croatia and beyond continue to 
remember the town of Vukovar today - the opposite of what enemy forces 
sought to do.
Vukovar’s own memory was destroyed - lost - through the destruction of the 
public records office and yet the fact of its existence remains in the memories 
of others because they care about the town and about what happened to it. 
Similarly when, due to Alzheimer's disease or some other form of dementia, 
an individual’s memory is lost or destroyed the fact of that person’s identity 
remains in the memories of others who care about that person and, as 
indicated above, God continues to hold us in his eternal memory. Memory is 
vital in sustaining, not only the sense of self but also relationship and, as we 
see here, relationship has value not only in constituting self as discussed in 
the previous chapter, but also for sustaining identity.
David Keck touches on the importance and relevance of the memory of 
others to an individual’s identity in his study of Alzheimer's disease. He tells 
us that while our memories inform us who we are, we are also what others 
remember of us and what God remembers, even although we may forget 
Godself^®®. Keck calls dementia, whether the result of Alzheimer’s or some 
other illness or injury, ‘the theological illness’ because sufferers undergo what 
appears to be a disintegration of the human ‘person’, thus presenting a 
challenge to our perception of human being and purpose^® .^ The observation 
of a person suffering from dementia would certainly present a profound 
challenge to the Cartesian dictum which equates being with thinking and 
rationality and thus has serious ethical and pastoral implications.
Keck, 1996: 43, 45 
Keck. 1996:15f
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It is important to insist that a person’s life does not lose significance because 
memory is lost. This was stated by Leonard Shelby, the main character from 
the film, Memento, whom we have already encountered. Shelby suffered 
from amnesia following his wife’s murder. He could not remember 
conversations or experiences from one day to the next, or even from one 
hour to the next. He stated that just because he could not remember what he 
had done did not mean that his actions were unimportant^®®. So too the 
actions of a person suffering from dementia, and of course the person 
himself, do not become unimportant just because he Is unable to remember. 
As Bell and Troxel state, “There is still a person beneath the cloak of 
dementia, a person with remaining strength and abilities.’’ ®^® They caution 
that to lose sight of this, “It can become easy to negate the person, resulting 
in poor care or even abuse.’’ "^^®
The reason suggested by Falconer why the first step in liquidating a people is 
to erase its memory is that, “The cohesiveness and sense of direction of a 
community is nourished by its memories.’’ "^^  ^ This, I suggest, also applies to 
individuals - the person’s sense of self over time, my sense of ‘who I am 
today’, is nourished and sustained by memories of yesterday and yesteryear.
Mark Santer considers this same issue, that memory has a crucial role in our 
sense of identity and says that amnesiacs would no longer have an identity 
but for the memories of others. He observes that memories are mostly social 
- that is, experienced in relation to o t h e r s . L o s s  of certain memories, then 
are corrosive of relationships as ongoing relationships depend on memory for 
continuity. Robert Wilkin also notes this, saying, “Memory locates us in the 
corporate and the particular. There is no memory that is not rooted in 
communal experience.’’^ '^ ® He states that all memory -  even individual 
memory -  is rooted in communal e x p e r i e n c e ^ T h i s  would explain.
Memento, Newmarket Films, 2001 
Bell & Troxel, 2001:32 
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perhaps, why Jill Robinson felt shared memories are more costly to lose than 
solitary ones. “Worse will be when it’s a memory of a time shared with 
someone and I don’t have it, so in a way they’ll miss it too.... Solitary 
memories aren’t as troubling. If you don’t have them you don’t know.’’^^® It 
could be argued that the opposite of this is true because if the memory is 
shared and lost it can be given back by the person with whom it was shared 
but if no-one shared it, it is completely lost forever and, as Jill Robinson 
observes, we do not even know.
A novelist, Robinson suffered total amnesia in 1992 following a massive 
epileptic seizure which left her in a coma. Past Forgetting is her account of 
her attempt to reclaim her past, to rediscover who she was. It is her personal 
journey from forgetting to non-forgetting, from anonymity to identity, a journey 
in which she describes herself as a time traveller from 1946.
When she awakens from the coma Robinson realises that the unfamiliar 
room in which she finds herself is a hospital room and surmises that the 
stranger beside her is a doctor. He is, in fact, her husband, something he 
has to retell her every time he visits. She ‘remembers’ that she is American, 
that she has never left America or been on an aeroplane and that she is the 
mother of two young children. In reality, however, her two children are grown 
up with children of their own and she was in hospital in England having lived 
in London with her English husband for several years. She was right about 
her nationality. Frequently throughout the book Robinson draws attention to 
the fact that her husband was a stranger to her by referring to him as, “the 
Englishman’’ "^^®. Occasionally, in the early days, Robinson would have 
glimpses of trivial memories from her past. This annoyed her because she 
was unable to remember important things and felt that the trivia cluttered her 
mind. “Pieces of memory I do not need come through like dive-bombers 
dropping old flyers.’’^ "^  ^ The temporal remoteness of the memories was also 
a source of frustration for her. “LA in 1944 is not particularly helpful if you’re
Robinson, 2000: 5
Robinson, 2000: 7,8,9.10,12,13,14.20.23,28,29,38.143,275
Robinson, 2000, 7
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living in London in 1980-something,” she complains to her doctor who 
responds, "Especially as it's 1992.” "^^®
Her frustration as she struggled to remember about her own tastes and 
preferences as well as her feeling of insecurity and isolation when she was 
on her own with no-one to remind her is obvious in the following statement. 
“When I’m on my own like this, I feel I’m on a windy roof. Nothing to hold 
onto.... Will things I used to like to eat be distasteful? Will I love the music I 
used to hate? Will everything be a brand-new choice?.... Who did this 
needlepoint?.... Did I run a company?.... How many of these questions did I 
ask yesterday, and how many have already been answered?” "^*®
It seems that Robinson’s greatest loss was of events-memories. She could 
remember the names of film stars but not those of her own husband and 
immediate friends and she makes frequent reference to the world of films. 
She complains, “It’s only my life I seem to be missing.” ®^® She could also 
remember skills she had previously learned - the fact that she had not lost 
the ability to cook, even although she could not remember the taste of things, 
puzzled her somewhat^®\
Robinson had to piece together her past life and her present identity from 
fragments. She had to salvage a series of images from the past which, 
alongside fantasy images, would flip through her mind when she was having 
a petit mal^ ®^ . That these fragments of memory overlapped one another, 
creating different patterns each time, is evident from her descriptive use of 
the term 'kaleidoscope' for the various thoughts and images she had in her 
head^ ®®. Just as the fragments of coloured glass in a kaleidoscope are in 
different positions each time they are seen, giving a seemingly infinite variety 
of images and patterns, so the fragments of memory overlapped in her mind 
in different configurations, giving different images and variations of her ‘self.
Robinson, 2000: 62 
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According to Sacks, empirical research indicates that epileptic hallucinations 
such as Robinson experienced and describes are never merely imaginary 
fantasies but are always precise and vivid m e m o r i e s ^ A s  this differs 
somewhat from Robinson's experience perhaps the images she describes as 
fantasy were in fact memory images of a past that was so remote that she 
did not recognise it, or images of the solitary memories, which she says were 
lost forever. On the other hand, it could be that the empirical research is 
incomplete and she was correct in her diagnosis of fantasy.
Oliver Sacks tells of an elderly patient, Mrs O’C., who late in life developed 
what Sacks calls ‘musical epilepsy*. This ‘musical epilepsy’ caused her to 
‘hear’ music inside her head as clearly as if a radio had been left on. (Mrs 
O’C. was deaf so would have been unable to hear the radio.) The songs Mrs 
O’C. ‘heard’ were memories retrieved from early childhood, memories that 
had been lost to her for 85 years. It had always saddened her that she was 
unable to remember her early years before her mother died and, having 
regained something long since lost to her, wanted no treatment for the brain 
disturbance that caused it. After it had righted itself she stated with 
satisfaction, “There’s a sort of completeness I never had before.” ®^®
Robinson used several aides-memoires - books, photographs, letters, her 
husband Stuart’s journals, ‘memory partners’, visual aids and frequent 
repetition^®® and, as a result, was able gradually to create what she called the 
‘film’ of her past life by splicing together odd scenes^ ®^. The frequent 
reference to the world of film both in her remembrances and in the 
vocabulary she uses is in itself a reference to her early life for her father was 
a film producer and owned a film studio.
In her attempt to understand memory Robinson read books which handled 
memory of the past in different ways - she looked at works of architecture.
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ancient philosophy and psychology. She also created her own ‘memory 
theatre' using photographs of significant persons in her life to remind her 
about them^ ®®.
As a writer Robinson had learned at a young age the importance of 
separating memory from storytelling^®®. Now, as a woman in her late fifties, 
she found herself having to recreate her past - her memories - from the 
stories others would tell her. Although she was learning about her own life, 
her own past, she was learning that she was a grandmother, that her father 
had died ten years before, that she was married to this Englishman, that she 
had had a problem with addiction in her past, in much the same way as we 
considered one might learn that the Scots and the English fought a bloody 
battle at Culloden in 1746. It was factual memory of events, as remembered 
by other people, not events memory as she had experienced them she was 
creating. This distinction was not lost on Robinson who writes, “Don’t... 
confuse information with memory. The real memories are the emotional 
connections.” ®^®. For example, we probably do not eat curry (or avoid eating 
it) because we remember the taste for it is not easy, in the absence of 
olfactory cues, to recapture the flavour in the imagination. Rather, I suggest, 
we eat curry (or avoid eating it) because we remember that we enjoy the 
taste (or not). But if we catch a whiff as we walk past our favourite restaurant 
we find our mouth watering for the olfactory cue enables the imagination to 
remember the flavour and make the emotional connection. Our memories 
contain the same emotional and spiritual charge and the same moral element 
as do the original experiences. Memory of an event cannot be separated 
from its accompanying emotion. If it is, it is only a partial memory.
Robinson voiced her concern that she was reinventing rather than 
recollecting memory to Steven Rose, professor of neurochemistry with the 
Open University. Rose responded that in a sense we do this every time we 
relate some remembered event. “Every act of memory is a reinvention, isn’t
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it?” he says, “When you tell a story, or have an experience, the memory shifts 
as the tale is a little different next time it is told. Its character also changes 
depending upon who you tell it to.” ®^^ For example, to ask someone for a 
memory from childhood they would recall it as it was last recalled, bearing in 
mind that it changes each time it is retold^® .^ This happens because we do 
not simply look back at past events but pass them through the filter of 
interpretation as we saw when we considered Mark Freeman.
In her effort to recreate her past Robinson discovered that she had more 
difficulty in remembering some facts and some people than others and noted 
that we often forget people quite simply because we are not interested in 
them^ ®®. The same could be said of some places and some events. In 
considering why, at a time when she was able to retain other information, she 
had to be told repeatedly that her father had died some ten years before, she 
asks, “I wonder if I remember less if it’s something I don’t want to know.” ®^"^  
Because the human mind has a tendency at times to forget or deny some 
memories that are too awful to remember, Robinson’s friend, John Lahr 
expressed concern that by seeking to retrieve what was forgotten she was 
making herself vulnerable^®®. Lahr does the opposite. With varying degrees 
of success he wills himself to forget painful memories or even memories of 
happier times which would cause him pain^ ®®. Despite his concern, however, 
Lahr was aware that it was important to Robinson’s sense of personal identity 
that she did make every effort to retrieve memories. He was aware because 
of his own experience with his mother when she lost her memory. Speaking 
of his experience of that time Lahr says, “Without memory, you lose a sense 
of who you are, a sense of self, because really the self is only a collection of 
associations and memories of things done and done to you and where you’ve 
been - and without that, it’s very hard to get any definition of who you are....
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But the experience of being with her when she lost her memory - there was 
nothing to share - she’d lost her identity.” ®^^
This was also Robinson’s experience of herself when she lost her memory. 
Having lost her memory she had no sense of her identity, hence her journey 
to recapture the past and recreate her own identity. Despite much 
encouragement and support from her husband and friends who retained a 
sense of her identity when she lost it, it was a lonely journey, fraught with 
confusion, frustration and painful discoveries yet it was interlaced with special 
times, tender moments and exciting flashes of insight. It was a long, slow 
process but her efforts were rewarded. Going to Los Angeles for work was a 
breakthrough time for her^ ®®. It brought back many memories from the time 
when she had lived there some thirty years earlier. After reminiscing about 
people, places and work situations she eventually realised that the person 
from the past she had recreated herself into from the fragments of memory 
and imagination was different from reality and states, "I never was this girl I 
am looking for now."^ ®®.
Through repeatedly asking questions about her past life and listening as 
others related stories from her life Robinson was able to weave the stories 
together to construct her personal narrative and make sense of who she was 
and is. Robinson’s experience illustrates Warnock’s thesis that we value 
memory so highly because it contributes to our sense of identity over time. 
As we have considered, it enables us to see our lives as a pattern and to 
make sense of our lives. In a few years Robinson went from being a woman 
with no past that she could recall and no sense of her own identity, from 
being a novelist unable to write because she could remember neither what 
she had written the previous day nor the plot she might have had in mind, to 
being able to write her autobiography and share her past, as well as the 
person she now knows herself to be, with her readers, even although that 
past and sense of self have been reconstructed from the fragments given to
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her by the stories told to her by others. Robinson was literally enabled, 
through reconstructing memories to see the pattern of her life and make 
sense of herself. This reconstruction was possible only though the help of 
those with whom she was in relationship who remembered for her.
2.9 The Place of Storv-tellinq
For Anderson and Foley the telling of stories and weaving stories together to 
construct narratives is a basic human function. They look at the way we 
shape our stories and, perhaps more significantly, how our stories shape us. 
They look too at how we are able to connect to others through both telling 
them our story and hearing theirs, and incorporating theirs into ours. They 
consider the vital role of narrative in enabling us to make sense of what has 
happened to us in the past, who we are now and our hopes for the future. 
“We tell stories of a life in order to establish meaning and to integrate our 
remembered past with what we perceive to be happening in the present and 
what we anticipate for the future.”^^ ®
This, as Wells notes, is also true of the Christian story, narrative enables us 
to understand God’s progressive revelation of himself over time, and that 
which is to come -  the New Creation -  is an important part of that story. “It is 
the sense of an end to the story that makes it possible to speak of story at 
all.... Eschatology brings a shape to Christian theology.... By providing an 
end to the story it shows that the Christian narrative is indeed a story, not an 
endless sequence of events.
This statement from Barbara Hardy helps us understand the ubiquity of 
narrative in our daily lives. “We dream in narrative, remember, anticipate, 
hope, despair, believe, doubt, plan, revise, criticise, construct, gossip, learn, 
hate and love by narrative.”^^  ^ Bauckham and Hart cite Hardy to show that 
despite the antinarrativity of post modernism, narrative is an ever-present
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part of our lives and is here to stay. They further support this with reference 
to many popular genres that employ narrative -  film, drama, novel, 
biography, comic strip, and soap opera.
Anderson and Foley tell of the healing experience of Rwandan women in a 
refugee camp in Tanzania from recalling, telling and retelling their stories. 
Even although they were in a safe place many of the women were unable to 
sleep and so the camp authorities brought in a psychologist to help with this 
problem. Through conversation with the women, the psychologist discovered 
that on arrival at the camp the women were instructed by camp officials not to 
bring the horrors and atrocities of war, which they had experienced, into the 
camp by talking about them. The psychologist created a ‘safe place’ under a 
tree for the women to come and tell their stories. This continued for several 
weeks at the end of which the women were able to sleep^^^. This experience 
illustrates that painful memories which are suppressed, denied or ignored will 
continue to be destructive to the functioning of the individual but that healing 
can begin once the painful memories are acknowledged and addressed. In 
his forward to a book on reconciliation Desmond Tutu quotes Ellen Kuzwayo, 
a South African writer and journalist, saying, “We need more stories never 
mind how painful the exercise might be. This is how we will learn to love one 
another. Stories help us to understand, to forgive and see things through 
someone else’s eyes.”^^® The use of story in understanding and forgiving 
others will be discussed further in chapter 3.
Bosch also considers the importance of telling and listening to stories. For 
her, storytelling is a powerful tool in breaking down barriers between people 
because it allows understanding to develop. She also makes the interesting 
observation which is all too easy to miss - that storytelling is as necessary for 
perpetrators as for their v i c t i m s ^ B u t  storytelling does not go far enough, it 
is only a start in the healing process. “Telling your story,” she says, “is a 
liberating experience, but without faith in Jesus Christ it will remain a mere
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shadow of that deeper reconciliation the Gospel tells us about."^^^ In 
considering why stories are used and their place in theology, Hauen/vas cites 
Sallie TeSelle who writes, “We love stories, then, because our lives are 
stories.... For the Christian, the story of Jesus is the story par excellence. 
That God should be with us in the story of a human life would be seen 
as...God’s way of always being with human beings as they are, as the 
concrete, temporal beings who have a beginning and an end -  who are, in 
other words, stories themselves.
Stories not only have to be told, they have to be listened to and heard. It is 
through both telling our own stories and listening to the stories of others that 
we are enabled to accept and perhaps begin to understand the reality of the 
past^ ^®. As we have been considering, hurts that are swept under the carpet 
and denied instead of being told as part of our story fester in much the same 
way as an open flesh wound that is left untreated and uncleaned would do. 
As a result of being left to fester these hurts can have an adverse affect on 
our lives for many years. “Genuine Christian healing and peace can only be 
achieved when old wounds are opened and cleaned,” ®^® and this can only 
happen when they are remembered, acknowledged and told.
Stroup notes that social scientists suggest narrative is the appropriate genre 
for recounting experienced®  ^ and asks if there is, “something intrinsic in the 
structure of human experience that makes narrative...the most appropriate, if 
not necessary, form of expression.”d®^ Stories enable us to identify with 
others by telling us something about them and by giving us points of contact. 
This was recognised by Dag Hammerskjôld. Two years before his 
appointment to Secretary General of the United Nations, he wrote in his 
diary, “What you are can be of interest to (others) not that you are.”d®® Henri 
Nouwen draws our attention to the related distinction between events of our
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life and how these events affect us as persons. “The events of our lives are 
probably less important than the form they take in the totality of our 
story...much of their sense of self derives less from what happened than 
from how they remember what happened, how they have placed the past 
events into their own personal history.”d®‘^
Stanley Hauerwas explains the difference between theory and story. Theory 
explains and informs while story involves both storyteller and listener in a 
way of life. “A theory is meant to help you know the world without changing 
the world yourself; a story is to help you deal with the world by changing it 
through changing yourself."d®® In other words, story enables and incites our 
identification and involvement with one another.
Storytelling not only reminds us of what has been, it gives us hope for what 
will be. “As long as we have stories to tell each other there is hope. As long 
as we can remind each other of the manifest there is reason to move forward 
to a new land in which new stories are hidden.”d®® As we will consider in the 
chapter on Forgiveness, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South 
Africa discovered the value of story-telling for both victims and perpetrators if 
forgiveness and reconciliation are to take place.
2.10 Forgiveness and Reconciliation
Chapter three looks in detail at forgiveness. In this section I will look 
specifically at the reconfiguring of memory through forgiveness.
Father Michael Lapsley, who went to live in South Africa from New Zealand 
in the 1970s was exiled from the country for some years. During his exile, 
which he spent in Zimbabwe, he was informed that he was on a South 
African Government hit list. In April 1990, just over two months after 
Mandela's release from prison, Lapsley received a letter bomb from South
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Africa. The blast blew off both his hands, blinded one eye and injured the 
other. He writes, “If we try to ignore or bury the past it will haunt us and may 
even destroy us... we cannot be healed until we acknowledge our 
s i c k n e s s . L a p s l e y  returned to South Africa where he worked as a 
chaplain to a Trauma Centre in Capetown. He notes that the one thing many 
of the Trauma Centre's clients have in common is that they are seeking 
healing of their memoriesd®®.
In considering situations such as those of Father Lapsley, the people with 
whom he worked at the Trauma Centre and the Rwandan women who were 
unable to sleep until they were given the opportunity to tell their story, 
Anderson and Foley conclude by quoting R Schreiter, “In forgiving we do not 
forget; we remember in a different way. We cannot forget what has 
happened to us. To erase part of our memory is to erase part of our very 
identity as persons.... We remember in a way that does not carry rancour for 
what has been. We remember now from God’s perspective, thanks to the 
grace of reconciliation.”d®® This is what it is to ‘remember well'.
David Seamands also shows that it is only through acknowledging and 
addressing painful memories that healing can begin. Memory healing is not 
about forgetting the past, in fact it may involve hard work recalling long- 
buried memories. It is rather about deliverance from past hurts and the 
redeeming of painful memories. For Seamands this kind of healing takes 
place by revisiting in the imagination painful events and experiences from the 
past. He writes, “It is then through the use of our sanctified imaginations, that 
we pray as if we were actually there at the time it took place, allowing God to 
minister to us in the manner we needed at that time.” ®^® I would suggest that 
if it is possible for painful memories to be healed and redeemed In this way 
during our lifetime while we continue to live in a world which is fallen then we 
will undoubtedly be able to live with our painful memories in God's New 
Creation without these memories causing debilitating pain or suffering. We
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can anticipate a New Creation without suffering where God will “wipe every 
tear from our eyes” - permanently^®^!
Learning to forgive others and to accept the forgiveness of others and of God 
is a crucial factor in remembering well. Lewis Smedes sees forgiveness as 
the key that unlocks the painful prison of our memories. “When you forgive,” 
writes Smedes, “you must often be content with the editing of your own 
memory. It is the editing of your memory that is your salvation... If you 
cannot... You enslave yourself to your own painful past and by fastening 
yourself to the past you let your hate become your future. You can reverse 
your future only by releasing other people from their pasts,” ®^^ This is an 
important point for it places an emphasis on releasing others from their past 
through forgiveness while forgiveness is often seen only in terms of what we 
do for ourselves.
Of equal importance to the necessity of learning to forgive others is the 
necessity of learning to accept forgiveness. “At the heart of our learning to 
remember well is learning to be forgiven by God.” ®^^ God redeems the past. 
He does not erase it. It was God who said, “The truth will set you free.” (John 
8:31). Truth Is not concerned with suppression, denial and hiddenness. It 
has, rather, to do with openness, honesty, knowledge and understanding.
Forgiveness and being forgiven are possible if and only if that which requires 
forgiveness is remembered. Unacknowledged and denied issues are 
unresolved issues. Writing of the Northern Ireland situation Stevenson 
expresses his concern that to gloss over the atrocities in the name of ‘forgive 
and forget' is to deny the reality of the atrocities and subsequent feelings of 
the victims. “If we cover up past wrongs with a veneer of forgiving 
forgetfulness this does not deal with the deep-seated need to keep faith with 
those who have suffered and died.” ®^"^  Although writing about Northern 
Ireland these words can quite easily apply to any number of other atrocities -
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the Holocaust, apartheid in South Africa, the Balkan crisis, the Dunblane 
massacre, terrorist bombings in New York and Washington, or even -  from 
the perspective of some - the American bombing of Afghanistan and Iraq to 
name but a few. The difference between forgiving and condoning or denying 
(which is what forgetting would amount to) will be discussed in the following 
chapter.
In our non-forgetting we take our example from the Scriptures of the Old and 
New Testaments. As Abraham Heschel writes, “Much of what the Bible 
demands can be comprised in one word, ‘Remember’.” ®^® There are many 
instances, particularly in the Old Testament Scriptures, of the command to 
remember. Craig Dysktra lists for us examples of what we are to remember:
- Freedom from Egypt
- The wilderness and Canaan
- All God’s commands
- God’s judgement and mercy
- God.
Of the children of Israel he says, “They remember in times of trouble and 
affliction. They remember as they seek understanding and a way to live. 
They remember while in bondage. They remember in order to interpret what 
is going on in the world and what it means, and they remember in giving 
thanks and praise.” ®^®
From this we can see, as Nouwen also discusses, that remembering is more 
than looking back. It is bringing past events into today. In the Old and New 
Testaments remembrance is participation.^®^ Nouwen cites Brevard Childs 
who states, “The act of remembering serves to actualise the past for a 
generation removed in time from those former events in order that they 
themselves can have an intimate encounter with the great acts of 
redemption.... Although separated in time and space from the sphere of 
God’s revelation in the past, through memory the gulf Is spanned and the
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exiled people share again in redemption history.” ®^® This is, in a way, what 
Jill Robinson was doing as she attempted to make the memories of others 
her own. It is also something Ricoeur discusses. He suggests that our 
ancestors' memories of time before our birth can become part of our own 
memory by being passed on to us -  a kind of ‘apostolic succession’ of 
memories. “My grandfather might have told me during my youth of events 
concerning people whom I could never have known. Here the frontier that 
separates the historical past from individual memory is porous.... An 
ancestor’s memory partly intersects with his descendants’ memories.... In 
this way, a bridge is constructed between the historical past and memory by 
the ancestral narrative that serves as a relay station for memory directed to 
the historical past, conceived of as the time of people now dead and the time 
before my own birth.” ®^® In his discussion of how Jewish identity relies on
memory going back to the time of the patriarchs, Elie Wiesel also notes, in 
interview with Carol Rittner, that, “Everyone has a memory before his or her 
own.” ®^®
The following poem by Timothy Dudley-Smith further illustrates that 
remembering is not for the sake of remembrance alone. Not only do we 
remember in order to have an encounter with the redemptive acts from the 
past but also for the sake of others who themselves may have forgotten 
these acts. We remember, in part, to enable others to make our memories 
theirs.
So much of our identity depends on memory: 
the who-l-am-now made up from 
what-l-have-been, from that’s-how-it-was, 
from all the formative experience of life.
But my real identity - a s  a child of God 
and in the sight of heaven -  
means remembering you, Lord, 
all you have done for me, 
all you command me, promise me, provide for me, 
all that you are.
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Much is indeed written on my heart; 
much taught to my children 
(which now I learn again from them). 
I have my tokens of remembrance, 
words spoken, blessings given, 
prayers answered, Bible promises, 
bread and wine.
Living as I do in a world 
where too many 
have simply forgotten God, 
help me to be in my small way 
a reminder
that our lives are not our own, 
that we are only tenants of earth, 
strangers and pilgrims, 
who must one day give account.^®^
As well as encouraging and commanding us to remember, Scripture also 
frequently ‘remembers’ the suffering of Christ. And Christ’s resurrection body 
bears the scars of the crucifixion as an eternal reminder. For God to forget 
forgiven sin would mean forgetting Christ’s suffering, therefore God 
“remembers our sin no more;” ®^^ he non-remembers our sin. Similarly, if we 
did not remember the depth of our forgiven sin then we would run the risk of 
trivialising the enormity of God’s forgiveness and his all-embracing power to 
redeem the damage our sin causes^ ®®. Just as with Peter the forgiveness 
and restoration we receive from God would mean little to us if we had no 
memory of that which had been forgiven. This surely is why there is frequent 
biblical exhortation to remember. For example, the apostle Paul exhorts the 
Ephesian believers to remember that from which they had been forgiven. He 
reminds them both of their past and their present states. "You were dead 
through the trespasses and sins in which you once lived.... All of us once 
lived among them in the passions of our flesh, following the desires of the 
flesh and senses, and we were by nature children of wrath, like everyone 
else. But God... Even when we were dead through our trespasses made us 
alive together with Christ - by grace you have been saved... Remember that 
you were at that time without Christ... Having no hope and without God in the
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w o r l d . “Whilst the past cannot and shall not easily be forgotten,” writes 
Stevenson, “within the grace of God it can be redeemed and the memory of it 
can be healed.” ®^®
The biblical injunction to remember, Ricoeur tells us, is not the same as 
historiography. For many years Jews ‘remembered’ and had no need of 
historiography. The beginning of historical research was a result of their 
assimilating gentile culture^ ®®. Ricoeur explains that the difference between 
memory and history is that memory is continuous while history is 
discontinuous.^®^ Memory grows, develops and takes on new meaning over 
time in the ways and for the reasons we have already considered. Memory is 
personal and has meaning and relevance only as long as it is meaningful and 
relevant to the one whose memory it is. History, on the other hand, remains 
fixed -  nothing can change the historical fact that the Battle of Culloden was 
fought in 1745 and no amount of reinterpretation can transfer victory to the 
defeated Scots. History is shared and can continue to have relevance and 
meaning in a nation’s life long after the participants are gone. Like Ricoeur, 
Gillian Banner draws attention to the difference between history and memory, 
noting that history presents the facts of the past as past while memory is 
current, and also that, “Memory, whilst it inhabits territory which is 
coterminous with history, concerns itself with something other than historical 
accuracy.” ®^® History, she tells us, often seems to sanitise facts where 
memory does not. For example, reports from soldiers liberating 
concentration camps contained phrases like “allegedly used as a lethal gas 
chamber” and, “stains which appear to be caused by blood” ®^®. No-one who 
was incarcerated in the camps would use such phraseology in their 
remembrance. The facts would not be sanitised with words like ‘allegedly’ or 
‘appears to be’.
^  Ephesians 2:1-12 
Stevenson (www)
Yosef Hayim Yerusalmi, cited in Ricoeur. 1990: 320, n.6 
Ricoeur, 1990: 303 
Banner, 2000:11 
Banner, 2000: 12
145
The difference between history and memory is also portrayed in Charles 
Powers' novel, In The Memory Of The Forest The novel is set in a Polish 
village in the 1980s. We are told that before the Second World War, eighty 
percent of the village population were Jewish, now there are no Jews in the 
village. The village has secrets - most of which the reader is not told but left 
to guess - dating back to wartime and largely related to the Jews. The village 
also suffers from ongoing corruption among village leaders and business 
people. Both the secrets and the corruption are causing unrest among the 
villagers. One of the parish priests, Father Jerzy, together with a group of 
men from the village, is engaged in an effort to expose present corruption. 
The senior priest. Father Taduesz who, himself is secretly trying, from old 
parish records and maps to ascertain what happened in the past, in particular 
with regard to the Jews, disapproves of his colleague’s political activities and 
reminds him,
“But we’re religious men.”
Father Jerzy replies, “We’re men with a religious vocation living in the real 
world. We have duties, one of them is to truth.”
“Or truthful memory,” Father Taduesz says,
“Memory?” asks Jerzy.
“That’s what it is, isn’t it?” Taduesz continues, “A remembered version of
Later, when they were arguing about it again. Father Jerzy said angrily to 
Father Taduesz, “They’ll take your willingness to forget, and they’ll turn it to 
(their) advantage.”^^ ^
Banner gives the following illustration of the difference between history and 
memory. The pathway with reproduction Jewish headstones at the entrance 
to the camp at Plaszow was created for Stephen Spielberg’s film, SchindleTs 
List It is not historically factual, but it represents truth, and as such has 
meaning for many, and is visited by many^^^.
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Reconciliation, then, which does not involve remembering the offence - albeit 
the forgiven offence - is, for Stevenson, based on something other than the 
cross of Christ. Reconciliation is impossible without remembering for how 
can we be reconciled one to the other unless we remember what caused the 
need for reconciliation in the first place? Similarly Bosch comments that to 
forget or deny the past is to destroy truth and deny the power of Christ’s 
death and resurrection. She goes on to say that remembering will always be 
painful without reconciliation^^®. Our need for reconciliation is as important to 
our emotional and spiritual health and well-being as is remembering.
Although his focus is not on reconciliation during our lifetime, Volf would 
agree with both Bosch and Stevenson about our need for reconciliation with 
one another and with God.^ "^^  Taking as his starting point Barth's challenge 
that in heaven we will be reunited not only with those we have loved in this 
life but also those whom we have not loved, Volf looks at the social aspect of 
reconciliation at the eschaton. His thesis is that those whom we do not love 
will have to be transformed into those whom we love and the unloving will 
have to become loving in order to inhabit what Jonathan Edwards calls, 'a 
world of love'. He then seeks to address the question of how this is to be 
possible, how not only individuals but also the relationships between them 
will be eternally healed and transformed. This healing and transformation of 
relationships will take place between people, not as something that is 
imposed on them^^®. Forgiveness and reconciliation, says Volf, cannot be 
imposed on people against their will but is always volitional.
If relationships between individuals, as well as the individuals themselves, 
are not restored Volf argues that there will not be a New World but just more 
of the same. If God's New World were a wholly newly created world, 
judgement and resurrection would be sufficient rites of passage. But this is 
not the case, rather God will recreate the present world, transforming and 
completing it. “While we may properly wish to insist that this ‘new’ creation
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Volf, 2000: 93
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will (unlike its original counterpart) not be ab initio (not a novel creation) but 
precisely a re-creation of the fallen order, nonetheless it is vital to recognise 
that such identity and continuity as may ultimately prove to exist between the 
two will be set within the context of such a radical newness.”^^ ®
Volf suggests that only those who had already been fully transformed in this 
life would be able to enter God's New World unless this eschatological 
transformation and newness includes reconciliation, not only between God 
and human beings but also between human beings^^^. That this will be 
something that happens between people by their effort and not imposed on 
them from outside seems to be suggested by the prophet Isaiah, "They will 
beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks. 
Nation will not take up sword against nation, nor will they train for war any 
more."^^® A similar theme, embracing all creation, not just human beings is 
also found in Isaiah. "The wolf will live with the lamb, the leopard will lie 
down with the goat, the calf and the lion and the yearling together; and a little 
child will lead them. The cow will feed with the bear, their young will lie down 
together, and the lion will eat straw like the ox. The infant will play near the 
hole of the cobra, and the young child put his hand into the viper's nest. They 
will neither harm nor destroy on all my holy mountain, for the earth will be full 
of the knowledge of the LORD as the waters cover the sea."^^®
Such reconciliation between people involves both the grace of God and an 
act of the will of those involved in much the same way as the love of human 
beings for God is an act of the will made possible by the grace and mercy of 
God working in them. Volf stresses the point that the cleansing of sin by an 
outside agency alone (God) is insufficient for relationships to be healed but 
that the persons involved in these relationships have to be included in the 
process. He argues that to suggest otherwise is to undermine identity by 
divorcing it from the person. Identity is shaped and harmed, formed and 
deformed, in relationships and for this reason Volf suggests that the healing
Bauckham & Hart, 1999: 80 
Volf, 2000: 93
Isaiah 2:4 (emphasis added) 
Isaiah 11:6-9
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should also be a social evenP®. If the integrity of personal identity is to be 
retained then the past cannot be changed. It must be redeemed so that it 
can be made possible for victims and perpetrators to be given a new future 
together. A new past is not possible. Volf sees as thoroughly inadequate 
any doctrine of reconciliation between persons that advocates reconciliation 
as something happening to rather than between them. The grace of God, 
together with the participation of human beings, he says, transforms life and 
individuals into an eternal community of love^^\ Volf's requirement for post­
mortem reconciliation between people seems to be a move away from his 
earlier contention of eschatological forgetting for if we were to forget the hurts 
caused by others, it seems that there would be no need for reconciliation. 
We surely would relate to them as if nothing had ever happened to fracture 
our relationship. If the suffering caused by a wrong done to me by another is 
permanently erased from my memory as Volf suggests, then I would not be 
aware of having anything to hold against the other. Reconciliation between 
persons is necessary when their relationship is damaged. If I were to forget 
the actions of the other that at one time caused pain as Volfs ‘eschatological 
forgetting' indicates, I would not be aware that our relationship had been 
damaged therefore have no need to be reconciled.
If, on the other hand, my painful memories were reconfigured because, 
through the grace of God, I have been enabled to remember well, a further 
act of reconciliation would be superfluous. I suggest that there is no place for 
post-mortem reconciliation as Volf suggests. Reconciliation which is a 
necessary part of relationships in a broken world has no place in God’s New 
Creation where, as we will consider in chapter 4, all negative and painful 
memories will be healed and redeemed.
2.11 Healing The Past
Responding to Volf’s notion of eschatological forgetting, Jones takes as his 
starting point the time honoured cliché that ‘time heals all things’. He
220
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challenges the cliche's veracity. Whether we are thinking about physical or 
emotional wounds it simply is not true to suggest that time and time alone 
can heal all things. Some things will heal with time alone but other things 
need careful attention if they are to heal and not spread causing further 
damage. Jones points out that if time alone could heal there would be no 
need for physicians, surgeons, psychiatrists or even drugs^^^. He suggests 
that perhaps we say time heals all things to enable us to hope that one day 
we can say, ‘forgive and forget’ but, he suggests it is eternity, not time that 
heals^^®. Time on its own is no more a causative factor in healing than it is in 
the distortion of memories or in the growth and development of a child, as 
considered above.
To forget, he tells us, has the same effect as to deny or to neglect - the 
wound does not receive attention so festers and spreads. This is illustrated 
in Barbara Neil’s A History of Silence, the fictional story of Laura and Robbie, 
two adult sisters with unspoken secrets from their childhood, secrets which 
continue to affect life in the present, to impair their functioning as persons 
and adversely affect their relationships with one another and with others 
because of their silence, because of their refusal either to acknowledge or tell 
their story, or to listen to the story of the other. Time alone did not heal the 
wounds of their past. The younger woman, Robbie, is unable to allow herself 
to form close relationships with others, while her sister Laura appears on the 
surface more able to form relationships but frequently self-harms and at one 
period in her life engaged in promiscuous behaviour. In reflecting about her 
inability to form relationships Robbie states, “Something hinders me from 
being close to people, the same thing that drives Laura right up to them, I 
suppose.”224
Henri Nouwen also comments on the fact that healing is not possible when 
memory is denied or hidden. He writes, “Feelings of alienation, loneliness, 
separation; feelings of anxiety, fear, suspicion; and related symptoms such
Jones, 2001:241 
^  Jones. 2001: 242 
Neil, 1998:166
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as nervousness, sleeplessness, nail-biting -  these are all part of the forms 
which certain memories have taken. These memories wound because they 
are often deeply hidden in the centre of our being and very hard to 
reach...painful memories tend to remain hidden in the corner of our 
forgetfulness...they escape healing and cause so much harm.”^^ ®
To say that time alone does not heal is not to deny that healing involves time 
or that it can take a long time to forgive. Jones mentions CS Lewis who on 
one occasion took thirty years to realise he had forgiven someone who had 
wronged him. Jones asks, “If it takes so long to discover forgiveness in some 
situations or relationships, how much more might be the burden of memory, 
formed, and nurtured over at least that long a time?”^^ ®
Returning to In The Memory Of The Forest, Mr Maleszewski, grandfather of 
the main character, Leszek had been telling his grandson about a distressing 
wartime experience. Some time before, he and his friend, Gorski, had made 
an agreement with one another that if either of them was injured and unable 
to escape being captured by the Germans the other would kill him in order to 
prevent the injured one being tortured. Gorski was shot and badly injured as 
they were running from enemy soldiers and was unable to keep up with the 
rest of his group so, true to his word, Maleszewski shot him in the back of the 
head. Even as he spoke to Leszek about it over forty years later he could 
visualise the scene and said, “I have to remember it. I forgot it for years, and 
then it came back...I didn’t ask to remember it. Something made me 
remember it. Now I want to remember it.” Leszek asked him why and the 
old man replied, “Because it’s the truth. It’s my life. It was one moment, but 
it was part of my life. Not all my life but my life. No one else’s. When I go, it 
goes with me.”^^ ^
Mr Maleszewski’s memory, which had apparently been forgotten for many 
years, returned to him as an old man. Much as the memory distressed him
Nouwen, undated: 21 
Jones, 2001: 242227 Powers, 1998: 337f (original emphasis)
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he recognised that he was more complete with it than without it and, given 
the choice would not bury it. He knew that years of ‘forgetting’ had not 
healed the memory and that he had to face it and work with it in order to find 
completeness and healing.
“Truthfulness demands that we admit and face the past as it really was... 
denying or ignoring it doesn’t heal it... makes things worse... God heals by 
facing and working through problems, not by circumventing them."^^® In 
order to be healed the individual, like Peter, has to remember, face and 
tackle past experiences. Without doing so, without confronting past pain and 
trauma, healing cannot begin. Memory healing is not about forgetting the 
past, it is, rather, deliverance from past hurts. This is only possible if, like we 
saw with Peter, the past is confronted and remembered. Healing of 
memories not only can free the individual to live life in all its richness and 
fullness today and to face the future with confident hope, it can also improve 
the self-image.
Eve Batiste’s sister Cicely refused initially to acknowledge her trauma. She 
became withdrawn, not talking to anyone, and her behaviour became 
irrational. She even denied herself the love and support of her best friend 
and sister. Eve. In so doing Cicely went from being a loving and playful child 
to a withdrawn, silent child with unpredictable and irrational behaviour. The 
language her family and friends could have used in describing her behaviour 
would be to say that she was acting ‘out of character’. It could perhaps be 
argued that the trauma alone caused these changes in her, that her refusal to 
deal with it had nothing to do with it, had she not connected with Eve once 
more when, with Eve’s forceful encouragement and loving confrontation, she 
acknowledged her painful memory.
A similar pattern can be seen, for example, in victims of child abuse who may 
carry the consequences of such violation well into adult life, if not for the rest 
of their lives if they are not encouraged and enabled to remember the past in
Kraft, 1993; 193
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order that it can then be left behind. McFadyen writes, “Childhood sexual 
abuse often has severe long-term traumatic consequences that affect a 
person’s basic pattern and direction of dynamic life-intentionality.”^^ ® If the 
victim of child abuse is to be able to move on, if she is to be able to interact 
with and respond to others in relationships of mutual trust and of mutual 
benefit, if she is to move on from being a ‘victim’ to being a 'survivor', she 
must, through the sensitive help of others, come to a place where she 
acknowledges the ugly memories with which she is living, takes control of her 
own life and takes responsibility for her actions. She has to learn to 
‘remember well’. Then, and then only, is she able to leave the past behind, 
embrace the present and move forward and into the future.
Charles Elliot states that we are what we are because of conscious and 
unconscious memory of our personal narrative and our largely unconscious 
memory of childhood trauma, and argues that, “We need to be in touch with 
counter-memories that can encourage and enable us to rewrite our 
narratives.” ®^® He argues that this is what salvation offers -  memories are 
healed by bringing the memory to the ‘conscious light of reason’ (a phrase he 
borrows from Freud) of Christ’s life, death and resurrection^®^ In so doing 
the memories do not lose their reality but lose power to determine how we 
live and act^ ®^ . Elliot argues further that to attempt to tackle unhealed 
memory apart from the counter-memories of the Christ-narrative “is to invite 
seven more devils, more evil than the first, to move into the vacuum left by 
the healing of the original memory.” ®^®
Thinking of the issue of suffering and memory, Volf suggests that to forget 
suffering is better than to remember it because to forget it brings wholeness 
while to remember it brings continued suffering. He suggests that to lose the 
memory of an unredeemed past is to be free of the past, thus for the past to
^  McFadyen, 2000:14 
^  Elliot, 1995:193 
Elliot, 1995:194 
Elliot. 1995: 203 
^  Elliot, 1995:194
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be redeemed^®" .^ This argument seems to be open to question theologically 
and psychologically. Thinking back to Peter, would his past have been 
redeemed if he had not remembered it? Did it not have to be remembered in 
order that it would be forgiven, thus future remembering of his failure being in 
the light of the memory of his forgiveness? In counselling, people are urged 
to remember the past in order that they can be freed from it. Sometimes the 
very fact that something is deeply buried and apparently forgotten results in 
serious psychological problems as well as physical ailments. It has to be 
recalled in order that it can be left behind. The work of psychoanalyst 
Sigmund Freud is based on his experience that, “Especially powerful or 
traumatic experiences in our memories may be repressed but still influence 
us on an unconscious level.” ®^®
The following poem by Holocaust survivor, Alexander Kimel, shows how, in 
many ways he longs to forget his experiences but knows that he cannot and 
indeed must not.
The Action In The Ghetto Of Rohatvn. March 1942.
Do I want to remember?
The peaceful ghetto, before the raid:
Children shaking like leaves in the wind.
Mothers searching for a piece of bread.
Shadows, on swollen legs, moving with fear.
No, I don't want to remember, but how can I forget?
Do I want to remember, the creation of hell?
The shouts of the Raiders, enjoying the hunt.
Cries of the wounded, begging for life.
Faces of mothers carved with pain.
Hiding Children, dripping with fear.
No, I don't want to remember, but how can I forget?
Do I want to remember, my fearful return?
Families vanished in the midst of the day.
The mass grave steaming with vapor of blood. 
Mothers searching for children in vain.
The pain of the ghetto, cuts like a knife.
No, I don't want to remember, but how can I forget?
^ V o lf, 1996: 138f 
Ralston, 1999 (www)
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Do I want to remember, the wailing of the night?
The doors kicked ajar, ripped feathers floating the air. 
The night scented with snow-melting blood.
While the compassionate moon, is showing the way. 
For the faceless shadows, searching for kin.
No, I don’t want to remember, but I cannot forget.
Do I want to remember this world upside down? 
Where the departed are blessed with an instant death. 
While the living condemned to a short wretched life, 
And a long tortuous journey into unnamed place. 
Converting Living Souls, into ashes and gas.
No. I Have to Remember and Never Let You Forget.
2.12 Remembering Well
Just as Kimel yearned to forget the horrors of his holocaust experience but 
knew he must not, so Jones questions the validity, the rightness, of forgetting 
the sins - whether our own or other people’s - that separate us from God and 
from one another. He asks whether forgetting our own forgiven sins and the 
forgiven sins of others might lead us to worship an uncrucified Christ, just as 
for God to forget forgiven sins would mean his forgetting Christ’s suffering. 
He writes, “I fear that linking forgiveness with forgetting tempts us to worship 
an uncrucified Christ rather than Christ who was crucified.” ®^^
By posing questions, such as, “Can we find ways to forget things that have 
happened without unhealthily repressing the memories?” or “Does forgetting 
betray the victims and their loved ones?” Jones implies that it is not possible 
to forget in a healing way, that only repression is possible and further, that it 
is not moral to forget because forgetting betrays victims (and presumably 
exonerates perpetrators). The alternative, he suggests, is ‘remembering 
weir^ ®®. We will only remember well when we are willing to forget. It is an 
indication of our forgiveness and reconciliation with God and others^ ®®.
http://www.remember.org/wltness/kimel2.html 
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Memory of the past can be a burden and Jones suggests that forgiveness 
can enable us to remember differently "^^®. In day-to-day living, however, we 
often find that we forget what we want to remember and remember what we 
would rather forget. He states that we are physiologically unequipped to 
remember everything but gives no evidence in support of this claim. His 
claim contradicts that of Canadian neurologist. Wilder Penfield who, based 
on his own empirical research in the 1950s, states that the brain stores every 
detail of everything we experience - as well as the accompanying emotions - 
even although we have no conscious awareness of many of the events and 
incidents at any given time^"^\ Similarly, Mary Stott also notes that even 
when people think they do not remember much from their childhood, the act 
of thinking back (she refers to people thinking back for the purpose of writing 
their autobiography) generally stirs memory "^^ .^ For Penfield the problem is 
not so much one of retention as one of retrieval and he claims that if the 
appropriate part of the brain were stimulated then the forgotten memory 
would be retrieved. Perhaps then we should say instead that we are 
psychologically unable to remember everything. George Steiner observes 
that we could go mad if we remembered everything - “To remember is to risk 
d e s p a i r . -  and he is very probably correct. Remembering everything was 
the problem of Luria’s mnemonist, ‘S’, whose memory, Luna noted “had no 
distinct limits” "^^ "^ . S’s problem was that he had to learn to forget the images 
that he did not need because he had so much information retained that facts 
began to interfere with each other. After trying different methods he 
eventually discovered that he could volitionally forget -  if he did not want 
something to appear in his mind it would not^ "^ ®. This ability must be as rare 
as his remarkable memory.
There are, of course, both advantages and disadvantages of our inability to 
remember everything. An obvious major advantage is that it prevents 
sensory overload and a disadvantage is the frustration that at times results
Jones. 2001:243 
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from our failure to remember something "^^®! Thinking of this positive function 
of forgetting - or, perhaps more accurately, non-remembering - Underwood 
reminds us that just as processes of growth and decay are found in nature so 
too in our intellects we have processes of growth (learning and memory) and 
of decay (forgetting). For example, he says, nature produces a beautiful tree 
which is then destroyed by a tornado. But, he continues, forgetting is not as 
negative as that. (He would perhaps find the growth and decay of the 
changing seasons a more helpful analogy from nature than his tree and 
tornado analogy for the decay of autumn has a positive function in the life of 
the organism in the way that a tornado does not.) Forgetting, he tells us is a 
release mechanism and prevents sensory overload "^^ .^ In the light of our 
previous discussion, however, it might be better to say that it is non­
remembering that is a release-mechanism. Without such non-remembering 
we would, like Luria’s mnemonist, need to discover ways to discriminate 
between what once was relevant but no longer is and what is relevant 
now^ "^ ®. For example, I may be able to remember the telephone numbers of 
the houses in which I lived twenty and thirty years ago but need to be able to 
discriminate between these numbers which are no longer relevant and my 
current telephone number which is relevant to my life now.
Rowan Williams asks, “What if the past that is returned or recovered is a 
record of guilt, hurt and diminution? The memory I have to recover is that of 
my particular, unalterable past; and if that is a memory whose recollecting Is 
unbearably painful... How is it liberating?” He answers, “If forgiveness is 
liberation, it is also a recovery of the past in hope, a return of memory, in 
which what is potentially threatening, destructive, despair-inducing, in the 
past is transfigured into the ground of hope.” "^^®
The potential problems of revisiting particularly painful memories is also 
considered by Charles Elliot who argues that in doing such ‘memory work’ we 
need to be in touch with ‘counter-memories’. These counter-memories, as
Jones, 2001:243
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we have already touched on, are to be found in the life, death and 
resurrection of Christ. They make it possible for us to rewrite our narratives 
thus enable us to see the incompleteness, partiality and oftentimes illusionary 
nature of our memories and free us from subsequent compulsion and 
error^®°. The destructive power of our memories is lessened, Elliot argues, 
when we view them through the lens of the counter-memory of the Jesus 
narrative. This gives us clarity and sharpness of vision, and a perspective 
not otherwise possible. Some might argue, however, that to view past 
events through a lens gives artificiality to our vision, blurring and distorting it. 
The responses to this argument are first that oftentimes vision that is blurred 
and distorted is corrected and clarified by lenses, and second that the past is 
always passed through an interpretative filter. The choice is, to some extent, 
ours whether we view the past through a constructive, perspective-giving 
filter or through a negative, destructive one. Forgiveness and salvation, then, 
transform the meaning of our past because we are enabled to view our past 
through the constructive, perspective-giving lens of counter-memories.
Relativising memories by placing them alongside the counter-memory of 
Jesus' life, death and resurrection enables us to gain perspective. It does not 
undermine, negate or deny the memories, neither does it deny the pain 
caused by them. Elliot states, “They begin to lose their compulsive power. 
Such a process does not deny the sense of injustice or hurt or the reality of 
past and present suffering. But it undermines the ultimacy of these emotions, 
denying them the absolute value that they easily acquire - and which is 
essential if they are to be maintained over any length of time.” ®^^ In other 
words, to confront the destructive memories from which we need to be 
liberated with the consciousness and light of reason of the counter-memories 
of the life, death and resurrection of Christ is to ‘remember well'.
Jones also makes this point, noting that as Christians we have no need to 
hide the truth from ourselves - no need to forget - because we are enveloped 
in God’s grace. “We locate our lives, our memories and our forgiveness in
^  Elliot, 1995: 163f 
Elliot, 1995: 238
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the grace of the crucified and risen Christ.... Forgiveness ought to be linked 
far more closely to ‘remembering well’ than to forgetting.” ®^^
We need to be clear what motivates our desire to remember. Remembering 
well, as we have seen, is a sign of our forgiven-ness and of our reconciliation 
with God and with others, so we will remember well when we are willing to 
forget. If we are to remember well, and not simply remember, we have to be 
clear whether our remembering is to be the basis of reconciliation or if we are 
holding onto something because we want to let our wounds fester in order to 
make a moral or political point^ ®®.
Memories of gross injustice and suffering inflicted by others; the kind of 
cankerous memories, in other words, with which Volf is concerned are the 
kind of memories which, as I have attempted to show, only fester and 
become worse if suppressed and denied. Henri Nouwen suggests that it 
may be worse to forget sins (our own and those of others) than for them to 
have been committed. “Because what is forgotten cannot be healed and that 
which cannot be healed easily becomes the cause of greater evil.... By 
cutting off our past we paralyse our future: forgetting the evil behind us we 
evoke the evil in front of us.” ®^"^  Just as cutting off our past paralyses the 
future, so too to heal the wounded past opens up a new future^ ®®, it gives us 
a future and a hope.
2.13 Summary and Conclusion
The chapter began by distinguishing between our own memories of events 
we have experienced, places we have been and people we have met from 
the memory of facts or skills we have learned. The type of memories with 
which we are concerned here is the former -  memories, that is, of people, 
places and events we have experienced.
Jones, 2001: 248f 
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We saw that memory -  which is an activity of the imagination -  enables us to 
see life as a pattern, thus enabling us to make sense of our lives. It 
contributes to our sense of continuity over time, thus our sense of a 
congruent self. For this reason we place a high value on memory. This was 
illustrated later in the chapter through the autobiographical work of Jill 
Robinson who, when she lost her memory, was unable to make sense of her 
own life. We have seen that memory has a crucial function in making us who 
we are and putting us in touch, through the imagination, with the people, 
places and events that have contributed to the formation of our identity. 
“Memory is a profound shaping force which grants us our identity. It is 
memory which reminds us of our personal heritage, bearing into our 
presence (often unbidden) people, events, places which define the shape of 
our personal story to good or ill effect.” ®^®
Having considered that memory enables us to make sense of self we then 
saw that studies of patients with Korsakov’s syndrome have shown that with 
loss of memory goes a loss of sense of identity. We saw too that people with 
dementia who are past the stage of communicating with others are often 
seen to commune with God in worship. People who show little obvious 
response to other stimuli have been observed to respond to familiar hymns. I 
suggested that this may be because in worship we reach out to God who 
communicates with us in our spirit and enables response.
We looked at some of the factors that distort memory and considered that 
each time we rerun a scene from the past through our minds it is slightly 
different from each other time. This does not mean that our memories are 
invalid or that they are not valuable. It happens because experiences as they 
occur and memory as we look back are passed through the filter of 
interpretation. Old and new memories interpret and give meaning to one 
another in much the same way as Old and New Testament interpret and give 
meaning to one another.
Bauckham & Hart. 2000: 58
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We considered the fact that day in, day out we are bombarded with 
numerous sensual stimuli. We cannot retain them all. Many day-to-day 
events are not consciously retained in our memories but we do retain those 
which have significance for us or which strike us as unusual. Key 
experiences, however, are formative and to forget them would change us. 
To attempt to forget painful memories, then, is not healthy. Non­
remembering, on the other hand, differs from forgetting in that the memory is 
not erased but Is dealt with and does not need to be called to mind. 
Remembering well is different again. An event that is remembered well does 
not need to be volitionally non-remembered as it no longer constitutes any 
threat to the well-being of the self.
We saw that to lose significant memory is to lose sense of who we are. 
Identity, however, is not lost because others who know us remember and 
God remembers eternally. Loss of memory does not equate with loss of 
significance as a person. We also saw that loss of memory affects 
relationships because both time spent with other people and the other people 
themselves can be forgotten. It is not unusual for people with dementia to 
forget the very people whose memory sustains their identity.
Stories, we saw, help us connect with others and also give meaning to our 
own lives. Telling stories and hearing stories being told can help us accept 
the past. We considered the role of story-telling in integrating what we 
remember from the past with what we perceive to be happening in the 
present and our future hopes.
As forgiveness will be considered in some detail in chapter 3, we looked only 
briefly at forgiveness in relation to memory and saw that forgiving enables us 
to remember differently -  to remember well. It enables us to reconfigure 
memories and give them new meaning. Memory healing, we said, is not 
about forgetting the painful past but about learning to remember well. If we 
are to forgive and to be forgiven then we need to remember well.
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We looked briefly at the difference between memory and history and saw that 
memory is concerned with more than historical accuracy. History, we said, 
sanitises facts because it is distant from them. Memory does not.
We saw that just as a neglected physical wound festers and spreads, so too 
a neglected emotional wound. Healing, then, cannot take place in the 
absence of remembering. We said that we only remember well when we are 
willing to forget. To remember well is to remember differently and this is 
made possible by giving and receiving forgiveness. Placing memories 
alongside what Charles Elliot describes as the ‘counter-memory’ of Jesus’ 
life, death and resurrection enables us to gain perspective. As such we have 
no need as Christians to hide the truth from ourselves because we are, as 
Jones points out, enveloped in God’s grace. “We locate our lives, our 
memories and our forgiveness in the grace of the crucified and risen 
Christ.” ®^^
We have seen in this chapter that memory has a crucial function in making 
us who we are and of putting us in touch, through the use of imagination, with 
the people, places and events that have informed our identity. I started the 
chapter with Volfs thesis that, because of their potential to diminish the joy 
and perfection of the New Creation, memories of horrendous suffering will be 
forgotten^®®. Reference is made later in the chapter to his suggestion that to 
forget suffering is better than to remember it because forgetting brings 
wholeness while remembering brings continued suffering^®®. I indicated that 
his argument is open to question theologically and psychologically. That 
Volf’s argument is open to question theologically and psychologically is, I 
believe, adequately demonstrated throughout the chapter.
I cited Keck who states, “We are our memories and without them we have 
but a physical resemblance to that person we suppose to be.” ®^° And, “Life
Jones, 2001:249 
^  Volf, 1996: 132f 
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without memory is no life at all.” ®^^ If this is true, and if in the New Creation it 
is our selves who are redeemed and recreated; and if we are to have an 
awareness of being ourselves, then the significant, formative memory has to 
be retained and that which has been lost restored.
The following chapter focuses on forgiveness which, as we have said, 
enables us to gain perspective on our past and to remember well.
Keck, 1996: 43
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Chapter 3
FORGIVENESS AS REMEMBERING WELL
"Forgiving does not erase the bitter past. A healed 
memory is not a deleted memory. Instead, forgiving 
what we cannot forget creates a new way to remember. 
We change the memory of our past into a hope for our 
future.” (Lewis Smedes^)
“Forgiveness has nothing to do with forgetting... A 
wounded person cannot - indeed, should not - think that 
a faded memory can provide an expiation of the past.
To forgive, one must remember the past, put it into 
perspective, and move beyond it. Without 
remembrance, no wound can be transcended.” (B 
Flanigan
3.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters have attempted to show, by looking at what 
memory is and its centrality to who we are, why the notion of eschatological 
forgetting is unacceptable. This chapter, by way of offering an alternative to 
forgetting -  remembering well made possible by forgiveness -  will show that 
eschatological forgetting is not only unacceptable but is also unnecessary. 
To forgive is not to forget but is a specific way of remembering. As we 
considered in the previous chapter, suffering, perhaps especially the 
suffering inflicted on us by others, can result in bitter memories which 
themselves continue to cause suffering for many years, undermining our 
sense of identity and self-worth, preventing us from reaching our potential 
and holding our future hopes to ransom. If our future hopes and our 
experience of the New Creation are not to be marred by painful memories as 
Volf suggests could happen, and if, as I have argued, this will not be avoided 
through the permanent erasure of such memories, then we need to learn, in 
Jones’ words, to remember well.
 ^ httD://w w w .bralnvauote.com /auotes/auotes/l/a132879.h tm l 
 ^ httD://w w w .brainvauote.com /auotes/auotes/b /q132880.htm l
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When we looked at remembering well in the previous chapter, we said that if 
something is remembered well it no longer poses a threat to the well-being of 
the one who remembers. Traumatic and painful experiences can be called to 
mind without causing suffering and distress. This, of course, is what we hope 
for in the New Creation but is also something towards which we can strive 
now. In many situations where the suffering was caused by another person 
we will not be free to remember well and move on until we are able to forgive 
perpetrators or, when we are the perpetrator of someone else’s suffering, 
until the one whom we have harmed is able to forgive us, for unforgiveness 
binds both perpetrator and victim. It binds them in an unhelpful, destructive 
way to one another and binds both to their individual, unresolved past. “And 
so” writes Volf, “ both victim and perpetrator are imprisoned in the 
automatism of mutual exclusion, unable to forgive or repent and united in a 
perverse communion of mutual hate.”® It is, therefore, to forgiveness that I 
turn my attention in this chapter.
Unlike personal identity and memory, forgiveness is a central theological 
theme, so, while the first two chapters have largely drawn on sources from 
the social sciences with some contribution from theology, this chapter will 
draw mainly from theology with some contribution from the social sciences.
Writing of the doctrine of sin, McFadyen says, “Eclipsing any functioning 
reference to God shears sin-talk of its essential, functional characteristic and 
mark of distinctiveness, eliding the difference between speaking of sin in 
theological and in any other terms. Why use the empty terminology of sin if, 
stripped of its essential and distinctive theological frame of reference, it 
conforms itself precisely and without remainder to the contours offered by, 
say, secular psychology, psychiatry, sociology or ethics.... Sin-talk cannot 
survive testing unless it continues to function as a distinctive theological 
language. ”"^ Exactly the same could be said of the doctrine of forgiveness. 
There is no doubt that secular discourse has something to contribute to the 
discussion but the doctrine of forgiveness is essentially theological, therefore,
®Volf, 1996: 120 
 ^McFadyen, 2000: 5
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‘eclipsing any functioning reference to God’ will strip forgiveness of its 
essential functional characteristic and mark of distinctiveness’. McFadyen 
goes on to make the following statement which, again, applies equally to the 
doctrine of forgiveness. “It must be admitted from the outset that, if God-talk 
merely appends itself to an analysis already in place.... It adds precisely 
nothing at the level of explanation and understanding to baptise and bless 
conclusions arrived at by secular means for secular reasons. Only if 
Christian faith possesses a specifically theological understanding of what sin 
is and how it functions might it have something to offer secular diagnosis and 
therapy.
Forgiveness -  or rather, some vague idea of what forgiveness might be -  
appears to be in vogue. In a recent Gallup Poll, ninety four percent of 
Americans said it was important to forgive®. Seibold states that in the 1980s 
and 1990s there was a threefold increase in the number of articles in 
psychology journals dealing with some aspect of forgiveness^. A quick 
search on the ‘World Wide Web’ reveals several websites wholly devoted to 
the notion of forgiveness. A glance at the names of some of the 
organisations responsible for these websites highlights something of the 
extent of this trend: ‘International Forgiveness Institute’, ‘The Forgiveness 
Web’, ‘Campaign for Forgiveness Research’ and ‘Forgiveness Forum’, to 
name but a few. Too often, however, organisations such as these tend to 
deal with forgiveness lightly and, it might be argued, to attach the label 
‘forgiveness’ to something which is not truly forgiveness at all. Sometimes 
condonation, excuse, mercy or pardon is meant when the word ‘forgiveness’ 
is used. At other times what is meant is a somewhat tawdry sham 
masquerading as forgiveness. To use the word ‘forgiveness’ in these ways 
cheapens true forgiveness. It makes forgiveness, which is profoundly 
difficult, sound easy.
® McFadyen, 2000:11 
 ^www.forqivina.ora/campalan/DOwer.htmi
 ^Seibold, 2001:297
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The concern of this pseudo-forgiveness that is popularly peddled is more the 
‘feel-good factor’ of the victim than any kind of reconciliation or restoration. 
There is much emphasis on forgiving for the sake of the victim, whether or 
not the perpetrator desires to be forgiven or is even aware that such 
forgiveness has taken place. That there are situations in which this is 
appropriate will be touched on below but it should probably be the exception 
rather than the rule. Doc Childre suggests that the knowledge that we do 
more for ourselves than for the perpetrator when we forgive actually gives 
incentive to forgive and he suggests this is valid because we cannot address 
the needs of others until we address our own needs®. There is no doubt that 
forgiveness brings healing to victims and liberates them, nor that there is a 
direct link between forgiveness, and mental, physical and spiritual health. On 
the other hand, the inability or refusal to forgive is known to result in 
depression, anxiety and stress disorders as well as physical ailments. This is 
because as psychologist Dan Shoulz states, “We are designed by God not to 
hold onto anger, revenge, bitterness and resentment, when we do it’s 
destructive to our being, leading to a slow and insidious breakdown of the 
entire system.”® Forgiving others does heal the self but to forgive the other 
only in order to heal the self, release the self from rage and bitterness and to 
give the self a more peaceful life redefines forgiveness. It “changes 
forgiveness from an expression of love to a self-centred act of self- 
protection.” ®^
3.2 Distinguishing Forgiveness From Its Counterfeits
Words acquire meaning from the ways in which they are popularly used - 
think, for example of the radically altered meaning of the word ‘gay’ during 
the latter half of the last century. Thinking of meaning of language, 
Wittgenstein writes, “To insist...that the literal referential meaning of a word is 
its one and only meaning is to end with all kinds of nonsense...the meaning
® Childre (www)
® Cited In Kitchen, 2000 (www)
Jackson (www)
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of a word is its use in language.”^^  For example, Haymes says that for him to 
declare, ‘My love is like a red, red rose’ is not to suggest that his wife should 
be sprayed with insect repellent. He states, “To assume such a limited use 
and meaning of language is simply a failure in intelligence.”^^
In his philosophical discussion of forgiveness, Joram Haber observes that 
forgiveness takes on different meanings depending on what people intend 
when they use the word. “What forgiveness is at any one time depends then 
on what one means when granting it.” ®^ For this reason, it has been 
suggested that because people commonly say forgive’ when they are 
excusing or condoning minor offences against themselves then the meaning 
of ‘forgive’ embraces condoning and e x c u s i n g A s  Haber goes on to show, 
however, it is not in fact his belief that the word ‘forgiveness’ takes its 
meaning from the way it is popularly used. He believes that in being used to 
mean different things the word is being misunderstood and misused by those 
using it. This is reinforced by his later discussion of what forgiveness is not. 
It is not condonation, pardon, mercy or modifying one’s moral judgement. Let 
us look briefly at these in turn.
(a) Forgiveness is not condonation. To condone is to overlook an injury^®. 
As with forgiveness, when condoning someone we acknowledge that the 
person has done something wrong for which she or he is morally responsible. 
Some think that to condone indicates that the one condoning has been 
injured but Haber disagrees. He says that we do not condone injury to 
ourselves, but to others, and not necessarily others with whom we identify. 
For Haber, the fact of forgiveness presupposes the presence of resentment. 
Condonation, on the other hand, does not^ ®.
Unlike Haber, Downie seems to be of the opinion that we do condone injuries 
to ourselves. He suggests that it is often seen as an easier option than
”  Cited In Haymes. 2000:180 
Hamyes, 2000:180 
Haber, 1991:25 
Neblett, 1974: 272 
Collins English Dictionary 
Haber, 1991: 59
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forgiveness, “in many cases,” he says, “it is easier to play down the extent of 
the injury and ignore the nature of the moral offence, and so condone, than it 
is to face up to the injury and make the effort to forgive.”^^  Patton notes, 
however, that to take this easy way out devalues the victim for it ignores the 
wrong, saying, in effect, that the moral offence does not matter when, in 
reality, it does^®,
(b) Forgiveness is not pardon. To pardon is to release from punishment for 
an offence^®. In pardoning we let perpetrators off what they are seen to 
deserve. People in whom authority to do so has been vested pardon, while it 
is those who have been injured by the offences, who forgive. Forgiveness is 
personal because injury is personal. It is non-transferable. I cannot forgive a 
wrong done to another person any more than another person can forgive 
wrong done to me. We pardon what is done against the normative order and 
forgive what is done against the moral order^®, or, as Downie puts it, injuries 
are forgiven and offences are pardoned. “Thus” says Haber, “we pardon as 
officials in social roles, but forgive as persons qua persons.”^^  If to condone 
is to overlook an injury and to pardon is to release from punishment, it seems 
that pardon contains condonation. Downie makes this point when he notes 
that to pardon is to condone but to forgive is not^ .^
To illustrate the difference between forgiveness and pardon, Judson Cornwall 
tells the story of a servant caught stealing from the queen. Brought to the 
queen for sentencing the servant girl threw herself at the queen’s feet, 
begging forgiveness and pledging future trustworthiness. The queen said 
she forgave the girl and added that she never wanted to see her again, 
instructing her to leave the palace and find another job. The servant girl 
argued that this was pardon, not forgiveness. She stated that she wanted to 
be forgiven and to be able to remain in the queen’s employment. Taken 
aback at the servant’s depth of understanding on the matter, the queen
Downie. 1965:131 
Patton. 1987:118 
Collins English Dictionary 
Haber. 1991:61 
Haber, 1991: 61 
^  Downie, 1965:131f
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agreed and told her to return to her duties as if nothing had happened 
because she had already declared the servant forgiven^®.
(c) The next thing Haber tells us that forgiveness is not is mercy "^ .^ The 
dictionary defines mercy as, “compassionate treatment of or attitude towards 
an offender, adversary, etc” ®^. Haber tells us that mercy is giving a lesser 
punishment than the one deserved^®. This is where mercy differs from 
pardon -  mercy is imposing a lesser sentence than the one deserved, pardon 
is letting the perpetrator off without punishment. “The essence of mercy lies 
in the waiving of a right that we could in justice assert...for reasons having to 
do with pity or compassion.”^^  Haber suggests that mercy is, in effect, unjust 
to other wrongdoers who do not receive a lesser punishment than the one 
deserved^®. The same, perhaps, could be argued about pardon.
For Murphy, the difference between mercy and forgiveness is that to show 
mercy is to treat a person less harshly than one has a right to, whereas 
forgiveness is not about how a person is treated but how we are disposed 
towards that person. He notes that we may believe we have forgiven 
someone for injuring us but later realise we have not when old resentments 
surface again. If, however, mercy has been shown to the perpetrator, it has 
been done once and for all and is not negated by a change in our feelings 
and emotional responses towards the perpetrator^®. He goes on to suggest 
that we can forgive without showing mercy. For example, he says he might 
forgive an injury done to him by the embezzling of his funds but still demand 
recompense®®. The fact that he demands recompense does not negate or 
undermine his forgiveness of the embezzler. Forgiveness is not incompatible 
with letting justice take its course.
Cornwall, 1978: 81
Haber, 1991: 62
Collins English Dictionary
Haber, 1991: 63
Haber, 1991: 64f
Haber, 1991: 63
Murphy & Hampton, 1988: 20f
Murphy & Hampton, 1988: 21
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It could be argued, on the other hand, that while mercy is not the same as 
forgiveness, forgiveness is in fact merciful; that without mercy, forgiveness 
would not be possible, inasmuch as forgiveness cannot, by definition, be 
deserved, and the concern of mercy is with the undeserved. This is implied 
by Herbert Morris who argues that forgiveness requires grace and mercy to 
be applied to our efforts and willingness. He illustrates this by comparing the 
act of forgiveness as being like growing flowers. The gardener, he says, 
prepares the ground and sows the seeds but other agencies such as 
sunshine and rain are required to bring them to bloom®\
(d) Forgiveness is not a matter of modifying one’s moral judgement of an 
action® .^ If we were to modify our moral judgement of an action, it could be 
argued that there would be nothing to forgive. Haber cites an example given 
by Anne Minas. The parents of an eloping couple may harshly censure the 
young couple’s action but later come to realise that their judgement about the 
elopement was too severe, so modify or abandon their judgement and so 
forgive the couple. Haber points out, however, that it is illogical to say we 
forgive something that we come to see as not wrong. ‘The expression of 
forgiveness In the absence of real wrongdoing cannot be countenanced as 
forgiveness at all.”®® Hampton makes a related point in saying that 
forgiveness does not condone wrong actions as it is the wrongdoer, not the 
wrong actions themselves, towards whom we change our feelings®"^ .
Sartre thinks differently. He says that in asking for forgiveness we are asking 
not to be seen as blameworthy®®. Is it not the case, however, that we ask to 
be forgiven because we are, and see ourselves to be, blameworthy, that is, it 
is precisely because we are blameworthy that we need forgiveness? Haber 
makes the point that forgiveness does not absolve the perpetrator of blame. 
He or she is still blameworthy®®.
Cited In Haber, 1991: 8 
Haber, 1991:12 
Haber, 1991:12 
^  Murphy & Hampton, 1988: 84f 
Cited In Haber, 1991; 24 
Haber, 1991: 38
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Hampton speaks of forgiving a person as coming to see that person in a new 
light and understanding her or him to be more than, or other than bad 
character traits. This sounds similar to Sartre’s ceasing to see the person as 
blameworthy, although perhaps such an attitude would be motivated by the 
desire to be seen by those whom we might offend as something other than 
and more than our offensive behaviour. “Forgiveness is...the decision to see 
a wrongdoer in a new, more favourable light.... The forgiver never gives up 
her opposition to the wrongdoer’s action, nor does she even give up her 
opposition to the wrongdoer’s bad character traits. Instead, she revises her 
judgement on the person himself -  where the person is understood to be 
something other than or more than the character traits of which she does not 
approve.”®^ Haber challenges this view by asking, “In precisely what sense 
can a wrongdoer be understood as something more than the actions or 
character traits of which we disapprove without committing ourselves to a 
dubious ontology?”®® He further asks how we can decide to see a 
wrongdoer in a new, more favourable light as Hampton suggests -  to see a 
person as other than we know him or her to be -  without deceiving 
ourselves®®. It is surely not possible for us to see someone as something 
other that what we know that person to be.
Anne Minas, in her discussion of how it is logically impossible for a divine 
being to forgive, expresses the view that prior to being forgiven a person has 
done wrong but after being forgiven she or he has not"*®. Forgiveness, 
however, does not say, ‘You have done no wrong’. It says, ‘You have done 
wrong and I forgive you for it’. We do not come away from having been 
forgiven with a sense that we have done no wrong -  this would surely be a 
form of denial and self-justification -  but hopefully we come away with the 
knowledge that although we have done wrong our wrongdoing is forgiven 
and will not be held against us. It is we, not our wrongdoing, who are made 
right, and, in Christian terms, where God is concerned, sin is always wrong 
and cannot be made right by God or anyone else. God does not make sin
Murphy & Hampton, 1998: 84f 
Haber, 1991: 14 
^  Haber, 1991: 14 
Minas, 1975: 149
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and wrongdoing right but he does forgive the wrongdoer for the wrongdoing 
and redeem the wrong.
(e) Forgiveness is also often confused with excusing though Haber does not 
discuss this. To excuse is to free a person from blame or guilt or to overlook 
an offence. This is closely related to, but different from, modifying one’s 
moral judgement of an action. If we modify our moral judgement and come 
to see an action as not wrong, there is nothing to overlook; there is no blame 
or guilt from which to free the person. Lewis clarifies what he sees as the 
distinction between forgiving someone and excusing her or him. To forgive, 
he tells us, is to acknowledge that the pain-inflicting incident happened but 
not to bear a grudge against the perpetrator for it, even though he or she is 
fully responsible, as is the case, for example, in ‘diminished responsibility’. 
To excuse, on the other hand, is to say that it did not really happen or that it 
was not really the fault of the perpetrator. If something is excused, there is 
no need to ask for forgiveness'^^ “Forgiveness is addressed to those whom 
we do not excuse because we understand that they are in some way 
responsible for the injury we have experienced.’"^ ^
Forgiveness is different from excusing, pardoning, justifying, accepting or 
understanding; we forgive the inexcusable, the unpardonable, the 
unjustifiable, the unacceptable, and the non-understandable'^®. Lewis admits 
that he sometimes asks God for forgiveness when what he is really asking 
God to do is excuse him, to let him off^ '^ . “Real forgiveness,” he tells us, 
“means looking steadily at the sin, the sin that is left over without any 
excuses, after all allowances have been made, and seeing it in all its horror, 
dirt, meanness and malice, and nevertheless being wholly reconciled to the 
man who has done it.”'^ ® This, Lewis reminds us, is the nature of God’s 
forgiveness.
Lewis, 1975:40 
Studzinski, 1986:16 
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173
If this is the nature of God’s forgiveness then it is the model of forgiveness 
towards which we, as human beings made in God’s image, are obliged to 
strive. Alan Torrance says, “If the forgiveness of God is integral and 
essential to his love, which is unconditional, then it must also be so for man 
created in the image of God ... Accordingly there can be no conception of 
forgiveness that is not true to its absolute (logical) priority in all contexts. 
Conditional forgiveness in the secular socio-political world is no more true 
forgiveness here than it would be in God if predicated of him while 
understood in these terms.’"^® In other words, if the message of the Gospel -  
the message of forgiveness - does not ring true in the market place then it is 
quite simply not true. As Alistair McFadyen says, “The business of Christian 
theology...is to understand both God and reality from the perspective of 
God’s creative presence and activity in the world and in relation to our 
concretely lived experiences of being in the world.
To forgive someone is not to excuse them, it does not mean that we trust 
them next time and give them another opportunity to hurt us. What it does 
mean is trying to rid ourselves of resentment towards those who do us harm 
and not wishing them harm. Augsburger states, “Forgiveness... is not 
forgetting, not condoning, not pardoning.... Forgetting drops the act down the 
memory hole; condoning accepts it within the memory collection, while 
denying the significance. Pardoning recognises its significance but cancels 
the consequences (no recollection, no significance, no consequences). 
Forgiveness deals with all th ree .Forg iveness,  as we have considered, 
enables us to remember well -  the act is not, to use Augsburger’s phrase, 
‘dropped down the memory hole’, it is not triviallsed by denying ' Its 
significance and consequences are not cancelled for, as indicated above, 
forgiveness is compatible with letting justice take its course.
Torrance, 1986: 56 
McFadyen, 2000: 44 
Augsburger, 1996: 123
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Having considered what forgiveness Is often mistaken to be but is not, it will 
be useful before we proceed further to look at something of what forgiveness 
is.
3,3 Forgiveness As Utterance And Attitude
There is some discussion in the literature regarding the nature of forgiveness. 
On the one side of the debate are those who would argue that forgiveness is 
a ‘performance act’ or ‘performance utterance’ which comes about simply by 
saying the words, I forgive you"^ ®. David Augsburger defines what is meant 
by ‘performance utterance’. “A performance utterance offers (1) a 
conventional procedure (2) with a ritual effect (3) through certain words (4) by 
certain appropriate persons (5) in certain appropriate and particular 
circumstances; (6) the procedure is executed by all participants correctly and 
(7) completely, (8) with congruent and sincere thoughts and feelings (9) 
resulting in their so conducting themselves subsequently. Such performance 
utterances include rituals from ‘I take this woman to be...’ to ‘I bet ten 
thousand on...’.”®® Neblett takes the view that saying ‘I forgive you’ 
constitutes forgiveness even if the forgiver still resents the perpetrator. He 
says, “To grant forgiveness while resentment still exists is not uncommon at 
all.”®^ Resentment is a theme to which I will return.
On the other side of the debate are those who maintain that it is not enough 
to say, ‘I forgive you’. The words have to be backed up by the appropriate 
attitude. As Downie says, “To say ‘I forgive you’.... The forgiver is merely 
signalling that he has the appropriate attitude and that the person being 
forgiven can expect the appropriate behaviour.”®^
Patton also indicates initially that forgiveness is both an action and an 
attitude but then goes on to suggest that it is in fact neither, but that it is 
discovery. He says the discovery that the person who hurt me is more like
‘‘^ Swinburne, 1989: 8550Augsburger, 1996:12
Neblett, 1974: 270 
Downie, 1965: 132
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me than different helps me to forgive ®®. Brian Keenan experienced this in 
his Lebanese jail. On one occasion he witnessed Said, a guard who had 
previously beaten him and violated him and who he loathed as a result, being 
overcome by raw, painful emotion. “I felt, as I never had before, great pity for 
this man and felt if I could I would reach out and touch him. I knew 
instinctively some of the pain and loss and longing that he suddenly found 
himself overwhelmed by. The weeping Said became fleshy and human for 
me. Here was a man truly stressed. His tears now wrenched a great 
wellspring of compassion from me.... Said’s violence against us was a 
symptom of his need of us. Here was a man whose mind was forever locked 
in that desert wilderness that I had known during my worst moments in 
isolation.”®'^  Augsburger likewise recognises a correlation between the ability 
to accept our own shortcomings and the ability to forgive others. “Genuine 
forgiveness,” he says, “requires an internal capacity for empathy with parts of 
oneself that are less than perfect, and an external empathy that accepts 
one’s commonality with the imperfections of others.... These are essential 
components of forgiveness: to see the other as a distinct self; to expand the 
self to include the other as human, as a co-traveller, as a fellow sufferer, and 
to affirm, confirm and understand our human coexistence in community.”®®
This discovery that the person who hurt me is more like me than different 
seems to be behind this thought-provoking statement from Volf. “For the 
followers of the Crucified Messiah, the main message of the imprecatory 
Psalms is this: rage belongs before God -  not in the reflectively managed 
and manicured form of a confession, but as a pre-reflective outburst from the 
soul...by placing the unjust enemy and our own vengeful self face to face 
with a God who loves us and does justice.”®® He argues that being in the 
presence of God in this way enables us to come to see perpetrators as 
human and ourselves as sinful. We thus come to see ourselves as sinful and 
in need of forgiveness from others and from God. This knowledge that we 
too are in need of forgiveness enables us -  or should enable us - to forgive
Patton, 1987: 145
Keenan, 1992: 223f
Augsburger, 1996: 80 
®®Volf, 1996: 124
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others. For Seibold, it is the knowledge of God’s forgiveness of us that 
motivates our forgiveness of others. “As we meditate on the glory of God 
and the riches in Christ that are available to us, we can begin to appreciate 
how miserly it would be not to extend forgiveness to those who have harmed 
us. We offer forgiveness then out of a profound sense of the treasure we 
have found in eternal life, and out of a generosity that naturally flows from 
that realisation.”®^
Deborah Hunsinger notes, however, that if a victim is to overcome emotional 
trauma, it is important she does not blame herself for the actions of the 
perpetrator. While the victim needs to separate her status of victim from her 
status of sinner she also needs to come, through the process, to the stage of 
acknowledging her own sin, thus see herself as “more like the victim than 
different”. The victim, says Hunsinger, needs to, “Distinguish her status of 
victim from her status of sinner, the woman is from a theological perspective, 
both a sinner in her relationship to God and a victim in her psychological 
reality.”®®
Haber sets himself apart from what he perceives as the mainstream of 
philosophers who see forgiveness as something more than a ‘performance 
utterance’, from those who say that resentment has to be overcome before 
forgiveness can be said to have taken place. For him the words ‘I forgive 
you’ can mean that all resentment has been overcome or it can mean that 
the one who utters them is working on overcoming resentment®®. So, to say 
that we have not entirely forgiven someone for something can mean that we 
have not forgiven at all or that we are in the process of it®®. Haber goes on to 
state that saying, I forgive you’ is not the only way to forgive but that we can 
do so in our attitude and behaviour towards the perpetrator. He compares 
marriage, saying that couples can be married by saying, I do’ or, under 
common law, by habit and repute over a number of years®\ This, however.
Seibald, 2001: 306 
Hunsinger, 1995:100 
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does not add weight to his argument for so-called common law marriage is 
not legally -  and, some might add, morally -  seen as marriage, and some 
could argue that this indicates that unexpressed forgiveness is not real 
forgiveness. Regardless of the fact, however, that Haber’s illustration does 
not add weight to his argument, unexpressed forgiveness can be valid 
forgiveness.
Neblett is of the view that in some situations we are morally obliged to forgive 
while in others forgiveness is supererogatory, “Unquestioningly” he states, 
“there are some contexts at least, particularly contexts in which forgiveness is 
‘asked for’ and the offence ‘made up for’, where granting forgiveness is not 
only morally desirable, but also morally prescribed. (Just as there are 
contexts where being forgiving is ‘above and beyond the call of duty’ and 
indicative of an especial goodness of heart.)”®^ But surely if forgiveness were 
ever a moral obligation it would be something other than forgiveness; 
something less than forgiveness. No-one can be placed under a moral 
obligation to forgive another person any more than to love or to trust or to 
respect that person. Hunsinger says of this that, “True forgiveness and 
reconciliation do not happen as the response to a moral demand.... To 
conceive of forgiveness...as a moral demand is to misconceive it.”®® 
Furthermore, to describe forgiveness as a moral obligation would make 
victims morally obligated to those who harm them, thus increasing the power 
of perpetrators and further victimising and oppressing their victims. Haber 
hints at this when he says, “No-one has a perfect right to be forgiven 
imposing on others a perfect duty to forgive.”®'^
We saw above that Neblett believes it is possible to forgive while still 
harbouring resentment. Jeffrie Murphy, on the other hand, tells us, 
“Forgiveness is the forswearing of resentment -  where resentment is a 
negative feeling (anger, hatred) towards another who has done one moral
Neblett. 1974: 273 
Hunsinger, 1995:102
Haber, 1991:103
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wrong.”®® While acknowledging that this is a useful definition because it 
makes a distinction between forgiving someone and forgiving only what 
someone did, and also because of the attention drawn to the deliberate 
controlling of an emotion which explains why forgiveness can be so difficult, 
Richards rejects Murphy’s definition. His objection is that it precludes 
forgiving someone we have not resented. He argues that we can feel 
contempt, hurt or sadness at what another has done without resenting the 
other but according to Murphy’s definition it is not possible to forgive in the 
absence of resentment®®.
Resentment should not be confused with vindictiveness which includes the 
desire to get even. Rather, “Resentment is anger that one may property feel 
on being personally injured.”®^ James McClendon describes resentment as, 
“God’s good gift, protecting us in an injurious world from greater harms and 
inciting us to secure justice we might otherwise be too placid or too 
compassionate to enforce.”®®
Resentment, for Richards, is not a necessary response every time we are 
hurt by another but only to protect the self against certain people. He 
challenges the view that says to refuse forgiveness is to burn with 
resentment and be consumed by bitterness®®. From his earlier argument, we 
can conclude that he would argue that to refuse forgiveness might result in 
no more than the victim continuing to feel contempt or hurt or sad and, by 
contrast, that to forgive is not only the foreswearing of resentment as Murphy 
states, but is also the foreswearing of all feelings of contempt, hurt or 
sadness. He writes, “To forgive someone for having wronged one is not 
merely to reduce the intensity of one’s hard feelings but to abandon such 
feelings altogether (insofar as they are based on the incident in question).” ®^
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Haber disagrees with Richards about the absence of resentment. 
Resentment, he says, follows when our self-respect is challenged by the 
actions of another while indignation is felt when others are injured and our 
self-respect is not threatened^\ He believes that not to resent the person 
who has hurt the self indicates that the one who has been hurt has no sense 
of her or her own rights or importance. The victim who has low self-esteem 
will not resent injury for she or he will not believe the self to be worthy of 
more dignified behaviour from others^^.
Resentment, then, is both occasioned and warranted by the perpetrator's 
behaviour^®. Failure to feel the resentment occasioned and warranted by 
moral injury against the self is, for Murphy, itself a moral failure. He writes, 
“If I count morally as much as anyone else (as surely I do) a failure to resent 
moral injuries done to me is a failure to care about my own person...and thus 
a failure to care about the very rules of morality.” '^^
3.4 Forgiveness As Costly
True forgiveness is not an easy ‘quick fix' for the forgiver. It can be very 
costly and difficult because it is undeserved, unfair and unmerited^®. Those 
struggling to forgive may be helped by remembering that they are not 
attempting to forgive innocent people, the very fact that they are victims who 
have been hurt or harmed in some way, means that someone else -  the one 
whom they are attempting to forgive -  is a victimises As Lewis says, to 
forgive enemies is not to imply that they are pleasant people^®. And Phillip 
Yancey says, “Forgiveness is achingly difficult, and long after you’ve forgiven 
the wound... lives on in the memory.”^^  In expressing just how difficult true
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forgiveness is, Nouwen writes, "Forgiveness from the heart is very difficult. It 
is next to impossible.” ®^
One way in which forgiveness is costly is that the healing resulting from 
forgiving the other brings with it responsibility. The victim gradually ceases to 
be a victim in need of support, help and sympathy and becomes responsible 
for her or his own life and behaviour^®. While this is clearly positive and 
empowering, it may be daunting and even off-putting for someone who has 
been in the victim role for a long time. Some may have thrived for many 
years on the attention they receive because they are victims and to give up 
the role of victim and become a survivor is to lose that level of attention.
Forgiveness is also costly In terms of the time it can take to forgive, 
particularly when the victim has suffered greatly. As Seibold notes, “When 
there has been deep wounding, forgiveness is a process, a journey, often 
down a very long road.”®®
Another cost of forgiveness is the negative reaction with which it may at 
times be met. Kroli notes that, in some cases, we may expect forgiveness to 
be rejected or even for situations to be aggravated through offering 
forgiveness. She cites the reaction of the Pharisees to the healing of 
Lazarus in John 11 as a demonstration of the increased hatred that is 
occasionally incited by an encounter with goodness and holiness, although it 
does not actually concern forgiveness®^ Forgiving presumes the action 
being forgiven was wrong. To forgive someone for something the person 
being forgiven did not see as wrong can be misconstrued as offensive or 
patronising or insulting.®  ^ Even when the perpetrator is in no doubt about the 
wrongness of his or her actions, he or she may feel indignant at being offered 
forgiveness which has not been sought®®.
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Having considered, however, how difficult and costly forgiveness can be for 
victims, Yancey is clear that it is worth the effort and cost involved and makes 
the challenging statement, “The only thing harder than forgiveness is its 
alternative.”®"^. He considers the impact of refusing to forgive on the self as 
victim and on the relationship between the victim and perpetrator, stating, 
“Not to forgive imprisons me in the past and locks out all potential for change.
I thus yield myself to another, my enemy, and doom myself to suffer the 
consequences of the wrong.”®® (He fails to acknowledge, however, that 
victims may be doomed to suffer the consequences of the wrong even if they 
do forgive.) He warns that where there is no forgiveness there is no end to 
the ‘cycle of unforgiveness' and the wounds inflicted grow more horrific with 
each act of retaliation. Taking the Balkan conflict of the 1990’s as an 
example, Yancey notes that during the Second World War the Croats were 
the main aggressors and the Serbs their victims. The Serbs remembered 
and did not forgive, and in turn, some forty-five or fifty years later, committed 
unthinkable atrocities against their old enemy, including the slaughter of tens 
of thousands of Croats®®.
Katerina® ,^ a widow in her sixties, lived in a Croatian town that was invaded 
by Serb forces. In the ensuing conflict she lost her home, her family 
business, 14 members of her extended family and, as a result of multiple 
rape, her dignity. Soldiers also threatened to kill her but she was saved by 
the actions of a Serbian woman whom she had never seen before. This 
woman stepped forward and pleaded with the soldiers not to kill her 
‘grandmother'. For three months after her experiences Katerina was unable 
to speak, eat or sleep, spending the night crouched in the middle of the floor. 
But Katerina was able to forgive her enemies and when she did the horrors in 
her memory lost their power over her, and she was able to speak, eat and 
sleep once more.
Yancey, 1997: p. 100 
Yancey, 1997: p. 99 
Yancey, 1997: p. 115
I knew Katerina when 1 lived in Croatia. Her name has been changed
182
Sometimes we forget experiences because they are so trivial and 
insignificant, other times because they are too painful for the mind to 
continue to hold. In the work of forgiveness, Smedes notes, the pain has to 
be faced because we cannot forgive what we cannot remember or what we 
deny®®. The offence and the hurt associated with it need to be remembered 
and acknowledged if the work of forgiveness is to begin. The pain of this 
remembering is another part of the cost of forgiveness.
At one time CS Lewis wondered why the statement, “1 believe in the 
forgiveness of sins” was included in the creeds of the church. He thought it 
should go without saying that Christians would believe in the forgiveness of 
sins but eventually came to appreciate that it was an appropriate inclusion 
when he realised just how difficult forgiveness can be®®. Thinking of the 
Lord’s Prayer he writes, “He doesn’t say that we are to forgive other people’s 
sins provided they are not too frightful, or provided there are extenuating 
circumstances, or anything of that sort. We are to forgive them all, however 
spiteful, however mean, however often they are repeated. If we don’t, we 
shall be forgiven none of our own.”®® Also referring to the Lord’s Prayer, 
Bonhoeffer writes, “But God will only forgive them if they forgive one another 
with readiness and brotherly affection.”®^ Still speaking of the Christian duty 
to forgive others, Bonhoeffer says, “’Bear ye one another’s burdens and so 
fulfil the law of Christ. ” (Gal. 6:2). As Christ bears our burdens so we ought 
to bear the burden of our fellow-men.... My brother’s burden which I must 
bear is...his sin. And the only way to bear that sin is by forgiving it in the 
power of the cross.... Forgiveness is the Christlike suffering which is the 
Christian’s duty to bear.”®^
In reading the New Testament, however, it is not immediately clear whether 
God’s forgiveness of individual persons precedes our forgiveness of one 
another or whether our forgiveness of one another precedes God’s
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forgiveness of us, as some passages seem to suggest one and others the 
other. In his commentary on Colossians and Philemon, Robert Wall states, 
“In Matthew the disciple is exhorted to forgive in order to be forgiven; we 
secure God's forgiveness by forgiving others (Mt 6:12, 14-15; 18:35; 
compare Lk 11:4). Paul gives the same exhortation but roots it in the 
community's experience of already being forgiven. Rather than a condition of 
God's forgiveness as in Matthew, forgiveness for Paul is a response to God: 
we forgive because we are already forgiven.”®® I would venture to suggest 
that our understanding and ability to forgive is severely restricted if we have 
no prior experience of being forgiven. According to Westlock, God will not 
forgive us if we do not forgive others. “We will not be forgiven if we do not 
forgive others.”®^ This, however, is not everyone’s interpretation. An 
anonymous author writes, “Accepting forgiveness increases our ability to 
forgive others, and forgiving others increases our ability to accept 
forgiveness.... The more you really believe that God has forgiven you, the 
more you forgive others. And the more you forgive others, the more you will 
experience the forgiving love of God.”®® In Mark 11:25 (“And when you stand 
praying, if you hold anything against anyone, forgive so that your Father in 
heaven may forgive you your sins.”) forgiving others sounds like a 
precondition of being forgiven by God. In Matthew 6:12 (the section of the 
Lord’s Prayer referred to by Lewis and Bonhoeffer - “Forgive us our debts as 
we have forgiven our debtors”) forgiving others again sounds like a 
precondition of, or perhaps even a concomitant of, being forgiven by God. 
While in Colossians 3:13 (“Forgive as the Lord forgave you.”) God’s 
forgiveness comes first. Douglas Hare in his commentary on Matthew says, 
"Determination not to forgive another is a form of impenitence that blocks the 
flow of divine forgiveness."®®
For Patton, we forgive others in response to God’s forgiveness of us and also 
as a preparation to receive God’s forgiveness and it is made possible by
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God’s forgiveness®^. We have already considered the cycle of 
unforgiveness. The process of forgiveness is also a cycle or, as George 
Soares-Prabhu describes it, a spiral -  we forgive others in response to God’s 
forgiveness of us. As we do we become more aware of the cost of God’s 
forgiveness and so forgive more which makes us more aware of the cost, 
and so on. Our forgiveness, he suggests, is both a condition and a 
consequence of God’s forgiveness of us. He suggests that refusing or failing 
to forgive others results in us no longer experiencing God’s forgiveness, not 
because God stops forgiving -  that would be against God’s nature -  but 
because our own unforgiving attitude cuts us off from it and makes it 
impossible for us to receive forgiveness®®. Patton states, “To the degree to 
which we are unable to release others from their indebtedness to us we are 
also unable to know the depth of our forgiveness by God.”®®
To deal lightly with forgiveness and Ignore the cost, trivialises both the 
sufferer and the suffering. While clear that forgiveness is both desirable and 
necessary, Kroli warns that we should be on our guard against rushing into 
forgiveness. “Premature attempts to get people, be they victims, relatives or 
bystanders, ‘to forgive and forget’ may destroy the creative drive towards 
justice that should be generated by creative a n g e r . I n  the wake of world 
war two, Christians outraged Jews and other victims by declaring that the 
Nazis were forgiven. “ Softness ... seems to trivialise the suffering of victims. 
Christians have too often supported forgiveness, love and forbearance, while 
failing to acknowledge the moral force of anger, hatred and vengeance. ” 
Seibold expresses concern that the Christian church is often guilty of 
overlooking the fact that forgiveness is a process and a journey and that it 
can take a long time. “Rather than offering compassion and concern to 
deeply wounded persons, the church often generates more distress for these 
Individuals by making harsh demands for rapid forgiveness of the
Patton, 1987:163 
Soares-Prabhu, 1986: 60 
Patton, 1987:145 
Kroli, 2000: 26f 
Jones, 1995: 224
185
offender...but in many cases of deep wounding forgiveness can be 
considerably more complex and laborious than some Christians proclaim.
We hear the sense of injustice and moral outrage at this uncompassionate 
attitude of ‘quick forgiveness’ reverberating behind these words of Jewish 
Holocaust survivor Simon Wiesenthal, “But ere long priests, philanthropists 
and philosophers implored the world to forgive the Nazis. Most of these 
altruists had probably never even had their ears boxed, but nevertheless 
found compassion for the murderers of innocent victims.” ®^® In post-war 
Germany, priests were telling the people that it was valid to dispense with 
earthly judgement for the Nazi war criminals because they would have to 
face the Divine Judge. Wiesenthal points out, however, that this attitude 
played into the hands of the Nazis because, as atheists, they had no fear of 
divine justice, only of earthly justice and retribution^®' .^
Another way in which suffering is often triviallsed is by proclaiming a general 
and abstract forgiveness. God’s forgiveness may be universal in its scope 
but, as Jones notes, it is specific and individual, not general and abstract, in 
its application ®^®. Just as sin and suffering is concrete and specific so too 
must forgiveness be concrete and specific. “The formulation, ‘Repent and 
believe’,” writes Williams, “stresses that God’s forgiveness cannot be abstract 
and general.” ®^® He continues, “God does not come to ‘humanity’ in the 
abstract, forgiveness engages with a particular Bonhoeffer was also
concerned about this, warning that if the church underplays the reality -  and, 
we might add, the specificity -  of sin then it loses credibility when it speaks of 
forgiveness^®®.
Although costly, Jones insists that, because human beings are created for 
communion with others, and with God as the ultimate other, forgiveness is
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necessary to restore communion between Godseif and humankind, and 
between human persons^®®. The cost of forgiveness is too high for some, 
although there are others for whom it can never be high enough because it 
can never be effective. This, Jones says, is because, “It is assumed that 
forgiveness cannot effectively respond to the pervasive darkness that 
characterises the world.”^^® To hold to this assumption that forgiveness is 
worthless and useless is in itself costly as it results in diminished, lost and 
damaged selves, in respect of both victims and perpetra tors^In  order not 
to lose hope in the face of such darkness we need to remember that although 
forgiveness does not remove all darkness from the world, nor does the 
darkness eclipse forgiveness^
Dietrich Bonhoeffer lived in a dark world where force and violence, not 
forgiveness, were seen and believed to be effective. Bonhoeffer, who as 
Jones reminds us was willing to pay the ultimate high cost of forgiveness -  
his life -  “sought to affirm the theological possibility of forgiveness in a world 
where God's grace had seemingly been eclipsed."
For Bonhoeffer, non-specific, generalised forgiveness was a symptom of 
cheap grace. “Cheap grace,” he writes, “...means forgiveness of sins 
proclaimed as a general truth.... An intellectual assent to that idea is held to 
be of itself sufficient to secure remission of sin without the justification of the 
sinner....Cheap grace is the preaching of forgiveness without requiring 
repentance.... Cheap grace is grace without discipleship, grace without the 
cross.”^^ "^  This cheap grace, explains Jones, requires no effort, no 
commitment and no embodiment. “Perhaps most destructively cheap grace 
anaesthetised people so that they were no longer capable of embodying 
forgiveness through discipleship; they could not even discern how 
forgiveness might require of us our death.
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Bonhoeffer’s response to the cheap grace that he saw all around him in the 
churches of his day was to emphasise costly forgiveness. He “sought to 
reclaim the gospel’s eschatological focus on a forgiveness that is not simply 
a word to be spoken but a way of life to be embodied in fidelity to God’s 
inbreaking K in g d o m .P e te r  Bolt also draws attention to the eschatological 
focus of forgiveness in his study of forgiveness in Mark’s Gospel. Looking at 
the link between healing and forgiveness (for example in 2:5) he says, “The 
forgiveness of sins also entailed the removal of consequences upon the lives 
of individual Israelites. As such, the servant’s ministry was a foretaste and a 
pledge of the coming kingdom of God, when all would be set right in Eden- 
like splendour.’’^ H u n s i n g e r  also considers the relationship between 
forgiveness and healing in the same passage in Mark’s Gospel, noting that 
healing is the sign and forgiveness is what the sign signifies. “Healing and 
forgiveness...are not identical, yet they cannot in this instance be separated 
from each other.’’^^® Quoting Barth on this, Hunsinger continues, “The 
forgiveness of sins is manifestly the thing signified, while the healing is the 
sign, quite inseparable from, but significantly related to this thing signified, yet 
neither identical with it nor a condition of it."^ ^® She makes the important 
point that while only God can forgive sin, human effort may bring about 
healing. She notes that in reality forgiveness and healing can be so closely 
intertwined that to force them apart does violence to the inseparable unity of 
the person who needs both forgiveness from sin and healing of emotional 
wounds.^^®.
I said at the outset that the idea of forgiveness is in fashion and cited a 
Gallup Poll in which ninety four percent of Americans said they thought it was 
important to forgive. The actual number of respondents in the same poll who 
said they had actually ever tried to forgive someone else, is just over half of
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this -  forty eight percent of the total^^\ Lewis showed his awareness of this 
gulf between people’s opinions and experiences of forgiveness when he 
wrote his oft-cited words, “Everyone says that forgiveness is a lovely idea 
until they have something to forgive.”^^  ^ It is easier to admire from a distance 
the noble ideals driving Nelson Mandela to forgive his jailors or the Pope to 
forgive his would-be assassin than to apply them to our own lives^ ^®.
As indicated there are many for whom the cost of forgiveness, or more 
specifically the cost of Christian forgiveness, is too high. Jones states that 
when the cost of Christian forgiveness is too high for people they seek a 
cheap therapeutic alternative. This is the (relatively) easy, feel-good factor 
‘forgiveness’ mentioned above which, as we have seen, is not in fact 
forgiveness. It is excusing or condoning, not forgiving. While acknowledging 
that counselling can play an important and valid part in the lives of individual 
Christians, Jones expresses his concern about the way he perceives that it 
has cheapened and distorted forgiveness through being accepted and 
adopted unquestioningly. “Christians have allowed...a therapeutic mindset to 
overtake Christian claims and Christian practices. As a result, Christians 
have failed to appropriate psychological insights critically all too often 
adopting distorting and reductionist practices and beliefs that trivialise those 
central Christian claims and practices.’’^ "^^  We note from his emphasis that 
his concern is not the adoption of the practices but their uncritical adoption.
Yancey also makes reference to the concern that the Christian church has 
permitted its claims and practices to be distorted and triviallsed when he 
notes that in the 1950s and 60s mainline denominations in America moved 
away from preaching the gospel and towards purely secular political issues. 
People, he notes, need a message of forgiveness and when this shift in 
emphasis took place attendance at church services dwindled and 
membership halved^^®. Yancey’s concern is not with political and social
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awareness or involvement within the church. Far from it, Yancey is very 
socially aware. His concern, rather, is when purely secular matters eclipse 
the Gospel as the central concern and message of the church, In 
considering the same issue, TF Torrance says, “It is distinctive of moral 
inversion that it carries with it a strong sense of righteousness and moral 
superiority, evident in passionate moral indignation against prevailing evils, 
social injustice, racial discrimination, overpopulation, etc. These are all of 
course very right and highly laudable causes, but the inflamed moral passion 
for social betterment that lies behind this, appears to go hand in hand with a 
guilty detachment from an objective and divine source of moral obligation and 
a replacement of a personal religious ethic with a naturalistic ethic of self- 
determination in which man assumes absolute responsibility for himself.... 
The uprooting of moral passion from Its creative source in Christian faith and 
therefore its lack of Holy Spirit, makes it quite helpless unless it can secure 
centres of power, from which it can move and change society.... I would not 
like to be misunderstood, for I am not asking for the slightest curtailment of 
concern for any genuine human, moral or social need anywhere in the world. 
But I am more and more staggered at... the growing contradiction that the 
Western Churches exhibit to Jesus’ total rejection of every value-system of 
power... together with a failure to remember that Jesus was crucified by 
contemporaries who bitterly resented his refusal to have anything whatsoever 
to do with their political theology.’’^^®
Jones criticises Lewis Smedes for writing as a Christian theologian, yet 
approaching forgiveness from a therapeutic standpoint and ignoring the 
central themes of Christian forgiveness^^^. For example, Smedes makes the 
statement that forgiveness is necessary for “coming to terms with a world in 
which, despite their best intentions, people are unfair to each other and hurt 
each other deeply.”^^® Jones argues that it is not usually ‘despite their best 
intentions’ and states that, “such a description significantly underplays the 
Christian claim that forgiveness is necessary because of our culpable
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complicity both in specific breaches of relationship...and in a percussive 
reality of always-already broken ness and diminution.” Smedes ignores the 
issues of culpability, sin and repentance^and gives the impression that the 
world is made up of thoroughly innocent victims who have never sinned and 
thoroughly guilty perpetrators who are rotten to the core and have never 
been victims themselves.
Jones expresses his concern that the emphasis on individual autonomy 
found in today’s western society has marginalized the place of forgiveness^^®. 
Another factor that he perceives has contributed to this marginalisation is the 
secularisation of language. Sin and grace, for example, become ‘accepting 
you’re accepted’^®\ As an example of how the marginalisation of forgiveness 
works In practice, Jones notes that clergy ‘found guilty’ of sexual or financial 
misconduct are typically sent for counselling, not encouraged to repent and 
seek forgiveness and reconciliation^®^. This concerns Jones because, 
“Costly practices of forgiveness and reconciliation whose aim is the 
restoration of communion with God and with one another are significantly 
different from those counselling techniques that focus on an individual’s 
ability to cope with his or her feelings or to alter his or her behaviour to 
conform to unexamined standards.” ®^® It is interesting to note that despite his 
concern that the secularisation of language and the focus on individual 
integrity belittle sin and undermine forgiveness, Jones falls into the trap of 
using euphemistic secular language for sin, referring instead to ‘sexual and 
financial misconduct’.
Jones argues that if we are to reclaim the significance of forgiveness in 
Christian life and theology then we need to give up the therapeutic mindset 
under whose spell we have fallen. “An eschatological account of forgiveness 
situated in the doctrine of the Triune God,” he tells us, “stands in direct 
contrast to a therapeutic culture that sees forgiveness as an internalised
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process of healing ourselves of hate.... Only by reclaiming the centrality of 
God’s already-established but yet-to-come Kingdom will we be able to 
understand Christian forgiveness properly and, more importantly, to practice 
Christian forgiveness properly.” ®^"^  Forgiveness, he tells us, needs to 
become a way of life^ ®®. "Christian forgiveness is not so much a word to be 
spoken as a way of life to be lived in fidelity to the Triune God.” ®^®
3.5 Forgiveness as a wav of life
"Forgiveness," says Martin Luther King Junior, “is not just an occasional act: 
it is a permanent attitude.’’ ®^^ In other words, it is a way of life. The central 
recurring thesis of Gregory Jones’ Embodying Forgiveness, which undergirds 
the entire book, is the need to adopt forgiveness as way of life, the need for 
forgiveness, as King says, to become a permanent attitude. Right from the 
opening pages of his book, Jones introduces us to the idea that forgiveness 
is an embodied way of life that takes a lifetime to learn and we learn It by 
being a part of the body of Christ^ ®®. Embodying forgiveness, for Jones, 
means that we know what it is to be forgiven by God and then respond by 
forgiving others. Those who have been forgiven by God, he argues, ought to 
live a life of repentance and forgiveness, and to pursue holiness^®®. “From 
the Christian perspective...forgiveness is not primarily a word that is spoken 
or an action that is performed or a feeling that is felt. It is a way of life 
appropriate to friendship with the Triune God. ” But, he continues, while 
forgiveness is not simply words, actions and feelings, it does include them^ "*®.
The Christian Scriptures, he argues, show that God’s forgiveness is logically 
and theologically prior to human forg iveness^Jesus, he tells us, offered 
forgiveness that did not demand prior repentance, for example in his meeting
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with Zacchaeus, although this did not eliminate the need for repentance^"^ .^ 
What this means in practice is that we are forgiven in order that we can enter 
a life of repentance and forgiveness. Jones states, “While repentance and 
confession are not conditions of receiving God’s forgiveness, they are 
indispensable means of acknowledging our need for forgiveness and hence 
embody that forgiveness in our relations with others.’’^^ ®^
Similarly, Alan Torrance states that repentance follows forgiveness, making 
the point that if forgiveness depended on repentance the Gospel story, both 
the parables and Jesus’ encounters with people, would be radically different. 
He makes the observation that the prodigal showed no repentance in 
returning to his father but was, rather, seeking to use his father further. The 
father, however, showed his unconditional and unconditioned love towards 
his son by running to him and embracing him^ "*^ . Also considering the 
parable of the Prodigal Son, Nouwen suggests that ‘repentance of sorts’ was 
present in the son, “but not a repentance in the light of the immense love of a 
forgiving God.” He calls it a ‘self-serving repentance’ for the purpose of
surviva|i45
Jones cites von Balthasar who writes, “God forgives through free grace and 
not on the basis of acts of penance but...this forgiveness cannot become 
effective unless there is an act of expiatory conversion of the person.” '^^ ® 
Nouwen also observes that God’s readiness to forgive is independent of our 
response or repentance^^^. Jones argues that we do not change in order that 
we might be forgiven but as an act of gratitude in response to receiving 
forgiveness. It is the way of living out, or embodying, forgiveness '^*®. The 
woman in Luke 7 (37ff), for example, showed extravagant love because she
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received extravagant forgiveness, not the other way around. She was not 
forgiven on account of her act of love*'*®.
Embodying forgiveness is a slow, painful process. Jones suggests that the 
reason for this is that we are living in what Barth calls the ‘puzzling interval’. 
That is, the time between the first and second advents, a time analogous to 
Easter Saturday in that it is between God’s two great acts of grace*®®. Barth 
suggests that we find forgiveness to the extent we that practice it. Jones 
responds to this suggestion by asking, “Could it be that one of the reasons 
Christians see so little authentic forgiveness in the world is that, because our 
own lives are too marked by cheap grace or bitterness and violence (or both) 
we have had our vision eclipsed by our own failures?” He observes that the 
world is often quicker than the church to assimilate and embody (and 
presumably see) practices of forgiveness*®*.
Jones goes on to consider forgiveness as a craft, a craft that takes a lifetime 
to learn and perfect. Crafts, he observes, are learned by doing alongside 
those who are experienced and proficient, not only by reading about them. 
This is not being alongside simply as observers, but as apprentices who 
observe and practice. Jones gives the example of the craft of medicine not 
learned from textbooks alone but from working alongside experienced 
doctors and learning from them, and observes that even among senior 
practitioners there is no end to the learning*® .^ He could just as easily have 
cited the professional training of nurses, teachers, social workers or many 
others. Learning the craft of forgiveness, he tells us, is much the same. 
Forgiveness, he suggests, is learned by being alongside those who are 
experienced and proficient but the learning is never finished. Learning the 
craft of forgiveness involves learning what needs to be transformed in 
ourselves to make us holy as well as how to apply it in the many different 
situations which we come across In our daily lives*®®.
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Jones states that the Christian forgiveness we are called to embody has both 
vertical and horizontal aspects. The vertical involves unlearning sinful habits 
while the horizontal involves working towards reconciliation with others in 
specific broken situations*®'*. This principal of Christian forgiveness having 
vertical and horizontal aspects was echoed by the previous Archbishop of 
Canterbury, George Carey, in his address at the Memorial service in 
Westminster Abbey for the victims of the terrorist attacks in America on 11 
September 2001, when he said, “The Christian answer is cross-shaped.” In 
other words, it is through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ that we 
are forgiven by God and through an appreciation of the cost of our 
forgiveness that we begin to forgive others. We are able to reach out to 
others because God first reaches out to us. In a review on Volfs Exclusion 
and Embrace, Stephen Williams states, “The cross can never offer us an 
authentic vertical Christianity if its horizontal significance is denied.... But we 
do not, in fact, understand it, if we do not grasp it as a cross which is for the 
sake of horizontal reconciliation and the inclusive embrace of the other.”*®® 
Elizondo also suggests that it is only through the cross that we learn about 
healing broken relationships. He suggests that while such varying practices 
as counselling, hard work, vacations, rest, medication and group therapy all 
may help, they do not rehabilitate victims to inner peace and freedom. The 
cross, he argues, shows that forgiveness is the only way to rehabilitate and 
liberate victims. “Mercy and forgiveness are the only ways to put a blunt end 
to the cancerous spread of sin and violence. There is no other way.”*®®
Forgiveness as a way of life is also the central concern of James Emerson’s 
The Dynamics of Forgiveness. Emerson distinguishes between what he 
terms the ‘context’ and the ‘instrument’ of forgiveness, emphasising that both 
are necessary for, “Without the context the instrument is useless and without 
the instrument the context never comes alive.”*®^. Each gives meaning, 
perspective and reality to the other. The context makes forgiveness possible,
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while the instrument makes it real. In Christian forgiveness, then, the context 
is Jesus Christ, while the instrument -  that which makes our forgiveness real 
to us -  is to be found, more than anything else, in forgiving others*®®. He 
emphasises that it is not the fact that we forgive another that frees us to face 
God’s judgement and receive his forgiveness but the other way around. It is 
receiving God’s forgiveness that judges us and frees us to forgive others*.159
Like Jones, Emerson expresses some concern about the influence of 
psychiatry, psychology and psychoanalysis on Christian theology. While 
acknowledging that each has a valid role to play in the life of modern society 
he is very clear that his role in pastoral care is not that of a therapist. 
Acceptance, he tells us, which is often the key in therapy, is different from 
forgiveness and when the emphasis is on acceptance instead of forgiveness 
then forgiveness is reduced to no more than an instrument that releases 
people from guilt*®®. This is not to say that releasing people from guilt is not 
one function of forgiveness. “Forgiveness,” states Pattison, “lies in 
recognising and acknowledging the offence and making realistic reparation in 
an appropriate way where that is possible. At this point the guilty feeling 
should depart.”*®* While wrongdoers may be released from feelings of guilt 
through being forgiven, they may well retain a deep sense of shame. Guilt 
and shame are often confused. Shame might be described as dysfunctional 
guilt. “Guilt...is a less global and devastating emotion than shame. Guilt 
arises from a negative evaluation of specific behaviour...(which) is found to 
be immoral, lacking or otherwise defective...because a behaviour -  not the 
self -  is the object of approbation, the self remains mobilised and ready to 
take reparative action the extent that circumstances allow.”*®^
Guilt has a constructive function. Feeling guilty about certain behaviour 
ought to lead us to repentance and to seek forgiveness. Receiving 
forgiveness should dispense with the need to feel guilty about the forgiven
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behaviour. Not so shame. The focus of shame is on the self, rather than the 
behaviour; it is thus the self rather than the behaviour that is seen as 
despicable. Shame is unhealthy guilt. It defeats and destroys people's 
sense of worth and sense of self. Chronic shame isolates as it causes the 
shame-prone person to hide the true self from others for fear of rejection. 
Pattison states, “One is trapped in the self without words and without other 
people...as the person turns inward, loses a real sense of self. The 
functioning self is lost in shame. It is a lonely alienating experience,”*®®
Chronic shame causes feelings of dread and discomfort that are not 
alleviated by repentance and forgiveness. Stephen Pattison feels that The 
Angel of Judgement from Roget Van der Weyden’s polyptych, The Last 
Judgement is a representation of his own shame-producing self-surveillance, 
and in his book on shame he shares the following poem, which his encounter 
with the Angel stimulated. The poem reveals some of the feelings of pain, 
dread, discomfort and of exposure to the gaze of others engendered by 
shame.
The Angel of Judgement at Beaune
He is lovely.
Stepping out from beneath Christ’s rainbow throne of judgement, this 
curly-haired youth is the most beautiful of the sons of the morning, 
all decked in white, glittering cope, wings of peacock eyes.
Around him naked people are beckoned into bliss or hurled into hell. 
This he knows -  the balance of justice is in his own right hand.
Slowly, stately he advances, his sweet face impassive, his progress 
inexorable.
There is no stopping him.
To him all hearts are open.
From him no secrets are hid.
No hiding place from his gaze.
Onwards, ever onwards he comes.
He is not angry.
Nor does he condemn.
In his perfection, he does not notice the fate of humankind.
163 Pattison, 2000:74
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Naked souls are weighed in his balance.
They find themselves shamefully, sordidly wanting.
The angel has been walking my way for ever.
I am in his path.
I cannot flee his all-seeing eye.
No door can resist him, no screen can block the windows of the
heart.
His entrance is automatic
The lofty spirit of judgement is already within.
Will I ever see the back of him?*®'*
Luther and Calvin, to use Emerson’s terminology, saw the church as both the 
context and the instrument of forgiveness. The context would be the 
preaching of the Word, while the instrument, which makes it real, would be 
baptism, the Lord’s Supper and the presence of the Holy Spirit in the life of 
the believer. The outgrowth of the context is the confession of sin; the 
outgrowth of the instrument is the confession of faith*®®. For Calvin, we 
become aware of the nature and extent of our sin after receiving God’s 
forgiveness; while for Luther we need to be aware of sin before receiving 
God’s forgiveness*®®. Emerson agrees with Calvin, arguing that we can only 
understand our sin in the context of God’s forgiveness*®* .^
3.6 Forgiveness and Remembrance
Not only do we have to remember what we are going to forgive, we also do 
not forget that which has been forgiven. Even when a victim forgives a 
perpetrator’s actions, the victim or perpetrator, or both, may have to continue 
to live with the consequences of the actions. Smedes urges us to, 
“Remember, you cannot erase the past, you can only heal the pain it has left 
behind. When you are wronged, that wrong becomes an indestructible reality 
in your life. When you forgive...you do not change the facts, and you do not
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undo all of the consequences. The dead are still dead; the wounded are 
often crippled still.”*®®
God forgives human beings for the wrongs that they do, so that they can 
know themselves accepted by him, not to remove sin's consequences. He 
removes the guilt and shame but not the scars*®®. Similarly, when people 
forgive one another the scars may remain as a constant, and at times 
uncomfortable, reminder. In the following poem Amy Carmichael not only 
reminds us that Christ's resurrection body bore the scars of the crucifixion, 
she also recognises the inevitability of scars for all humanity and seeks to 
emphasise them as things of beauty rather than of shame and disgrace.
No Scar?
Hast thou no scar?
No hidden scar on foot, or side, or hand?
I hear thee sung as mighty in the land,
I hear them hail thy bright ascendant star,
Hast thou no scar?
Hast thou no wound?
Yet I was wounded by the archers, spent.
Leaned Me against a tree to die, and rent 
By ravening beasts that compassed Me, I swooned;
Hast thou no scar?
No wound, no scar?
Yet, as Master shall the servant be.
And, pierced are the feet that follow Me;
But thine are whole; can he have followed far 
Who has no wound or scar?*^®
Jackson defines forgiveness as, “the loving, voluntary cancelling of a 
debt.”**"* This, however, suggests that forgiveness removes an action's 
consequences which as we are considering, it does not necessarily do; some 
consequences are permanent, or leave permanent scars. We will return to 
consider the eternal permanence of scars in chapter four.
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In his discussion of whether we can forgive a child molester, Stephen Pope 
notes that part of forgiving criminals is desiring for them to accept 
responsibility for their actions. It has nothing to do with absolving them of 
punishment*^^. With or without forgiveness actions still carry consequences. 
For example, when Pope John Paul II visited his would-be assassin in prison 
as a public demonstration of his forgiveness he did not open prison doors 
and set the offender free. That would have been to pardon the offender and 
would have been inappropriate and unacceptable. The offender still had to 
accept the consequences of his actions and the public still had to be 
protected. “Christian love demands forgiveness, but it also demands making 
sure the criminal does not harm another person.”**'® Forgiveness and 
punishment, then, are not mutually exclusive.
It is the injury caused by the offence, not the offence itself, which is forgiven. 
As we have seen, injuries are forgiven; offences are pardoned. We forgive 
as persons who have been injured in some way and pardon as ‘officials’ in 
social roles. Any person who has been injured in any way has authority to 
forgive, but only a person with the authority which is conferred because they 
hold a particular role such as monarch, judge, or even club official, may 
pardon** '^*. Thus, the Pope had authority to forgive his assailant but not to 
pardon him. Of course, there are situations in which we can occupy both 
offices at once -  thinking back to Murphy’s example, just as he could forgive 
the person who embezzled his funds and still demand recompense, so he 
could have forgiven the embezzler and also pardoned the debt.
There are those who believe that forgiveness and punishment are mutually 
exclusive. Kroll, for example, says that to forgive is to release the perpetrator 
from the deserved punishment**^®. I would suggest that what Kroll has in 
mind here is excusing or pardoning, not forgiving. To excuse or condone the 
wrongdoing is effectively to say it did not matter. To pardon, as we have 
seen, is the act of an official remitting appropriate punishment.
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‘Forgive and forget’ is a popular cliché. On a superficial level, it may sound 
highly desirable but on closer examination, we realise that it offers nothing 
positive to the physical, psychological or spiritual well-being of victims or, 
indeed, perpetrators. In his study of reconciliation, Robert Schreiter makes a 
similar point about trivialising the victim’s memory undermining and 
trivialising the Identity of the victim. “By calling on those who have suffered to 
forget or overlook their suffering, the would-be reconcilers are in fact 
continuing the oppressive situation by saying, in effect, that the experiences 
of those who suffered are not important -  and therefore they themselves are 
unimportant to the process.”*^ ® To forget what has been forgiven could 
cause the victim to place herself or himself in a vulnerable position, at risk of 
further suffering. The former Dachau concentration camp is now a grisly 
museum where visitors may pass through the gas chamber and the 
crematoria, as well as look at photographs of the victims of torture. Over the 
entrance is a sign bearing the legend, “Those who cannot remember the past 
are condemned to repeat it.”**^ *'
Thinking of the importance of remembering to our sense of identity, Seibold 
quotes John Lee, saying, “To remember is the opposite of dismember." And 
continues, “We need all parts of our history to be fully ourselves. To shut out 
some part of ourselves in the name of forgiveness is to fragment ourselves 
rather than to bring healing.’’**^® Seibold later adds, “Forgiveness is letting go 
of the past, but not in the sense of forgetting what happened or disconnecting 
myself from the pain. Forgiveness is refusing to allow the past to be the sole 
determinant of my life’s course. It is being open to allowing the past to be 
redeemed so that my story can still be good and fulfilling. Forgiveness is a 
radical statement to the world that there is more to the story that the ending 
has yet to be told.’’*^ ®
God does not forget forgiven sin. God forgave Moses, Abraham, David, 
Paul, Peter and the thief on the cross, among countless others, but he did not
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erase their sins from his memory. He caused their deeds to be recorded in 
the pages of scripture for all time*®®. In the story of the Prodigal Son, the 
father forgave his son but he did not divide his estate a second time because 
he remembered*®*. As Volf points out, the father’s words to the older son, 
“all I have is yours” indicate that the inheritance will not be redivided*®®. In 
saying that God does not remember our sins, the Bible is saying that he does 
not remember them against us, not that he forgets them. Forgiveness, as we 
have already said and will consider below, enables us to remember well.
Smedes suggests that to remember the wrongdoing of others against 
ourselves carries potentially as great a risk as to forget them. “Forgetting 
invites repetition” he tells us, while, “remembering incites perpetuation.”*®® It 
is not difficult to see the truth in this statement, to perceive the risk that to 
remember wrongs inflicted by another can give rise to bitterness and 
resentment on the part of the victim, thus keeping the victim a victim. For this 
reason we need to discover what Smedes calls ‘redemptive remembering’, 
which is essentially the same as what Jones calls ‘remembering well’. Jones 
says, “Appropriating Christ’s forgiveness by the power of the Spirit...invites 
us not to forget the past, but to remember it well so that we can envision and 
embody a future different from the past. In that sense we need the Spirit 
both to return to us our memories and also to enliven our imaginations.”*®'* 
We are reminded here of what was said in the previous chapter about the 
imagination’s roles of creation and recreation in reconfiguring memory. 
Forgiveness enables us to reconfigure memory -  to remember events 
differently, to remember events well.
The act of forgiveness is deliberately reconfiguring the memory through 
imagination with the result that the memory in question no longer has the 
power it did have. This happens when we let go of resentment, when we 
learn to dispense with our shame, when we gain a new perspective, thus
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renarrate the incident. It happens when we learn to see our lives and the 
events and experiences in them against an eternal, eschatological canvas. 
“Forgiveness,” says Volf, “breaks the power of the remembered past and 
transcends the claims of the affirmed justice and so makes the spiral of 
vengeance grind to a halt.”*®®
Forgiveness, then, gives a new perspective on the past that makes it 
possible for us to cope when remembering it. It enables us, not just to 
remember differently, but to remember better, to remember well. To 
remember well gives us hope for the future thus enables us to move on*®®. In 
forgiving those who have harmed us we have no need to forget the wounds 
they have inflicted because forgiving involves renarrating the past in the 
context of God’s eschatological future. That is the essence of remembering 
well*®*^ . Remembering well loosens people from the fetters that bind them to 
a painful past and that hold them back, giving them the freedom to move on.
3.7 Freedom, Creatîvîtv and Moving On
The Greek word used in the New Testament for forgiveness {Aphesis) is 
made up of words meaning ‘from’ and ‘to send’. Literally, then, the word 
means to send from or let go. This letting go, or freeing the self, of 
something, says Hurding, is intrinsic to the concept of forgiveness*®®. It is 
true of Christ’s forgiveness of us, which confronts us with the truth about 
ourselves and frees us for a new life in him*®®. It is also true about the 
forgiveness we receive from others and about our forgiveness of others.
The early church Fathers used the word ‘freedom’ when referring to 
forgiveness and James Emerson reports that in his tape-recorded interviews 
with people about forgiveness, he found that what they generally said they
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were seeking was ‘freedom’*®®. This theme of freedom is also found in Volf 
who speaks of ‘slavery of revenge’ and ‘freedom of forgiveness’*®*. He cites 
Moltmann saying, “To forgive those who have wronged one is an act of 
highest sovereignty and great inner freedom. In forgiving and reconciling, the 
victims are superior to the perpetrators and free themselves from the 
compulsion to evil deeds.” *®®
In considering the question of whether people feel more need to be free of 
dependence than to be forgiven, Jan Peters asks, “And is the craving of 
freedom In our age not stronger than the need for forgiveness? When 
freedom is understood as individual autonomy, then the opening to admit 
forgiveness from an individual and above all from a group is contracted to a 
narrow gate.”*®® He asks further whether the relinquishment of offering and 
receiving forgiveness is a step towards individual autonomy of every person 
and every society*®'*. Having considered these questions, he suggests that 
perhaps forgiveness does not in fact make people dependent but frees them 
to ‘move up to a higher level’ towards friendship, goodwill and cooperation. 
Forgiveness, he concludes, affirms the person as a person. “By the 
experience of forgiveness, people are encouraged and enabled to be 
themselves, to become autonomous in critical freedom.”*®®
Forgiveness gives freedom from something in the past and freedom to and 
for something in the future. “Forgiveness, “ says Emerson, “...allows a 
person a sense of freedom with regard to the chains of the past. It also 
allows freedom to be creative In regard to relationships of the future.”*®® 
Freedom from the past includes freedom from our own destructive behaviour. 
Jones also tells us that the forgiveness we receive from God and others also 
frees us to remember the past well. “We are enabled by God to remember
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the past so that we can be freed for new life.”*®*^ So, through forgiveness, we 
are freed from the chains of the past that bind us and hold us back, we are 
freed to be creative in our future relationships with others and we are freed 
for new life.
Forgiving others also frees the victim from self-destructive bitterness and 
feelings of revenge. Forgiveness, Showalter tells us, is “the elimination of all 
desire for revenge and personal ill towards those who deeply wrong or betray 
us. This elimination usually brings an inner peace of heart and the freedom 
of not having our lives dominated by the injuries we have suffered.”*®® As a 
test of this, and an illustration of how difficult it is in reality, Tim Jackson 
challenges us to, “Imagine that you are given the choice to: (a) torment for all 
eternity those who have harmed you the most (the one who sexually abused 
you, your unfaithful spouse, the date rapist, the drunk driver who killed your 
child, your abusive parent), or (b) see them brought in brokenness before the 
God who has been so kind to you. Which would you choose?”*®®
Hampton also touches on the freedom to be found in forgiveness, indicating 
that it benefits both forgiver and forgiven because it enables renewed 
relationships. The forgiver is no longer trapped as victim and the forgiven is 
no longer a sinner indebted to the victim. Her emphasis seems to be more 
on liberation of perpetrators than of victims as can be seen in the following 
citation. “But perhaps the greatest good forgiveness can bring is the 
liberation of the wrongdoer from the effects of victims’ moral hatred...of 
himself...so that he comes to believe that there is nothing good or decent in 
him.... It may enable wrongdoers to forgive themselves by showing that there 
is still enough decency in them to warrant renewed association with them. It 
may free them from the hell of self-loathing.” ®^®
It should be noted here that Hampton is not suggesting there is any decency 
in the action for which the perpetrator is being forgiven. As we have
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considered, forgiveness is only relevant in relation to the indecent, the 
inexcusable, the unjustifiable, the unpardonable, the unacceptable, the non- 
understandable. The 'decency' lies within the perpetrator. In forgiving, the 
victim is acknowledging that she or he places value on the perpetrator in 
spite of the injury. What this value is will vary. For some it will be the 
perpetrator as a person or the relationship between perpetrator and victim as 
it was before the injury that is valued. For others it will be a belief in the 
intrinsic value of human beings.
Forgiveness has also been described as being a creative act. “When we 
forgive we come as close as any human being can to the essentially divine 
act of creation.... We create healing for the future by changing a past that 
had no possibility in it for anything but sickness and d e a t h . O f  course, it is 
not the past that is changed but the power of the past over the present and 
the future. Raymond Studzinski also links both freedom and creativity with 
forgiveness. “Forgiveness frees an individual from the grip of irreversible 
history.... It is an immensely creative act that changes us from prisoners of 
the past to liberated individuals who are at peace with the memories of our 
past.” ®^^ This same idea of releasing the power of the past over the 
individual by changing its meaning was also considered in the previous 
chapter.
Kroll tells the story of a minister in Zimbabwe who was held for 22 years 
without trial. Following his release he encountered two of his former gaolers 
in a restaurant. One of them came over and greeted the minister, placing a 
hand on his shoulder. When asked later how he felt about the incident he 
replied, “If I had not forgiven that man he would still be my gaoler.” ®^® 
Similarly, Nelson Mandela, a prisoner for 27 years, invited his white gaoler to 
be guest of honour at his presidential inauguration thus showing that he was 
no longer emotionally captive. What these anecdotes illustrate for us is the 
fact that if we are to be able to move on then we need to forgive, otherwise
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the one who perpetrated our suffering will continue to have power over us 
and to hold us captive. Forgiveness frees not only the forgiver but also the 
forgiven^®'*. This benefit is mutual and is different from the priority given to 
the victim by forgiving the perpetrator as suggested by Doc Child re.
In order to be able to let go of the past and move on in this way, we also 
need to have hope that things can, and will, be different. “You will learn to let 
go of what happened in the past by creating a clear mental picture of where 
you are headed now.” ®^® Rowan Williams also indicates the association 
between moving on as a result of forgiveness, and hope. “If forgiveness is 
liberation, it is also a recovery of the past in hope, a return of memory, in 
which what is potentially threatening, destructive, despair-inducing, in the 
past is transformed into the ground of hope.” °^®
In No Future Without Forgiveness, Desmond Tutu describes the work of the 
Truth and Justice Commission set up to deal with the injustices and cruelty of 
South Africa under apartheid. Their question was not whether to deal with 
the past but how to deal with it. The past could not be swept under the 
carpet for national amnesia would have further victimised apartheid's victims 
by denying their experiences; experiences which are a vital part of their 
identity^ ®*^ . The work of the Commission was not to sit in judgement but to 
listen to and record stories from both victims and perpetrators. Marginalized 
victims had their humanity and individuality acknowledged through recounting 
their stories. We have already looked in previous chapters at storytelling and 
its value in understanding the self over time and with regard to memory. We 
look here at the value of storytelling with regard to forgiveness.
The Truth and Justice Commission found that the recounting of stories was 
empowering, not just for individuals, but also for communities for, as Tutu 
points out, because of belonging there is a sense in which one person's story
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is another’s story too^ ®®. David Augsburger also considers the role of 
narrative in forgiveness, noting that for forgiveness to be possible, “We need 
a story greater, larger, longer than our own little narratives, a story that is 
capable of offering us content for our moral lives and context for our ethical 
decisions.... It is a faith story.... Only such a story can reconcile us to 
ourselves, to each other, and to God, who is the author of all 
reconciliation.” ®^® In similar vein, Seibold writes, “In the midst of our pain 
autobiography can be an invitation to God to be present with us, to remind us 
of the Resurrection and the Hope. In short, telling our stories is not 
incompatible with forgiveness...affirming our story is a vital component in the 
journey to forgiveness.” *^® If the telling of one’s story is so important for 
victims then there have to be those who will listen. This is considered by 
Schreiter, who says, “Victims of violence and suffering must tell their story 
over and over again.... As they recount their own narrative, little by little they 
begin to construct a new narrative of truth that can include the experiences to 
overwhelm it.... The ministry of reconciliation at this stage is a ministry of 
listening.” *^*
In the South African situation, perpetrators also had to tell their story, for if 
the process of forgiveness and reconciliation is to be successful perpetrators 
must be willing to acknowledge the truth. Forgiveness and reconciliation are 
not simply pretending things are different for as Tutu says, “Spurious 
reconciliation can only bring about spurious healing.” *^^  The Commission 
took the following approach. Amnesty was granted to individual perpetrators 
for a full disclosure of their crimes while non-disclosure resulted in 
prosecution and possible prison sentence^*®. Remorse was not a condition 
for amnesty for this would have involved passing judgement on the 
genuineness and depth of remorse shown or experienced. Despite this,
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however, - or perhaps because of it -  the Commission found that most 
perpetrators expressed remorse and asked for forgiveness^*'*.
Tutu comments that both the public story-telling, which for many story-tellers 
and listeners alike was a harrowing ordeal, and the amnesty for perpetrators 
was a high price to pay for freedom but he believes it resulted in the great 
stability they have known since. He contrasts their experience with the 
ongoing upheaval in the former Soviet Union and the carnage in the former 
Yugoslavia^*®. This cost and benefit is hinted at in the slogan used on the 
Commission’s leaflets and posters, "The Truth Hurts, But Silence Kills’’^ *®.
It was not only facing and acknowledging truth and listening to the gruesome 
details unfolding that was a difficult exercise but also seeking and giving 
forgiveness. As Tutu stated at a hearing of the Commission, “It isn’t easy as 
we all know to ask for forgiveness and it’s also not easy to forgive, but we are 
a people who know that when someone cannot be forgiven there is no 
ft/fure.” *^^  He goes on later to say, “When you embark on the business of 
asking for and giving forgiveness you are taking a risk. If you ask another 
person for forgiveness you may be spurned; the one you have injured may 
refuse to forgive you. The risk is even greater if you are the injured party 
waiting to offer forgiveness. The culprit may be arrogant, obdurate or blind: 
not ready or willing to apologise or to ask for forgiveness in their turn. He or 
she thus cannot receive the forgiveness they are offered.” *^® Also thinking 
about the difficulty of asking for forgiveness from those we have harmed Volf 
states, “Genuine repentance may be one of the most difficult acts for a 
person, let alone a community to perform.” This, he suggests is because we 
do not like being wrong and because the other is not necessarily completely 
right^ *®. The work of the Truth and Justice Commission not only shows that 
there is no future without forgiveness (as indicated by the title or Tutu’s book) 
but also that there is no forgiveness without truth.
1999: 48 
Tutu, 1999: 52 
Tutu, 1999: 51 
^^^Tutu, 1999:117 (emphasis added) 
21® Tutu, 1999: 216f 
21® Volf, 1996: 119
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3.8 Repentance
We considered earlier in this chapter the Christian belief that while God’s 
forgiveness is universal in its scope, it is specific in its application. In other 
words, forgiveness is available to all but forgiven-ness is forced on none. As 
we considered in chapter one, God gives human beings the choice about 
whether or not to become what McFadyen calls his dialogue partners^^®. He 
gives them the choice, that is, about being in relationship with him. While 
God’s forgiveness is available to all, he leaves us free to choose whether or 
not to avail ourselves of that forgiveness and become his dialogue partners. 
Swinburne states that for God to forgive all sin without us associating 
ourselves with the death of Christ -  without our involvement -  would fail to 
take us, or our sin, seriously.^^* “For,” he continues, “if...God forgives men 
before men seek him, God would not be taking men seriously, he would be 
treating with contempt the chosen hostility to himself of free agents.
While there is a sense in which it is correct to say that God does not forgive 
without our repentance, is it not the case that there is also a sense in which 
God does offer us his forgiveness prior to our repentance, before we are 
even aware of our need of forgiveness? While God does not impose 
forgiven-ness on individuals against their will, without their repentance, his 
forgiveness is prior to that repentance. It is available to all and it is this 
forgiveness that makes repentance possible. We might say that repentance 
transforms inert forgiveness into active forgiven-ness.
Calvin says of this, “When God offers forgiveness of sins, he usually requires 
repentance of us in turn, implying that his mercy ought to be a cause for men 
to repent.... Turn again, and repent, that your sins may be blotted out.’ (Acts 
3:19) Yet we must note that this condition is not so laid down as if our 
repentance were the basis of our deserving pardon, but rather, because the 
Lord has determined to have pity on men to the end that they may repent. 
“Both repentance and forgiveness,” he tells us, “...are conferred on us by
22° McFadyen, 1990; 119f. 
221 Swinburne, 1989: 87 
22^  Swinburne, 1989: 153 
22° Calvin, 1981:614
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Christ, and both are attainted by us through f a i t h . F o r  forgiveness to be 
the result of repentance would make forgiveness works-based, would make it 
something we could earn rather than, as Calvin says, it being conferred on us 
by Christ and attained by us through faith.
Although we have to repent before we can receive forgiveness, the 
forgiveness is theologically prior to the repentance. As Volf says, 
“Forgiveness must already be at work before repentance can take place.
We see this illustrated in the parable of the Prodigal Son. Without waiting for 
the son's words of apology, “The father pre-empts his son’s begging by 
spontaneous forgiveness...without asking questions.”^^ ® Also thinking of the 
Prodigal Son, Holloway writes, “His coming to his senses was no act of 
repentance, but a characteristically opportunistic move that was designed to 
save his own skin.”^^ *^  He goes on to say that in running to meet his son, the 
father violated a social convention that said the greater a person’s dignity the 
slower he moved, but the father, says Holloway, had no need for pomposity. 
He had no interest in his own dignity or status. “It is this abandonment of 
code and conditionality that is the scandalous heart of the story... the father’s 
outpouring of love caused a true change in the son, so that we might say that 
the forgiveness that was unconditionally given actually caused the 
repentance that followed it, an exact reversal of the order that is followed in 
the usual system of conditional forgiveness.”^^ ®
The father, we notice, did not go and seek the son out while he was still in 
the far country to offer the forgiveness which awaited his return, rather, he 
waited until he saw his son making his way home. The father’s forgiveness 
of the son was prior to the son’s return to the father but did not become 
forgiven-ness until the son was willing to leave the far country and return to 
his father’s home, even although what he had in mind when he set out on his
224 Calvin. 1981: 592 
22° Volf. 1996:120n 
22° Nouwen, 1994: 111 
22^  Holloway, 2002: 81 
22° Holloway, 2002: 81 f
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journey was less than the full forgiveness, restoration and reconciliation that 
took place.
In the Christian Scriptures there is a definite link between repentance and 
forgiveness. For example, "Repentance and forgiveness of sins will be 
preached in his name.” (Luke 24:47) "The Lord is...not wanting any to 
perish, but everyone to come to repentance.” (2 Peter 3:4) “God’s kindness 
leads you to repentance.” (Romans 7:4) “Restore me and I will return.” 
(Jeremiah 31:18). It is not the case, however, that forgiveness is conditional 
on repentance. For, as indicated above, this would make repentance a work 
and forgiveness works-based. It is, rather, that in repenting we are accepting 
the gift of forgiveness God offers.
These same principles might be applied to interpersonal relationships. 
Swinburne notes that for a victim to overlook a serious wrong without any 
repentance or apology from the perpetrator trivialises both victim and 
perpetrator, and also their relationship®^®. Forgiveness of wrong done 
against us in the absence of repentance not only trivialises victim and 
perpetrator as Swinburne points out, but can also make the victim vulnerable 
to being hurt further. For these reasons, Haber argues, repentance is the 
only good reason to forgive®®®. He feels, “that repentance is a uniquely 
appropriate reason to forgive,” and that it is not a challenge to the self- 
respect of victims to forgive if the perpetrator repents. In fact, he suggests 
that to withhold forgiveness may undermine the repentant perpetrator®®*.
Richards agrees with Haber that the perpetrator’s repentance makes 
forgiveness reasonable but adds the caveat that although repentance makes 
forgiveness morally permissible it does not make it mandatory. He feels that 
while repentance makes forgiveness reasonable it is insufficient because it 
carries no guarantee that the perpetrator will not revert to the previous
22° Swinburne, 1989: 86 
2°° Haber, 1991:109 
2°i Haber, 1991:101
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harmful behaviour®®®. I suggest that repentance is sufficient reason for a 
victim to embark on the process of forgiving a perpetrator’s wrongdoing, 
although it may not be sufficient reason for reconciliation to take place. We 
see here a significant difference between God’s forgiveness of us and our 
forgiveness of one another. God’s forgiveness, as we have discussed is 
always prior to our repentance. Our forgiveness of one another may, at 
times, be prior to the perpetrator’s repentance. There are, on the other hand, 
situations when it will not occur to victims to forgive until the perpetrator 
repents.
Another significant difference between God’s forgiveness of us and our 
forgiveness of one another is that whereas God’s forgiveness of us always 
results in restored relationship between us and God, this is not necessarily so 
of interpersonal relationships. There will always be situations even following 
forgiveness when, as Volf says, “A clear line will separate ‘them’ from ‘us’. 
They will remain ‘they’ and we will remain ‘we’ and we will never include 
‘them’ when we speak of ‘us’.”®®®
What, then, is repentance? According to Richards, the awareness that one’s 
behaviour is unacceptable and later to regret of it does not in itself constitute 
repentance. Repentance, he says, involves a change in one’s moral views 
and coming to disapprove of what was previously thought to be 
permissible®®'*. This definition, however, does not address the situation 
where the perpetrator was always aware that the action was wrong. To 
return to the theological context for a moment, how often do we seek God’s 
forgiveness for something we knew to be wrong even before we did it? In 
asking his father for his inheritance the Prodigal Son was, in effect saying 
that he wished his father was dead. His actions were not just acts of 
disrespect but of betrayal. He not only had a desire to see the world but to 
break with the world of his family®®®. In squandering his money, health, self-
2°2 Richards, 1988: 87 
2°° Volf, 1996:124 
2°4 Richards: 1988: 88 
2°° Nouwen, 1994: 35f
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respect, reputation and honour, it seems unlikely that the prodigal ever 
thought his behaviour anything but wrong.
Repentance is both backward-looking (looking back at the past offence) and 
forward-looking (looking towards a future that will be different). Haber tells us 
that it is both emotional (feeling regret over wrongdoing) and volitional 
(promising to refrain from such wrongdoing in the future) and that it must be 
sincere®®®. He does not explain, however, how he considers the sincerity of 
repentance should be measured or by whom, whether by the repentant 
perpetrator, the forgiving victim or some neutral third person. Writing of 
apology, which could be seen as an expression of repentance, Augsburger 
writes, “In its most responsible, authentic and hence vulnerable expression, it 
constitutes a form of self-punishment that cuts deeply because we are 
obliged to retell, relive and seek forgiveness for sorrowful events.... The act 
is arduous and painful, the gesture reiterates the reality of the offence while 
superseding it, and the remorseful admission of wrongdoing is converted into 
a gift that is accepted and reciprocated by forgiveness.”®®*^
Kant, Haber tells us, suggests that by repenting the wrongdoer can undergo 
a moral rebirth, become a new person, and this new person stands against 
the person who did the wrong and resents it. If repentance means that the 
perpetrator is a new person, he suggests the victim can forgive the 
perpetrator without any challenge or threat to self-respect®®®. It could be 
argued, however, that if the repentant perpetrator is a ‘new person’, a 
different person, the need for forgiveness is negated. Although Haber 
attributes the idea of repentance leading to new birth to Kant, we should note 
that it is in fact a New Testament concept. In the New Testament, however, 
it is not our act of repentance that brings about new birth (although it follows 
repentance). It is, rather, an act of God’s grace. (“I tell you the truth, no-one 
can enter the kingdom of God unless he is born of water and the Spirit. 
Flesh gives birth to flesh but the Spirit gives birth to spirit.” John 3:5f)
2°° Haber, 1991: 90f 
2°^  Augsburger, 1996: 40 
2°° Haber. 1991: 96f
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Having stated that the New Testament does not speak of regeneration of 
individual persons but only of the regeneration of fallen humanity brought 
about by the incarnation, and the final transformation at the eschaton when 
all things will be made new, TF Torrance tells the following story. During his 
first week as Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, 
he was asked if and when he had been born again. “I told him that I had 
been born again when Jesus Christ was born of the Virgin Mary and rose 
again from the virgin tomb, the first-born from the dead. When he asked me 
to explain I said: ‘this Tom Torrance you see is full of corruption but the real 
Tom Torrance is hid with Christ in God and will be revealed only when Jesus 
Christ comes again. He took my corrupt humanity in his incarnation, 
sanctified, cleansed and redeemed it, giving it new birth in his death and 
resurrection.’”®®®
For Richards, on the other hand, repentance is less than rebirth. It is a 
change in moral views. Haber prefers this way of thinking as the Kantian 
‘new person’ theory raises questions for him about personal identity®'*®. He 
suggests that if forgiveness is of a person for an offence, then it should be 
sufficient that she or he has a changed moral view towards the action. He 
goes on to say that the fact of a perpetrator’s repentance indicates that he or 
she acknowledges that the victim is right to feel resentment®'**. Even 
although the perpetrator repents and acknowledges the victim’s right to feel 
resentment, forgiveness is still difficult and costly for the victim who has been 
hurt.
3.9 Forgiveness Uniimited?
Whether or not it brings about reconciliation, forgiveness is a complete act. It 
does not necessarily depend on the perpetrator’s repentance®'*®. Kroll states 
that we are not responsible for the actions of others and neither asking for
2°° Torrance, 1983: 95f 
24° Haber. 1991: 97
241 Haber, 1991: 97, 99
242 Showalter, 1997 (www)
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nor offering forgiveness presupposes a response on the part of the other^ "*^  
although clearly one looks for and hopes for it  As Tutu points out, if we 
could only forgive when perpetrators showed contrition, victims would ever 
be prisoners of the whim of perpetrators and would forever be victims '^ '^ .^ 
Haber, however, disagrees, stating that the only situation in which 
forgiveness is appropriate is when resentment is negated, and that comes 
about only through the perpetrator’s repentance. In fact, he goes as far as to 
say that if the perpetrator does not repent then it is immoral to forgive for that 
would undermine the self-respect of the victim^ "^ ®.
Kroll gives an illustration of a situation where a victim’s attitude of forgiveness 
would not have led to reconciliation as the perpetrators were unlikely to be 
aware of the forgiveness extended towards them by their victim while the 
victim was alive. A scrap of paper was found in the possession of a dead 
child In Ravensbrück concentration camp bearing the following words, “O, 
Lord, remember not only the men and women of good will, but also those of 
ill will. But do not remember all the suffering they have inflicted on us; 
remember the fruits we have brought, thanks to this suffering -  our 
comradeship, our loyalty, our humility, our courage, our generosity, the 
greatness of heart which has grown out of all this, and when they come to 
judgement, let all the fruits that we have borne be their forgiveness.” "^^®
Jones asks if there are limits to forgiveness, if there are those who are 
unforgivable. We can all think of those towards whom hatred, anger and 
vengeance seem more appropriate than forgiveness -  Adolf Hitler, Slobodan 
Milosovic, Osama Bin Laden, Saddam Hussein as well as those who 
perpetrate horrors against individuals and remain impenitent -  rapists, 
murderers, child abusers "^^ .^ Similarly, Torrance asks how we can talk of 
forgiveness in situations like Bosnia, Rwanda and the holocaust, “where 
survivors are stalked by unthinkable but, for them, unforgettable memories.”
Kroll, 2000: 58 
1999: 220 
Haber, 1991: 90 & 103 
Kroll, 2000: 100 
Jones, 1995: 243f
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He replies that Christians are more inclined to talk about ‘justice and 
liberation’ than ‘reconciliation and forgiveness’ In situations such as these^ "^ ®. 
Holloway states, “There are some deeds so monstrous it will drive us mad if 
we do not forgive them, because no proportional retribution is possible.... We 
cannot press a button to rewind history, to reverse the events of September 
11, to get the planes back on the tarmac in Boston.... Those horrifying events 
cannot be undone. The dead cannot return, the deed cannot be 
undone...nor can it be appropriately avenged or made sense of. Only 
unconditional impossible forgiveness can switch off the engine of madness 
and revenge and invite us...to move on into the future. Until we can do that 
we are exiled in the horror of the past.” "^^® Similarly, Smedes states that to 
say some offenders are monsters who do not deserve forgiveness is to afford 
to them a power they do not deserve. It sentences the victims to a lifetime of 
suffering and renders the offenders unaccountable. “We give them power to 
condemn their victims to live forever with the hurting memory of their painful 
pasts.” ®^°
Derrida responds to the question. Is there such a thing as the unforgivable?’ 
this way, “Yes, there is the unforgivable. Is this not, in truth, the only thing to 
forgive? The only thing that calls for forgiveness?...there is only forgiveness, 
if there is any, where there is the unforgivable.” ®^^ He says that if we are 
prepared to forgive only what appears forgivable -  so-called ‘venal sin’ then 
the very notion of forgiveness disappears. It is, he says, ‘mortal sin’ -  
unforgivable harm -  we have to forgive^® .^ We have already said that we 
forgive the inexcusable, the unpardonable, the unjustifiable, the 
unacceptable, and the non-understandable. Perhaps we could summarise 
this list by saying, with Derrida, that we forgive the unforgivable.
Torrance, awaiting publication 
Holloway, 2002: 86 
Smedes, 1988: 79 
Cited in Holloway, 2002: 11 
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Reynolds responds to Derrida’s statement of forgiving the unforgivable 
saying, “This particular paradox revolves around the premise that if one 
forgives something that is actually forgivable, then one simply engages in 
calculative reasoning and hence does not really forgive... according to its 
own internal logic, genuine forgiving must involve the impossible: that is, the 
forgiving of an ‘unforgivable’ transgression.” ®^® In a study on reconciliation, 
Brennan writes, “If one had to forgive only what is forgivable, even 
excusable, venial, as one says, or insignificant, then one would not forgive.... 
If, in the process of any given transformation, the fault, the evil, the crime are 
attenuated or extenuated to the point of veniality, if the effects of the wound 
were less hurting...there is no need of forgiveness. The forgiveness of the 
forgivable does not forgive anything: it is not forgiveness &. (one must 
forgive) the unforgivable that resists any process of transformation of me or 
of the other.” ®^"^
Torrance argues that to deny unconditional love and forgiveness is to 
dehumanise both self and others and, as such, is acting contrary to the will of 
God. He states, “To operate from a Christian epistemic base (and to be a 
Christian is to do precisely that) is to recognise and affirm no purpose for 
humanity that does not stem from that one Word to humanity which defines 
what it is to be human. To be human in truth is to love not only one’s friends 
but one’s enemies -  and to do so unconditionally. And to love 
unconditionally is to forgive unconditionally.... The unconditional forgiveness 
of one’s enemies is the only orientation towards them that is in accordance 
with the only will of God we know, God’s only Word to humankind.” ®^® 
Clarifying what unconditional forgiveness means, Rodney Hunter says, 
“(Forgiveness) is unconditional not in the sense that no conditions are in 
force, but in the sense that the conditions which are in force are nevertheless 
ultimately not allowed to alienate and destroy the relationship they are 
intended to secure.” ®^® Writing about unconditional forgiveness, Holloway 
cites Derrida who says, “It is a madness of the impossible.” and responds, “It
Reynolds, www 
Brennan, www
Torrance, awaiting publication 
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is a madness of the impossible but when it occurs it can create a profound 
qualitative change in people and events.... In theological language, it is a 
mixture of pure unmerited grace, given out of uncalculating love."^ ®^
Haber, on the other hand, indicates that there are indeed limitations to 
forgiveness when he says that in certain circumstances it is wrong to forgive. 
He says that there are times when to forgive rather than resent is not right 
and is a moral defect or vice rather than a virtue^ ®®. He says, for example, 
that a concentration camp inmate ought not to forgive injuries inflicted^ ®®. We 
find this debate about whether forgiveness should always be given 
unconditionally or whether it is sometimes right to withhold forgiveness in 
Simon Wiesenthal's The Sunflower considered below. Haber suggests that 
because we have to preserve our self-respect we should look for a reason to 
forgive, asking, ‘Why should I forgive?'. If we can find no answer to that 
question, then he concludes that we should not forgive^ ®®. Is Haber correct? 
Is it the case that, “Sometimes there is a strength and grandeur in the refusal 
to forgive.”? Can it be true, as Holloway suggests, that, “The refusal to 
forgive can be the righteous thing to do, the thing that commands justice.” ®^^ ?
Haber’s contention that there are times when righteousness demands 
withholding forgiveness seems to contradict his earlier assertion that to 
withhold forgiveness may undermine the repentant perpetrator. It is contrary 
to the teaching of Christian theology and to the experience and example of 
Nelson Mandela, Pope John Paul II, and of the Zimbabwe minister already 
mentioned. It is also contrary to the experience and example of Corrie ten 
Boom in her famous forgiveness of one of her former concentration camp 
guards. The guard, one of the most cruel in the camp, had been in a meeting 
where she had been speaking about her wartime experiences and about 
forgiveness. After the meeting he came forward and introduced himself. He 
told her that in the interim he had become a Christian. He knew God had
Holloway, 2002: 85 (original emphasis) 
^  Haber, 1991: 69f 
Haber, 1991: 89
^  Haber. 1991: 89261 Holloway, 2002: 65
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forgiven his cruelty and, extending his hand, asked for her forgiveness for his 
offences against her. Corrie could remember the man clearly and, as he 
stood before her, could visualise him in his Gestapo uniform. Initially she 
hesitated as she looked at him, and remembered him and his cruelty towards 
her and the other women. But she was able to shake his hand and grant the 
forgiveness for which he had asked^® .^ If we are honest with ourselves we 
will always find an answer to Haber’s question ‘why should I forgive?’ for 
each of us frequently finds ourselves in need of forgiveness from others and 
from God.
Haber’s presupposition is that resentment is not wrong. It is a negative but 
proper response and is, as we have seen, different from vindictiveness which 
includes the desire to get even. “Resentment is anger that one may properly 
feel on being personally injured.” ®^® Schreiter also considers the 
appropriateness of anger as a response to being hurt. “Anger is an 
acknowledgement of the depth of pain and the breadth of the threat that has 
been made to our well-being. Not to express anger that arises from violence 
is not to acknowledge the suffering. And unless we do acknowledge it, a new 
narrative cannot be constructed.” ®^"^
Murphy's suggestion that ‘old times sake’ is a reason to forgive is forgiving 
not who the perpetrator is but who the perpetrator once was^ ®® but Haber 
asks what that has to do with forgiveness of a person for an action. He cites 
Norvin Richards who asks, “Why should your having ‘been a good and loyal 
friend to me in the past’ be a reason to forgive you for wrongdoing rather than 
something that deepens the hurt.” ®^® The bitter words in Psalm 55, which we 
considered in an earlier chapter - “If an enemy were insulting me, I could 
endure it; if a foe were raising himself against me, I could hide from him. But 
it is you, a man like myself, my companion, my close friend, with whom I 
once enjoyed sweet fellowship as we walked with the throng at the house of
^® t^en Boom, 1971: 55ff 
Haber, 1991:71 
Schreiter, 1992:44 
Murphy and Hampton, 1988: 29 
^  Cited In Haber. 1991:196
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God.” ®^^ - indicate that the pain inflicted by someone who has been a loyal 
and good friend at one time is far deeper than the hurt caused by a stranger. 
This would perhaps make forgiveness more difficult rather than easier than 
Murphy seems to suggest.
Unlike Haber, Holloway sees forgiveness as being of a person, not a deed 
and for this reason he says we should focus on the person rather than the 
deed. He states, “We cannot ever forgive a murder or a theft, but we might 
learn to forgive a murderer or a thief.” ®^® In the Lord’s Prayer, however, we 
are not taught to ask forgiveness because we are sinners but to ask, “Forgive 
us our sins.” ®^® It is surely not the case that the person divorced from the 
wrongdoing, nor the wrongdoing in isolation from the person who committed 
it that is forgiven, but rather, as we have already considered, the person who 
has done wrong is forgiven for the wrongdoing committed. Our concern, 
however, is not only with who or what is forgiven but also with who is entitled 
to forgive and it is to that question we now turn our attention.
3.10 Who is entitled to forgive?
Simon Wiesenthal tells the story that as a young Jewish concentration camp 
inmate he was taken to the room of Karl, a dying SS officer. Karl had asked 
that a Jew, any Jew', be brought to him in order that he might confess the 
atrocities in which he had participated and die in peace. Despite his feelings 
of revulsion and horror, Wiesenthal remained and listened to Karl's 
confession. He listened while Karl told of the time when, acting under orders, 
he set fire to a petrol-doused house filled with Jews and shot those who tried 
to escape. Wiesenthal offered no words of consolation or forgiveness to the 
dying man, but neither did he utter words of condemnation or accusation. He 
left the room in silence. Wiesenthal was haunted by his own silence from 
that day on, and in the weeks and years that followed, he sought affirmation 
from others that he had done the right thing. He recorded his experience in
Psalm 55:12-14 
Holloway, 2002: 36 
Luke 11:4
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The Sunflower: On The Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness, concluding 
with the challenge, “You, who have just read this sad and tragic episode in 
my life, can mentally change places with me and ask yourself the crucial 
question, *What would I have done?\"^^^ Of the fifty-three respondents in the 
symposium that follows, very few answer Wiesenthal’s question. Most 
instead address the unwritten question of whether or not they believe him to 
have done the correct thing. Perhaps this has something to do with the fact 
that few of the respondents feei qualified to state what they would do for 
none of them had been in Wiesenthal’s situation. Perhaps they find it 
impossible to mentally change places with him as he suggests, for we like to 
think that the horrors of concentration camp are beyond the imagination of 
civilised and educated human beings.
In Jewish thought only the victim may forgive a wrong, no-one else, not even 
God, can do so on the victim’s behalf. Perpetrators are required to seek 
forgiveness from their victims three times. If forgiveness is refused three 
times the perpetrator is released from her or his obligations. Jesus, 
however, offered forgiveness that did not require the perpetrator’s prior 
repentance and, following the resurrection, gave his disciples authority to do 
the same (“If you forgive anyone his sins, they are forgiven; if you do not 
forgive them, they are not forgiven.” John 20:2Sf^\ There is also no mention 
of repentance when Jesus tells his disciples they are to forgive their brother 
seventy times seven. Jesus appears to be telling his followers that their 
forgiveness has to be as unlimited as God’s forgiveness, regardless of the 
attitude of the perpetrator. These differences between Jewish and Christian 
thought are reflected in the kind of responses given to Wiesenthal. By and 
large, Jews respond that Wiesenthal could only have done what he did as 
no-one other than the victims, who in Karl’s case were dead, had any right to 
forgive^^^. Christians tend more towards the suggestion that Wiesenthal 
could have told Karl that he should seek God’s forgiveness or make
Wiesenthal, 1998: 98 (emphasis added)
Jones, 1995:104ff
For example, Joshua Rubenstein says, “The Nazi had committed mass murder. Simon 
was merciful enough with him. For Simon to grant him forgiveness, as well, would have 
been a betrayal of his and his family’s suffering, and all the suffering around him.” 
(Wiesenthal 1998: 240)
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confession to a priest^ ^®. The two Buddhist respondents state unequivocally 
that Karl should have been offered forgiveness^^" .^
Neblett challenges the view that says only victims may forgive. He suggests 
that one member of an injured group can forgive on behalf of the whole 
group^^®. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that one person may 
express forgiveness on behalf of the whole group with the group’s consent, 
but not forgive on behalf of the whole group. He considers that the social 
roles of some -  for example judges and priests -  allow them to forgive what 
is done to others^^®. Judges, however, do not forgive. They may pardon but 
as we have considered this is distinct from forgiveness. Priests express 
forgiveness on behalf of God; they do not forgive on God’s behalf. He also 
considers the scenario of A injuring B, which may also indirectly injure C who 
is close to B. In this situation, he claims, C may challenge B’s right to 
forgive^^^. This seems to contradict his previous thought that one person 
may forgive on behalf of an injured group.
Haber, on the other hand, Indicates that we can forgive what is done to a 
third party when, because of our relationship with the third party, we are 
injured by their injury^^®. He emphasises, however, that such forgiveness is 
only appropriate when we are close to the injured party, not when the third 
party is a stranger. “So one cannot forgive what is an injury to a stranger 
because one cannot resent such an injury, resentment being linked to self- 
respect.”^^ ® I suggest that no-one has a right to forgive what is done to 
another, no matter how close our relationship with the injured party. 
Forgiveness belongs only to the one who is injured and to God.
Robert McAfee Brown is one of the few who says what he would do. He writes, "I think 
would have urged the young man to address his plea directly to God and throw himself on 
the possibility of Divine mercy, something I am not permitted to adjudicate one way or the 
other." (Wiesenthal 1998: 123)
Buddhist monk, Matthieu Ricard, for example, states, "For a Buddhist, forgiveness is 
always possible and one should always forgive.” (Wiesenthal 1998: 235)
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Alan Torrance, however, suggests that Christ’s vicarious humanity and the 
Holy Spirit makes forgiveness for and on behalf of others possible. He says 
that in the incarnation Christ becomes the victim so could say, ‘In as much as 
you have done it to the least of these, you have done it to me’ (Matthew2 4). 
Christ does not just stand in solidarity with the victim. He is the victim. 
Christ’s identification is with people as individuals. “The incarnate Son 
identifies with the particular pain and suffering of the particular victim.” ®^® His 
identification is not with humanity In some kind of general or universal way. 
He goes on to say that Christ forgives our perpetrators, or as he prefers to 
call them, ‘victimisers’, and invites us to participate in his forgiveness. We, 
who have received God’s forgiveness through Christ, are permitted and 
commanded to forgive^®\ Or, as Jones would say, we are permitted and 
indeed commanded to embody forgiveness.
3.11 Summary and Conclusion
At the beginning of this chapter I cited what McFadyen says about the 
doctrine of sin, “Why use the empty terminology of sin, if stripped of its 
essential and distinctive theological frame of reference, it conforms itself 
precisely and without remainder to the contours offered by, say secular 
psychology, psychiatry, sociology or ethics?” ®^^ And again, “Sin-talk cannot 
survive testing unless it continues to function as a distinctive theological 
language, speaking of concrete theologies in relation to God. .. If sin-talk 
attempts to meet the challenge by evacuating itself of all functioning 
reference to God, conforming itself to the standards or references afforded by 
non-theological discourses, then it defeats itself in the process.” ®^® The 
same, I suggested, could be said about forgiveness. If the message of 
forgiveness is central to the Christian Gospel then Christian theology must 
have something unique and vivifying to say about forgiveness not found in 
the secular disciplines.
Torrance, awaiting publication 
Torrance, awaiting publication 
McFadyen, 2000; 5 
^  McFadyen, 2000: 5f
224
Forgiveness, we saw, is more than a ‘performance utterance’. The words ‘I 
forgive you’ have to be accompanied by the appropriate attitude and 
behaviour towards the one being forgiven. 1 have suggested (with Patton) 
that the discovery that the person who hurt me is more like me than different 
helps me to forgive. We forgive because we know ourselves, like the 
perpetrator, to be sinful and in need of forgiveness from others and from 
God. William Neblett states that forgiveness can be a moral obligation or can 
be supererogatory. I suggest that it is always supererogatory. For 
forgiveness to be a moral obligation would make victims morally obligated to 
those who harmed them, further empowering perpetrators and further 
disempowering victims. Forgiveness is always undeserved. Indeed, if it 
were deserved there would be no need for forgiveness at all.
We looked at several counterfeits of forgiveness -  things with which it is often 
confused but which are not, in fact, forgiveness. These are condonation, 
pardon, mercy, modifying one’s moral judgement and excusing. Forgiveness 
and punishment, we said, are not mutually exclusive. There is, at times, an 
assumption that forgiveness is coterminous with pardon. It is not. It is not 
the offence but the injury caused by the offence that is forgiven by the injured 
person. The offence, we said, is pardoned by one in whom such authority 
has been vested.
We considered resentment. The term ‘resentment’ tends to have negative 
connotations in the thinking of most people. The dictionary defines to resent 
as ‘to take badly or to consider as an injury or affront’. If, as Haber says, not 
to resent is an indication of low (or no) self-esteem and no sense of one’s 
own rights or importance, then it is in fact a positive and healthy response to 
being injured by another, so long as it becomes a catalyst for action and is 
not allowed to fester and further damage the self.
With regard to repentance there are three main views represented. (1) 
Repentance is a necessary and sufficient reason to forgive. (2) Repentance 
is unnecessary for forgiveness. (3) Repentance is insufficient as a reason to 
forgive. It is perhaps this more than anything else that distinguishes our
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forgiveness of one another and God’s forgiveness of us. God forgives 
without our prior repentance although it is by repentance that we make it our 
own. In most interpersonal forgiveness, to forgive without any indication of 
the perpetrator’s remorse, regret or repentance risks giving the impression of 
excusing or even condoning the perpetrator’s behaviour and placing the 
victim at risk of further injury. I suggest that in most interpersonal situations 
repentance is a necessary reason to forgive. This does not necessarily 
mean that victim and perpetrator will be reconciled.
Forgiveness, which is unnatural and often difficult for us, is, according to 
Christian theology, natural for God. It is in God’s nature to forgive - and to 
forgive completely - because God’s nature is love (1 John 4:8) and love 
forgives. We can, therefore, be entirely confident that God forgives our 
wrongdoing and can have the assurance that we are forgiven. He will not 
reject or refuse anyone who seeks his forgiveness. “If we confess our sins, 
he is faithful and just and will forgive us our sins and purify us from all 
unrighteousness.” ®^"^  Confidence that we will be forgiven and assurance of 
being forgiven are often missing in interpersonal situations. Another 
difference between God’s forgiveness and interpersonal forgiveness is that, 
unlike human persons, God will never cast up what has been forgiven. In 
God’s economy, what is dealt with is dealt with. “As far as the east is from 
the west, so far has he removed our transgressions from us.” ®^®
As considered above, human forgiveness does not always result in 
reconciliation. God’s forgiveness of humankind, however, always results in 
restored relationship. But God’s forgiveness is about more than restoring 
what was there before, it is about something new. God says in Isaiah 43:19, 
“See, I am doing a new thing.” “The forgiveness Jesus describes and lives 
out is profoundly radical. .. Jesus does not forgive as a means of returning 
people to the status quo. His actions are directed at transforming them, at 
breaking them out of the limited vision of culture and idol so that they catch a
1 John 1:9285 Psalm 103:12
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glimpse of the true God beyond culture and the culture’s moral system (who 
is right and who is wrong).
In the discussion of whether our forgiveness of others or God’s forgiveness of 
us is prior, I suggested that our ability to forgive would be limited if we had 
not first experienced forgiveness. Soares-Prabhu suggests that we forgive 
others in response to God’s forgiveness. This gives us a greater 
appreciation of God’s forgiveness, which in turn enables us to forgive more 
and so on. We saw too that forgiveness is a process. It is a journey which is 
often long and painful.
We have considered that forgiveness is costly because it is undeserved, 
unfair and unmerited, because it may mean giving up the ‘victim role’ and 
because of the pain of remembering. This was contrasted with the cost of 
not forgiving. To ignore or deny the cost of forgiveness trivialises both 
sufferer and suffering.
We considered that like sin and suffering, forgiveness is concrete and 
specific, not abstract and general. Non-specific, generalised forgiveness is a 
symptom of cheap grace. Concrete, specific forgiveness is costly for both 
forgiver and forgiven.
In the discussion regarding whether repentance brings about God’s 
forgiveness or God’s forgiveness brings about our repentance, my conclusion 
is that God’s forgiveness is prior to our repentance. I cited Jones saying, we 
are forgiven in order that we can enter a life of repentance and forgiveness. 
He states, “While repentance and confession are not conditions of receiving 
God’s forgiveness, they are indispensable means of acknowledging our need 
for forgiveness and hence embody that forgiveness in our relations with 
others.” ®^^ For it to be otherwise -  for God’s forgiveness to be dependent on 
our repentance -  makes forgiveness something we can earn. To be effective
Hinkle cited in Augsburger, 1996:22 
Jones, 1995: 195
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a gift has to be received. Forgiveness is a gift of God's grace. In repentance 
we are effectively receiving God’s gift of forgiveness.
Haber, we saw, contends that there are circumstances in which, even if the 
perpetrator expresses regret, remorse and repentance, it is not right to 
forgive. Attractive as this may, at times, appear, it is not what is taught or 
modelled in the Christian Scriptures. Nor is it in the best interest of victims to 
harbour resentment and bitterness. Even if no answer relating to the 
perpetrator can be found to Haber’s question, ‘Why should I forgive?’, the 
victim will always be able to find answers relating to him or herself. ‘I too am 
in need of forgiveness’ or *I have received forgiveness from God and from 
others’ or even, ‘Harbouring resentment against others has an adverse effect 
on my well-being and on my ability to remember well.’ As indicated at the 
beginning of this chapter, while the benefit to the self may be the catalyst that 
encourages us to forgive, if it was always the prime motivating factor then 
forgiveness is redefined from an act of love to an act of self-centredness.
Emerson cites Tillich when he says, “One could say that the courage to be is 
the courage to accept oneself in spite of being unacceptable.” and, “The 
courage to be...is the courage to accept the forgiveness of sins, not as an 
abstract assertion but as the fundamental experience in the encounter with 
God.” In other words, courage comes first and involves forgiveness. 
Emerson suggests that the opposite is the correct order; that forgiveness of 
sins comes first and that gives one the courage to be. He states, “It is 
realised forgiveness that makes one free to have the courage to be.” ®^®
Once we have experienced forgiveness, we are called upon to forgive others. 
This is why we need courage. Forgiveness, as we have considered, is not 
easy. It is to become a way of life and, in some situations, will take a lifetime. 
“Because of the pervasiveness of sin, healing brokenness and unlearning 
sinful habits is an unfinished and unfinishable task.^ ®®” “Forgiveness has 
many layers, many seasons.... The important part of forgiveness is to begin
Emerson, 1964; 176f
Jones, 1995: 63
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and to continue. The finishing of it all is a life work.” ®^° Why is it so important 
to begin? It is important because, as Bishop Desmond Tutu says, "There's 
no future without forgiveness.” ®^^ This surely is as true of individuals as it is 
of communities.
There is surely a temptation to embrace Haber's contention that even when 
they repent of their wrongdoing, there are some perpetrators who should not 
be forgiven. The Christian theologian, however, must be true to the example 
and teaching of the New Testament and that means to ‘forgive as we have 
been forgiven' (Matthew 6:12). And how are we forgiven? We are forgiven 
following our repentance (or, rather, the forgiveness that precedes our 
repentance becomes forgiven-ness), we are forgiven completely, we are 
forgiven limitlessly (seventy times seven) and we are forgiven without 
condition. That is how we are to forgive others. It is, Volf states, a 
misunderstanding of the sacrament of the Eucharist if we see it as simply a 
reminder of Christ’s sacrifice for us and God’s embrace of us. “Inscribed on 
the very heart of God’s grace is the rule that we can be its recipients only if 
we do not resist being made into its agents. What happens to us must be 
done by us.” ®^^ So it is with forgiveness.
This is not to suggest, however, that we are to forgive indiscriminately. Just 
as God’s forgiveness is universal in its scope but not in its application, so too 
we would be unwise to attempt to forgive indiscriminately. For example, the 
victim who offered forgiveness to a perpetrator while that perpetrator 
continued to wield abusive power and inflict harm on the victim, be it 
physical, emotional or spiritual harm, would condone the abusive behaviour, 
undermine the self-worth of the victim and increase the victim’s vulnerability. 
The Japanese have a proverb that highlights the futility of forgiving in the 
absence of repentance. It says, “Forgiving the unrepentant is like drawing 
pictures in water.^ ®®” David Augsburger also considers that forgiveness is not
Clarissa Pinkola Estés, cited In Kroll, 2000:111
Wiesenthal, 1998: 268 {No Future Without Forgiveness is also the title of Tutu’s book 
about the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee in South Africa)
Volf, 1996:129 (emphasis added)
Cited in Augsburger, 1996: 29
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always the most appropriate response. “But,” he says, “forgiveness may not 
be the morally responsible way to respond to a particular unjust injury. It may 
be better to resent responsibly than to forgive irresponsibly, to resent in love 
of principle, of self, of other or of moral community rather than forgive in 
negation of one or all of these.” ®^"^
Forgiveness, as considered in this chapter, is different from excuse, pardon, 
justification, acceptance or understanding. If, as I have noted, an injury could 
be pardoned, justified, accepted, or excused there would be nothing to 
forgive. It is the inexcusable, the unpardonable, the unjustifiable, the 
unacceptable and the non-understandable -  we might even say the 
unforgivable -  that we forgive. Put simply, what we are doing when we 
forgive another is ridding the self of resentment against that person and not 
wishing him or her harm. Forgiveness releases perpetrator and victim from 
the chains that bind them to one another and to their individual, unresolved 
pasts in an unhelpful, destructive way and sets them free to realise their 
potential. “Forgiveness,” says Willmer, “is a change in the relations, 
circumstances and possibilities of sinners...such that while sin is truthfully 
recognised for what it is, it does not have the power to determine the future 
or final worth and being of the sinner. This change does not consist in 
overlooking the wrong or treating it as trivial or tolerable. To be forgiven is 
not to be freed of responsibility but is a way of taking responsibility with hope 
for good rather than despair.” ®^®
In his study of forgiveness in Mark’s Gospel, Peter Bolt looks at the 
connection between healing and forgiveness of sins in the Gospels (for 
example Mark 2:5). He says, “The forgiveness of sins also entailed the 
removal of its consequences upon the lives of individual Israelites. As such 
the Servant’s ministry was a foretaste and a pledge of the coming kingdom of 
God, when all would be set right in Eden-like splendour.” ®^® While this may 
be true in certain respects it would be unwise to declare it as a general truth
Augsburger, 1996: 87 
^®®Wlllmer.2001:26 
^  Bolt. 1998: 66
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for, as considered above, often when wounds are healed, scars remain as a 
permanent reminder of the wound. “The dead are still dead.” ®^^
There is, then, a considerable gulf between God’s forgiveness and 
interpersonal forgiveness but surely God’s forgiveness should serve as a 
model for us if we are to ‘forgive as we are forgiven’. As McFadyen points 
out, and we have already briefly mentioned, theology has to interact with the 
secular and has to have meaning in the marketplace if it is to be true to itself. 
“The business of Christian theology...is to understand God and reality from 
the perspective of God’s concrete presence and activity in the world, and in 
relation to our concretely lived experiences of being in the world.” ®^® John 
Patton also draws attention to the gulf between God’s forgiveness and 
interpersonal forgiveness when he writes, “If we are forgiven, then we should 
be forgiving. This may be true -  and in many ways I believe it is -  but human 
beings have significant capacity for avoiding that truth. They simply are not 
what they ought to be, nor do they do what they should in spite of impressive 
religious announcements and expectations.” ®^®
I have considered in this chapter that forgiveness -  both forgiving others and 
being forgiven -  frees us from the chains of the past that bind us to others in 
unhelpful and destructive ways and frees us for new life. Forgiveness, we 
saw, is a ‘recovery of the past in hope’ and through forgiving and being 
forgiven hitherto painful and potentially damaging memories lose their 
destructive power and we are enabled to remember well. To remember, that 
is, in such a way as to present no threat to the one who remembers. To 
remember well, I said, is not simply to remember differently (different need 
not equate with better). Nor does it mean to remember falsely. It was, as we 
saw, the experience of the Truth And Justice Commission in South Africa, 
that in order for victims and perpetrators, and indeed for the entire 
community, to move on, the truth of the past had to be told, however
Smedes, 1988:108 
^  McFadyen, 2000: 44
Patton, 1987: 72 (emphasis added)
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harrowing the telling and hearing of that truth may have been. To remember 
well is to remember truthfully and with integrity.
I also said that the freedom from the past forgiveness brings is transformed 
into hope. In chapters one and two I touched on the link between memory 
and hope, saying that the memory of what has been in the past (thinking in 
particular of God’s faithfulness but also looking at relationships with others) is 
the foundation on which future hopes and expectations are built. For God to 
erase memory at the eschaton, therefore, as Volf suggests, would leave us 
without a solid foundation. Even if only certain memories were erased the 
foundation would have gaps. With the erasure of certain memories, I have 
argued, our personal narrative, and with it our sense of self, would also have 
gaps. If, as I have suggested, forgiveness enables us to remember well - 
enables us to live comfortably with the memories that once caused suffering 
-  then, I suggest that Volfs eschatological forgetting, as well as being 
problematic, is unnecessary.
I have already indicated why it is reasonable to suppose our memories will 
not be erased in the eschaton but that they will be redeemed and healed, 
therefore will present no further threat of suffering. They will, in other words, 
be remembered well. It is then, to the eschaton that I now turn my attention.
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Chapter 4
Eschatological Remembering and Being
“Would you know my name 
If I saw you in heaven?
Would it be the same 
If I saw you in heaven?”
(Eric Clapton, Tears In Heaven)
“The word ‘Hope’ the learned say 
is derived from the shorter one ‘Hop’ 
and leads one into ‘Leap’
Plato, in his turn, says that the leaping 
of young creatures is the essence of play - 
so be it!
To hope, then, means to take a playful leap 
into the future -  to dare to spring from firm ground 
to play trustingly -  invest energy, laughter;
And one good leap encourages another -  
on then with the dance.”\Joan Erikson)
4.1 Introduction
In earlier chapters I have shown that our sense of personal identity is, at least 
in part, constituted by our experiences, both pleasant and painful, and the 
memory of these experiences. I have argued that, because of the part our 
memories play in our sense of who we are, the erasure of certain memories 
puts our sense of identity at risk. In this chapter I will argue that if in God’s 
New Creation, personal identity (and our sense of it) is retained in all its 
richness, then it is necessary to suppose that even our darkest memories will 
be retained and not, as Volf suggests, forgotten. Furthermore, I suggest that 
if in the New Creation who and what we are will be completed and perfected, 
forgotten memories will be restored. I will consider that in the New Creation 
there will be elements of both discontinuity with life now and of continuity. 
While Volf supposes that our memories fall under the rubric of discontinuity, I 
argue the opposite.
^Cited in Capps, 1995:176
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Lester expresses concern that social and behavioural scientists ignore the 
impact on personal identity of the future in general and in particular of the 
Christian hope of the New Creation but, he tells us, we are shaped as much 
by the ‘not yet' as by the ‘now’ and the past. He tells us that we need to 
combine a sense of identity rooted in past experience with self­
transcendence which is future-oriented to be happy, hopeful and balanced^. 
Brunner makes the same point when he says, “I am never without my past 
and I am never without my future. Even today I am he who I once 
was...without the knowledge of my past and the persistence of my past in 
me, I am not a man; the presence and responsibility for my past gives to my 
being its human character. Even so it is in regard to the future...for only in 
reference to the future do I experience my freedom. Just as I am my past I 
am also my future.”® In both Brunner’s ‘freedom’ and Lester’s ‘self­
transcendence’ we see a hint that the possession of future hope has the 
potential to keep us from being fettered to the past, enabling us to rise above 
our present circumstances. The influence of the future and the hope we 
have for the future on the way we live and make sense of life now will be 
considered in this chapter.
Important as the past and the influences of the past on our sense of who we 
are may be, it is the future and our hopes for the future that determine and 
shape our present most fully. “Instead of being constrained by the 
prolongation of what has been and what is we act in ways that are genuinely 
open to surprise.... We live, in other words, in a present which is shaped by 
the future rather than the past, in the power of what we might call the future- 
made-present.”"^ This is highly significant, for the events which caused 
suffering lie in the past, but the future holds the promise and hope of healed 
and redeemed memories and of liberation from pain and suffering.
 ^Lester, 1995: 24, 77 
® Brunner, 1954:45 
Bauckham & Hart, 1999:198
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Wells makes the potentially liberating suggestion that the present is not about 
working through the consequences of the past but is about striving towards 
future transformation®. Bauckham and Hart, however, caution that while we 
can influence the future, our influence is only partial. We cannot control it. 
Christian hope, as we shall consider, motivates us to action but it does not 
attempt to do what only God can do. “We can influence our future, but far 
from completely or predictably.... Christian hope...neither attempts what can 
only come from God nor neglects what is humanly possible.”®
I will proceed by next looking briefly at the wider structure of hope and at 
hopelessness before turning to look at the distinctive shape of Christian 
eschatological hope in particular. I will consider the resurrection on which the 
Christian’s hope is based and the New Creation toward which it is finally 
directed. I will also consider what difference hope in the New Creation, 
where suffering is no more and, as I suggest, memories are transformed and 
redeemed, should make in our lives, looking at it in relation to present 
suffering, and the difference possessing such hope should make to our 
behaviour now. In other words, I will look at how our beliefs concerning the 
future inform our praxis. I will seek to show that, “Even in pain and fear, 
community with the crucified Christ brings into life sparks of trust and candles 
of hope.
As Christian eschatological hope is finally directed toward the New Creation, 
where, as I have just indicated, memories are transformed and redeemed 
and suffering is no more, and because who we are and what we do now is 
shaped by these hopes, the final two sections of the chapter will consider 
different aspects of the New Creation. What goes before explains in both 
secular and Christian terms what hope is and its importance to our very 
being. It also shows how our eschatological hopes and beliefs should and 
must influence our behaviour now. The sections on New Creation (sections 
4.5 and 4.6) show the richness and greatness awaiting the Christian.
® Wells, 1998:149 
® Bauckham & Hart, 1999: 43
 ^Moltmann, 1996: 338 (emphasis added)
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Without an adequate picture of the New Creation’s richness and greatness 
we could be excused for thinking that anything temporal -  be it sin or 
suffering -  could mar it. But first, let us look at the wider patterns of human 
hopefulness.
4.2 Wider Accounts of Human Hope And Hopelessness 
4.2.1 Secular Accounts of Hope
Sociologist Henri Desroche tells us that ‘hope is a rope’ which seems, in 
many ways to be an appropriate description. By way of explanation 
Desroche considers the classic rope trick in which a rope that is, or seems 
somehow to be, anchored to nothing hangs on its own and can bear the 
weight of a person. “The officiant...throws a rope like a lasso in the air. The 
rope rises higher and higher ‘in the air’. It should fall down. But...has 
mysteriously anchored itself somewhere, and to prove it, he or his disciple 
climbs up the rope. The rope does not give way. It holds. And it carries the 
weight of the man as he climbs.”® In order to cope with the strains and 
burdens of life, Desroche tells us, people find for themselves ‘ a rope’ which, 
like the rope in the rope trick, seems to be ‘in the air’ but it holds and pulls the 
person up above the circumstances of life. Hope, he says, is that ‘rope’.
Much everyday hope, like Desroche’s rope is, to a greater or lesser degree, 
‘in the air’, but not all. Hope is essential to life and well-being. Lynch points 
out that all our actions are precipitated by hope -  hope that a chair will hold 
us, hope of finishing a sentence when we start it, hope that there is ink in the 
pen, coffee in the tin or fuel in the car’s tank. Even suicide, he says, carries 
the hope that it will solve some problem®. Ultimately, however, our everyday 
hopes, whether realistic or fanciful, are fixed on things that are unable to 
deliver us from sin’s power, from eternal suffering and from separation from 
God, and from that viewpoint is in the air no matter how firmly anchored in 
reality it may be. A wish that the world could be other than it is or a desire for 
health, wealth or happiness are valid hopes but when these hopes are
® Desroche, 1979:1 (original emphasis)
Lynch, 1965: 33f
236
unfulfilled the hoper is disappointed^®. Very often, however, the emotions are 
deeper than disappointment. The person whose hopes for health, wealth, 
happiness or change are unfulfilled may suffer disillusionment, despair and a 
sense of hopelessness. Perhaps this is why Desroche thinks in terms, not of 
fulfilled hope and unfulfilled empty hope but of peaks and troughs of hope^\
It would be unfair to equate everyday human hope with false hope but the 
fact remains that much human hope is false and even when it is positive, it 
contains a certain degree of uncertainty^^. Thiselton highlights this 
uncertainty when he refers to the “illusory optimism of modernity” ®^.
Everyday hope could also be said to be transient and fleeting as illustrated in 
this statement from a character in a novel, “Once or twice though I did allow a 
minnow of optimism to flash into my chest.... But the minnow always swam 
away again instantly."^"  ^ These are the words of Helena, a woman in her 
early 30s who is planning suicide because everything on which her hopes 
were pinned has let her down. Her best friend died of cancer. She is facially 
disfigured and partially blinded as the result of an accident. Her career as a 
singer-songwriter is over as the pop world rejected her in favour of younger 
up-and-comings. Her boyfriend is a disappointment. Helena is lonely, has 
no job prospects and is acutely aware of her facial injuries. She feels she 
has nothing left in which she can hope and, as such, no reason to live. The 
reason for Helena’s abject hopelessness was her apparent feeling of nihility 
occasioned by her losses. There is nothing wrong with any of her objects of 
hope -  friendships, relationships, career, health. To have hopes such as 
these is a normal, healthy, even necessary, part of human life. Indeed, as 
we will consider, the absence of hope from our daily lives stunts our 
development (whether personal or professional) and saps our vitality.
Colwell, 2000: ix 
Desroche, 1979: 9 
Doyle, 1999: 298 
Thiselton, 1996:129 
‘^^ Voss, 2002: 24
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Hope that is hollow, however, is no real comfort to the one who hopes and is, 
as indicated above, transient. So potentially damaging is hollow false hope 
that Leslie Farber states it is better to have no hope than false hope because 
false hope entraps and ensnares that hoper^®. Sophocles shows his lack of 
sympathy for the person who hangs on to false empty hope when he writes, 
“1 have nothing but scorn for the mortal who comforts himself with hollow 
hope.” ®^
Sophocles is not the only philosopher who writes negatively and with distain 
of hope. Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza all write hope off as illusionary, 
disruptive and dubious^^. “False hope,” writes Desroche, “entraps and 
leaves us...where we began.” ®^ Comparing false hope with real hope, 
Bauckham and Hart make a similar statement. “Real hope liberates and 
moves us forward. False hope entraps and leaves us, listless, essentially 
where we began.” ®^ I suggest, however, that false hope does not simply 
leave us where we began but leaves us worse off than before, having had to 
endure the disappointment of thwarted or unfulfilled hope. Of course there 
are many factors influencing whether or not, and how much, false hope has a 
negative effect on the hoper. These factors relate to the subject and the 
object of hope -  the importance of the object of hope, the intensity of the 
hope, the past experience of failure or disappointment and the emotional 
reserves of the person hoping, to name a few.
If hope is to be real rather than false it has to be realistic. The supporters of 
second division football team Queens Park may hope that the team will win 
their league and be promoted but to hope that they will win the Scottish cup 
is fantasy. It is not realistically possible (even although, I am told, they won it 
around 100 years ago!). As Lynch says, “Hope is indeed an arduous search 
for a future good of some kind that is realistically possible but not yet
Leslie H Farber In foreword to Lynch, 1965; 7
Cited in Desroche, 1979: 26
Doyle, 1999: 300
Desroche, 1979: 64
Bauckham & Hart, 1999: 64
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visible.”^®(like Queen’s Park winning their league). He later says that it is 
essential to learn that some things are impossible^\ To hope for the 
impossible is false hope. It is hope-less.
Bloch also distinguishes between the possible and the impossible when he 
says, “The thus determined imagination of utopian function is distinguished 
from mere fantasizing precisely by the fact that only the former has in its 
favour a Not-Yet being of an expectable kind...anticipates a Real-Possible.”^^  
Unfulfilled hope, false hope and lack of hope can all give rise to a sense of 
hopeless and despair. Brian Keenan, while incarcerated in Lebanon, was 
aware that unless he carefully reined in his hopes they would become 
fantasy, become the kind of false hope that would then give way to crushing 
despair. He writes, “We began to think that somewhere in the very near 
future our captivity would come to an end. But my ultimate conclusion was 
always. ‘Hope for everything, but expect nothing.’.... Hope should always be 
restrained by objectivity lest it leads one off on a dance into fairyland, which 
is the final delusion. If that hope is somehow shattered then the level of 
despair becomes unbearable.” ®^ It is to hopelessness that we now turn our 
attention.
4.2.ii Hopelessness
Both Leslie Farber and William Lynch "^  ^ note the irony that when we say of 
someone that she or he has hope’ it usually means that the person is in 
some kind of trouble with little, if anything, other than hope (if indeed they 
even have true hope at all). Lynch writes, “As we use language, when we 
say that a man has hope we mean that he is in serious trouble. When we 
say that someone has hope, we usually imply that he has nothing else, and 
that he is close to despair.” ®^
Lynch, 1965: 23 
Lynch, 1965: 61 
Bloch, 1986: 144 
Keenan 1992: 109
Foreword to Lynch, 1965: 8 & Lynch, 1965: 22 
Lynch, 1965: 22
239
Donald Capps identifies despair, apathy and shame as the three major 
threats to hope with despair being the most serious of the three^®. 
Etymologically, apathy means negation of feeling. Despair, on the other 
hand, is characterised by the presence of negative feelings of hopelessness. 
The disabling effect of shame was touched on in chapter 3, and the antidote 
to apathy will be considered later in this chapter. Our concern here is with 
despair.
Our word ‘despair’ comes from the Latin word, desparare, which is made up 
of two words: De meaning ‘absence’, and Spes meaning ‘of hope’.^  ^ In 
reality and experience, however, it means more. To despair is to be devoid 
of promise, hope, vitality and meaning in life^ ®. For Bringle, to despair is, in 
religious terms, to show doubt in the providence of God, thus showing that 
we are sinners^®. Others have also linked sin with despair in their thinking. 
For Kierkegaard, for example, “One who despairs...abandons God.”®® 
Despair has been described as, “The sin of freely abandoning hope which 
relies on God’s faithfulness, help and mercy in all our jeopardy and 
distress.”®^ Luther goes further, seeing despair, not just as a sin or as the 
root of sin but as sin itself®^ . And Moltmann describes it as sin against 
hope®®.
“Life without hope,” says Paul Cedar, “is like a beautiful flower cut off from 
the stem. Like a precious child who has nothing to eat. We cannot live very 
well or very long without hope. Without it we shrivel and die.”®"^ This same 
idea of hope being so essential to our very existence that without it we would 
shrivel and die is found in Moltmann, who says that as water is to fish so 
hope is to humankind®®, and in Brunner, who says hope is as essential to the
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continuity of humanity as water or oxygen to the survival of human beings. 
So essential does Brunner see hope being to human life that he writes, 
“What oxygen is to the lungs, such is hope for the meaning of life. Take 
oxygen away and death occurs through suffocation, take hope away and 
humanity is constricted through lack of breath.... As the fate of the human 
organism is dependent on the supply of oxygen, so the fate of humanity is 
dependent on its supply of hope.” ®^ Swindoll also uses similar illustrations in 
an attempt to highlight just how basic hope is to life. He draws parallels with 
water to a fish, electricity to a light bulb and air to an aeroplane^^.
Kilbourne, from her work with children of war, suggests that the worst of all 
experiences for children is the loss of hope, worse than loss of parents or 
loss of home, worse than rape or being maimed^®. This was seen during the 
Iraq war in 2003 in the much publicised story of twelve year old Baghdad 
boy, Ali Ismaeel Abbas. All was orphaned and lost his siblings when a 
missile devastated his home. He was badly burned in the blast and lost both 
his arms. It was neither the loss of home nor of parents and siblings that 
caused Ali to despair, but the loss of his arms which he felt threatened his 
future hopes of studying medicine and becoming a doctor. He is reported as 
saying. “If 1 don’t get a pair of hands 1 will commit suicide.... 1 want to become 
a doctor, but how can 1? 1 don’t have any hands.” ®^
Viktor Frankl writes in a similar vein of hopelessness in adults. While 
incarcerated in concentration camp during World War Two, Frankl witnessed 
fellow-prisoners dying because they lost hope. “The prisoner who had lost 
faith in the future -  his future -  was doomed. With his loss of belief in the 
future he also...became subject to mental and physical decay.... 1 once had 
a dramatic demonstration of the close link between the loss of faith in the 
future and this dangerous giving up.” He then narrates the story of a fellow- 
prisoner who told him of his dream in which he was told they would be 
liberated on 30^ March. The day before, on 29^' March, when there was no
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sign that liberation might be near, the man became ill, the next day which 
was his ‘liberation date’ he lost consciousness and, on 31®* March he died^°. 
Frankl witnessed similar occurrences between Christmas 1944 and New 
Year 1945 when higher than usual numbers of prisoners died. Hopes had 
apparently run high in the camp of being home for Christmas. When this did 
not happen many prisoners lost courage, became unable to resist disease, 
and died. “The sudden loss of hope and courage can have a deadly 
effect.”"*^ Frankl also observed the opposite to be the case, those who 
believed that someone, or some task, was waiting were able to survive 
against the odds. In considering this phenomenon, he cites Nietzsche who 
says, “He who has a why to live for can bear with almost any
In similar circumstances to Frankl, Primo Levi was encouraged to look 
beyond the pain and horror around him for something better through the 
goodness of his fellow-prisoner Lorenzo. This, he believes, saved his life. “I 
believe that it was really due to Lorenzo that I am alive today...for his having 
constantly reminded me by his presence, by his natural and plain manner of 
being good, that there still existed a world outside our own, something and 
someone still pure and whole...something difficult to define, a remote 
possibility of good, but for which it was worth surviving.... Thanks to Lorenzo, 
I managed not to forget that 1 myself was a man.”"*^  Levi later urgently 
exhorted his fellow-patients in the camp hospital to look beyond their dire 
circumstances in order to survive. “1 was thinking life outside was beautiful 
and would be beautiful again, and that it would really be a pity to let 
ourselves be overcome now. 1 woke up the patients who were dozing and 
when 1 was sure they were all listening 1 told them...that they must all begin 
to think of returning home now.” "^*
Winston Smith who, in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four proposes a 
toast ‘To the past’ records a more detailed version of his toast in his secret
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diary. The fuller version of his toast reveals that he too is seeking to survive 
an oppressive regime by remembering that things have not always been as 
they are now and hoping that in the future they might be better once more. 
“To the future of the past, to a time when thought is free, when men are 
different from one another and do not live alone -  to a time when truth exists 
and what is done cannot be undone.""*®
Moltmann also notes that when they lack hope people often give up and die 
even when there is no obvious physical cause. Alternatively, he notes, they 
may turn to crime"*®. Experience tells us that as well as turning to crime, 
those who live in the darkness of hopelessness and despair may also 
become involved in substance abuse, abusive relationships or self-harming 
more readily than those with hope"* .^ For Moltmann, “Both death from 
expired hope and criminality from hopelessness, show that man, as a 
temporal creature, is directed towards the future and that this is a direction 
which alone corresponds to hope.”"*®
It seems likely that this was Dostoevsky’s observation when, writing of 
prisoners, he says, “Totally without hope one cannot live. Without some goal 
and some effort to reach it, no man can live. When he has lost all hope and 
object in life, man often becomes a monster in his misery.”"*® Moltmann 
states, “To live without hope is to cease to live. Hell is hopelessness,” and 
he observes that Dante’s inscription above the entrance to hell is no 
accident, “Leave behind (or abandon) all hope you who enter here.”®®
Not only can hopelessness have such negative, and in some cases 
devastating, effects on a person’s life as we have just considered -  death, 
crime, substance abuse, abusive relationships, self-harming -  it can also 
result in the relinquishing of the positive, creative elements in a person’s life. 
People stop making the effort in all aspects of their day-to-day lives. “Without
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hope prisoners of war languish and die. Without it students get discouraged 
and drop out of school. Without it athletic teams fall into a slump and 
continue to lose...fledgling writers, longing to be published, run out of 
determination... addicts return to their habit...marriage partners decide to 
divorce...writers, artists, entertainers, even preachers, lose their creativity.”®* 
Of course, loss is not always the result of hopelessness and despair, it may 
also be the cause. The suffering of bereavement, broken relationships, loss 
of employment and so on can cause despair because, as Lynch notes, 
preoccupation with a specific event or situation causes imagination to cease 
and, because as we will discuss later, hope is a function of imagination, this 
brings an end to hope® .^ As Bauckham and Hart put it, “Hopelessness... 
imprisons us within the tyranny of an absolute present.”®®
It is easy to sympathise with those who thus imprisoned by such tyranny wish 
for the memory of their suffering to be erased, and with Volfs supposition 
that ‘paradise’ will entail such erasure. Erasure of painful memories, 
however, I suggest, as well as posing significant difficulties for our thinking 
about the identity of the sufferer in such an imagined future, is not the best 
the Christian Gospel has to offer. Christian hope is not for an eternal 
present, for more of the same, but for eternal newness and transformation. It 
is for a future where memories, together with those whose memories they 
are, have been healed and transformed, as argued below.
While hope enables the hoper to view the future with a sense of positive 
anticipation, hopelessness or despair is accompanied by negative thoughts 
about the future. Lester states, “Hope is positively oriented towards the 
future while hopelessness views the future with suspicion, anxiety or apathy” 
or, he also adds, dread®"*. Dread, he explains, tells the despairing person 
that the future will bring a repetition of a painful or negative past. Suspicion 
says the future is untrustworthy, anxiety that it is dangerous, and apathy that 
it is meaningless. Hope, like dread, fear, anxiety and suspicion, has
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imagination and dreams dreams of what will be. While the images hope 
imagines are positive, constructive and liberating, those born of dread, fear, 
suspicion and anxiety are negative, destructive and imprisoning. Likewise, 
despair and hopelessness cannot dream apart from the negative and 
perhaps frightening dreams born of dread, suspicion and anxiety. In despair, 
then, the future is a cul-de-sac, it is a road to nowhere®®.
Lester looks at the difference, between despair and depression. Despair, he 
explains, is an emotion, and depression an illness. In depression there may 
be no sense of future, while in despair the future is threatening or 
meaningless and makes no sense. He also considers the overlap between 
the two, observing that despair may push a person to depression and severe 
depression may leave the person with a sense of despair®®. A despairing 
person may also suffer from depression; a depressed person may also be in 
despair.
Hope, says Lynch, wishes and imagines. Hopelessness does neither. In 
hopelessness, therefore, Lynch tells us that we need to take time to examine 
what is preventing us from being able to wish and hope for a goaF. That 
means if we are to escape from the hopelessness of the immediate then we 
have to move beyond it. To deliberately move beyond the limitations of the 
present in this way is precisely to hope®®. Let us look, then at what hope, 
and in particular, what Christian hope is invested in because as Mary Bringle 
states, “Despair does not deserve the final word.”®®.
4.3 Christian Eschatoioqical Hope
“In an age where despair, discouragement and disappointment are the 
predominant emotional dynamics, it becomes increasingly necessary for the
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Christian faith to unmask, refurbish and communicate its belief in hope.”®® In 
the earlier part of this chapter we considered false hope and everyday hope. 
We turn here to look at Christian eschatological hope.
We considered the rope trick and said that, like the rope, the hope on which 
people depend to hold them up is often anchored ‘in the air’. This is not true 
of Christian eschatological hope, which is anchored, not in the air but in the 
promises of the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the God who raised 
Jesus Christ from the dead. Of course, many people would argue that 
Christian hope is ‘anchored in the air’ and remain unconvinced -  and 
unconvincable -  that it could be otherwise. The apostle Paul, who clearly 
encountered similar sceptics, states, “For the message of the cross is 
foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved, it is 
the power of God.”®* Similarly those who are sceptical about the promises of 
God will continue to see Christian hope as folly but to those who believe 
God’s promises are a source of hope and strength.
There are many factors that make Christian hope unique and distinctive, 
separating it from all other hope. We can see this in the way ‘hope’ is 
defined within Christian theology. McKim, for example, defines Christian 
hope as, “The Christian anticipation of the future as the fulfilment of God’s 
purposes based on the resurrection of Jesus Christ as known by the work of 
the Holy Spirit in the church.”®^ Macquarrie, on the other hand, expresses 
the opinion that Christian hope is related to wider patterns of human hoping 
and thus that it is not entirely set apart. He says that, “Christian hope is total 
hope, and it touches on all aspects of human life, both individual and 
social...a truly total hope is so large and many-sided that we impoverish and 
misrepresent it if we lay all the stress on its supernatural and other-worldly 
aspects. It is in the first instance a hope arising in the history of this world 
and having relevance for our life in this world.”®® Having said that, however, 
he then indicates that he does not totally reject the views of other theologians
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who would seek to set Christian hope apart as something unique. While 
continuing to see it closer to everyday hope than other Christian theologians 
who want to emphasise the transcendence of Christian eschatological hope 
might be comfortable with, he concedes that to deny the specialness of 
Christian hope is to impoverish and disempower it. “Let me at once concede 
that...there are new dimensions in Christian hope that cannot be derived 
from consideration of the general human experience of hope...we shall be in 
danger of presenting a defective and impoverished interpretation of Christian 
hope, one in which it has been deprived of its distinctive power.”®"*
As well as the basis and object of Christian hope being distinct, as we will 
consider below, there is also an element of assurance, which separates the 
tenor of Christian hope from secular, everyday hope. When used of day-to- 
day hope, or secular hope, the word ‘hope’ means wish or desire. It refers to 
expectation that is rooted in a degree of probability. For example, it seems 
probable that the traveller who hopes for sunshine in Spain in June is likely to 
see his hopes fulfilled. It is not assured, however, and occasionally travellers 
report two weeks of rain, cloud and thunder in their southern coastal resort. 
When used of Christian hope, on the other hand, ‘to hope' means to have 
knowledge and confidence®®. For Hart, the quality distinguishing Christian 
hope from other hope is assurance®®. Williams points out that when hope is 
used theologically it is not hope as contrasted with knowledge but as 
contrasted with sight. “Hope can be a kind of assurance, not a kind of 
uncertainty as one usually gets in ordinary language.”®^ Dunn considers the 
difference between biblical, or Christian, hope that is confident and trustful 
hope, having its confidence in God, and the popular usage of the word hope. 
In saying, for example, 1 hope it does not rain’, Dunn points out, 1 am not 
confident that it will not®®. As Christians we can have confidence and 
assurance that in the New Creation our existence will not be marked by the 
suffering so characteristic of our lives in this world. This is not just fanciful
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wishful thinking like the hope that it will not rain. It is based on God’s promise 
that he will ‘make all things new’ (Revelation 21:5). It is because Christian 
hope goes beyond day-to-day hope, because we have confidence beyond 
our desires, Lester suggests that we do not -  or perhaps we might say we 
need not -  fall into despair when day-to-day hope is thwarted®®.
The Christian’s hope in the New Creation is rooted in the faithfulness of God 
as revealed in the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, and in 
particular in the resurrection of the crucified Christ. In chapter 1 we saw from 
John Macmurray’s work that the infant is able to hope for his mother’s return 
when she is absent, based on his experience of the mother's past actions -  
her pattern of withdrawing from and returning to the infant. In a similar way, 
the ground of our hope is the past actions of God: we believe he will act in 
certain ways because he has acted in certain ways in the past. As Moltmann 
points out, in our speaking of God we remember and draw attention to 
historical persons and events in the language used. ‘The God of Abraham, 
Isaac and Jacob’. ‘The God who raised Jesus from the dead’. When these 
sayings, or sayings like them, are used in Christian scripture they are used to 
remind the reader or listener of the power and faithfulness of God; they are 
used to demonstrate that it is not futile to hope in God. The former is found 
in several places in both the Old and New Testaments (Genesis 50:24, 
Exodus 4:5, Matthew 22:32) and the latter in several of the New Testament 
epistles (Galatians 1:1, Romans 4:24, 1 Peter 1:21). “The hermeneutical 
starting point of Christian theology is therefore the concrete history witnessed 
to in both the Old and New Testaments,” Moltmann tells us^ ®. The same 
point is made by Craig Gay who states that the basis of Christian hope is the 
tridactic formula, “Christ has come, Christ has risen, Christ will come 
a g a i n . B e c a u s e  we can be certain of God’s faithfulness to his promises 
we ought to say, writes Thiselton, “Christ will come; live accordingly.” not, 
“Live as if Christ will come.”^^  Christ’s coming and what that will mean for our
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fulfilment and redemption is, in other words, something in which we can hope 
with knowledge, confidence and assurance.
Moltmann goes on to say, “As the anticipation of the future of God, Christ 
becomes the ground of hope.... Eschatological hope can be ‘hope against 
hope’ only if it is born out of the redeeming and freeing efficacy of the cross 
of Christ.” ®^ Elsewhere Moltmann states that Christian eschatology must 
have a christological base. By this, he explains, we do not mean that it has 
to be grounded on prophecies made by Christ but that it is based on Christ’s 
coming, death and resurrection. “The fact that Christ came into this world 
and appeared in Jesus, the crucified and risen one, is the eschatological 
presupposition of the whole Christian f a i t h . T h e  same point is made by 
Bauckham when he says, “Just as all eschatological statements must be 
grounded in Christology, so all christological statements are statements of 
hope and promise with eschatological implications.” ®^ Barth leaves no room 
for doubt when he draws attention to the necessary overlap between our 
belief in Christ and our eschatological belief. He writes, “Christianity that is 
not entirely and altogether eschatological has entirely and altogether nothing
to do with Christ.” ®^
1
Moltmann points to the cross of Christ as the heart of Christian hope. “The 
cross of Christ is the sign of God’s hope on earth for all those who live here 
in the shadow of the cross. Theology of hope is at its hard core theology of 
the cross. .. In the crucified Christ we view the future of God. Everything 
else is dreams, fantasies and mere wish images. Hope born out of the cross 
of Christ distinguishes Christian faith from superstition as well as from 
disbelief.... There is no true theology of hope which is not first of all a 
theology of the c r o s s .A l v e s ,  however, points out that it is important that 
our hope is grounded on Christ’s cross and resurrection and not in the cross 
alone for without the resurrection the cross is, in fact, a sign of hopelessness.
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“The cross stands, thus, for death, for the end, for a situation with no 
possibilities whatsoever, for the end of the future and the end of hope.” ®^ 
The resurrection transforms the meaning of the crucifixion and gives us hope 
that our crosses -  our painful and shameful memories -  will likewise also be 
transformed.
Milne suggests that at the heart of Christian hope is not the resurrection but 
the cross. He writes, “In itself the resurrection as an event does no more 
than demonstrate the possibility of life after death in some form. The true 
epicentre of that glorious hope...is the cross, where sin was overcome and 
with it the divine judgement which is the reason for our d y i n g . M i l n e  sees 
the resurrection as the proclamation of Christ's victory but surely the 
resurrection is more than a proclamation of victory but is victory over death. 
Without resurrection there would have been no victory to proclaim and no 
basis for our hope. Without the resurrection the cross with its shame and 
suffering would have the last word, its horror would not be transformed and 
we could have no basis for saying our painful memories will be transformed 
and redeemed.
Although, as indicated above, Moltmann points to the centrality of the cross, 
elsewhere he too points to the resurrection of the crucified one as the final 
ground for our hope. “Freedom is born from his suffering, life from his death, 
the exaltation of the man of God from the self-humiliation of God. 
Resurrection faith is faith in the crucified one, and hope which overcomes the 
world, which can hope against hope, is born in the community of the crucified 
one.”®®
Moltmann does not look to the cross without the resurrection, nor to the 
resurrection without the cross, but to both together. He makes the point that 
to separate the crucified and resurrected Christ or for the one to be 
subsumed or negated by the other, gives rise to various heresies such as
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Docetism, Ebionism and Modalism. Christ’s identity is in the cross and 
resurrection. “In that case,” he writes, “the contradictions between the cross 
and resurrection are an inherent part of his identity.... It is formally a question 
of a dialectical identity which exists only through the contradiction and a 
dialectic which exists in the identity.”®* We may never be able to understand 
the paradox and contradiction of the dialectic of cross and resurrection but 
we need to learn to live with the tension for, as Moltmann indicates, the 
identity of Christ lies in both. So too, our post-resurrection identities will be in 
ourselves as we are now, together with our resurrected selves. We will be 
new, enriched, completed selves but we will be our selves. In Chapter 1, we 
considered the distinction in Ricoeur between numerical or quantitative 
identity and qualitative identity® .^ We might say, then, that our post­
resurrection identities will be quantitatively identical with our present 
identities, but that they will be radically qualitatively different. To hope that 
our most painful memories will be healed and redeemed is indeed to hope for 
radical qualitative newness and difference.
Since earliest times Christians have seen Christ’s resurrection as the 
guarantee that they too would live, seen it as the promise of what was to 
come®®. Indeed, that hope of resurrected life was promised by Christ when, 
before the crucifixion, he spoke to his disciples of what was to come 
(“Because 1 live, you also will live.” John 14:19), and was the substance of 
the first Christian sermon ever preached, when Peter addressed the crowd 
on the day of Pentecost (Acts 2: 14ff). The raising of a divine Son, however, 
gives no hope of resurrection to human people -  our hope of resurrection, 
therefore, is in Christ’s humanity, crucified and raised from the mortality 
which otherwise holds it captive®"*.
Not only does the resurrection promise new life, it also promises to transform 
and give new meaning to the past, as it does the cross. Christ’s resurrection 
has been described as a pledge of our resurrection and of the New Creation.
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“That upon which Christian hope rests is precisely the action of this same 
God in summoning life forth out of death in the resurrection of Jesus, an 
anticipation and a pledge of the ultimate resurrection and renewal of all 
things.”®®
Writing at a time of religious wars and political revolutions, post-reformation 
theologians reminded Christians that their hope was founded in the 
resurrection of Christ, not in political stability or even religious freedom. 
“They summoned their readers -  theologians and, through them, 
congregations -  back from escapism...and confronted them with God acting 
to judge and redeem.... They did not simply react to the challenges of their 
time but gave an account for the hope which according to 1 Peter (3:15) is ‘in 
you', because Christians are ‘born anew into a living hope by the resurrection 
of Jesus Christ from the dead (1 Peter 1:3)”®®
From his supernatural conception and throughout his earthly life, the Christ 
event broke the mould of the ordinary and familiar but the most disturbing 
event of all is surely the resurrection®^. The New Testament uses death as 
the end of a person’s life (and indeed, the end of the life of animals and of 
vegetation) as an illustration of universal atrophy. “Thus the resurrection of 
Jesus from death is, more than any other single event or combination of 
events in his life, a breach of the ‘orderliness’ of this world which scandalises 
and turns our views of the whole of reality upside down.”®® We find an echo 
of this in Brunner who writes, “The resurrection is an incomprehensible event 
because it represents the inbreak of God into our temporal sphere...it is the 
cancellation of space-time existence.”®®
“1 am the resurrection and the life,” says Jesus (John 11:25). Moltmann 
notes that because Jesus is the resurrection, he is our future, and to wait for
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our future is to wait for his future®®. “The Christian hope for the future comes 
of observing a specific, unique event -  that of the resurrection and appearing 
of Jesus Christ. Therefore to recognise the resurrection of Christ means to 
recognise in this event the future of God for the world which man finds in this 
God and his acts.... Thus Christianity is to be understood as the community 
of those who on the ground of the resurrection wait for the Kingdom of God 
and whose life is determined by this expectation.”®*
4.4 Other Worldly Hope And This-Worldiv Experience
Some have expressed an objection that such otherworldly hope detracts from 
our ability to enjoy now. Moltmann spells out the essence of their concern. 
“Is it not always in the present alone that man is truly existent, real, 
contemporary with himself, acquiescent and certain? Memory binds him to 
the past that no longer is. Hope casts him upon the future that is not yet. He 
remembers living, but does not live.... He hopes to live, but he does not live. 
He expects to be happy one day and this expectation causes him to pass 
over the happiness of the present. He is never, in memory and hope, wholly 
himself and wholly in his present.... They rob him of his present.”®^ In this 
section, 1 hope to show that concerns of this nature are ill-founded.
As Walter Capps observes, those leading the hope movement were 
oppressed (Moltmann and Metz were prisoners of war, and Bonhoeffer who 
was also influential was executed in prison.). He then suggests that to 
embrace hope we must also embrace suffering. He supports his suggestion 
by noting that there is ultimately no basis for hope apart from the 
crucifixion®®.
From his historical perspective of Christian eschatology, Doyle indicates that 
throughout church history times of suffering, persecution and oppression 
have heightened the interest in eschatology. This is because when the
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present world has nothing to offer but trouble and estrangement, the future 
world is the only source of hope. This is still true in the twenty first century of 
Christians living in areas where the Christian church is persecuted, as 
Schlossberg indicates in his book on the suffering church. Speaking of 
eschatological hope he writes, “It is an antidote to both self-pity and the curse 
of apparent meaningless.”®"*
The opposite is also true -  when life in the here and now is comfortable and 
unthreatening Christians generally have less of an interest in eschatology. 
For example, because the church’s sense of security following the 
conversion of Constantine and because the world in which they lived was 
less threatening than in the past, Greek theologians of the mid fourth century, 
Daly tells us, paid little attention to eschatology®®. It is not only true of the 
actions and writings of the church, but is also found in the writings of the 
Bible itself. Bauckham and Hart show that many of the eschatological 
writings in the Bible were written at times of persecution and exile. This is 
because as 1 have just indicated, “Eschatology is above all a source of hope 
and liberation.... The more other-worldly the focus, it seems, the more this- 
worldly its relevance. The more we are able to trust God finally to transform 
the situation, the more we are lifted out of the mire of despair.”®®
Writing of his experience as a prisoner of war, Moltmann says hope in the 
midst of suffering is not born of a yearning to go home but an acceptance of 
the situation. By so accepting the situation and hoping in the midst of it, he 
says, we discover the real person within both self and others. "For more than 
three years 1 was in Prisoner-of-War camp and 1 understood something of the 
language of prisoners, the loneliness and the dreams of the unhappy.... If 1 
remember rightly, it was during that time among the prisoners that the motifs 
of the ‘theology of hope' came into being. These impulses did not grow out 
of the yearning to be released and finally to ‘go home'. Rather hope came to
Schlossberg, 1991:126 
Daly, 1991: 76
Bauckham & Hart, 1999:193
254
life as the prisoner accepted his imprisonment, affirmed the barbed wire, and 
in this situation discovered the real human being in himself and others.”®^
Moltmann was inspired during this time by the writing of Dostoevsky. He 
cites him, “That is why every convict in Russia, whatever prison he may be 
in, grows restless in the spring with the first kindly rays of sunshine. Though 
by no means everyone plans to run away...yet they dream at least of how 
they might escape and comfort their hearts with the very desire, with the very 
imagination of its being possible.”®® Hope makes the suffering of the prison -  
whatever our own personal ‘prison’ may be -  more tolerable. Still thinking of 
hope born of suffering, Moltmann writes, “The practice of hope becomes 
concretely stronger in suffering.”®® This is reminiscent of the apostle Paul, 
himself no stranger to suffering, who writes, “And we rejoice in the hope of 
the glory of God. But we also rejoice in our sufferings, because we know that 
suffering produces perseverance; perseverance, character; and character, 
hope. And hope does not disappoint us.” (Romans 5:2ff)
Elsewhere Moltmann declares that a hopeful future not born out of suffering 
is ideological and that, “Genuine future always focuses on negativity of the 
present.”*®® This being so then, we can see that rather than detracting from 
the enjoyment of the present, as some feel may be the case, hope can inject 
enjoyment into a joyless present. Far from robbing us of the happiness of the 
present, Moltmann declares hope to be the happiness of the present 
because, as we have just considered, hope enables us to cope with the 
difficulties and suffering -  the ‘prison’ or, as Moltmann suggests, the cross -  
of life today. “Expectation makes life good,” writes Moltmann, “for in its 
expectation man can accept his whole present and find joy not only in its joy 
but also in its sorrow, happiness not only in its happiness but also in its 
pain.”*®* Hope, Moltmann tells us, should give people the courage to look 
forward and keep going. It should keep them from being depressed and
Moltmann, 1975; 85
Fydor Dostoevsky, cited in Moltmann, 1975: 89 
Moltmann. 1975:189 
Moltmann, 1973b: 91 
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despondent over their circumstances*®^. So, if those for whom suffering is so 
horrendous that its memory continues to cause suffering were given the hope 
that one day their memories will be healed and redeemed, that hope could 
have the power to change their suffering now.
Lynch makes the claim that if we have hope we suffer less because we are 
less preoccupied with the present moment*®®. Perhaps it is more true to say, 
however, that if we have hope we suffer differently. It enables us to know joy 
even in the midst of suffering because it removes the bitterness, or what 
Moltmann would call ‘the suffering of suffering’*®"*. This surely echoes 
something of what Paul must have had in mind when he wrote, "Where, O 
death, is your victory? Where, O death, is your sting?"*®® And, in telling the 
Thessalonian church that they, as Christians, would not grieve as those 
without hope, he did not tell them that they would not grieve at all*®®. 
Another way of saying this would be to say that to hold a vision of future hope 
takes the power out of suffering*®^. Suffering is relieved, it is transformed, by 
possessing eschatological hope, not because the suffering itself is removed 
but because the bitterness, or suffering, and the power are removed from it.
Christian hope is not a denial of suffering, but should be an impassioned 
acknowledgement of suffering. We hope for a future free from suffering, and 
that hope has the potential to disempower the suffering of the present for the 
one who hopes. James exhorts his readers to be joyful in suffering as they 
look beyond the suffering of the present to a future of completeness and 
wholeness*®®. This does not mean, however, that we do not take seriously or 
that we deny the suffering of the present. “In the meantime,” write Bauckham 
and Hart, “the Christian story is open to all the cries and protests of those 
who suffer. It does not silence them or explain them away, but allows them 
to keep the theodicy question agonizingly alive and open.... Christian
“^ Moltmann, 1975:15 
Lynch, 1965: 37 
Moltmann. 1972: 46 
*°^1 Corinthians 15:55 
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eschatology sustains our outrage against innocent and meaningless 
suffering.”*®®
As well as future hope having the potential to remove the bitterness, or the 
‘suffering’ from present suffering as we have considered, and providing the 
impetus to work to change the present, as we have touched on and will 
consider below, it also has the capacity to disturb the present and to make us 
dissatisfied with the status quo. This is something to which Moltmann draws 
attention at different times. “Faith, wherever it develops into hope, causes 
not rest but unrest, not patience but impatience, it does not calm the unquiet 
heart but is itself the unquiet heart in man. Those who hope in Christ can no 
longer put up with reality as it is, but also begin to suffer under it, to contradict 
it...for the good of the promised future stabs inexorably into the flesh of every 
unfulfilled present.”**®
Moltmann highlights the paradox that without hope difficult situations (our 
‘prisons’) become intolerable but the hope that makes the difficult situations 
tolerable itself causes unrest and discontent. “Hope...relentlessly makes 
them aware of their intolerable situation. It turns their suffering into pain and 
their imprisonment into agony.... The prisoner must hope in order to survive, 
but the hope is what really makes him a prisoner, letting him know that he is 
imprisoned.”*** He again draws on Dostoevsky who says that imprisonment 
and hope intensify one another**^. This, of course, is not just true of literal 
prisoners but of all humankind whatever circumstances imprison or oppress 
them. The realisation that ‘the grass is greener on the other side of the 
fence’, turns our less green grass into straw and dust in our perception.
Considering Moltmann’s contention that hope makes us aware of the pain of 
the present, Rubem Alves briefly explores the opposite perspective, that 
hope is born of negation -  we hope because we are seeking a remedy to the 
negativity of the present. Having thus considered the debate, however, he
Bauckham & Hart, 1999:41
Moltmann, 1965:21 (see also Moltmann. 1975: 89)
Moltmann, 1975: 90
Moltmann, 1975: 89
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concurs with Moltmann saying, “The promised future gives birth to the crisis 
of the present. It is not the crisis of the present that gives birth to hope for a 
promising future.”**®
Although it is hope that enables us to endure otherwise intolerable suffering, 
without it we would be more content with the present and less fearful. Our 
hope that circumstances will one day be better than they are draws attention 
to the ugliness and privation of the present and arouses fear that perhaps our 
hope will not come to fruition, that life will eternally be as it is now. This 
ought not to be so of Christian hope for, as Barth states, “The Christian 
expectation of the future cannot be uncertain, nor unsettled, nor sceptical, but 
only assured and patient and cheerful expectation.”**"* It is because we are 
more content with the present and less fearful without hope that hope is listed 
among the evils found in Pandora’s Box**®.
Similarly Carl Braaten, in considering that the significance of the future is in 
its relation to the present, notes that the future lacks the bad news that we 
have in the here and now, “So that the symbols of eternal life and the 
hereafter, or of the beyond, the transcendent, or of heaven and the Kingdom 
of God, speak eloquent messages concerning the lack in the present and 
generate the energies of hope and courage to work for change.... The 
prospect of nothing has no power to generate hope.”**® In the same way, 
“There can be no hope when there is no longer any future.”**^
Not only does the hope that things will not always be as they are now have 
the capacity to relieve present suffering in this way, it also motivates action to 
change the present. There is, as I have already mentioned, a school of 
thought which says hope of heaven diverts energy from seeking to right 
wrongs and injustices now; and says that if people are ‘too heavenly minded
Alves, 1975: 59f 
Cited in Doyle, 1999: 266 
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they are no earthly use’, but it should, in fact have the opposite effect**®. As 
Lewis states, "Hope...means...a continual looking forward to the eternal 
world. It does not mean that we are to leave the present world as it is. if you 
read history you will find that Christians who did most for the present world 
were just whose who thought most of the next...It is since Christians have 
largely ceased to think of the other world that they have become so 
ineffective in this. Aim at Heaven and you will get earth 'thrown in'; aim at 
earth and you will get neither." **® Hebblethwaite expands on this saying, 
“The sense of man’s eternal destiny has inspired Christians of all ages to 
charitable action, missionary outreach and the creation of community life 
under God.... Christian eschatology, far from diverting attention to the 
hereafter, has again and again inspired on the one hand a theology of social 
power and on the other an ethic of work for the realisation of God’s Kingdom 
in the historical future.”*^ ® That is why, throughout history, Christians have 
been involved in social action and in mission.
Stephen Williams, on the other hand, argues that because, for the non- 
universalist, there is not hope for all humankind, hope is not a basis for 
mission and social action. But, he continues, we are called to love all even if 
we cannot hope for all. “The scope of love is universal, the scope of hope is 
not.”*^ * Social action, he argues, should be seen as a labour of love rather 
than a labour of hope.*^^
In response to Williams, Volf insist that, “Christian hope gives not only 
inspiration but also direction to cultural and ecological involvement.”*^ ® He 
says that to base social action on love as Williams suggests we have first to 
separate love and hope but, Volf argues, this is something we cannot do for, 
“The practice of love is an integral part of the content of this-worldly
Hebblethwaite, 1984: 1202 
Lewis, 1952:116 
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Williams, 1990: 25 
Williams, 1990: 27 
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eschatological hope; and the object of eschatological hope is the fulfilment of
the dreams of love.”*^ "*
When the suffering of the present is relieved through the possession of hope 
for the future this is passive change. It is change that happens to us as a 
result of our future focus. In the remainder of this section I will look at 
change that happens by us - active change. 1 will argue that, because of our 
future vision, we endeavour to bring about change.
Grenz indicates that ultimately it is unimportant whether one holds pre-, post- 
or a-millenialist beliefs, the believer's hope is in the reign of God’s Kingdom, 
chronology of events is not important*^®. He states, “Believers who 
understand God’s future intentions for the world both hear and proclaim 
God’s Word in the present, for they realise that God’s future has implications 
for life now.... Eschatology is the attempt to employ the truth concerning the 
future consummation in order to issue God’s call (the Word of God) in the 
present."*^® A similar point is made by Althaus who states, “The most 
important theological justification of chiliasm is that it points to the necessary 
this-worldly character of Christian hope.”*^ ^
Alves cautions that we must be careful not to see God only as the God of the 
future and not of the past and present. “The pure futuricity of God, ” he 
warns, “is a new form of Docetism in which God loses the present dimension 
and therefore becomes ahistorical. The messianic possibilities of history for 
both the Old and the New Testaments depend on the fact that God has a 
present. For the Old Testament one can hope because ‘the Lord your God is 
in the midst of you’ (Deut 8: 21); for the New, hope is derived from the 
historicity, the incarnation of God.... God was thus experienced as present 
determined toward the future.”*^ ®
Volf, 1990; 31
Grenz, 1992: 197f
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To live life in God’s time and according to God’s will, Alves tells us, “is thus to 
participate in a present that determines itself for the creation of a new 
tomorrow.... Therefore, every present must be experienced as time-toward- 
the-new-tomorrow. The new tomorrow is thus the sole determination of the 
present.”*^ ® It would, perhaps, be better were this to read. The new 
tomorrow ought to be the sole determination of the present’ for a great many 
people’s presents are determined and overshadowed by their pasts. The 
one who is tormented by the memory of past suffering lives in a present 
determined by the past. How much more easily the present would be borne 
if lived in the light of the hope of memory redeemed and transformed. Such 
hope, as we have seen, can remove the ‘suffering from suffering’ and thus 
disempower it.
We will consider below that the future for which we wait is promised and 
anticipated, that it is what Moltmann calls ‘word-present’. If that is the case 
then we are compelled to act, inaction is not an option, because, as 
Moltmann tells us, “No-one will see the land of fulfilment if he does not start 
seeking it.”*®® The future is not remote and distant because the God of the 
future is not remote and distant but is also the God of the here and now. The 
future, therefore, influences the present. “By future (‘advent’) we do not 
mean a faraway condition, but a power that already qualifies the present of 
new possibilities. As the power of the future, God reaches into the present.... 
As the coming God, he is not only the future but also the future of the 
past.”*®* This belief should give hope to the one who suffers that she or he 
need not wait until the future for the work of healing and transformation of her 
or his painful memory to begin. Healing and transformation -  remembering 
well -  can begin in the here and now.
In helping us to understand how the future influences the present rather than 
the other way round, Moltmann reminds us that it is Christmas that influences 
advent, not advent that influences Christmas. Advent is what it is because of
Alves, 1975: 93f 
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what Christmas will be. He says, “We do not extrapolate the future out of the 
present, rather we anticipate the future out of the present. We do not have 
the feeling that we must plan the future, but rather we must be responsible 
for the present in face of the future.”*®^
Peters emphasises that present activity against injustice is motivated by 
future hope by noting that instead of being past oriented, our thinking should 
be future oriented. This, he suggests should be reflected in our language so, 
instead of using terms like ‘re-volution’, ‘re-turn’ and ‘re-newaP, we should be 
using words like ‘pro-phecy’, ‘pro-claiming’, pro-pogating and ‘pro-fessing’.*®® 
He cites Moltmann, saying, “In provolution, the human dream turned forward 
combined with the new possibility of the future and begins consciously to 
direct the course of human history as well as the evolution of nature.”*®"*
As we have seen, the possession of eschatological hope has been accused 
of robbing us of power for life now but if the eternal future overlaps with 
present time as discussed above, then surely, far from robbing us of power it 
sharpens our focus and imbues us with power. After quoting from 
Augustine’s description of the New Creation as a time-place where “We shall 
rest and we shall see; we shall see and we shall love; we shall love and we 
shall praise. Behold what shall be in the end and shall not end.” Mascall 
points out that ‘hope of glory’ is not escapist because it sharpens our 
behaviour now*®®. If, for example, it is our hope that God will not destroy this 
world but will recreate it then we are more likely to care for it. Similarly, if we 
have hope in eternal life, we are more likely to respect the integrity of life at 
all stages now and to share that hope with others.
As Moltmann states, “The eschatological hope shows that which is possible 
and transformable in the world to be meaningful, and the practical mission 
embraces that which is now within the bounds of possibility in the world.... It 
seeks that which is really objectively possible in this world, in order to grasp
Moltmann, 1975: 52 (original emphasis) 
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and realise it in the direction of the promised future of righteousness, the life 
and the kingdom of God.”*®® And again, “We can only trust that even the end 
of the world hides a new beginning if we trust the God who calls into being 
the things that are not and out of death creates new life.... Life out of this 
hope then means already acting here and today in accordance with that 
world of justice and righteousness and peace, contrary to appearances, and 
contrary to all historical chances of success.... It means an unconditional Yes 
to life in the face of the inescapable death of all the living.”*®^
Earlier in this chapter I mentioned that apathy is one of the enemies of hope 
identified by Capps. If the Christian’s hope is as it should be then it 
motivates action in the here and now, counteracting any tendency toward 
apathy. Perhaps, then, it is not apathy that precipitates hopelessness so 
much as the absence of hope precipitating apathy for, as Brunner says, “The 
picture of the future sets in motion the power of the present.”*®®
So sure is Haymes of the relationship between the eschatological hope and 
activity to change the present that he asks if a belief in the life to come 
makes no difference to the practice of Christian living whether it can be said 
to be a religious belief at all. Citing Wittgenstein, he writes, “Suppose 
someone made this guidance for this life: believing in the last 
judgement...how are we to know whether to say he believes this will happen 
or not...it will show, not by reasoning, or by appeal to ordinary grounds for 
belief, but rather by regulating for all in this life.”*®®
In response to Moltmann’s assertion that action is the only possible response 
to suffering, Volf draws on Ricoeur who states that action is insufficient to 
stem the flow of questions arising from suffering -  questions such as, ‘Why 
me?’ or ‘Why?’*"*®. He does not say, however, why he feels it is necessary to 
stem the flow of questions. Questioning in the face of suffering is surely
Moltmann, 1965: 288f 
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healthy -  Christ asked ‘Why?’ in the midst of his suffering on the cross. 
Rather than such questioning being a problem, 1 suggest that it is an 
indication that the sufferer believes that things need not be as they are, that 
there is a preferable alternative. A lack of questions may be an indication of 
fatalistic determinism. Fifteen-year-old Paul*"**, whose older brothers and 
father were all serving prison sentences, demonstrated this kind of fatalistic 
determinism when asked by a Children’s Panel member*"*^ where he saw 
himself in ten years time. Paul looked at the Panel member with something 
like contempt -  perhaps because of her apparent lack of insight, perhaps her 
apparent lack of understanding, or perhaps because he felt she was 
patronising him asking what looked to him such an obvious question, and 
replied, “In the Bar-L.”*"*®. Paul, it would seem, had not questioned why all 
the men in his family spent more time in prison than out of it, nor how it could 
be any different for him. Instead, he saw his future as determined and 
outwith his control. Surely then it is not only acceptable but also desirable to 
ask questions in the face of suffering.
Volf’s apparent discomfort with questioning illustrates that point made by 
Allender to which 1 referred in chapter 2, that if we deny or trivialise painful 
memories we do not have to ask the prickly question of why God does not 
intervene*"*"*.
Volf also points out that action only addresses today’s suffering. It does 
nothing about the suffering of the past. He makes a valid point when he 
says, “Only non-remembering can end the lament over suffering which no 
thought can think away and no action undo.”*"*® Although, as Volf indicates, 
action cannot undo past suffering, it can do something to reduce suffering in 
the present and the future and that surely includes the suffering caused by 
the memory of past suffering. Christian hope must not and cannot be content 
with the situation as it is for many people, but must work to improve it.
The anecdote that follows is drawn from the writer’s experience as a social worker. 
Name has been changed.
The Children’s Panel System is the Scottish Juvenile Justice System.
‘The Bar-L’ is the local nickname in Glasgow for HM Prison Barlinnie.
Allender, 1995; 14 
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Radical social activity Is a valid and appropriate response to our hopes and 
beliefs. As Doyle stresses, it is not a way of coming to know God and his 
promises but is an expression of our knowing him*"*®. We find reference to 
this close relationship between work and hope in Paul where he writes, “We 
continually remember before our God and Father your work produced by 
faith, your labour prompted by love, and your endurance inspired by hope in 
our Lord Jesus Christ.” (1 Thessalonlans 1:3) Likewise in James we read, 
“What good is it, my brothers, if a man claims to have faith but has no deeds? 
Can such faith save him...so faith without deeds is dead.” (James 2:14,26) 
Whether this is prescriptive or descriptive is unimportant. What is important 
is that we find in Scripture an expectation that our eschatological hope will 
stimulate action in the present. Surely we acknowledge something of this 
every time we pray the words of Christ, “Thy kingdom come, thy will be done 
on earth as it is in heaven.” (Matthew 6:10)
Referring to the Christian’s eschatological hope, Moltmann writes, 
“Christianity stands with all its powers in the dawn of the future and must 
therefore bring the ‘power of the future world’ into the troubled spots of the 
present, personally, socially and politically.”*"*^  Elsewhere he indicates the 
coexistence of heaven and earth he makes the point that Christian hope is 
not only for the end-times but is also for now. This, he says, is why it has the 
power to transform the present. “From first to last, and not merely in the 
epilogue, Christianity is eschatology, is hope, forward looking and forward 
moving, and therefore also revolutionising and transforming the present.”*"*® 
This happens because, as considered above, hope unsettles us. Hope is the 
source of our restlessness with the present. If hope does not stir us to work 
for change there is something missing and our hope is unbalanced and 
meaningless. Hope, Moltmann tells us, must influence the way we think and 
thought must influence hope. “As long as hope does not embrace and
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transform the thought and action of men, it remains topsy-turvy and 
Ineffective.” '^^ ®
Moltmann later illustrates this point, “If the promise of the Kingdom of God 
shows a universal eschatological future horizon spanning all things -  ‘that 
God may be all in air -  then it is impossible for the man of hope to adopt an 
attitude of religious and cultic resignation from the world. On the contrary he 
is compelled to accept the world in all its meekness...(to be) homeless with 
the homeless... restless with the restless...rightless with the rightless.... 
Thus Christianity is to be understood as the community of those who on the 
ground of the resurrection of Christ wait for the Kingdom of God and whose 
life is determined by this expectation.”^^®
It is not possible to retain our vision of the New Creation and simultaneously 
to feel despair. It is not possible to hope for a New Creation where the 
injustice, suffering and oppression that prevails in the here and now will be 
no more and to be content with the injustice, suffering and oppression of the 
present. And it is not possible to believe the words of Peter, “Praise be to 
the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ! In his great mercy he has given 
us new birth into a living hope through the resurrection of Jesus Christ from 
the dead, and into an inheritance that can never perish, spoil or fade - kept in 
heaven for and do nothing about those who know nothing of that
‘great mercy’ nor of the inheritance ‘kept in heaven’ for them. Thus, what we 
believe about God’s promised future, in concrete and practical ways, shapes 
our present and, as we saw in Mascall, sharpens our present behaviour.
As we considered above, just as we do not understand Christmas in the light 
of advent but advent in the light of Christmas, so we do not understand the 
future in the light of the present but understand the present in the light of the 
future. “What is can only be fully understood in the light of what will be,” write 
Bauckham and Hart, “and thus God’s future reaches back into the present
Moltmann, 1965: 33 
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and bathes it in a quite distinctive light, transfiguring it and generating 
alternative ways of being in it. To be a Christian, a person of faith, we might 
suggest, is precisely to live as a person for whom God’s future shapes the 
present.” ®^^
Hope, Lynch tells us, imagines continually^Bauckham  and Hart describe 
hope as, “...the capacity to imagine otherwise, to transcend the boundaries 
of the present in a quest for something more, something better than the 
present affords.”^ T h i s  capacity to be able to continually imagine otherwise 
and to transcend what is, is vital if we are to be able to make a difference to 
the present. As Hart points out, it is not only imagination that is necessary 
but imagination that is inspired by the Holy Spirit. “The power of the future to 
transform the present lies chiefly in the capacity of God’s Spirit to capture our 
imagination and to open up for us a new vision of God’s promise.... 
Imagination is thus a vital category in eschatology as in theology more 
generally.” ®^®
Mere change, however, is not enough. Macquarrie makes the important 
observation that hope does not only seek change but seeks improvement.^®® 
If the future we anticipated was to be different from the present but no better 
than it, or indeed if our anticipation was of a future where circumstances were 
worse than they are now, we would not anticipate it with hope. Rather, we 
should have a feeling of hopelessness or even despair or dread as we looked 
forward. Such a future would have no power to change the present for the 
better and may even have a negative impact. It would offer nothing to the 
one who suffers, apart from further suffering. It would not offer a future 
where painful memories were transformed and redeemed. As Grenz states, 
however, “People of faith are rightfully people of hope.” ®^^ This is because 
the future we anticipate under God, because the future God has promised us, 
is not change without improvement, not change for the worse but is a future
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that is, in every way, better than we can even begin to anticipate. "Hope 
stands alongside the knowledge that matters could be quite different'* writes
Sauter'®®.
Ultimately, just as Christian hope is rooted in the resurrection of Jesus Christ 
from the dead, its focus, the unprecedented change for which it waits, is his 
return in glory as touched on briefly at the beginning of this chapter. 
“Therefore hope can have no other object than he who...will come again in 
glory. .. Faith in Jesus Christ without the expectation of the Parousia is a 
voucher that is never redeemed, a promise that is not seriously meant. A 
Christian faith without expectation of the Parousia is like a ladder which leads 
nowhere but ends in a void.” ®^® Bauckham also points to the Parousia as the 
central event of eschatology. The Jesus who is now unseen will appear. 
The Jesus who is hidden will be revealed. The Jesus who is absent will 
come physically. He will come to bring believers to resurrection and to 
eliminate evil from the world^®°. And also elsewhere, “The 'coming'...of 
Jesus Christ at the end of history...is a focal image in the New Testament. 
Ail else depends on it.... The coming of Jesus Christ is the focus of Christian 
hope because his future is our future and that of all creation.” ®^^ Just as the 
incarnation and resurrection of Christ both heralded something new and 
previously unimaginable, so too will his Parousia. The Parousia of Jesus 
Christ will usher in the New Era when all will be made new, when suffering 
will be no more, when brokenness will be restored, wounds healed and all 
will be made whole. That is the hope we have to offer broken and suffering 
people.
4.5 New Creation. Transcendence and Discontinuity
In the resurrection of Christ, which, as we have been considering, prefigures 
the general resurrection, we can see both continuity and discontinuity with his
Sauter, 1996:147 (original emphasis) 
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earthly life, which in turn provides a pattern for wider eschatological 
expectation. As indicated in the dissertation’s introduction, the Christian 
claim of discontinuity and the equally strong claim of continuity are not 
contradictory, the one does not cancel out the other. Bauckham and Hart 
state, “The discontinuity between creation here and now and creation 
renewed and transformed does not cancel the continuity between them.” ®^^
As in the resurrected body of Christ we see continuity with his temporal body, 
so too in the resurrection accounts there are clear indications of discontinuity. 
His physical presence was in some way different from before -  transfigured -  
for we see in the Gospels accounts of him meeting friends who, at least in 
the first instance, failed to recognise him^ ®®. The discontinuity of the New 
Creation is not a result of brokenness or fragmentariness but is because of 
newness and completeness. The New Creation is more than the first.
It could be argued that because reference to Christ’s resurrection body 
relates to the period prior to the ascension it has no relevance to the 
eschaton. There is no indication in Scripture, however, that Christ does not 
have a post-ascension body and strong indication that he does, and that he 
is recognisable. For example. Acts 1:11 states, "This Jesus, who has been 
taken from you into heaven, will come in the same way as you saw him to 
into heaven.” It has been suggested, though, that Christ’s body underwent 
further transformation when he ascended^®' .^ Just as his resurrection body 
was his own body but in some way transfigured, so too, however further he 
has changed, it seems likely that he continues to be recognisable as himself.
Bauckham and Hart suggest that, “Humanity’s loss of Eden was more the 
loss of a possibility than of an actuality...not so much from what they had as 
what they might have had.” ®^® In the New Creation possibility is not only 
restored, it is actualised. In the Garden of Eden Adam and Eve were able 
not to sin but also able to sin. In the New Creation, on the other hand, we,
Bauckham & Hart, 1999:138 
John 20:15f, Luke 24:13-35 
Erickson, 1987: 777 
Bauckham & Hart, 1999: 149
269
who because of the Fall are unable not to sin, will be unable to sin^ ®®. 
Potential will be actualised at last!
In Isaiah 43 we read these words, “Forget the former things. Do not dweil on 
the past. See, I am doing a new thing." (18f). Of course, as Bauckham and 
Hart point out, we will not forget the former things but they will pale into 
insignificance because the ‘new thing’ God will do will so surpass the old^ ®^ . 
This thought is found in Paul. “I consider that our present sufferings are not 
worth comparing with the glory that will be revealed in us.’’^ ®® Although we 
will not forget, neither will we have any cause to remember. We might better 
understand the difference by considering the following illustration. A person 
may, as the result of a freak accident, sustain an injury that heals completely, 
leaving no disability or distressing disfigurement, no indication apart from a 
small scar that it ever happened. Once the injury is healed, regardless of 
how debilitating it was at the time and regardless of the remaining scar, it 
need not affect their daily living. Even although the fact of having had the 
injury is not forgotten, there is no need for it to be remembered in the day-to- 
day activities of life. It is, therefore, non-remembered or remembered well. 
If, on the other hand, the same person sustains an injury that leaves a 
weakness, which means they are susceptible to further injury then it has to 
be remembered in every-day living in order that potentially harmful actions 
can be avoided. Non-remembering and remembering well have been 
considered more fully in previous chapters. We can only remember well 
when we are willing to forget. We saw that a non-remembered incident is one 
that is not forgotten but can be left alone because it has been dealt with, 
there is no further reason to call it to mind. Non-remembering is volitional 
and distinct from memory which has been lost and forgotten. As we saw in 
chapter 2, to confront the destructive memories from which we need to be 
liberated with the consciousness and light of reason of the counter-memories 
of the life, death and resurrection of Christ is to ‘remember well’.
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To offer a suffering person a future characterised by the erasure of the 
memory of their suffering triviaiises both the suffering and the sufferer. To 
offer them a glory such as Paul refers to above, a glory so great that present 
suffering cannot be compared with it, on the other hand, is to offer them a 
future where their pain will be replaced with joy and wonder. Not only that. It 
also affirms them as people of value and worth to God and acknowledges the 
enormity of their painful experience. It promises them the ‘new’ which 
surpasses the old without denying or erasing it.
The book of Revelation, says Hoch, is shot through with newness -  New 
Name (2:17; 3:12), New Jerusalem (3:12; 21:2), New Song (5:9; 13:3), New 
Heaven (21:1), New Earth (21:2), Everything New (21:5). “The climax of 
newness is God making all things new! This is a most exciting thought for 
Christians.” ®^®
‘New’ can mean another of the same -  quantitatively new -  a new pen, a 
new car, new shoes, or it can refer to radical, qualitative newness, a newness 
that transcends the old. The new we are considering here is, “the 
qualitatively new, the unprecedented, the new which utterly surpasses the 
old ”170 Yh# newness is not something that comes about as the natural 
course of events but is a newness brought about by a creative act of God. 
As Bauckham and Hart state, “All things will not become new through some 
natural process or human programme of works, but must be made new by 
God who made them in the beginning.... Thus this is a genuine newness 
which wholly transcends the state of the here and now with its tragic limits, 
yet which does not collapse into a novelty in which creation is no longer the 
object of God’s concern and action, having effectively been abandoned and 
replaced by another.”^^ ^
Moltmann also lists some of the ‘new things’ of God found in scripture. From 
the Old Testament he lists New Exodus, New Conquest, New Zion, New
Hoch, 1996:187
Bauckham & Hart, 1999: 77
Bauckham & Hart, 1999: 69 (Original emphasis)
271
Heaven, New Earth, and from the New Testament, New Life, New Covenant, 
New Commandment. He says, “The new Is there when the impossible 
becomes possible, when the unthinkable is thought, when the undiscovered 
is found and discovered.... Hope is always born from the emergence of the 
new. Hope sees the advent of the future and reaches out for it in open 
expectation.”^^ ^
Citing Moltmann, Doyle states that the eschaton and parousia are from 
beyond our experienced^®. It is certainly an irrefutable fact that future events, 
whether temporal or eternal, are beyond our experience for they have not yet 
taken place. They are not, however, entirely beyond our expectation. We 
make definite, confident statements about future events -  “You will be...”, “I 
will do...”, “We will go...”. We make plans, and such is our anticipation that 
what we plan will come to pass that people commonly use present tense 
when referring to future events. ‘I am in Edinburgh next week’ and ‘I am 
working tomorrow’ are typical examples of commonly heard expressions.
As Christians we have certain expectations about the New Creation because, 
although beyond our experience, it is not entirely beyond our belief or our 
expectation for it is not beyond the promises of God or God’s revelation of 
himself in scripture and in Christ. For example, although Christ’s resurrection 
is unique because Christ is unique and there are radical differences between 
his resurrection and the general Resurrection (for example, we do not 
anticipate being physically present in this world in our resurrection bodies, 
interacting with people we knew as he did) but we can anticipate that we will 
be recognisable to others and to ourselves in the Resurrection by looking at 
what scripture shows us about the Risen Jesus. We find further indication of 
post-mortem recognition in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus^ '^ .^
1 Corinthians 15 considers the question of the Christian’s resurrection body.
“How are the dead raised? With what kind of body do they come?” (35).
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Paul states that these are foolish questions and indicates some kind of 
discontinuity between our earthly bodies and our resurrection bodies (36f). 
The New Creation is of a different order from present creation; therefore our 
resurrection bodies will be in some way different from bodies as we 
understand them in this life. Paul illustrates the difference by drawing 
analogies with the difference between the bodies of humans, animals, birds 
and fish (39) (all very different from one another but all clearly recognised as 
‘bodies’), and the difference between sun, moon and stars (41).
Christ’s resurrection body was of a different order from the body he had 
before -  he walked through closed doors (John 20; 19,26) -  but it was a body 
bearing the scars of the crucifixion, a body that ate food with friends. This, I 
suggest, gives us sufficient reason to suppose that although in some way 
different from the bodies we have now we shall have bodies in some way 
bearing the scars of our present lives and will be recognisably ourselves.
Although, as I am arguing, the eschatological future is not entirely beyond 
what we know, we do not and cannot know in full for, as McDannell and Lang 
point out, even our biblical descriptions of the New Creation are limited 
because the writers’ understanding and experience is limited. As with all talk 
about God and the things of God, eternity transcends human language. The 
biblical writers were seeking to understand and express the infinite within the 
confines of finite human thought and language. This clearly imposes serious 
limitations on their understanding and ours. As Bauckham and Hart point 
out, much of the biblical language concerning End Times is figurative -  it 
uses image rather than description. “Eschatological language is irreducibly 
imaginative.”^^® Even the apostle John with his heavenly vision in Revelation 
was limited by human language, relying on image to convey what he saw. 
McDannell and Lang illustrate how limited experience and understanding 
affects the biblical writers’ ability to convey the New Creation by asking how 
an Eskimo might describe pineapple, even if he were to see and taste one -  
‘sweet juicy blubber’^^ ®? No matter how much he has read about pineapples
Bauckham & Hart, 1999:140,146 
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and even if he saw one, it would still remain outwith his sphere of 
understanding. We find a further illustration of our limited ability to 
understand the things of God, and in particular the Parousia, in Lewis. 
Writing of the symbolic and analogical language used he says, “All details are 
derived from our present experience: therefore all details are wholly and 
equally symbolical. But suppose a dog were trying to form a conception of 
human life. Aii the details in its pictures would be derived from canine 
experience. Therefore all that the dog imagined could, at best, be only 
analogically true of human life.”^^ ^
Although much of it is beyond our understanding because it is beyond our 
experience; beyond our cognition because it is beyond our recognition, the 
New Creation is not left entirely to guesswork and prediction. Douglas 
Adams states, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, “Trying to predict the future is a 
mug’s game. But...we need to have some sort of idea what the future’s 
actually going to be like because we are all going to have to live there, 
probably next week.”^^® It is not, however, the job of Christian theologians to 
attempt to predict the future but to create for the man and woman in the pew 
and in the street, a picture of the future based on God’s rich and imaginative 
revelation in the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments.
It is perhaps this tension between what is revealed in scripture and what we 
cannot yet know that has caused Luther to be misquoted as saying that 
Christian hope knows that it hopes but does not know for what it hopes. 
What he actually says, according to Sauter, is that “Hope inserts the hoping 
one into that which is hoped for but that which is hoped for is not 
apparent.”^^ ® He continues, quoting from Luther, that hope ieads the one 
who hopes, “Into the unknown and hidden, into inner darkness so that it does 
not know what it hopes and yet does know what it does not hope for.” ®^®
Lewis, 1975:123 
Adams, 2003:102 
Sauter, 1996:175 
Cited in Sauter, 1996:175
274
Christian hope is not merely speculative. “Eschatology...does not involve 
mere speculation about what might lie hidden in the mists beyond the end of 
history, but rather it essays the articulation of what is the coherent ground of 
present hope.” ®^^ Unlike the kind of stab-in-the-dark predicting the future to 
which Adams refers, Moltmann asserts, as I do, that Christian hope is not 
speculation and theorising. The starting point has to be what we know and, 
for Moltmann, its transformation. “Pure theorising about the future is, 
obviously, pure theorising and thus abstract...the future of God and the future 
of the humanity of man begin in the transforming thought of the present.... A 
future which does not begin in the transformation of the present is for me no 
genuine future.” ®^^ For Moltmann, then, it seems that the starting point of the 
eschatological future is the transformation of these memories that are 
formative of our very selves but which in their untransformed state continue 
to cause suffering; and that transformation begins in the present.
Unlike Moltmann Stephen Travis expresses the belief that Christian hope is 
speculative because it concerns faith about the future and faith is not 
proof^ ®®. To say, however, that hope is speculative because it is based on 
the promises of God and experience of God could sound to the sceptic that 
Christian hope is a shot in the dark, or that God cannot be trusted to be 
faithful to himself and his Word. It would, perhaps be better to say that 
Christian hope is suppositional or allusive, or even expectant. Christian 
hope, Doyle tells us, does not blow hot and cold. It is, “the expectation that 
God will keep all his promises.*'^^^
That this is Travis’ intention is clear when he later states, “Eschatological 
hope is in any case not capable of empirical demonstration but is essentially 
a matter of extrapolation from present experience of God and trustful 
acceptance of what the God thus experienced is believed to have revealed 
through Christ and his apostles.” ®^® It is here we see the overlap between
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faith and hope. So dependent are they on one another that we might 
describe them as two sides of the same coin. “Christian faith is closely 
bound up with the Christian hope of the future that faith and hope can be 
regarded as two aspects of the same thing.... Faith is the foundation of hope, 
hope is that which gives content to faith. Both faith and hope are rooted in 
the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.” ®^®
Moltmann also highlights the interdependence of faith and hope, saying, 
“Without faith, hope cannot laugh and without hope, faith cannot live.” ®^^ He 
calls hope faith’s ‘inseparable companion’, saying that without it faith would 
die, and continues, “Faith is the foundation on which hope rests, hope 
nourishes and sustains faith...faith in Christ gives hope its assurance...hope 
gives faith in Christ breadth.... Thus in the Christian life faith has priority but 
hope has the primacy^®®. In this description of faith giving hope its 
assurance, we hear an echo of the writer to the Hebrews who says, “Now 
faith is being sure of what we hope for and certain of what we do not see.” ®^®
Elsewhere Moltmann shows the interconnection, not only between faith and 
hope but between faith, hope and love in the following poem from Charles 
Péguy.
“Hope leads everything 
For faith only sees what is 
But hope sees what will be 
Charity only loves what is 
But hope loves what will be -  
In time and for all eternity.” ®^®
This faith-hope-love motif is found in several places in Paul’s letters^®\ 
perhaps the best known being, “And now these three remain: faith, hope and 
love. But the greatest of these is love.” ®^^ Doyle picks up on the popular New
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Testament motif of faith, hope and love, noting that the focus of faith is the 
past, the focus of love is the present and the focus of hope is the future. He 
states, however, that the three have a parallel rather than chronological 
relationship. There is, he says, no Christian faith that does not hope and 
iove, no Christian love that does not have faith and hope and no Christian 
hope that does not love and have faith^ ®®. If, as he says, the focus of faith is 
the past, the focus of love is the present and the focus of hope is the future, 
he is saying here that there is no Christian faith that does not also look to the 
present and the future, there is no Christian love that does not also look to 
the past and the future and there is no Christian hope that does not also look 
to the present and the past. John Colwell makes a similar observation when 
he says that Christian faith is loving and hopeful, Christian love is hopeful 
and faithful and Christian hope is faithful and loving. He says that faith, hope 
and love need one another and that if one is missing the others are unable to 
function properly^ ®^ .^
While, as we have been saying, we cannot know everything about the New 
Creation and cannot prove anything, we can imagine and hope based on 
what we are told in scripture with the knowledge that what will be will be even 
greater. As Scroggie states, “We cannot possibly exaggerate the 
blessedness of heaven, nor can our imagination stretch to the full measure of 
its wonder.” ®^® A similar observation is made by Bauckham and Hart who 
write, “Corresponding to the principle of theology that God is always greater 
than we can imagine is the principle of eschatology that the fulfilment God 
gives will always be better than we can imagine.” ®^® Perhaps because it is 
difficult to conceive of how we can retain hitherto painful memories without 
them causing pain that the best we can imagine is forgetting. Surely to 
remember without pain is greater, even if we have difficulty imagining it. And, 
as we are saying, the fulfilment God gives is always better than the best we 
can imagine.
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As touched on briefly above, hope, like memory, is an activity of the 
imagination. It is the capacity to imagine otherwise and better. Just as in 
memory the imagination enables us to make present people, places and 
events that are no longer physically present, so it enables us to reach 
forward toward the future. In both cases making present that which is not 
present. The present, for Sartre, would barely exist without the presence of 
what is not present -  the presence of past and future. “What is present is -  
in contrast to the future which is not yet and the past which is no longer. But 
on the other hand, a rigorous analysis which would attempt to rid the present 
of all which is not it -  i.e., of the past and of the immediate future -  would find 
that nothing remained but an infinitesimal ins ta n t . "^T h e  present, then, 
consists of the memory of what has been and the hope of what will be, as 
well as the infinitesimal instant that is now. As indicated in chapter 2, 
imagination is concerned with what is real, not with fantasy as in 
imaginary^®®. It is important to be clear about that when discussing hope or 
we will, like Aristotle, see hope as no more than, "The dream of a wakened 
man.” ®^® The Christian theologian must be able to argue that hope is 
something other than a mere daydream. “Our memories of what has been 
are always incomplete and often carefully edited to produce a particular 
‘spin’, rose tinted or othenvise. Our imagining of the proximate future, 
meanwhile can only ever be the imagining of one among many futures and, 
as such, may turn out to be reasonably accurate or quite false. But in both 
cases...the imagined product is anything but a matter of illusion or wanton 
daydreaming.” ®^®
If our imagined future, our hope for the future, is no more than illusion or 
wanton daydream then religion is no more than “the sigh of the oppressed 
creature, the opium of the people” that Marx proclaims it to be^®\ While our 
hopes for the future, then, must not be vague and dream-like, nor must they 
be too specific. As Oppenheimer discusses, to invent too specific an image
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of heaven is somewhat akin to making God in our own image. It is 
“prescribing to God the kind of heaven he must provide for us if we are to 
welcome the prospect of it."^ ®^  So, whiie we can imagine that somehow our 
memories will be healed and redeemed because we believe it is necessary 
that they are retained and not eternally lost, we cannot begin to imagine how 
this might happen. What we can know with certainty about the New 
Creation is, to use the words of Julian of Norwich, “All shall be well and all 
manner of things shall be well.” ®^®
Although we cannot know everything and, for the reason highlighted by 
Oppenheimer, ought not invent too specific an image of what the New 
Creation will be like, we would be without a focus and thus without hope if we 
did not have some image beyond our temporal existence for, as Paul says, “If 
only for this life we have hope in Christ, we are to be pitied more than all 
men.” (1 Corinthians 15:19) There are many clues throughout the Old and 
New Testaments about what we might hope for in the New Creation. There 
is, however, much debate among biblical scholars about the intention of 
references to the New Jerusalem, whether New Jerusalem refers to the 
people of God or an actual place. Some see it as a literal city, others do not, 
and others see it as both place and people^ ®'^ . For Bauckham it is people, 
place, and the presence of God -  it is a place where the people of God will 
live in his immediate presence. He notes, “The description of the New 
Jerusalem is a remarkable weaving together of many strands of Old 
Testament tradition into a coherent and richly evocative image of a place in 
which people live in the immediate presence of God.” ®^®
Samuel Wells also writes of heaven, saying that it is not just a place where 
God reigns but is God’s dynamic, transforming reign together with the 
obedience, service and joy of his subjects. He cites Hauwerwas saying, “The 
ultimate eschatological hope then is not that individuals will go to heaven but
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that heaven will fully and finally pervade e a r t h . I f  the Incarnation is 
‘Immanuel -  God with us', perhaps we might say that the Eschaton is, 
‘Immanuel -  us with God’, for just as in the incarnation he became as we are, 
so in the eschaton we will in a sense become as he is. That is not to suggest 
that we will become divine but refers to the Christian belief that we will live 
eternally and will be without sin. Our humanness will be complete and 
perfected as Christ’s humanity was complete and perfect.
Having considered some of the debate between whether the city of God -  the 
New Jerusalem -  is the place where God’s people are or the community of 
God’s people as such, Carl Hoch concludes, “Whether the New Jerusalem is 
just people or people and place, it certainly exceeds all previous places, 
including the Garden of Eden. The glory and joy characteristic of it will make 
all current arguments over its identity or location seem silly and misplaced. 
And all focus will be centred on the One who made it possible - the triune 
God.” ®^^ According to Polkinghorne, whatever else we can and cannot say 
with certainty about the New Creation, we can say that it is not boring! He 
states, “The life of heaven will involve the endless, dynamic exploration of the 
inexhaustible riches of the divine nature."^ ®® If all focus is, as Hoch suggests, 
on the triune God and our occupation will be, as Polkinghorne indicates, the 
endless exploration of that God’s inexhaustible riches then we cannot 
simultaneously be occupied by or focussed on the memories that cause 
suffering. The memories will not have been erased but will not be the focus 
of our attention, but they will not simply be non-remembered, for there is 
always something of a risk that which is non-remembered will become 
present to the mind and cause distress. They will be 'remembered well’.
The newness of the New Creation is, as we have said, a qualitative newness. 
As Polkinghorne says, the New Creation is not a second attempt by God to 
get it right. The old creation, he explains, was created ex nihilo, the new will 
be ex vetere. Creation ex vetere points to God as both creator and redeemer
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and is, for Polkinghorne, the only possible answer to the theodicy question^®®. 
The old is not wiped out but is redeemed and transformed. From this we can 
deduce that the suffering of the old will not be negated but will be redeemed 
and transformed. God, we are told, will wipe away all tears (Isaiah 25:8; 
Revelation 7:17. 21:4). This presents to those who suffer a beautiful image 
of a compassionate God dealing tenderly with them, taking their pain 
seriously and healing their suffering.
Bauckham and Hart also make this point, noting that God’s creative act in the 
New Creation will be just as much an act of origination as is found in the 
Genesis creation narratives, an act of origination which will preserve the 
identity of the old creation while at the same time transforming it. Creation 
will be fulfilled and transformed as God recreates it to make it what he has 
always planned it to be^ ^®. “The new creation is...a fresh creative act of the 
transcendent God.... The new creation is the wholly new -  eschatologically 
new -  future which God will give his creation, and which could not be 
expected other than as the transcendent act of the transcendent God. It is 
an act in which creation will be both fulfilled and transformed.”^^  ^ If our 
memories are part of what we are, as considered in the chapters on memory 
and personal identity, and if we are part of creation, then our memories are 
part of the creation that wili be transformed by God. They will, by a creative 
act of God, be fulfilled and transformed. That which is lost will be restored 
and that which is painful will be healed and redeemed. We will, in the New 
Creation, be enabled to remember all things well. Thinking of this Scroggie 
writes, “We cannot believe that those who are in the Lord’s presence can 
ever again be sad, but this does not mean that in order to be joyful they must 
be ignorant...the joy of our loved ones is not diminished because they have 
much knowledge and keen memory, for now they see everything from 
Christ’s standpoint.”^^ ^
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In a study of the New Creation, NT Wright makes the point that heaven is not 
just a future state but is also God’s dimension of present reality. So, when 
Peter in 1 Peter 1:4 says our inheritance is ‘kept in heaven for you’ he is 
saying it exists now, that it is present reality. Wright illustrates the point by 
saying that when a parent tells his child that her Christmas gift is safe in the 
cupboard for you’, he does not mean that when Christmas comes the child 
has to go and live in the cupboard to enjoy the gift. What the parent means 
is that when the time comes the gift -  which is a present reality, albeit a 
present reality with future potential -  will be brought out for the child to enjoy. 
The gift will enrich the child’s life and world, not the world inside the 
cupboard^^®. So, when the book of Revelation describes heaven, it is 
describing God’s dimension of present reality -  albeit, like the gift in the 
cupboard, present reality with, for us, future potential - it Is not giving a 
preview of what heaven will be like when one day we find ourselves there. 
“Heaven is God’s dimension of present reality... Heaven and earth are not 
distant spheres, separated by a great geographical or ontological distance, 
but actually overlap and interlock, supremely in Jesus but thereafter in the 
E u c h a r is tM c D a n n e l l  and Lang indicate this overlap between time and 
eternity when they refer to eternal life starting in time. “Life after death 
continued what had already begun in this life: existence under the impact and 
guidance of the divine.”^^ ®
Wright states that the physical layout of the Eastern Orthodox Church 
demonstrates an understanding of this co-existence between heaven and 
earth. A screen, he tells us, divides the building. One side of the screen, the 
east side, where the liturgy takes place, symbolises heaven. The west side, 
where the people are, symbolises earth^^®. The screen, in which there are 
three doors, may be made of wood, metal or marble and is called the 
Ikonostasis: so called because it is heavily decorated with icons and images 
of the saints, designed to give the worshipper a sense of saints and 
congregation worshipping together, a sense of participating in the
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communion of the saints. The central door is called the Royal or Holy door. 
As English woman, CE Padwick observed on a visit to an Orthodox church, 
“The Royal Doors at once reveal and conceal the actions of that other 
w o r l d . T h e  Royal door is sometimes closed, preventing access to the 
sanctuary and concealing what is behind -  the altar, Throne and priests -  
and at other times is open, revealing what is behind and allowing the 
worshipper access to the sanctuary and to participation in the Eucharist^^®. 
“The Orthodox temples represent heaven and earth joined in glorious union. 
The sanctuary divided from the rest by the screen is heaven with its holiness 
and mystery; it is always there yet inaccessible to sinful man so long as he 
remains In isolation; therefore the doors leading into the sanctuary are closed 
except during the service. They are open wide however when Christians are 
gathered together in obedience to Christ’s commandment and in faith, love 
and fear, begin to celebrate the Eucharist. Then heaven illuminates the earth 
and God meets his creation.”^^ ®
The co-existence of the eternal with the temporal is also found in Haymes 
who notes that when John’s Gospel speaks of eternal life sometimes it has a 
present focus, for example, "Whoever hears my words and believes him who 
sent me has eternal life...he has crossed over from death to life."(John 5:24) 
Other times it has a future focus, as in, “For my Father’s will is that everyone 
who looks to the Son and believes in him shall have eternal life, and I will 
raise him up at the last day."(John 6:40) Haymes writes. “Resurrection, 
eternal life, judgement, all these eschatological themes have a strong present 
sense in John’s Gospel. To live in God’s salvation is not for the future but is 
a present gift and calling.’’^ ®^
If, as we are saying, there is a present focus to our eternal life, then there is 
surely an eternal focus to our present life. As Wells indicates, to see the 
eschaton as a replacement of all that now is undermines all that now is.
Cited in Zernov, 1961: 244 
Zernov, 1961: 238 
Zernov, 1961:261 
^  Haymes, 2000:185
283
including creation and salvation^^\ Bauckham and Hart also point out that 
for all its newness, the New Creation is not a replacement of but a fulfilment 
of this world^^^. There is a hint of the same in Hoch where he says, “The 
eschatological hope of the Bible is not for deliverance from the earth but from 
sin and the redemption of creatures includes the redemption of creation. 
Citing from John Newport, Hoch later indicates that for the resurrection body 
to be non-physical would mean victory for the devil. He explains -  it would 
mean that God was compelled to destroy the physical because, as in Greek 
thought, matter was intrinsically evil, “But matter is not evil: it is part of God's 
good creation.”^^ '^  “God saw all that he had made and it was very 
McDannell and Lang note that, “Because of their appreciation of the world, 
the reformers tempered their theocentric heaven with an eternal life that 
recognised the importance of the earth. Luther, for example, hoped for a 
heaven where humans will be strong, animals will co-exist, flowers and grass 
are lush, rivers flow with jewels and trees hang with silver leaves and golden 
fruit^ ®^.
This said, however, temporal life is but the palest shadow of eternity. As TF 
Torrance says, “To look at the earthly church and say. There is the mirror of 
the New Jerusalem' is to confuse the seed with the plant which grows from it, 
and that only after the seed has died.”^^  ^ Scripture shows a certain continuity 
between the end time and the Christian’s present experience, as indicated 
above, but there is also “a quantum leap of unfathomable proportions” from 
the one to the other^ ^®. Alongside the continuity between the world now and 
the new Creation, there are, as we are considering, fundamental differences 
between the two. For example, the fact that A = B now does not mean that it 
will in the New Creation, or because Y in the new Creation, it does not 
necessarily follow that Y now. Continuity and discontinuity co-exist.
Wells, 1998: 169 
Bauckham & Hart, 1999:137 
^  Hoch, 1995: 193
Cited In Hoch, 1995:199 
Genesis 1:31
McDannell & Lang, 1988:152f 
Cited in Doyle, 1999:159 
^  Doyle, 1999:159
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Hebblethwaite states that, “For Luther, eschatological hope is determined 
and controlled by a man’s experience, in faith, of God’s justifying grace in 
Jesus Christ.... The eschatological moment is the moment when a man 
accepts what God has done for him in Christ.’’^ ®^ This sounds like realised 
eschatology but Hebblethwaite goes on to refer to the tension of the ‘now and 
not yet’ nature of the kingdom of God.
For Moltmann, if the future is promised it is ‘word-present’ ®^®. In other words, 
that which is promised by God for the future is as certain as present reality. 
For Moltmann, the eschatological future is the coming of God but, he 
explains, this should not be confused with Process theology’s becoming of 
God. There is, he says, a difference between the ‘becoming of God’ of 
Process theology and the coming of God’ of eschatology^®^ “God’s being is 
in his COMING, not in his BECOMING. ”^ ®^ If something is ‘becoming’ it is not 
yet and it will cease to be. It is in the process of coming into being. 
‘Coming’, on the other hand, speaks of the drawing near of that which is.
The belief that our hope for the future will one day be our present experience, 
that things will not always be as they are now but will be redeemed and 
transformed has the power to lift us from despair and motivate us to action. 
“By projecting a future, hope alters the present.” ®^® Far from the memory of 
having suffered marring the joy of God’s New Creation, as Volf suggests, the 
hope that in the New Creation memory will be redeemed and transformed as 
we have just considered, has the potential to lessen the suffering of painful 
memory now. Caird suggests not only are we to be pitied if our hope in 
Christ is for this life only, as we have already mentioned (1 Corinthians 
15:19) but we are also to be pitied if our hope is only other-worldly^®' .^ It 
needs to address both.
^  Hebblethwaite, 1984: 76f 
^  Moltmann, 1968: 378; 1975: 52 
Moltmann, 1968: 377; 1975: 53 
Moltmann, 1996: 23 
^  Capps, 1995: 70 
^  Caird, 1970: 21
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4.6 New Creation. Continuity and Personal Identity
The resurrected Christ bore -  and bears - the scars of the crucifixion. It has 
been suggested that Christ’s scars could have been removed in the 
resurrection for how small a thing that would have been for the God who 
raised the dead and created ex nihilo, but Christ kept them, “to wear as an 
everlasting trophy of his victory.’’^ ®® There was no cover-up, or pretence that 
the crucifixion had not taken place. The resurrection does not efface or deny 
the crucifixion. The scars remain on Christ’s resurrection body precisely as a 
reminder of his suffering, as symbols of his victory and as identifying marks. 
The risen Jesus showed his scars to his followers and friends as proof of his 
identity^ ®®.
If, as we have suggested, Christ’s resurrection prefigures ours, and he, in his 
resurrected state bears the scars of former wounds, then we too can 
reasonably expect to bear the scars of former wounds in the Resurrection. 
Scars, however, are not wounds. Wounds are raw and painful; scars bear 
witness to past wounds, now healed. Scar tissue is not always entirely free 
of discomfort initiaily. It may itch or feel tight or even, at times, be painful but 
the pain from scar tissue is seldom more than a whisper compared with the 
shouting and screaming pain of the original wound. Furthermore, the 
presence of a disfiguring scar, particularly if it is facially disfiguring, can 
cause deep emotional pain long after the physical wound has healed. Just 
as in his resurrection body, Jesus bore scars where once he had wounds so 
too in our resurrection bodies our emotional and physical wounds will be 
scars, indicating that healing has taken place.
“God’s healing does not eliminate past tragedies; rather the past is outshone 
as the present is transfigured.’’^ ®^ This, I suggest, applies to those whose 
suffering is so all-embracing that the memory of having suffered continues to 
cause intense suffering. The raw, painful wounds will be healed leaving, not 
oblivion but scars; scars which, like the scars of the Risen Jesus, speak of
Bede, cited In www.newadvent.org/summa/405404.htm 
Luke 24:40, John 20:25ff 
Nolan (WWW)
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past suffering, of victory over suffering, and are identifying marks. The past 
tragedies of those for whom Volf expresses concern -  a profound concern 
that evokes his thesis of eschatological forgetting -  will not, I suggest, be 
eliminated but will be transfigured and outshone in this same sense.
“The scar is a body’s permanent memory of its breaching, a mark of violation 
and yet also an endurable mark of transformation...a never-disappearing 
symbol of one’s sacrifice.’’^ ®® Of course, not all suffering is physical. 
Emotional and psychological wounds also leave scars in the one who has 
suffered. Scars of this nature are similarly a permanent reminder of 
breaching and violation and an indelible mark of transformation.
In twenty-first century popular culture, schoolboy Harry Potter is instantly 
recognisable from his lightning-shaped scar, a scar which occasionally 
causes him some discomfort but never reverts to an open wound. Harry’s 
scar both identifies him and speaks of his injury at the hands of, and victory 
over, the evil Voldemort. “It is the essence of who he is ... The scarred face 
of Harry Potter is much, much more than a mere mark on his forehead.’’^ ®® 
So too our scars, whether visible, physical scars or invisible psychological 
scars, reveal more than a mere mark. They speak of past wounds, past 
suffering, even past victories. They identify us. They may even, like Harry 
Potter’s, be the essence of who we are.
The crucifixion scars on the body of the risen Christ show us the importance 
of his temporal life in what he had become. What his temporal life had made 
him was not destroyed or rejected but was an important part of what he now 
was. The implication of this for us is that in the Resurrection we too will be 
what our temporal lives have made us as part of what we will become. 
Moltmann writes,
“(T)he eternal life that comes into being out of transformation 
carries the scars of mortality, because it is this frail, impaired and 
mortal life which is transformed into eternal life. Everything that
Macary (www)
Macary (www)
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has put its mark on this life remains eternally. Otherwise we 
should be unable to recognise ourselves in eternal life.... In the 
end all things will have worked together for good (Romans 8:28), 
even things which have made us inconsolable and which we shall 
never understand. The risen Christ should be recognised by the 
marks of the nails belonging to his death on the cross. And we too 
will still be recognisable from the reconfiguration of our truly lived 
life, a reconfiguration which will be continuous with its present 
configuration. Just as his crucified body was transfigured in the 
glory of God through his resurrection from the dead, so too the 
Gestalt of our truly lived lives will be brought back, transfigured 
and redeemed for God’s kingdom.
Thinking about this question of continuity between our resurrected selves and 
ourselves now, Hick, as we considered briefly in chapter 1, proposes a theory 
of ‘replication’. He states that if a replica has memory and believes her or 
himself to be the same person, and the person’s family and friends believe 
the same thing, then it is the same person^'^^ He goes on to suggest that 
resurrection is, in effect, God replicating us, which means our resurrected self 
is the same person as our present, temporal self. Polkinghorne states that 
the Christian’s hope for resurrection after death is not for a continued post­
mortem existence but for recreation. Recreation is, as the word suggests, a 
creative act. This means that resurrection is not the same as mere 
resuscitation. It is re-creation. God, he says, will remember individuals and 
will recreate them '^^ .^ God remembering and recreating persons is not 
threatening to the continuity of personal identity because, as Moltmann 
notes, in the memory of God nothing is ever lost. Everything is preserved for 
eternity '^*®. As we saw in the chapter on personal identity, “For the earthly 
matter of which mortal’s flesh is created Is never lost to God...it returns in a 
moment of time to that human soul which in the first place made it
^  Moltmann. 1996: 84f (emphasis added) 
Hick, 1979: 279ff 
Polkinghorne, 1994:163 
Moltmann, 1996: 331
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animate.” '^^ '^  God will recreate us in the New Creation. He will not create 
beings that resemble us or are partially us, but beings that are wholly us.
If the resurrected or replicated self were the same person, Hick claims she or 
he would have no doubt about her or his identity and would be able to 
recognise others with confidence. There is an argument that resurrected 
persons cannot remember the past because they are existing in a different 
time-world, therefore life here is not a past event, and so they have no 
memory of it. Hick counters this by suggesting that the ‘replica’ remembers 
dying, therefore it is a past event^ '^ ®. More concrete than Hick’s thesis, which 
seems to be based on conjecture, however, is the evidence from the New 
Testament that the resurrected Christ could remember people and places 
from his temporal life. It might be argued that because Christ’s resurrection 
experience is unique in as much as he, in his resurrection body, returned to 
the same temporal world while we will only experience resurrection in the 
New Creation, that we cannot anticipate remembering simply because he 
remembered. If, however, we believe that we will exist in the New Creation 
and if we believe, as discussed in previous chapters, that both relationship 
and memory are constitutive of personal identity, then we can see that our 
resurrected selves will, of necessity, both be with others and will have 
memory. “It is not possible to imagine a soul preserving 
consciousness...without admitting that it possesses also the faculty of 
remembrance; to deny it this would be to rob it of much of that which makes 
consciousness worth h a v ing .C on s id e r in g  the question of post-mortem 
memory, Graham Scroggie cites New Testament texts which speak of 
accountability and judgement (Matthew 12: 36, Romans 14:12, 2 Corinthians 
5:10) and states, “These, and other passages, plainly imply memory 
developed and quickened into fullest energy...we must conclude that the 
power of clear recollection here implied is a faculty of the departed.
Augustine, cited in Fiddes, 2000: 79f 
Hick. 1979: 285ff
Luckock, cited in Scroggie, undated: 73 
Scroggie, undated: 74
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The belief that we will remember is found in Russell who says that we will 
love all and recognise all, even those we knew only by reputation or not at all. 
“The good shall know the good in heaven as the evil will know the evil in 
hell.” '^^ ® That the disciples recognised Moses and Elijah who they knew only 
by reputation on the Mount of Transfiguration '^^® seems to point to this.
McDannell and Lang suggest that the widespread contemporary belief that, 
in the New Creation, we will be reunited with loved ones is more popular than 
theological®. Yet there is nothing in Scripture to contradict this belief and 
some indication that it may be more theologically based than McDannell and 
Lang indicate. Jesus’ words to the thief on the cross, for example, indicate 
reunion and recognition. “Today you will be with me in paradise." (Luke 
23:43) Likewise his words to the disciples, “I will come back and take you to 
be with me that you also may be where I am.” (John 14:3) God’s promises, 
we are told are, “For you and for your children. ” (Acts 2:39) As we saw in 
chapter 1, in asserting that there will be continuity of identity in the New 
Creation, Paul Fiddes states, “The faithfulness of God is not clear if divine 
promises are to be fulfiiled to a different person from the one to whom they 
were made.” ®^^ Furthermore, hope is not only for self but for all creation. All 
creation includes human beings, both those we know and those we do not. 
Just as we saw in chapter 1, and I alluded to above, that personhood is 
being-in-relation to others, so too the resurrected self is self-in-relation. 
Furthermore, I suggest, because we are what McFadyen calls a 
sedimentation of our significant relations^®  ^we could not be the same person 
in any meaningful sense if these relationships are erased. “But the renewed 
self of God’s promised future involves the personal experience of sociality.” 
says Moltmann^®®. Polkinghorne states if we believe that God will not allow 
anything good to be lost and that interpersonal relationships are good -  albeit
Russell, 1997: 97 
Matthew 17:2
McDannell & Lang, 1988: 309ff 
Fiddes, 2000: 84 
McFadyen, 1990: 40 
Cited in Thiselton, 1996: 130
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in need of redemptive healing -  then we can expect relationships to be 
restored at the eschaton^®" .^
In his discussion of post-mortem reconciliation (considered in chapter 2) 
Volf's starting point is the presupposition that we will Indeed be reunited in 
the New Creation with those we have known in this life^^ .^ Paul Fiddes also 
believes that there will be no loss of identity or of interpersonal relationships 
which, he says will be at a deeper level than we can now know^^®. Our 
resurrected selves, he says, will be, “unforeseeable in its newness of 
relationships and yet faithful to the relationships that have been in the 
past."^ ®^
According to Zizioulas, eternal life means continuing to love and be loved. 
He writes, “Life and love are identified in the person: the person does not die 
only because it is loved and loves; outside the communion of love the person 
loses its uniqueness and becomes a being like other beings, a ‘thing' without 
an absolute ‘identity’ and ‘name’, without a face. Death for a person means 
ceasing to love and to be loved, ceasing to be unique and unrepeatable, 
whereas life for the person means the survival of its hypostasis, which is 
affirmed and maintained by love.”^^ ® We might add that death, using 
Zizioulas’s terminology, means ceasing to remember and to know ourselves 
whereas the survival of our hypostasis means knowledge of self and of what 
has been, and furthermore that fullness of life means remembering well. 
Zizioulas continues, “The significance of the person rests in the fact that he 
represents two things simultaneously which are at first sight in contradiction: 
particularity and communion...for a person cannot be imagined in himself but 
only within his relationships.... The mystery of being a person lies in the fact 
that here otherness and communion are not in contradiction but coincide.” ®^^
Polkinghorne, 1994: 172 
Volf, 2000: 91 ff 
Fiddes, 2000: 88, 98 
Fiddes, 2000: 100 
^  Zizioulas, 1985: 49 
Zizioulas, 1985:105f
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From this we can see that in the New Creation, although we will experience 
radical newness as considered in the previous section, we will at the same 
time be continuous with the selves that we know ourselves to be in this life -  
we will remember people, places and events from this life and, as now, will 
be selves-in-relation. The eschatological forgetting proposed by Volf is more 
suggestive of discontinuity.
4.7 Summary & Conclusion
In this chapter I have considered that our present, while informed by the past, 
is largely determined and shaped by our hopes for the future. Like memory, 
hope is an activity of the imagination. I said that hope Is as essential to 
human existence as water to a fish or electricity to a light bulb. We saw, 
however, that often people’s hopes are anchored to nothing concrete and are 
delusionary. When this is the case hopes are unfulfilled or thwarted, and 
unfulfilled or thwarted hope often results in feelings of hopelessness or 
despair. Despair, we saw, is a major threat to hope and is even described by 
Moltmann as sin against hope.
We saw that Christian eschatological hope is separated from our everyday 
hope by assurance. This is because, unlike so much other hope, 
eschatological hope is not speculative. It is rooted in the cross and 
resurrection of Christ and in the faithfulness of God. The central focus of 
Christian hope is the Parousia. It is this that gives concreteness to our 
hopes. The possession of eschatological hope, I said, has the power to 
transform present suffering. Hope is born of suffering but also draws 
attention to the suffering of the present. Hope for the future motivates action 
in the present. This is true of both eschatological hope and everyday hope.
The New Creation, I said, is both discontinuous and continuous with the 
present creation. Just as Christ in his resurrection body bore the scars of his 
crucifixion, so we in our resurrection bodies which, as part of the New 
Creation that will have elements of continuity and discontinuity, will be both 
continuous and discontinuous with out earthly bodies, will have physical and
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emotional scars which will bear witness to past suffering and will identify us. 
Volf, in suggesting that painful memories will be erased at the eschaton, 
classifies memory as discontinuous. 1 suggest, because it is so essential to 
our sense of identity, that memory in the New Creation will be continuous 
with memory in life now. There is also an element of discontinuity however -  
the pain and suffering caused by certain memories.
Scripture tells us that God will “do a new thing”. He will recreate, not destroy 
and replace his present creation. Heaven, we saw, is not only a future state 
but is God’s dimension of present reality.
In looking at the New Creation I extrapolated from our experience of life now 
and from what we read in Christian Scripture images which help us piece 
together an image of what we can reasonably expect in the New Creation. 
Biblical language, for reasons already discussed, does not give us a 
complete picture of the New Creation but it gives us a starting point. Dealing 
with concepts far beyond our comprehension and imagination, biblical 
language is heavy with imagery that give us a picture of great opulence and 
splendour. A land flowing with milk and honey, streets paved with gold, 
gates made from single pearls, walls of jasper with foundations of many 
varieties of precious stones, white robes and crowns, and the marriage 
supper all speak of plenty, of extravagance, of beauty. If we revisit the 
Prodigal Son with whom we spent some time in a previous chapter, do we 
not have a glimpse of that same extravagance and beauty in the father’s 
forgiveness of his son? He lavished his son with the very best he had -  not 
just a robe but the best robe, not just a ring, but doubtless one made of the 
finest gold, and no simple fare but a banquet. A plain, rough robe and a 
mess of potage would have been extravagant for even that was more than 
the son deserved. Such then, are the treasures of the inheritance ‘kept in 
heaven for you’ to which Peter refers and for which the believer can hope.
At the heart of the Christian gospel is a message of hope; hope of a future 
without suffering. We considered that the Apostle Paul says that, “Our 
present sufferings are not worth comparing with the glory that will be
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revealed in us." (Romans 8:18) This is a far cry from Volfs concern that the 
painful memory of having suffered will mar the joy of the New Creation. Just 
as water dripped on the hotplate of an iron or hob evaporates completely and 
instantly without lessening the intensity of the heat of the hotplate, so all 
earthly suffering will evaporate completely and instantly without lessening the 
intensity of the beauty and perfection of the New Creation.
To say that the joy and the splendour of the New Creation could be marred 
by the memory of suffering, as Volf suggests, is to say that the joy of the 
resurrection is marred if we remember the crucifixion. It is like saying that a 
four year old’s joy and excitement when surrounded by gifts on Christmas 
morning with his favourite food coming later in the day is marred by the 
memory of the sorrow he felt when his grandmother died six months earlier. 
It is like saying that the goodness of God could be lessened or sullied by 
taking on the sin of the world. Nothing can mar the greatness of the New 
Creation for which we wait in hope; the New Creation God has promised. 
The risen Christ, we are told, is the yes’ and ‘amen’ of God’s promises, 
assuring us that the promises of the New Creation are ours if we claim them. 
“For no matter how many promises God has made, they are "Yes" in Christ. 
And so through him the "Amen" is spoken by us to the glory of God.’’^ ®°
2 Corinthians 1:20
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CONCLUSION
In the foregoing thesis I have considered Volf's concern that some people’s 
suffering in this life is so enormous that left as it is it would continue to cause 
suffering and mar the joy of the New Creation. I suggested that Volfs 
proposed remedy -  eschatological forgetting -  is problematic chiefly because 
of the importance of memory in our sense of who we are as distinct persons. 
In addressing that first stage of my argument I looked in some depth at 
notions of personal identity and at the centrality of memory to our ways of 
making sense of self. The next stage of my argument says that not only is 
Volfs proposal problematic, it is also unnecessary because, through 
forgiveness it is possible to learn to remember well.
The first chapter considered what personal identity is and how it is 
constituted, looking in particular at relationality and temporality. The 
following chapter, in considering various aspects of memory saw how 
memory of what has been enables us to make sense of what is and indeed 
what is to come; to make sense of what we have been, what we are and 
what we may yet become. It also claimed that where the memory is lost 
through illness or injury, personal identity is not lost for it may be preserved 
through the memory of others and of God even although the person’s sense 
of identity may be lost.
In chapter 3 I looked at both the experience of being forgiven and that of 
forgiving others. I considered how forgiving others and being forgiven by 
others can transform our memory and our perception of ourselves. We do 
not forget that which has been forgiven but come to see it through the lens of 
and in the light of forgiveness. I used the example of the apostle Peter. 
Peter’s experience of being forgiven did not cause him to forget his denial but 
it enabled him to view his denial through the lens of forgiveness. It enabled 
him to see himself as strong and having potential, rather than a weak 
character and an utter failure. Thus he was set free from the potential 
bondage of this event in his past and enabled to grow and to become a 
strong leader in the early church.
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The chapter on the New Creation (chapter 4) was a chapter of contrasts; 
contrasting non-hope with hope, day-to-day hope with Christian 
eschatological hope, new with old, discontinuity with continuity. Its purpose 
was to show that the radical newness of the New Creation transforms and 
redeems the old. I suggested that Christians have reason to suppose that 
new and old, things discontinuous and things continuous with this world will 
co-exist in the New Creation. As we are healed and renewed so our pasts 
are redeemed. The New, of course, does not undo the past but it does undo 
the chains binding us to the past. It does not change the past but it changes 
the meaning of the past. Our memory of what is past is not erased by the 
coming of the New but is healed and redeemed. In the New we will not 
forget the old but will remember it well.
When something is non-remembered, we said, it is not forgotten but is not 
called to mind because it has no need to be. It is non-remembered. 
Something that is remembered well, on the other hand can be recalled 
without any threat to the well-being of the one who remembers because it 
has been dealt with. We can only ‘remember well' when we are willing to 
forget.
In the introduction I posed the following question. Is the discontinuity 
indicated by the Christian claim that human suffering, loss and transience will 
be redeemed in God’s New Creation compatible with the equally strong claim 
that human beings will be recognisable to themselves, to others and to God 
in the New Creation because in some meaningful sense they will indeed be 
‘the same person’? I have, I believe, shown that the two claims are entirely 
compatible. I would suggest, in fact, that it is precisely because of the 
transformation and redemption that take place that the integrity of personal 
identity is protected and preserved and we are able to know ourselves and 
one another in the New Creation.
My starting place was Volf’s contentious thesis that unless the most 
horrendous of memories are forgotten in the New Creation they will mar the 
perfection and newness of the New Creation by continuing to cause
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suffering, it is my belief, however, that such erasure of formative memories 
poses a threat to the integrity of personal identity. If, as I have argued, we 
will be fully ourselves in the New Creation, that has to be ourselves complete 
with our memories; memories which, as we have said will be healed and 
redeemed.
That anything could mar the perfection of the New Creation, as Volf 
suggests, I also indicated is open to question. I have suggested that far from 
sin and suffering marring the perfection of the New Creation, the white-hot 
perfection of the New Creation will transform the ugliness and imperfection of 
the old to beauty and perfection.
If, as indicated in chapter 4, heaven is not a future state but is God’s 
dimension of present reality then I would suggest that the person whose life 
is lived in cooperation with God need not wait for the New Creation in order 
to experience the healing and transformation of painful memories. They can 
begin now to learn to remember well. As Haymes states, “To live in God’s 
salvation is not for the future but is a present gift and calling.’’  ^ Such healing 
and transformation are more likely to be a process like sanctification than 
instantaneous. As with forgiveness, however, it is costly -  too costly for 
some -  for it involves honestly facing the memory in all its horror and then 
having the courage to let it go and move on.
I stated at the beginning that Volf's thesis of eschatological forgetting is 
attractive but, I believe, flawed. Attractive as it is, however, the message that 
formative memories will be erased is not a message of hope for those who 
suffer for it presents a threat to the integrity of the self. How much more 
hopeful is the promise that they can be complete and whole persons with 
transformed, healed and redeemed memories. God will transform our 
memories, restoring those that have been lost and healing and redeeming 
those that cause suffering. He will give us, “A crown of beauty instead of
Haymes, 2000: 37
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ashes, the oil of gladness instead of mourning and a garment of praise 
instead of a spirit of despair." (Isaiah 61:3)
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Appendix 1. William Uttermohlen*s Photograph and Self Portraits
1. William Uttermohlen 
(source unknown)
a. Self-portrait, age 60
b. Self-portrait, age 62
c. Self-portrait, age 63
d. Self-portrait, age 64
e. Self-portrait, age 66
f. Self-portrait, age 65 
(The Lancet. Vol. 357, June 30, 
2001, p.2131)
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Appendix 2. Letter from Miroslav Volf
I DMO
Y A L E  U N I V E R S I T Y  D I V I N I T Y  S C H O O L
Miroslav Volf
H en ry  B. W right Professor o f Systematic Theology
409 Prospect Street 
N ew  Haven, Connecticut 06511-2167 
203 432-5332 MX 203 432-5356 
E-MAIL miroslav. volf@yale.edu
February 11,2000
Jane McAitliur 
748 Mosspark Drive 
Cardonald 
Glasgow 052 3AX 
Scotland
Dear Jane,
My apologies for not responding to your letter sooner, especially sirrce you took trouble and w ote so well 
in Croatian—at least part of the letter. I’d love to discuss with you the issues you raise. I am engaged vitli 
tlieni now since I am working (slowly) on a manuscript on memory and conflict. Here just a few sketches 
of a response.
Let me state from tire outset that I think tliat my use of the “forgetting’ was rmfortunate. The best term for 
what I am after seems to me now to be “not coming to mind” (also a biblical term, describing 
eschatological fulfillment). Put differently, if you wanted to remember past suffering—past suffering, that 
is, of tlie kind tliat carmot be integrated in the vision of a good life—you could do so. But the crucial 
question why would you want to remember (I am talking, of course, about horrendous events that caused 
and continue to cause great pain, not everything tliat happened to us; for memory in general, which consists 
of a differentiated process of remembermg and non-remernbering, is ftmdarnental).
1. I don’t tliink past pain is a precondition of enjoyment. For instance, I enjoy looking at a beauty of a 
paintmg even tliough prior to the event I liave not been immersed m ugliness. We appreciate goodness, 
beauty, and trutli for tlieir own sakes, and not simply as resolution to prior evil, ugliness, and 
deception.
2. Some of the most formative experiences in terms of om identity take place in our cliildhood. Many of 
tliem we don’t remember. Nonetlieless, that does not subvert our identity but in fact constitutes it. It is 
helpful to distinguish between different senses of identity when one ad&esses tliis question. In one 
sense we are tlie same person all tlirougliout our hves and in anotlier sense we are a radically different 
person.
3. What would it mean to say that the (event tliat caused) suffering will be transformed? I don’t know 
how to transform it witliout distorting it, wliich would be a forgettmg of sorts. The alternatives are to 
say of a horrendous event (such as Auschwitz) (1) “Oli, it was not bad after all (when you look at it 
from a distance)” or (2) “It served some good and is justifiable in terms of tliat good” or (3) to affirai 
etemaUity of tragetfy and therefore to deny heaven as heaven.
4. Clirist’s suffering is in many ways a special case and it would take a long time to respond to your last 
question. I don’t believe in the eternal wound in he heart of God caused by the cross, partly because 
that would take tragedy again into the midst of heaven. But that would take a long time to explicate 
and defend.
Let me also add that many theologians in tlie tradition had no problem witli the idea of forgetting in 
association wiüi forgiving wrong endured or committed (e.g. Gregory of Nyssa). The same is true of some 
significant philosophers (e.g. Nietzsche, Kierkegaard). I’d be very much interested in your escliatological 
reflections as your work progresses. Keep in touch (miroslav.volf@vale.eduL
Adi tlie best,
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